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Abstract
This thesis attempts to study the relationship between the Vietnamese 
communists and China between January 1956 and Summer 1962. It is the first 
book-length study of Sino-Vietnamese relations during those years. Its 
principle contribution will be to reconstruct the events as they unfolded 
in IndoChina and to provide a glimpse of the patterns of decision-making 
on the communist side of the Vietnam War. Every effort is made to keep in 
perspective the constant interaction of domestic politics, the role of 
individual leaders and political factions in both Hanoi and Beijing, and 
the changing international conditions which impinged on both countries.
1956 was the beginning of a new stage of the Vietnamese struggle for 
the unification of the country. The years from 1956 to 1962 saw the 
progression of the Vietnamese communists' struggle from one which was 
essentially political in nature to one which incorporated armed struggle, 
and finally in 1959 when armed struggle began to take on a more predominant 
role. By the summer of 1962, the Chinese were committed to assisting the 
Vietnamese communists' struggle in the South.
This study makes use of Vietnamese, Chinese, British and American 
sources, many of which were then either not available or have not yet been 
fully exploited by the earlier scholars. These comprise new Vietnamese 
source materials and in particular, the second volume of the Lich Su Quan 
Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam ([Official] History of the Vietnamese People's Army 
(VPA)); newly available Chinese source materials; first-person accounts and 
memoirs of those who in one way or another had been involved in the 
diplomacy of the 50s and 60s; communist sources monitored and translated 
by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) known as the Summary of World 
Broadcasts (SMB); the British Foreign Office General Political 
Correspondence (F0 371); the Confidential United States State Department 
Central Files; the United States State Department's Foreign Relations of 
the United States (FRUS) series; and United States intelligence reports and 
captured communist documents.
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Introduction
I
My thesis is an attempt to study the relationship between the 
Vietnamese communists and China between January 1956 and Summer 1962, The 
choice of 1956 as the starting point of this thesis is not without 
justification. By 1956, it was certain that North and South Vietnam would 
not be reunified in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Agreements. If 1954 
marked the end of one phase of the Vietnamese struggle for independence, 
1956 was the beginning of a new stage of the Vietnamese struggle for the 
unification of the country. The years from 1956 to 1962 saw the progression 
of the Vietnamese communists' struggle from one which was essentially 
political in nature to one which incorporated armed struggle, and finally 
in 1959 when armed struggle began to take on a more predominant role. This 
period is therefore significant for it marked the origin and the gradual 
escalation of the Second IndoChina War. Those years also saw the gradual 
change of the Chinese communists' attitude towards the intensification of 
the Vietnamese communists' struggle for the reunification of their country. 
We now know that by the summer of 1962, the Chinese were committed to 
assisting the Vietnamese communists' struggle in the South. It was 
therefore in those years, to borrow David Marr's words, that "key attitudes 
were formed and vital commitments made prior to the first American combat 
unit touching Vietnamese soil".1
The relationship between the Vietnamese communists and China was a 
very important one on the communist side of the IndoChina War. In his 
memoirs, Khrushchev recounted an incident during the concluding stages of 
the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1960 when the Chinese 
refused to sign the statement because they objected to one point in the 
document. Ho Chi Minh appealed to Khrushchev to accede to the Chinese 
because, according to Ho, China was a big country with a big party and they 
could not allow a schism in the communist movement. Khrushchev retorted 
that the Soviet Union was by no means a small country with a small party,
David G. Marr, Vietnam, (World Bibliographical Series, Volume 
147), (Oxford: Clio Press, 1992), p.127.
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to which Ho Chi Minh replied, "For us it is doubly difficult. Don't forget, 
China is our neighbour."2 Indeed, when one considers the geographical 
proximity of the two countries, the importance of that relationship becomes 
even more understandable. During the war, China was not only an important 
rear base for the Vietnamese communists, but the most logical and efficient 
route for vital Soviet aid to reach Vietnam had to pass through Chinese 
territory too.
However, anyone studying the literature of the Second IndoChina War 
in an endeavour to understand the decision-making process behind the war, 
will feel a sense of incompleteness because although there is an abundance 
of material, historians have concentrated on the American or the non­
communist side. We know very much less about the communist side of the 
war.3
There are possibly two main reasons why this is so. One is the 
general perception, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, that the Vietnam 
War was only part of a wider communist campaign to dominate the so-called 
Free World, and that the Lao Dong Party was but a satellite or political 
instrument of either the Soviet Union or China, or both. As a consequence, 
the possibility that the Vietnamese communists could have an independent 
identity of their own was disregarded, overlooked, or not taken 
sufficiently seriously. The second is the relative difficulty of access to 
the archives of the communist governments/ This has, to an extent, led
Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, (London: Andre Deutsch, 
1971), pp.444-5.
There are relatively fewer American scholars who have contributed 
to our understanding of the communist side of the IndoChina War. 
The more notable ones are: Douglas Pike, Eugene K. Lawson, 
Gabriel Kolko, Jon M. Van Dyke, William J, Duiker, W.R. Smyser, 
and Wi11iam S . Turley.
According to China-scholars, Michael H. Hunt and Odd Arne Westad, 
the relationships between China and the Soviet Union, Vietnam and 
North Korea "are still consigned to historical limbo" (by the 
Chinese authorities), regardless whether the relations were good 
or bad. See Michael H. Hunt and Odd Arne Westad, "The Chinese 
Communist Party and International Affairs: A Field Report on New 
Historical Sources and Old Research Problems" in China Quarterly, 
June 1990, Number 122, pp.269.
Chinese scholar Huang Zheng observed that in recent years not 
much attention has been given to historical research on Sino- 
Vietnam relations in China, See Huang Zheng, Zhongyue Guanxi Shi 
Yanjiu Ji Gao, (Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1992), p.315. This is
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historians to focus more on the non-communists, particularly the American 
side of the war, where official documents and material are more readily 
obtainable.
Given what we know today of Sino-Vietnamese relations, particularly 
from the revelations in the wake of the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), we now 
realise that Hanoi was far from being a satellite of Communist China, and 
the assumption that the communist side of the Vietnam War was a monolithic 
entity is not only simplistic, but untrue as well. As for the problems of 
the unavailability of adequate documentation, and the authenticity of such 
documents (when made available), they will remain an enduring difficulty,5 
The controversy surrounding the authenticity of a Russian translation of 
a report of a purported Lao Dong Party Politburo meeting of 15 September 
1972 discovered by the Australian academic, Stephen Morris, in Moscow's 
Centre of Contemporary Archives in 1993 is one such example.6 Even given 
the passage of time, it is unlikely that we will ever be able to gain
true also on the Vietnamese side.
See David Shambaugh, "A Bibliographical Essay on New Sources for 
the Study of China's Foreign Relations and National Security" in 
Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (ed.), Chinese Foreign 
Policy: Theory and Practice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); 
Michel Oksenberg, "Politic Takes Command: An Essay on the Study 
of Post-1949 China" in Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank 
(ed.), Cambridge History of China, Volume XIV (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989); Michael H. Hunt and Odd Arne 
Westad, "The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs: 
A Field Report on New Historical Sources and Old Research 
Problems" in China Quarterly, Number 122, June 1990; Odd Arne 
Westad, "Materials on CCP History in Russian Archives" in CCP 
Research Newsletter, Numbers 10 and 11, Spring-Fal 1 1992; James 
G. Hershberg, "Soviet Archives: The Opening Door" and Steven M. 
Goldstein and He Di, "New Chinese Sources on the History of the 
Cold War" in Cold Mar International History Project Bulletin, 
Issue 1, Spring 1992; Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, 
Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship On the Cold War Period: Two 
Reports (Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson 
International Centre for Scholars, Working Paper Number 7, 
September 1993); Vang Baoyun, "Presentation concise des resultats 
de la recherche sur le Laos en Chine" in Peninsule 26 (nouvelle 
serie), 1993.
Nayan Chanda, "Research and Destroy: Origins of Vietnam War POW 
document remain obscure" in Aar Eastern Economic Review, 6 May 
1993, pp.20-21; Mark Kramer, "Archival Research in Moscow: 
Progress and Pitfalls" in Cold War International History Project 
Bulletin, Issue 3, Fall 1993, pp. 1, 18-39.
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access to the complete archives of the ex-communist governments, not to say 
the still communist ones. However, this problem should not be allowed to 
discourage the historian, whose duty it must be to try to achieve, as far 
as possible, a more balanced perspective of one of the longest, bitterest 
and most complex wars of the 20th century.
The concentration of research on the American side of the war also 
meant that there is an abundance of theses, articles and books on the years 
from 1964 when American forces were directly involved in the fighting. This 
is clearly illustrated by a survey of the papers presented at the first 
conference of scholars from Vietnam and the United States held in Hanoi 
from 25-27 November 1988 and the second conference held at Columbia 
University in the Fall of 1990.7 As David Marr noted, the period from 
after the Geneva Conference till the early 60s was a sadly neglected period 
in recent Vietnamese history.8
II
To my knowledge, there is no published work, either in Vietnamese 
or in Chinese, which deals with Sino-Vietnamese relations between 1956- 
1962. There are only two books in English which deal with communist 
decision making in this period, of which Sino-Vietnamese relations form 
only a part of their broader account.
The first book is Carlyle A. Thayer's War by Other Means; National 
Liberation and Revolution in Vietnam 1956-1960 which was published in 
1989.9 Although published in 1989, the book is in fact the product of 
Thayer's two volume Political Science doctoral thesis, "The Origins of the
For the papers presented at the first conference, see Jayne 
Werner and David Hunt (ed.), The American War in Vietnam, 
(Southeast Asia Program)(New York: Cornell University, 1993); For 
the papers presented at the second conference, see Jayne S. 
Werner and Luu Doan Huynh (ed.), The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and 
American Perspectives, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993).
David G. Marr, op.cit., p.102.
Carlyle A. Thayer, War by Other Means: National Liberation and 
Revolution in Vietnam, 1954-1960, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 
1989).
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National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam" which he completed in 
September 1977. The published version, almost a decade later, contained 
some additional North Vietnamese documentation which had since become 
available. But there is no substantial difference between the thesis and 
the book.
Thayer rightly argued that the creation of the National Liberation 
Front was the outcome of a complex interplay of four factors, the 
international environment, domestic developments in the North, the state 
of the Party organisation in the South, and the policies of both the Diem 
regime and the Americans. He was particularly successful in describing the 
last three factors. Scholars certainly owe a debt to Thayer for his 
thorough documentation of the thirteen Plenary sessions of the Lao Dong 
Party Central Committee, the three Politburo meetings, the 7th and 8th 
sessions of the National Assembly and the three conferences of the Nam Bo 
Regional Committee, all of which took place between 1954 and 1959. However, 
in my view, the weakest link in his complex interaction model is the North 
Vietnam-China-Soviet Union factor to which Thayer did not give sufficient 
emphasis. Thayer also stopped short at the 15th Plenary session in January 
1959. The National Liberation Front was only formed on 20 December 1960, 
almost two years later. The 15th Plenary session can account for the 
decision to revive the struggle in the South but the subsequent two years 
before the establishment of the National Liberation Front were not 
inconsequential years.
It is not the purpose of my study to go over the same ground that 
Thayer has so admirably covered. It is also not the primary object of my 
thesis to rewrite the history of the formation of the National Liberation 
Front. However, in describing Sino-Vietnamese relations during this period, 
it is impossible to avoid recounting the events leading to its formation. 
In this aspect, my research - based on documentation made available since 
the publication of Thayer's book - should further substantiate and sharpen 
his thesis, as well as fill in the two-year gap in Thayer's work.
The other book is R.B. Smith's An International History of the 
Vietnam War of which Volume 1 and part of Volume 2 are relevant to my own 
study.10 Although Volume 1 was published in 1983, it is actually a much
Ralph B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, 
Volume 1: Revolution versus Containment, 1955-61, (London:
Macmillan Press, 1983); Volume 2: The Struggle for South East
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later work than Thayer's. As Smith himself acknowledged, his study relied 
to an extent on Thayer's then unpublished research on the origins of the 
National Liberation Front. However, An International History of the Vietnam 
War is very different from Thayer's book. Smith set out to identify the 
point at which and the reasons why the Vietnamese communists decided to 
return to armed struggle in South Vietnam by examining simultaneously the 
decision making of both the communist and non-communist sides and to relate 
the events in Vietnam to the regional and global developments at every 
stage of the conflict. In the process, Smith was able to correct the 
imbalance of Thayer's complex four-factor interaction model. An 
International History of the Vietnam War is a seminal work. Smith was one 
of the first historians to examine in some detail communist decision-making 
during the Vietnam War and to give the communist side of the war the equal 
weight it deserves. As he put it, no one would write the history of a game 
of chess, move by move, by recording only the moves of the black player.
Again, it is not the principal object of my thesis to cover the same 
ground as Smith's extensive study. Mine is a much more indepth study of a 
special relationship on the communist side of the war. However, in 
describing Sino-Vietnamese relations, it is inevitable that I address some 
of the same questions that Smith has asked. My own research, ten years 
later, using English, American, Chinese and Vietnamese sources not then 
available, will further substantiate and sometimes correct some of Smith's 
conclusions, sharpen others, answer some of the questions he raised, and 
highlight some of the still contentious points in his book.
Smith is probably the first to correctly identify the importance of 
developments in Cambodia and Laos during this period. There is no question 
that Cambodia and Laos were integral to Hanoi's strategy for the 
reunification of Vietnam. In fact, the Vietnam War should be correctly 
called the IndoChina War. Of the two countries, Laos was particularly 
important in the late 50s and early 60s. Unfortunately, scholars of the War 
have not given sufficient attention to the developments in Laos and 
Cambodia. This is an area which I shall explore in greater detail in my 
thes is.
Two other books need to be mentioned: The first is W.R. Smyser's 1 he 
Independent Vietnamese: Vietnamese Communism between Russia and China 1956-
Asia, 1961-65, (London: Macmillan Press, 1985).
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1969 published in 1980, in the wake of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War.11 By 
first highlighting certain major episodes within each year from 1956 till 
the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1969 and then applying the method of content 
analysis to the communist communications between Hanoi, Beijing and Moscow 
published in English, Smyser was one of the first to demonstrate that 
contrary to the conventional view, North Vietnam was not a puppet of China 
and the Soviet Union, hence the title "the independent Vietnamese". While 
no one would now dispute his conclusion, Smysers's methodology, useful at 
the time when there was a dearth of information regarding communist 
affairs, is no longer adequate today.
The second book is William J. Duiker's The Communist Road to Power 
in Vietnam, a pioneering study on the communist rise to power in Vietnam, 
from its origins in the colonial period till the end of the Vietnam War in 
1975.12 The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam has slightly more than one 
chapter which covers the period of this dissertation. In the book which was 
published in 1981, Duiker expressed regret that he was unable to make use 
of two important histories published in Hanoi, one on the Party and the 
other on the VPA up till 1954. As he stated, the new histories would 
presumably require revision of some of the facts and conclusions in his 
study. Since 1983, Hanoi has published more than just two official 
histories mentioned by Duiker.
In the last couple of years, there have been several new studies 
published in English specifically on the subject of Sino-Vietnamese 
relations during the Vietnam War, mainly in the form of articles based on 
newly-published Chinese sources: Leading the field is Chen Jian who has 
written two articles, "China and the First IndoChina War, 1950-54" which 
has since been published in The China Quarterly (Number 132, December 1992) 
and "China's Involvement with the Vietnam War, 1964-1969" {The China 
Quarter!y, forthcoming)13 There is also an article entitled "China and the 
Geneva Conference of 1954" by Zhai Qiang, published in The China Quarterly
W.R. Smyser, The Independent Vietnamese: Vietnamese Communism 
Between Russia and China 1956-1969, (Ohio: Ohio University Centre 
for International Studies, 1980).
William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1981).
I am extremely grateful to Professor Chen Jian for sending me a 
copy of this article before publication.
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(Number 129, March 1992). Although Sino-Vietnamese relations are not the 
main subject of Zhang Shu Guang's Deterrence and Strategic Culture: 
Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1959, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1992), Zhang provided a brief but succinct account of Beijing's 
policy objectives towards IndoChina during the First IndoChina War, 1950- 
1954 (Chapter 6, specifically pages 170-186). It is notable that these 
recent works do not focus on the period between 1956 and 1963.
Ill
This thesis is therefore the first book-length study of Sino- 
Vietnamese relations between 1956 and 1962. My princi pbk contribution wi11 
be to reconstruct the events as they unfolded in IndoChina and in the 
process shed some light on the complex relationship between the Vietnamese 
and Chinese communists between 1956 and 1962, and to provide a glimpse of 
the patterns of decision-making on the communist side of the Vietnam 
War,
No foreign policy of any country is completely independent of its 
domestic politics. It is also a fact that no country devises a separate 
foreign policy towards another with only bilateral considerations in mind. 
Therefore, in this study, every effort is made to keep in perspective the 
constant interaction of domestic politics, the role of individual leaders 
and political factions in both Hanoi and Beijing, and the changing 
international conditions which impinged on both countries.
For this thesis, I have made use of Vietnamese, Chinese, British and 
American sources, many of which were then not available or have not yet 
been fully exploited by the earlier scholars.
There have been a few well-known Vietnamese primary source materials 
published in the late 70s and early 80s which have been referred to by 
other scholars in the past, such as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
Foreign Ministry White Book on Relations with China and Vietnam published 
in the wake of the Sino-Vietnamese War in 19791'1; and The Anti-US
According to Han Suyin, in 1987 when she was in Vietnam, she was 
told that Hanoi was revising its 1979 White Paper on Sino- 
Vietnamese relations. Till today, the new version is not
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Resistance Mar for National Salvation 1954-1975: Military Events published 
in 1980. There are also the memoirs of Hoang Van Hoan, Vo Bam, Truong Nhu 
Tang and the letters of Le Duan to the southern comrades. To these, I have 
added more recent ones. Most notable are the memoirs of Tran Van Tra and 
Bui Tin, both high-level North Vietnamese officers; the Lich Su Quan Doi 
Nhan Dan (Tap II) {[Official] History of the Vietnamese People's Army 
(VPA)) published by Hanoi in 1988; and Lich Su Cach Mang Vietnam: Giai Doan 
1954-1960 by Cao Van Luong who is also the editor of Nghien Cuu Lich S u . 
Most of these Vietnamese sources shed new light on the situation in North 
Vietnam but do not deal directly with Sino-Vietnamese relations. In fact, 
other than the polemical White Book which has to be read with 
circumspection, the Vietnamese have not made any more revelations on the 
subject.
There are comparatively more Chinese source materials on Sino- 
Vietnamese relations. Apart from the Chinese replies to Hanoi's White Book 
in the late-70s, the most useful ones include Huang Zheng's Ho Zhiming Yu 
Zhongguo published in 1987.15 A Vietnamese edition of this book was 
published in 1990. There are also Xiandai Zhongyue Guanxi Ziliao Xuanbian 
(1986) which is a three-volume compilation of all the major speeches, 
editorials and press reports pertaining to Sino-Vietnamese relations from 
both North Vietnamese and Chinese newspapers from 1949-October 1978; and 
Zhongyue Guanxi Yanbian Sishinian (1992). The last two works are 
categorised as "neibu faxing" or "internally distributed works".16 In 
recent years, a number of official histories of China since 1949 have been 
produced such as the speeches and letters of Mao Zedong which were not 
included in the official five-volume Selected Works of Mao Zedong published 
by the Beijing Foreign Languages Press; the diplomatic activities of Zhou 
Enlai; and the histories of the Chinese army, air force and navy. I have
available. (Author's correspondence with Han Suyin, 22 May 1994).
In writing this book, Huang had the support of the International 
Liaison Committee of the Party Central Committee and the 
Political Affairs and Liaison Department of the PLA. The book is 
published by the PLA Publishing House.
For a discussion of neibu sources, see Flemming Christiansen, 
"The Neibu Bibliography: A Review Article" and Liu Changyun, "A 
Preliminary Analysis of the Characteristics of Neibu Materials in 
the Social Sciences" in CCP Research Newsletter, Number 4 (Fall- 
Winter 1989-90), pp.13-23.
Introduction 14
also made use of two well-known sets of documents: Kung-tso Tung hsun 
("Bulletin of Activities" of the PLA) and Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui (Long 
Live Mao Zedong's Thoughts). These materials have not been previously 
tapped by scholars working on Sino-Vietnamese relations.
I have also referred to many first-person accounts and memoirs of 
those who in one way or another had been involved in the diplomacy of the 
50s and 60s. Memoirs or recollections on the Chinese side include those by 
Peng Dehuai, Nie Rongzhen, Chen Geng (one of the Chinese military advisers 
to North Vietnam); Chinese Foreign Ministry officials including Liu Xiao 
(China's ambassador to the Soviet Union in the 50s), Wu Xiuquan (a senior 
official in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Wang Bingnan (China's 
representative to the Sino-US ambassadorial talks); personalities closely 
associated with Mao Zedong including Li Yinqiao (commander of Mao Zedong's 
bodyguard from 1947-1962), Shi Zhe (Mao Zedong's translator) and Dr. Li 
Zhisui (Mao's personal physician, 1954-1976).
I have also consulted the memoirs of many other leading personalities 
in the communist camp, namely, Khrushchev, Andrei Gromyko, Fedor Burlatsky 
(Khrushchev's adviser), Aleksandr Kaznacheev (Soviet ambassador to Burma 
in the 50s), Mieczyslaw Maneli (member of the Polish delegation to the 
International Commission for Supervision and Control for Vietnam), Veljko 
Micunovic (Yugoslavia's ambassador to the Soviet Union in the 50s), Janos 
Radvanyi (a Hungarian diplomat who was Director of the Asia and African 
Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 50s), Marek 
Thee (member of the Polish delegation to the International Commission for 
Supervision and Control for Laos), Enver Hoxha (Secretary-General, Albanian 
Communist Party), Jan Sejna (Chief of Staff of the Czech Army and Assistant 
Secretary of the top-secret Czech Defence Council) and Oleg Penkovsky.
On the Cambodian side, there is Sihanouk's account as well as the 
Black Paper: Facts and Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation 
of Vietnam against Kampuchea published by the Khmer Rouge government in 
September 1978. On the non-communist Laotian side, I have consulted the 
accounts by Sisouk Na Champassak (a leading Laotian politician in the 50s) 
and Prince Mangkra Souvannaphouma (son of Souvanna Phouma); also, Arthur 
Lall (head of the Indian delegation to the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos) 
and Sirin Phathanothai. (For details, see bibliography).
This study also makes the most thorough use of the Summary of World 
Broadcasts for this period. The Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) which
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contains press translations and monitored radio broadcasts from the 
communist countries on a daily basis is published by the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The greatest value of the SMB to the 
historian is its detailed record of public events and developments which 
is unsurpassed by any other form of documentation. It therefore enables the 
historian to reconstruct events in a chosen period as they unfolded with 
the degree of detail otherwise not possible. The original objective of the 
SMB is to provide the British government with information which it could 
use to formulate its foreign policies. As such there is a tendency for the 
reports selected for translation and release to be biased towards foreign 
policy. Generally domestic issues are translated only if they are thought 
to have value for foreign policy consideration. Also, it must be remembered 
that the SMB only provides authorised information which may be difficult 
to obtain outside the closed communist countries but are nevertheless 
public knowledge within those countries.
I have also made full use of the British Foreign Office Political 
Correspondence (FO 371). To my knowledge, this is the first time that the 
official British sources for this period are used for the study of Sino- 
Vietnamese relations and the communist side of the Vietnam War between the 
years 1956-1962.
A diplomat stationed in a foreign country is often described as the
Si r'
"eyes and ears" of his government. In the words of teaad Humphrey Trevelyan, 
"apart from negotiating, the ambassador's basic task is to report on the 
political, economic and social conditions in the country in which he is 
living, on the policy of its government and on his conversations with 
political leaders, officials and anyone else who has illuminated the local 
scene for him."17 During the period under study, the British government 
had embassies in the Soviet Union, China, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; 
and a consulate-office in North Vietnam. The British Foreign Office General 
Correspondence (FO 371) contains situational reports from the "men on-the- 
spot" which were sent to the Foreign Office on a regular and ad hoc basis. 
Apart from many special reports, there are routine weekly round-ups of 
events (for Laos), fortnightly summaries (for China), monthly reports (for 
Vietnam) and annual summaries (for all the countries). There are also the 
weekly reports from Geneva during the duration of the 1961-2 Geneva
Humphrey Trevelyan, Diplomatic Channels, (London; Macmillan, 
1973), p.85.
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Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question. The quality of the 
reportage inevitably depended on the calibre of the diplomatic staff, 
particularly the ambassador or in the case of North Vietnam, the consul- 
general and in China, the Charge d'Affaires. The reader will find from this 
thesis that the British Foreign Office General Correspondence is indeed a 
very rich source of information. Until such time when the historian can get 
access into the archives of the communist countries, the FO 371 series is 
definitely invaluable for the study of this period.
I have also consulted the Confidential United States State Department 
Central Files which have been declassified for the years 1956-1962. The 
Confidential United States Department Central Files (CUSSDCF) for this 
period are not as informative as the British Foreign Office General 
Correspondence for the same period. Perhaps it is a reflection of the level 
interests of the United States in IndoChina during this period. But as the 
United States became more deeply involved in South Vietnam beginning in the 
early 60s, the quantity of the reports increased.
In conjunction with the CUSSDCF, I have also made use of the United 
States State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 
series which is essentially an official historical record of US foreign 
policy decision-making and diplomatic activities. In late 1991, President 
George Bush ordered that the FRUS volumes should be published no more than 
30 years after the events they record and also passed new regulations to 
ensure the fullest declassification of the documents. FRUS Volume XVI 
(published in 1992) covers Cambodia and Laos up till 1960; and Volume XXIV 
(published in 1994) covers the Laos Crisis from 1961-1963. The Vietnam 
series of FRUS presently available covers the period up till 1964. For this 
thesis, I have consulted Volume I (published in 1988) which covers the year 
1961 and Volume II (published in 1992) which covers the year 1962.
Last but not least, I have made use of United States intelligence 
reports and captured communist documents. Captured documents during the 
Vietnam War and United States intelligence reports in the 60s occasionally 
throw light on the 50s and early 60s. Most notable is the United States 
Department of State "Working Paper on the North Vietnam's Role in the War 
in South Vietnam" (including the appendices)(27 May 1968) which contains 
amongst others, the CRIMP Document, captured during Operation CRIMP in 
January 1966. I have also made use of the Race Documents collected by the 
American scholar, Jeffrey Race, although they do not fall into the category
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of US Government documents.
All this information, used judiciously, should provide a better 
understanding of the communist side of the IndoChina War, and a more even 
account of Sino-Vietnamese relations between 1956-1962. As John Tosh put 
it, "each type of source possesses certain strengths and weaknesses; 
considered together, and compared one against the other, there is at least 
a chance that they will reveal the true facts - or something very close to 
them.
John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and Mew 
Directions in the Study of Modern History, (London: Longman, 
1993), p.66.
Chapter One
I
According to the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference 
regarding Vietnam, general elections should be held two years later in July 
1956 under the supervision of an international commission composed of 
representatives of the International Supervisory and Control Commission 
(ISCC). It was further stipulated that consultations between the North and 
the South on the impending general election were to commence a year 
earlier, from 20 July 1955. On 7 June 1955, Pham Van Dong stated that Hanoi 
was ready to hold consultations with South Vietnam to discuss the general 
election. However on 16 July, Ngo Dinh Diem declared in a broadcast that 
as South Vietnam did not sign the Geneva Agreements, it was therefore not 
bound by them. Two days later, on 19 July, Dong sent a note to Diem asking 
him to nominate delegates for a consultative conference. But on 10 August, 
Diem reaffirmed his declaration of 16 July and rejected any talks with the 
North. On 21 September, he issued a second statement declaring that there 
would be no question of a conference or any negotiations with the 
communists. Two weeks later, on 4 October, Diem announced that an elected 
assembly would exist in South Vietnam by the end of the year. Following 
that, on 23 October 1955, he proclaimed South Vietnam a republic with 
himself as President.1 Pham Van Dong continued to urge the co-chairmen of 
the 1954 Geneva Conference to convene the consultative conference as stated 
in the provisions of the Geneva Agreements.2 When it was made known by Ngo 
Dinh Diem in December 1955 that unilateral elections were to be held in 
South Vietnam during March 1956, his statement was immediately denounced 
by the Vietnamese communists.3
For details, see Documents relating to British 
Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-1965, 
(Cmnd. 2834), passim; The sequence of events during 
this period is also encapsulated in Keesing's 
Contemporary Tire hives , 5-12 July 1958 , pp . 16276-16277 .
Hanoi home service, 18 January 1956, SWB/FE/528, p.54.
VNA, 29 and 31 December 1955, SWB/FE/523, p.30.
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Despite Diem's intransigence, many Vietnamese communists, 
particularly the rank and file, looked forward to July 1956 when the 
reunification of North and South Vietnam would take place. Since the 
conclusion of the Geneva Conference, that was what they had been told by 
the leadership, time and again, to expect. The Vietnamese communist 
leadership however knew from the beginning that the general election 
stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements would not take place and there 
would not be a peaceful reunification. At a meeting in Spring 1959, Le Duan 
told Janos Radvanyi that no one in Hanoi had been surprised when the 
election was not held. In fact, the election was never expected to be held 
and the reunification of the North and South could only come about by 
military means. The election issue was kept alive because it had great 
propaganda value/
As early as the 6th Plenary session of the Lao Dong Central Committee 
from 15-18 July 1954, which took place even before the Geneva Conference 
ended, Ho had already identified the Americans as the main and direct enemy 
of the Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians, In his view, the Vietnamese 
people must concentrate their strength against the Americans.5 According 
to the Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam, the 6th Plenary session marked 
the beginning of a new period in the history of the Vietnamese people - the 
period of resisting the Americans to save the country. The Vietnamese 
people and army were confronting a new aggressor which possessed the 
greatest economic potential and the most powerful armed forces of all the 
imperialist powers. The Americans were the most influential and dangerous 
counter-revolutionaries they had ever confronted/ The Vietnamese
Janos Radvanyi, Delusion and Reality: Hoaxes and
Diplomatic One-Upmanship in Vietnamf (Indiana: Gateway 
Publishers, 1978), p.24.
Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam, Tap 11 - Quyen 
Mot, (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1988), 
pp.11-12; For a brief account of the 6th Plenary 
session which apparently included a closed session, 
see "Mot Vung Chien Khu Xua" in Nhan Dan, 28 August 
1993 ; Cao Van Luong, Lich Su Cach Mang Mien Nam 
Vietnam: Giai Doan 1954-1960, (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban
Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1991), p. 160. According to Cao Van 
Luong, Ho's view was reiterated at the 8th Plenary 
session in August 1955.
Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam, p.12. (hereafter 
cited as Lich Su.,.)
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communists thus knew what they were challenging and that the United States 
was not an opponent they could take lightly. The strategy was to rebuild 
as quickly as possible the economy of the North which had been badly 
damaged by the many years of struggle and to lay the foundation for 
socialism so as to make the North a strong base for the unification of the 
country. At the same time, the Vietnamese People's Army (VPA) was to be 
transformed into a modern and regular revolutionary army. This in itself 
was expected to be a long and arduous process. The army was expected to be 
responsible for the security of the country and also had to partake in the 
reconstruction of the economy. The first target was to restore the war- 
shattered economy in three years (1955-1957).7 In short, at the 6th 
Plenary session, the Hanoi leadership implicitly acknowledged that it was 
unlikely that they could reunite the country in 1956. Two years after the 
6th Plenary session, the perception of the Hanoi leadership had not 
changed.
The political and diplomatic facade had to be kept up for three 
reasons: First, as Le Duan recalled some years later, it had propaganda 
value as it put the North Vietnamese on the legal high ground and presented 
them as the injured party. Second, the Hanoi leadership had to show the 
majority of the communist cadres who had been told to expect reunification 
in 1956 that efforts were being made towards that end. Third, it served as 
a cover for Hanoi's preparation in the North for an eventual confrontation 
with the United States-Diem regime as envisaged at the 6th Plenary session 
of the Lao Dong Central Committee.
Ibid., p .14.
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II
Despite their differences with the Chinese in the summer of 1954”, 
after the Geneva Conference had ended, the Vietnamese communists still 
consulted Beijing as to which strategy to adopt to ensure the unification 
of Vietnam.9 Like the Vietnamese communists, the Chinese also thought that 
it would be impossible to reunite the country by elections as stipulated 
in the Geneva Agreements. In their view, it was imperative that the 
Vietnamese communists prepare for a protracted struggle. They recommended 
their own experience which had been successful against the Guomindang, 
which was to lie low for a long time, muster strength, keep in touch with 
the people and wait for an opportunity.10 According to Hoang Van Hoan, the 
Hanoi leadership decided to accept the Chinese recommendation.11
We can now confirm that in the early 50s, the Chinese had provided 
military assistance to the Vietnamese communists in their war against the 
French. In July/August 1955 (at around the period when consultations 
between Hanoi and Saigon on the 1956 general election should have started), 
Beijing decided that it was time to withdraw their military advisers who 
had been sent to North Vietnam in July/August 1950. The withdrawal was to 
be carried out in three phases - in September/October 1955, at the end of 
1955 and in Spring 1956. As requested by the North Vietnamese leaders, the 
military advisers would be replaced by military specialists to help in the
See Socialist Republic of Vietnam Foreign Ministry 
White Book on Relations with China, (Hanoi home
service, 6 and 11 October 1979, SWB/FE/6238 and 6242). 
For the replies of the Chinese government and Hoang 
Van Hoan, see Beijing Review, 23 November 1979, 30
November 1979, 7 December 1979.
Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan"s 
Revolutionary Reminiscences, (Beijing: Foreign
Languages Press, 1988), p.324.
Ibid.; Guo Ming (ed.), Zhongyue Guanxi Yanbian Shishi 
Nian, (Guangxi People's Publisher, 1992), p.65.
See Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean, (Beijing: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1988), p.324.
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modernisation of the VPA.12
By the beginning of 1956, the Chinese were poised to launch the first 
of their two economic "leaps forward".13 On 12 January 1956, Mao Zedong's 
updated preface of his book, Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside, was 
published. In it, Mao criticised those who underestimated the possibilities 
of speeding up production in all aspects of the economy.14 At the Supreme 
State Conference on 25 January 1956, Mao stated that China's First Five- 
Year Plan could either be accomplished ahead of schedule or in excess of 
the projected targets.15 What was foremost in Mao's mind at the beginning 
of 1956 was accelerating the pace of the economic development of China. A 
peaceful international environment was a pre-requisite for economic 
reconstruction.16 In fact as early as September 1955, in his summation 
speech at the 6th Expanded Plenary session of the 7th CCP Central 
Committee, Mao had already said that China needed a period of peaceful 
construction and that it was the duty of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the International Liaison Department and the army to ensure that a peaceful 
environment existed.17
Thus Zhou Enlai's political report to the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference on 30 January 1956 emphasised China's desire for
Zhongguo Junshi Guwentuan Yuanyue Kangfa Douzheng 
Shishi, (Beijing: Jiefang Jun Chubanshe, 1990),
pp.141-142.
Roderick Marfarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural 
Revolution, Volume I, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1974 ) , p .9.
Selected Works of Mao TseTung, Volume V, (Beijing: 
Foreign Language Press, 1977), pp.235-241; Beijing 
home service, 10 January 1956, SWB/FE/526, p.3.
John K. Leung and Michael Y. M. Kau (ed.), The 
Writings of Mao Zedong/ 1949-1976, (Volume II: January 
1956 - December 1957), (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 
pp.17-19.
Zong Huaiwen (compiled), Years of Trial, Turmoil and 
Triumph - China from 1949 to 1988, (Beijing: Foreign 
Language Press, 1989), pp.56 and 72.
Summing-up speech at the 6th expanded Plenary session 
of the 7th CCP Central Committee (September 1955) in 
Miscellany of Mao Tse-Tung Thought (1949-1968), Part 
I (JPRS 61269-1, 20 February 1974), pp.14-17.
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peace and her willingness to abide by the Bandung and Geneva spirit. In his 
report, he advocated the holding of a Far Eastern conference on the 
unification of Korea, repeated the Chinese proposal first made on 30 July 
1955 for a collective peace pact within the countries of both Asia and the 
Pacific, reviewed Chinese efforts to normalise relations with Japan and 
supported the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a Soviet-US treaty of 
friendship. According to Zhou, China was not hostile to the Americans. On 
the contrary, China was more than willing to live in friendship with them. 
What the Chinese opposed was the American military threat. Given a choice, 
China would prefer to live in peace but she would fight if her national 
security was to be threatened.18 There were indications during this time 
that despite China's public affirmation that it would take Taiwan by force 
if necessary, it was unlikely that they would do so. The preference was for 
a negotiated settlement.19
It was also in this report that Zhou made known the Chinese proposal 
that the Geneva Conference on IndoChina be reconvened and enlarged to 
include members of the ISCC in Vietnam so as to ensure the implementation 
of the Geneva Agreements in Vietnam.20 The Chinese suggestion was first 
made by Zhou in his letter of 25 January 1956 to the two co-chairmen of the 
1954 Geneva Conference. He was responding to the written request made by 
the latter on 21 December 1955 asking for suggestions of how to improve the 
implementation of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.21 Zhou's suggestion 
was therefore consistent with the policy of peaceful coexistence which the 
Chinese had been pursuing since the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 
April 1955.22 On 13 January 1956, the second group of Chinese military 
advisors who had been sent to North Vietnam in July/August 1950 returned
NCNA, 30 January 1956, SWB/FE/532 (Supplement).
FO 371/120869, FC 10110/8, 10 February 1956, from
Macau to Foreign Office (Secret) and FC 10110/23, 19 
February 1956, from Macau to Foreign Office.
Ibid.
Documents relating to British Involvement in the 
IndoChina Conflict 1945-1965, (Cmnd. 2834), pp.114-115 
and 118.
See Shao Kuo-kang, "Chou En-lai's Diplomatic Approach 
to Non-aligned States in Asia: 1953-60" in China
Quarterly, June 1979, Number 78.
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to China.”
There is no indication that the Chinese discussed their proposal with 
the North Vietnamese prior to their letter of 25 January to the two co- 
chairmen. They had so far supported the North Vietnamese call for the 
convening of the consultative conference.24 We do not know whether Ton Due 
Thang, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of the 
DRV, was informed about it. Thang was in Beijing from 9-11 December 1955 
before leaving for the GDR to attend the 80th birthday celebration of 
President Pieck. While in Beijing, he attended a banquet given in his 
honour by Peng Zhen, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress.25 He was in Beijing again from January 24 to 
28 this time at the invitation of Liu Shaoqi26 and he met Mao and Zhou on 
24 January.27 The Chinese proposal was quoted by the Voice of Vietnam with 
a commentary in support of it on 31 January, the day after it was made 
publ ic.2B
The Soviet ambassador to China, Yudin, met Zhou Enlai on 26 January 
with a message from the Soviet Government regarding Vietnam. We do not know 
the content of the message except that at this meeting, Vietnam was 
discussed.29 Then on 3 February, the Soviet Union declared its support for 
the Chinese proposal which it described as "noble and important".30 On 5 
February, Truong Chinh and Le Due Tho arrived in Beijing. They stayed for
Zhongguo Junshi Guwentuan Yuanyue Kangfa Douzheng 
Shishi, (Beijing: Jiefang Jun Chubanshe, 1990), p.143.
Documents relating to British Involvement in the 
Indochina Conflict 1945-1965, (Cmnd. 2834), pp.113- 
114.
Beijing home service, 11 December 1955, SWB/FE/518, 
pp.11 and 51.
NCNA, 24 January 1956, SWB/FE/530, p.15 and NCNA, 28 
January 1956, SWB/FE/531, p.18.
Zhou Enlai Waijiao Huodong Da Shiji, (Beijing: Shijie 
Zhishi Chubanshe, 1993), p.136.
VNA, 1 February 1956, SWB/FE/532, p.44.
Zhou Enlai Waijiao Huodong Da Shiji, (Beijing: Shijie 
Zhishi Chubanshe, 1993), p.136.
TASS in English, 3 February 1956, SWB/SU/698, p.36.
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four days before leaving on 9 February for Moscow to attend the 20th 
Congress of the CPSU.31 It was very likely that they would have discussed 
the Chinese proposal during their stay in Beijing. Given that both China 
and the Soviet Union favoured a new conference, Pham Van Dong eventually 
responded on 14 February 1956, the date of the opening of the 20th Congress 
of the CPSU, to the co-chairmen's request of 21 December 1955. He too 
suggested that a new and enlarged Geneva Conference should be held to 
discuss the enforcement of the 1954 Agreements.32
The 20th Congress of the CPSU was a landmark congress for two 
reasons: First, on 24 February, just before the Congress was to close on 
25 February, Khrushchev delivered a speech denouncing Stalin at a special 
closed-door session. Second, it was during this Congress that Khrushchev 
spelt out the revised guiding principles of Soviet foreign policy. The new 
Soviet position was that there could be peaceful coexistence between the 
socialist and capitalist camps; war was not inevitable and the transition 
to socialism could be non-violent and take different forms for different 
countries.33 According to Khrushchev, when it was said that the socialist 
system would win in the competition between the two systems, it by no means 
signified that the victory would be achieved through armed struggle. 
Rather, the certainty was based on the fact that the socialist mode of 
production possessed decisive advantage over the capitalist mode of 
production. There were only two ways, either peaceful coexistence or the 
most destructive war in history. There was no third way.
According to the French Foreign Ministry, the Russians, in contrast 
to the Chinese, were not concerned about the elections in Vietnam and
NCNA, 5 February 1956, SWB/FE/533, p.17; NCNA, 9
February 1956, SWB/FE/535, p.13.
Documents relating to British Involvement in the Indo­
china Conflict 1945-1965, (Cmnd. 2834), pp.115-117; 
VNA, 22 February 1956, SWB/FE/538, p.38.
The 20th Congress of the CPSU began on 14 February and 
closed on 25 February 1956? For the full text of 
Khrushchev's report on "The International Position of 
the USSR", see Proceedings of the 20th Congress of the 
CPSU, SWB/SU/16 February 1956, Supplement No.l, pp. 3- 
24.
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appeared to be deliberately refraining from pushing the case.34 Indeed, 
the Soviet Union had so far not paid too much attention to Southeast Asia. 
Southeast Asian affairs were largely left to the discretion of China. There 
seems to have been an agreed division of responsibilities in the 
international sphere between both countries. Some time in 1955-1956, a 
gentlemen's agreement initiated by the Russians was apparently reached in 
secret between the two countries whereby Burma, Thailand, Laos Cambodia, 
Malaya and Vietnam would be in the Chinese sphere of operations. The 
Russians promised not to challenge Chinese leadership of the communist 
movements in those countries. India, Afghanistan, and all of Asia to the 
west of these countries would be in the Russian sphere. The exception was 
Indonesia which fell within both the Russian and Chinese sphere of 
interests.35 With this arrangement, the Russians could concentrate their 
attention on issues nearer home. At the beginning of 1956, the Soviet Union 
had far more important concerns than the problem of Vietnam, notably its 
own 20th Congress. Nevertheless, in a note to its British counterpart on 
18 February (while the 20th CPSU Congress was still in session), the Soviet 
Union stated that it shared the views of both China and North Vietnam on 
the expediency of reconvening the Geneva Conference. It even included a 
draft message addressed to all the members of the 1954 Geneva Conference 
and the supervisory powers regarding the proposed conference.36 On 23 
February, a Nhan Dan editorial presented the argument that if South 
Vietnam, a strategic region in Asia and particularly South East Asia was 
transformed into an American colony and military base, it would only turn 
the region into a hotbed of war. It was therefore imperative that the
Confidential United States State Department Central 
Files (hereafter cited as CUSSDCF): 751 G. 00/2-1156, 
2743, 11 February 1956, State Department to Saigon
(Secret).
The above summary of Soviet policy in Southeast Asia 
is taken from Aleksandr Kaznacheev, Inside a Soviet 
Embassy: Experiences of a Russian Diplomat in Burma, 
(Philadelphia: J.B., Lippincott Company, 1962),
Chapters 10-11 and 17. Kaznacheev was in Rangoon from 
1957-1959; One of Kaznacheev's sources is Slava 
Tarasov, a liaison officer between the Soviet and 
Chinese embassies in Rangoon.
Documents relating to British Involvement in the 
IndoChina Conflict 1945-1965, (Cmnd. 2834), pp.119- 
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Geneva Conference be reconvened.37
Ill
Meanwhile, on 10 February 1956, it was announced that Sihanouk was 
to visit Beijing on 13 February at the invitation of Zhou Enlai. The 
announcement added that the Chinese Premier fully understood that 
Cambodia's policy of neutrality prevented her from taking sides in the 
dispute between China and Taiwan. The Chinese also accepted the fact that 
Cambodia could not take any steps towards the recognition of the PRC until 
the dispute was resolved.38 (Taiwan retained its consulate in Cambodia 
until 1958.) The visit appeared to have achieved the objectives of both 
parties. A joint Sino-Cambodian communique which reaffirmed the Five 
Principles of the Bandung Conference and which advocated the settlement of 
international disputes by peaceful means was signed on 18 February.39 The 
Chinese told Sihanouk that neutrality was the best course for Cambodia and 
assured him that they would support Cambodia's independence and neutrality. 
Sihanouk assured the Chinese that Cambodia would remain neutral and would 
not resort to SEATO for protection. In return, China would restrain North 
Vietnam from interfering in Cambodia's domestic affairs.40 Sihanouk's trip
VNA, 24 February 1956, SWB/FE/539, p.29.
Phnom Penh home service, 10 February 1956, SWB/FE/535, 
p.40; Zhongguo Waijiao Guan Huiyi Lu: Xin Zhongguo
Waijiao Fengyun, Volume I, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi
Chubanshe, 1944), pp.59-60.
NCNA, 18 February 1956, SWB/FE/537, p.10.
CUSSDCF: 751 H. 00/2-2856, 1108, 28 February 1956,
from Phnom Penh to State Department; According to 
Milton Osborne, he was told by Wilfred Burchett in 
1966 that Zhou Enlai offered Sihanouk a guarantee 
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interfering in Cambodia's domestic affairs. See Milton 
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Darkness, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994), p.114;
According to Sihanouk in 1973, from 1956, the Chinese 
had kept their word to respect Cambodia's neutrality. 
See Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett, My War with 
the CIA: Cambodia's Fight for Survival,
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to Beijing was a great contrast to his visit to Manila in January 1956 
where he was pressured (but unsuccessfully) to place Cambodia under the 
protection of SEATO and abandon his policy of neutrality.41
The Vietnamese communists appeared pleased with Sihanouk's visit to 
China. They were themselves keen to establish diplomatic relations with 
Cambodia and had in fact approached Nehru as their intermediary.4? They 
endorsed Sihanouk's policy of neutrality and Cambodia's compliance with the 
Geneva Agreements and her refusal to join any military alliance.43 The 
Nhan Dan editorial of 20 February described the establishment of friendly 
relations between China and Cambodia as helpful to the enforcement of the 
Geneva Agreements.44 In their effort to develop good relations with 
Sihanouk, the Vietnamese communists encouraged their Cambodian counterparts 
to exercise restraint. According to David P. Chandler, during this time, 
Saloth Sar "was working with fellow members of the IndoChina Communist 
Party... to protect its Cambodian leaders Tou Samouth and Sieu Heng and to 
lay the groundwork, when the time was ripe and permission came from 
Vietnam, for a larger and better organised Cambodian Communist Party."45 
In April 1956, at the 3rd Sangkum Congress, the Pracheachon proposed a 
coalition government which would include itself, the Sangkum and other 
political parties.46
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p.203.
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IV
The North Vietnamese, Chinese and Russians continued to condemn 
Diem's preparation for the unilateral election in South Vietnam. But 
despite all the denunciations, the so-called "separatist” and "fascist” 
election was carried out on 4 March 1956. Apparently, there were some 
attempts by the Vietnamese communists to sabotage the election, but they 
were not extensive enough to disrupt it.47 The inability of the Vietnamese 
communists to take widespread and coordinated action to foil the election 
indicated that the Hanoi leadership were still not able to force the pace 
for unification.45 According to the evaluation of the United States 
Country Team, Diem's policies and actions in the South had caused the 
Vietnamese communists to lose much of their broad base of support in 
certain areas where they used to be strong. The Country Team further 
reported that the consolidation of the South Vietnamese government's 
position and the improved local security particularly in the central 
provinces had sharply reduced the communist resistance potential. The 
Vietnamese communists' subversive capability in the South had gradually 
declined since mid-1955.49
Five days after the South Vietnamese National Assembly election, on
communist party in Cambodia.
CUSSDCF: 751 G. 00/3-1556, 302, 15 March 1956, from
Saigon to Foreign Office.
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Mien Nam". For the full text, see Race Document Number 
1002.
Jan - Jul 1956 30
9 March, the British government replied to the Soviet note of 18 February. 
The British view was that it was premature for the co-chairmen to propose 
such a conference. The British suggested that they first seek further 
clarification of the views of the other countries concerned. Following 
that, the two co-chairmen could then meet to discuss whether or not a new 
conference was profitable.50 Throughout this time, Truong Chinh and Le Due 
Tho were still in Moscow although the 20th Congress closed on 25 February 
1956. On 13 March, they returned to Beijing. It was reported that they were 
received by the Political Bureau on the next afternoon.51 They stayed on 
in Beijing till 20 March before returning to Hanoi.52 Although we still 
do not know about the activities of Truong Chinh and Le Due Tho during 
their very long stay in both Moscow and Beijing, it was very likely that 
the issue of the unification of Vietnam was discussed.
Meanwhile in mid-March 1956, the head of the Chinese Military 
Advisory Mission to North Vietnam, Wei Guoqing and the last batch of 
Chinese military advisors who had been sent to North Vietnam in the early 
50s returned to China.53 The departure of these Chinese advisers did not 
mean the end of the close ties between the PLA and the VPA. We should 
recall that they were replaced by Chinese military technicians and 
specialists. In April 1956, a Chinese military delegation led by General 
(four-star) Chen Geng, Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff and member of 
the National Defence Council, visited North Vietnam. In 1950-51, Chen was 
the Deputy-Commander of the Southwest Military Command and Commander, 
Yunnan Military.54 We now know that he was also one of the Chinese 
military advisers sent to assist the North Vietnamese in June 1950.55 Chen
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and Ho Chi Minh had close ties. We do not know about the activities of the 
delegation in North Vietnam except that Chen Geng returned to China on 3 
May 1956.56
Soon after Truong Chinh and Le Due Tho returned to Hanoi, it was 
announced on 23 March 1956, that the Soviet Deputy Premier, Anastas Mikoyan 
would be visiting Hanoi in early April. On the same day, the Indian 
Government wrote to the two co-chairmen informing them that an agreement 
had been reached between the French and the South Vietnamese authorities 
on. the evacuation of the French Expeditionary Corps from South Vietnam and 
that there would be no French High Command in the South after 15 April 
1956. The Indians expressed their concern that the South Vietnamese 
authorities had stated that they were not prepared to assume the legal 
obligations of the French High Command, as successors of the French in the 
South. They therefore asked the two co-chairmen to consider the grave 
situation as early as possible and before 15 April.57 The North Vietnamese 
insisted that regardless of whether there were French troops in Vietnamese 
soil, the French government was obliged to uphold the spirit and letter of 
the Geneva Agreements.
Some time between 18 March 1956 and the arrival of Mikoyan in Hanoi, 
the North Vietnamese leadership discussed a 14-point plan of action which 
had been drawn up by Le Duan and adopted by the Nam Bo Committee.56 The
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setbacks suffered by the communist cadres in the South and their 
increasingly low morale had prompted Le Duan to present this 14-point 
plan.59 The plan recommended that military action be used in support of 
other activities in the South, that support bases and more battalions be 
created and that the military organisations in the interzones be 
consolidated. Cambodia was considered to be strategically important and it 
was proposed that budgetary assistance should therefore be increased and 
senior cadres should be seconded to Cambodia. Part of the plan also 
included the creation of a support base to aid activities in Cambodia and 
the consolidation of the leading organisations there. In sum, the plan 
recommended a more aggressive and militant approach to complement the 
political struggle in the South.
The leadership's reply to Le Duan and the Southern cadres was that 
they should in the meantime exploit the agrarian issues in the South until 
a longer range strategy could be worked out.60 The Hanoi leadership turned 
down the 14-point plan possibly because firstly, it did not see itself 
strong enough to step up the military struggle in the South at this point. 
Secondly, even if it had wanted to back the plan, it would still need to 
discuss the matter with China and the Soviet Union. Mikoyan was expected 
in Hanoi soon. Both countries as we have noted were not in favour of any 
moves that could lead to a new military confrontation. Furthermore, North 
Vietnam had just over a month ago publicly committed itself to a new 
diplomatic solution initiated by China and supported by the Soviet Union.
Since the end of the 1954 Geneva Conference, the Russians had 
advocated that both North and South Vietnam should coexist peacefully and 
engage^! in friendly economic competition with each other. Their belief was 
that the socialist mode of production was superior to that of the 
capitalist South. Therefore the latter would naturally and in time yearn
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to be unified with the North.61 The Soviet approach was reiterated at the 
recent 20th CPSU Congress. According to Hoang Van Hoan, the Lao Dong 
Central Committee was not in favour of the Soviet proposal.” 
Nevertheless, on 31 March 1956, a few days before Mikoyan was due to arrive 
in Hanoi, the Vietnamese Politburo issued a statement endorsing the 
resolutions of the recent 20th CPSU Congress.
Mikoyan arrived in Hanoi on 2 April 1956. He was the highest ranking 
Soviet leader so far to visit North Vietnam and it was described as "an 
event of great significance".63 The importance of the Soviet Union to the 
Vietnamese communists was best described in an article by Ton Due Thang 
eulogising the visit. He wrote, "The two words "Soviet Union" were sacred 
for the Vietnamese people. Confidence in the Soviet Union remained a source 
of moral strength to the Vietnamese people."64 Indeed, no effect was 
spared to create an impression on the esteemed visitor.65
In his short speech on arrival, Mikoyan wished the Vietnamese people 
success in their efforts to heal the wounds of war and to raise their 
material and cultural standards, as well as in their struggle for the 
peaceful unification of their country through free and democratic 
elections.66 According to Colonel Huong Van Ba, an artillery officer in 
the VPA, some time before July 1956, he heard a speech made by a visiting 
Russian dignitary in Hanoi and the message was the same: that the North 
should build a strong and wealthy socialist state, and eventually the South
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would follow/’ The Russian dignitary referred to could have been Mikoyan.
Two days before Mikoyan's arrival on 30 March 1956, the Soviet Union 
had responded to the British note of 9 March. The Russians did not object 
to the British proposal of preliminary discussions between the two co- 
chairmen and proposed that they be held in London within the next few days, 
"in as much as any postponement of the discussion of this question makes 
more difficult the implementation of the Geneva Agreements." The 
discussions would also look into the problem brought about by the 
withdrawal of the French High Command from the South.68 Mikoyan's visit 
therefore provided the opportunity for the Hanoi leadership to clarify with 
the Russians the implications of the resolutions of the recent 20th CPSU 
Congress for the Vietnamese. We still do not know what was discussed but 
evidently the discussions were unexpectedly long-drawn out. On the morning 
when Mikoyan was to visit Haiphong, the entire population there began to 
assemble at 0430h. Only at 1030h were they told by the authorities that the 
visit was cancelled due to pressure of work in Hanoi.69 Significantly, 
Mikoyan ended his visit to Hanoi on 6 April without signing a joint- 
communique, which suggest that the North Vietnamese and the Russians could 
not reach a unity of views. After Hanoi, Mikoyan visited Beijing and Ulan 
Bator. In both these capitals, joint-communiques were however signed.70
Meanwhile, in early April, at a special conference attended by senior 
party officials in Nam Bo, a further evaluation of the situation in the 
South was made. Having taken into consideration Hanoi's rejection of Le 
Duan's 14-point plan, this time, it was decided that the tactical use of 
violence concurrently with political operations in accordance with the 
September 1955 instruction of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, 
had so far not achieved much positive result and from the standpoint of the 
DRV's international diplomacy, any further use of violence would be
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inappropriate. The emphasis should therefore shift away from that of a 
military struggle to an economic struggle.71
Despite this conclusion, there is evidence that the Southern 
communist leaders were less than happy with the strategy thrust upon them 
by the Hanoi leadership. A supplement to a special number of a communist 
newsheet, Nouvelles du Peuple (dated April 1956) meant for circulation in 
the South included an old document which explained in some detail communist 
policy and tactics in South Vietnam and the programme of the Fatherland 
Front. We know that this document was written some time earlier although 
we cannot ascertain the exact date, and that it was redistributed in April 
1956. This document first came into the hands of a USIS cinematograph team 
at Vinh Long some time after 20 July 1954. The British believed it was 
probably given to the USIS team by the French Surete who had captured it 
in a raid. The British were of the view that the material was genuine and 
was intended for use by the communist cadres in the South.72 It was clear 
from this document that the communists were intent on first consolidating 
the North whilst at the same time encouraging the sects or anyone else so 
disposed to create armed disturbances. It recommended against propagating 
the idea of a military intervention from the North and terrorising of the 
population. In Section 6, the writer appeared obliged to deny that there 
was either hypocrisy or opportunism in the communist party policy. The 
recirculation of this old document tells us two things: First, that the 
policy established by the Hanoi leadership at the 6th Plenary session had 
remained unchanged and second, there was the need in April 1956 to impress 
this strategy upon the Southern cadres.
Also in April, Chinese Vice-Premier Chen Yun visited Hanoi at the 
invitation of Ho Chi Minh and the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party 
to discuss the economic strategy for North Vietnam. North Vietnam at this 
time was experiencing a serious problem of food shortage and high 
unemployment. It did not have any financial infrastructure. Neither did the 
country have a pool of technically-skilled personnel. The country was 
therefore not ready for the development of heavy industry. Chen Yun's
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proposal, which was accepted by the North Vietnamese leadership, was to 
concentrate on agriculture before industry; and to establish light industry 
before heavy industry. Agricultural development would help alleviate North 
Vietnam's food shortage and also provide raw materials for the light 
industry. Chen Yun also proposed the construction of a number of light 
industries which required minimum investment but could yield quick returns. 
In mid-July 1956, an agreement was signed between Beijing and Hanoi whereby 
Chinese specialists in various fields were sent to North Vietnam to help 
in the rehabilitation of the North Vietnamese economy.73
V
While the Vietnamese communists were doing all they could short of 
resorting to arms to get the agreements on the unification of the North and 
South implemented by the July 1956 deadline, events were developing in Laos 
which they could not ignore. It had to do with the political survival of 
the Pathet Lao.711 After the 1954 Geneva Conference, the Pathet Lao were 
temporarily regrouped in the two provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly. The 
Geneva Agreements had envis^j^d an internal Laotian political settlement 
in the form of a general election in 1955. But the Royal Laotian Government 
(RLG) and the Pathet Lao were unable to reach any understanding and on 25 
December 1955, the incumbent government proceeded with a general election 
without the Pathet Lao participation. The North Vietnamese on 24 December 
declared the planned unilateral election undemocratic and "entirely 
contrary to the letter and spirit of the Geneva Agreements." They expressed
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their desire to have good neighbourly relations with Laos and were deeply 
concerned with the developments there.75 The Chinese shared the same 
sentiment. They saw the hand of the United States behind the election and 
spoke of an American plan to turn Laos into a US military base and colony. 
To the Chinese, the solution of the Laos question was vital to the security 
of IndoChina as well as the whole of Asia.76
Despite the boycott by the Pathet Lao and apparently some small scale 
effort by the communists to disrupt it, the election was smoothly carried 
out. The communists' propaganda had failed. There was no evidence that any 
major plan was drawn up to wreck the election.77 Despite having condemned 
the December election, Pham Van Dong sent a congratulatory message to the 
RLG through the International Supervisory and Control Commission on the 
occasion of the admission of Laos into the United Nations on 14 December 
1955.78
Soon after the unilateral election, between 6-14 January 1956, the 
Pathet Lao held a conference at Sam Neua and established the Neo Lao Hak 
Xat (NLHX or the Lao Patriotic Front). This new front replaced the Neo Lao 
Itsala, founded in 1950. It was to be a broad united front comprising both 
ethnic and non-ethnic Laotians. The NLHX was essentially modelled along the 
lines of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front. The proceedings of the conference 
were closely followed and duly reported by the North Vietnamese media, 
notably, the opening of the Conference on 7 January, Souphanouvong's 
inaugural speech on 10 January and the formation of the NLHX as well as its 
12-article programme on 14 January. The DRV Fatherland Front sent its 
greetings to the Pathet Lao on 11 January. In its message, it stressed the
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historic importance of the conference and referred to the close unity 
between the Vietnamese and the Laotians who had for a long time past fought 
side by side against a common enemy.79 A Nhan Dan article of 16 January 
described the formation of the NLHX as an important stage in the history 
of the Laotian people's struggle for national independence.SG Given the 
close links between the Pathet Lao and the Vietnamese communists and 
judging from the leading personalities in the NLHX, there is no doubt that 
the new front had the full blessings of the Vietnamese communists. On 15 
January, the Chinese also greeted the formation of the new front with 
enthusiasm and described it as a "great event in the political life of the 
Laotian people" which "conformed to the aspirations of the Laotian people 
and reflected the growing democratic forces in Laos." The Chinese further 
urged the RLG to resume its negotiations with the Pathet Lao fighting units 
so as to reach a political solution in accordance with the Geneva 
Agreements.81
With the Laotian election over and none of the four Laotian parties 
having a clear majority, the North Vietnamese and Chinese could only wait 
and watch how the new government would be formed. Expressions of support 
were for the recently reconstituted Laotian Patriotic Front rather than the 
Pathet Lao per se.e? The Vietnamese communists in fact intimated to the 
Indians that they had no wish to upset the Geneva Agreements on Laos.83 
Pham Van Dong also told the Indian Charge d'Affaires in Hanoi that he was 
willing to exercise his "good offices" to help settle the Pathet Lao 
problem and he also renewed his invitation to Katay Don Sasorith (who was 
the pro-western Laotian Prime Minister from October 1954 till the recent 
election) to visit Hanoi. The Indians, on their part advised the North 
Vietnamese against linking the unification issue with the Pathet Lao 
problem by pointing out that a settlement in Laos would improve the
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atmosphere for the settling of the unification issue.84 That the Pathet 
Lao did not resort to open fighting during and after the December 
elections, and the subsequent formation of the NLHX, as well as the 
conciliatory attitude of the North Vietnamese showed that the Hanoi 
leadership had an overall strategy in IndoChina which the Chinese approved 
of.
According to the Chinese, as a neighbour, they welcomed a Laos that 
would live peacefully and cooperatively with all her neighbours as a 
completely sovereign and independent member of the big family of Asian 
nations. They also indicated to the Laotian Premier-designate that so long 
as the Laotian Government strictly adhered to the Geneva Agreements, a 
basis would exist for the settlement of the political issues, particularly 
the integration of the Pathet Lao forces in the country's political 
life.65
Almost two months after the elections, it was confirmed that Prince 
Souvanna Phouma would form the new government. On 20 March, he pledged to 
bring about the national reconciliation in accordance with the Geneva 
Agreements. There was no more mention of Laos in the North Vietnamese media 
until 10 April, when they reported that the Pathet Lao had called for the 
reconvening of the political conference with the RLG. We should recall that 
during this interval of time, the North Vietnamese were preoccupied with 
the visit of Mikoyan and they also had to decide on the 14-point plan 
submitted by Le Duan. On 11 April, the Vietnamese broke their long silence 
and came out in full support of the Pathet Lao proposal, which they 
described as a "new effort showing the constructive spirit of the Pathet 
Lao forces". They further expressed hope that the RLG would act in full 
accordance with Souvanna Phouma's pledge.86 Again, the North Vietnamese 
position was in keeping with their policy regarding South Vietnam and 
Cambodia.
CUSSDCF: 751 J. 00/3-156, 1107, 1 March 1956, from
Vientiane to State Department (Secret).
NCNA, 24 February 1956, SWB/FE/539, p.3.
VNA, 11 April 1956, SWB/FE/552, pp.46-47.
Jan - Jul 1956 40
VI
We should recall that the Russians had agreed to meet their British 
counterpart in London to discuss the problem of the reunification of North 
and South Vietnam. On 5 April, which was the eve of Mikoyan's departure 
from Hanoi, the British replied to the Soviet Union with the proposal that 
the first meeting between Lord Reading and Gromyko take place on 11 
April.87 The London Talks between Gromyko and Lord Reading were publicly 
welcomed by the Vietnamese communists. The Vietnamese again urged the two 
co-chairmen to convene a new Geneva Conference.88 However there is 
indication that the Hanoi leadership might have been quite sceptical as to 
how much another conference could achieve. A document purportedly issued 
to senior Southern cadres in late-Spring 1956 by the Lao Dong Party Central 
Committee for their general guidance stated that although England, Russia, 
France, China and India were trying to arrange a second Geneva Conference, 
the solution to the Vietnam problem would depend basically on the actual 
strength of the Vietnamese communists. The North would have to make plans 
to solve the military, political and economic problems of the South.89
Despite all their expressions of support, the Russians showed only 
a minor interest in the Far East during the London Talks. They were 
evidently more concerned about developments in the Middle East than in 
IndoChina.90 The outcome of the Talks was most disappointing to the 
Vietnamese communists. As the Official British record put it, "...since the 
Government in South Vietnam adhered unflinchingly to the position that it 
was not a party to the Geneva Agreement or Final Declaration, and therefore 
under no obligation to discuss elections, and to the view that in any case 
it was unrealistic to think that any elections held in Communist North
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Vietnam could be free, there was nothing that could be done."91 A tacit 
understanding was reached between the two co-chairmen that there was no 
point in holding a new conference and that reunification would have to be 
postponed indefinitely. They also absolved the French of any further 
obligation for the execution of the Geneva Agreements.92
The Soviet Union, apart from playing its role as co-chairman of the 
1954 Geneva Conference, appeared content to let the Chinese take the 
initiative in IndoChina during this period. It paid hardly any attention 
to Laos. In the British note of 5 April to the Soviet Union regarding the 
meeting of the co-chairmen in London during April 1956, they had proposed 
to discuss Laos as well.33 But in London, the Russians refused to put any 
pressure on the Pathet Lao to conclude a political settlement.94 But this 
is not to say that they were completely uninterested in the region. In 
April, they approached Sihanouk regarding the establishment of a Soviet 
embassy in Phnom Penh but were unsuccessful.95 At the end of June, they 
offered de jure recognition to the Laotian government and suggested an 
exchange of diplomatic missions as well as the development of cultural and 
economic ties. They appeared rather anxious for a Laotian response to their 
offer.96
Following all this, in Hanoi, the North Vietnamese leadership held 
the 9th Plenary session (enlarged) of the Lao Dong Central Committee from 
19-27 April 1956. During this Plenary session, the resolution of the 20th 
CPSU Congress was once again acclaimed. However, the Vietnamese communists, 
like the Chinese, had reservations about Khrushchev's repudiation of 
Stalin. Ho's view was similar to that of the Chinese as expressed in an
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article in the Renmin Ribao of 4 April 1956, "On the Historical Experience 
of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat".97
But whereas the Chinese and particularly Mao, paid great attention 
to the denunciation of Stalin, the Vietnamese communists were more 
concerned about the question of the inevitability of war and its 
implications for their struggle for national reunification. In his closing 
speech at the Plenary session on 27 April, Ho Chi Minh did not discount the 
possibility of resorting to armed struggle to achieve reunification. 
According to Ho, "although it is possible that certain countries may 
achieve socialism by peaceful means, we must understand that in those 
countries where the administrative machinery, the military powers and the 
secret police of the bourgeois class are still powerful, the proletariat 
must prepare for an armed struggle. While noting the possibility of 
achieving the territorial unification of Vietnam through peaceful means, 
we must not forget the American imperialists and their lackeys, still 
occupy one half of our national territory and are preparing for war. That 
is why, while holding high the flag of peace, we must be prudent and 
vigilant."38
From the same speech, we know that during this period, Ho was also 
concerned with the differences within the Hanoi leadership. He believed 
that if they were not resolved, they could weaken the collective 
leadership. Unfortunately, we still do not have enough information 
regarding the specific problems within the North Vietnamese leadership 
during this period. It was likely that the issue of reunification was one 
of them.
In China, the primary concern was still for the economy. On 25 April 
1956, Mao made a speech at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of 
the Central Committee of the CCP in which he expounded on "the ten major 
relationships".93 In the speech, Mao spelt out the ten major relationships 
in socialist revolution and construction and set forth the principles
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underlying the acceleration of economic development in China. Of the ten 
relationships, the one that is most pertinent to this study is the 
relationship between economic construction and defence construction in 
which Mao said that China needed the atom bomb to protect itself. According 
to Mao, the only reliable way to have the bomb was to cut military and 
administrative expenditures down to appropriate proportions and increase 
expenditures on economic construction. In his words, "We must strengthen 
our national defence, and for that purpose we must first of all strengthen 
our work in economic construction."100
VII
On 8 May, the Geneva co-chairmen addressed a message to both North 
and South Vietnam urging them to make every effort to implement the Geneva 
Agreements and to prevent any violations of the military provisions and 
also to ensure the implementation of the political provisions embodied in 
the Final Declaration.101 Both the North and South Vietnamese governments 
were invited to let the co-chairmen know, either jointly or separately but 
as soon as possible, their views about the time required for the opening 
of consultations on the holding of the national election,102 The Russians 
were more concerned about the preservation of peace than about the 
unification of Vietnam. After receiving the co-chairmen's message, the 
Chinese, although they were the first to propose the idea of a new Geneva 
Conference, stopped calling for a conference. Having been led by China and 
the Soviet Union to support the idea of a new Geneva Conference, the 
Vietnamese communists were again let down by their mentors who once more 
failed to back them to the end.
After the outcome of the London Talks was made known, it was obvious 
that there would be no general election in July 1956 or even in the near
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future. However, the North Vietnamese continued to give the impression that 
they were optimistic of a peaceful unification of the country. In response 
to the co-chairmen's message, Pham Van Dong on 11 May dispatched yet 
another letter to Ngo Dinh Diem calling for consultations on the election. 
In the letter, Dong also pledged to maintain peace.103 Diem, with the 
support of the Americans opposed a national election and never replied. 
Diem's insistence that the South Vietnamese government was not bound by the 
Geneva Agreements was already public knowledge. Notwithstanding that, on 
4 June, Dong wrote to the co-chairmen and expressed North Vietnam's 
readiness for immediate consultations.104
The Chinese continued to give verbal support for the North Vietnamese 
cause. They declared that they had always been closely concerned that the 
Geneva Agreements were carried out and that it was their hope that Vietnam, 
which was their neighbour, would become a prosperous and united country in 
accordance with the 1954 Agreements. They further maintained that the South 
Vietnamese authorities should adhere to the agreements without further 
delay. China would continue to strive with the North Vietnamese for the 
full implementation of the Geneva Agreements.105
The Chinese at this time were very concerned about their economy as 
was reflected in the proceedings of the 3rd session of the 1st National 
People's Congress held in Beijing between June 15-30. The main attention 
of the Congress was focused on economic issues, improvement of the 
conditions of the intellectuals, science and education. As for foreign 
relations, the emphasis was again on the need for peaceful coexistence. 
Zhou Enlai's speech on foreign policy was conciliatory in tone. He urged 
improving Sino-Japanese relations and a peaceful solution of the Taiwan 
issue.100 According to Zhou, the absence of diplomatic relations need not 
prevent the strengthening of cultural and economic ties.
The Chinese as well as the Russians could easily continue giving 
moral and verbal support from a distance. But the North Vietnamese
VNA, 8 June 1956, SWB/FE/569, pp.38-39.
Ibid.
NCNA, 11 May 1956, SWB/FE/561, pp.1-2.
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leadership was faced with a problem. What they had to grapple with in 1956 
in particular was not so much that the reunification could not take place 
as stipulated but how to convince the Southern cadres that had gathered in 
the North as well as those who had been instructed to remain in the South 
that the leadership had a longer term plan to reunite the country, which 
for it to be successful had to be kept absolutely secret.107 This was not 
an easy task. According to an official North Vietnamese history, during 
this period, "the struggle of the people in the South to achieve the 
unification of Vietnam became increasingly fierce... The revolutionary 
movement demanded guidance that was appropriate to a situation that was 
undergoing new development." In response, the Politburo held a meeting on 
8-9 June 1956,108 On 19 June, Ho wrote a letter to the South Vietnamese 
cadres which had regrouped in the North and told them that the North was 
the foundation of their struggle to achieve the liberation and 
reunification of their country; and therefore whatever was done for North 
Vietnam was not only to increase the strength of the North but that of the 
South as well.109 On the same day, the Politburo issued a directive which 
clarified the role and responsibility of the Southern cadres in their 
revolutionary struggle. According to the directive, the struggle at that 
point of time was essentially a political and not a military struggle. 
Therefore, they should resort to arms only in situations which called for 
self-defence. The plan was to concentrate on the development of the armed 
forces to a point when they were sure of its capability as well as to
United States Department of State "Working Paper on 
the North Vietnam's Role in the War in South Vietnam" 
(27 May 1968), Appendices, Item 301: CRIMP Document, 
p.2.
The CRIMP Document is believed to be a notebook of a 
high level political cadre written some time around 
1963, recording his impressions of communist policies 
during the early years of the revolutionary struggle 
against Diem. It was captured by the Allied forces in 
early January 1966, during Operation CRIMP north of 
Saigon.
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June 1982), pp.16-17.
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consolidate the forces that they already control. Meanwhile, the Southern 
cadres were instructed to organise self-defence forces amongst the masses 
in order to protect the struggle and to attempt to free those cadres who 
had been arrested, develop more base areas and arouse the political 
consciousness of the masses. The establishment of a popular front and the 
consolidation of the Party in the South were to be the key tasks.110
Right up to the end of July and for some time after, the Vietnamese
communists continued to press for a meeting to discuss the elections. On
12 July, in an interview with Leroy Hanson, the editor of United Press, Ho
was asked what was likely to happen if nationwide elections were not held 
XSioA/
by the July 1956 dkfesOine. His ambiguous reply was that they would continue 
to struggle with even greater energy to have free elections throughout the 
country. (The real strategy must necessarily remain a secret.) When asked 
if the North were willing to accept a formula under which both North and 
the South would be regarded as separate nations recognised by the United 
Nations, Ho was adamant that Vietnam was a whole from the North to the 
South and it must be unified. Just as the USA could not be divided into 
two, Vietnam too could not be divided into two separate nations.111 In the 
event, the elections failed to take place and the Vietnamese, Chinese and 
Russians, all allowed the July 1956 deadline to pass by somewhat 
uneventful ly.112
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Chapter Two
I
In the second half of 1956, the Hanoi leadership had to grapple with 
two sets of problems: Firstly, it had to deal with problems in the North. 
Apart from trying to create a more cohesive collective leadership as 
mentioned by Ho Chi Minh in his speech at the 9th Plenary session of the 
Lao Dong Central Committee in April, Ho's letter of 1 July 1956 to the 
Agrarian Land Reform Committee during its conference to review Round 5 of 
the agrarian reform, revealed that many serious mistakes had been committed 
during the latest stage of the agrarian reform.1
We should recall that at the 6th Plenary session in July 1954, it 
was decided that the first target was to restore the war-shattered economy 
within three years (1955-57); and pave the way for North Vietnam's economic 
recovery and advance to socialism.2 Since the consolidation of the North 
was seen as a prerequisite to the unification of Vietnam, the success or 
failure of the agrarian reform would affect the pace of reunification. By 
August 1956, the North Vietnamese leadership was forced to come to grips 
with the errors which were committed in the carrying out of the agrarian 
reform. On 18 August, Ho Chi Minh publicly admitted that major mistakes had 
been made and promised that the Party would do its utmost to rectify those 
mistakes. He appealed to everyone to unite and to resolutely correct the 
mistakes.3
Besides the peasants, the intellectuals, particularly in Hanoi, were 
also disaffected. That the intellectuals were unhappy with many of the
Lich Su..., pp .460-461.
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policies of the DRV was not something new, but the North Vietnamese 
government had so far been able to control this small group of dissidents. 
However, the decisions of the EOth CPSU Congress in February and the 
Chinese example of liberalisation in the field of culture in May 19564 
provided the impetus for the North Vietnamese intellectuals to once again 
express their different views. During the Hanoi Municipal Congress from 
end-July to early August, the delegates were extremely critical of many of 
the Party's policies, ranging from the shortage of consumer goods to 
taxation. At a conference of writers and artists held from 1-18 August 
1956, the participants demanded not only material improvements but also 
freedom of expression.
Secondly, the leadership also faced pressure from certain quarters 
in the Party who felt that the "North Vietnam first" policy needed to be 
balanced by more consideration for the situation in the South. While these 
Party members did not necessarily object to the approach adopted by the 
Hanoi leadership, they felt that more attention needed to be paid to the 
problems faced by those in the South.5 The leadership had to placate and 
control the Southern comrades in the wake of the failed reunification. 
Because of the difficulties of communication, a number of regions in the 
South did not receive the 19 June directive mentioned earlier. After the 
failure to reunite the country in July, some comrades in the Plain of Reeds 
(region in Kien Phong and Kien Tuong provinces and parts of Dinh Tuong, 
Long An and Hau Nghia provinces) were already making preparations to 
restart armed struggle. On 18 August, the same day that Ho Chi Minh made 
public the mistakes of the agrarian reform in the North, the Politburo sent 
a letter to the Nam Bo Regional Committee which reiterated and clarified 
the main points of the June directive,6 In August too, while the Hanoi 
leadership were preoccupied with the problems in the North, Le Duan was 
assigned by the Politburo to remain in the South to guide the revolutionary 
struggle. Le Duan had by this time already written the thesis, "Duong Loi
On 2 May 1956, Mao made his famous "hundred flowers" speech to a 
closed session of the Supreme State Conference. The theme of 
liberalisation in the field of culture was further amplified by 
Lu Dingyi, Director of the CCP's Propaganda Department on 26 May.
Hanoi home service, 17 August 1956, SMB/FE/589, pp.41-42.
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Cach Mang Mien Nam", which spelt out the path which the struggle in the 
South would gradually advance into a violent revolution.7 In the same 
month, he travelled from U Minh (the area extending along the coast of the 
Gulf of Siam in An Xuyen Province) across the Plain of Reeds up to Ben Tre. 
Le Duan instructed the Southern comrades not to conduct any further 
struggle in the name of the religious sects. He also entrusted Comrade Sau 
Duong to write a thesis on the proper conduct of armed-propaganda.8
II
Meanwhile, events in Laos were moving at a somewhat faster pace than 
before. Talks between the RLG, represented by Souvanna Phouma, and the 
Pathet Lao, represented by Souphanouvong, took place in Vientiane between 
August 1-4.9 At the outset of the talks, all Hanoi papers published 
articles welcoming the negotiations and described the talks as a very 
important event. Nhan Dan stated that unlike past attempts, the present 
talks were taking place under favourable conditions.10 On 5 August 1956, 
a joint-communique was signed between the RLG and the Pathet Lao. The 
communique stated that Laos would follow a policy of neutrality; would 
neither join any military alliances nor allow foreign bases on its soil
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other than those stipulated in the Geneva Agreements; pending a political 
solution, both sides would observe a ceasefire; the provinces of Sam Neua 
and Phong Saly would be restored to the RLG; Pathet Lao fighting units 
would be placed under the command of the RLG and there would be no
discrimination against the Pathet Lao. It was agreed that a military and 
a political committee would be formed to look into the implementation 
procedures.11 The next day, on 6 August, Ho Chi Minh sent a message of 
greetings to King Sisavang Vong on the occasion of the Laotian National Day 
which expressed the conviction that relations between the two countries 
would become closer.12 Souvanna Phouma told the correspondent of the 
Japanese newspaper, Yomiuri on 7 August that he would visit China in the 
near future. The invitation to Souvanna Phouma to visit Beijing had been 
extended by Zhou Enlai through the Indian channel as early as 7 May
1956.13 He also disclosed that Laos was considering signing treaties of 
friendship and trade agreements with China and the Soviet Union.14 On 8 
August, it was reported that agreement had been reached between the RLG and 
the Pathet Lao on general elections and the establishment of a coalition 
government which would include the Pathet Lao and other parties.15 A final 
round of talks took place on 10 August and a supplementary communique to 
the one signed on 5 August was issued.16
The Vietnamese communists hailed the success of the talks as a major 
victory for the people of Laos. They also pointed out that the talks had 
provided a good example for solving political differences through 
negotiations on the basis of the Geneva Agreements.17 Likewise, the
Chinese were all praises for the success of the talks. They firmly
supported the agreements reached describing them as being in line with the
NCNA, 5 August 1956, SUB/FE/585, pp.38-39.
VNA, 6 August 1956, SUB/FE/586, p.44.
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spirit of the Geneva Accord and a good foundation for consolidating peace 
and independence in Laos and for bringing about democracy and 
unification.,B A few days earlier, on 6 August 1956, the Chinese 
government had unilaterally lifted its ban on American journalists entering 
China. A telegram was sent to fifteen US news agencies inviting them to 
send their reporters to China for a month’svisit.19
Souvanna Phouma arrived in China on 20 August 1956.20 The RLG's 
delegation spent a week in China. The Chinese played the perfect host as 
they did to Sihanouk in March. In speech after speech, the Chinese stressed 
their support and approval for the agreements reached at the recent 
Vientiane talks. They did their best to convince the Laotians that although 
their social systems were different, they were sincere about establishing 
friendly relations with Laos on the basis of the Five Principles of 
peaceful coexistence, just like their ties with India, Indonesia, Burma, 
Pakistan and most recently Cambodia. Indeed, at the Sino-American 
ambassadorial meeting at Warsaw on 21 August 1956, the Chinese 
representative, Wang Bingnan, had proposed that talks on subsidiary issues, 
such as trade restrictions and other kinds of contact could be settled 
before matters of principle. The Chinese were prepared for the time being 
to put aside the intractable issue of the renunciation of force regarding 
Taiwan.21 According to Souvanna Phouma, in the only serious discussion 
during the visit which lasted for two to three hours on the evening of 25 
August, the Chinese leaders had welcomed the progress made in the RLG's 
discussions with the Pathet Lao but had made no attempt to intervene. Zhou 
Enlai also compared the Taiwan issue with that of the Pathet Lao saying
NCNA, 8 August 1956, SMB/FE/SB6, p.6.
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that he too would patiently seek a peaceful solution. Zhou spoke much about 
China's need for peace in order to complete her programme of internal 
development and expressed pleasure at having a friendly Laos pursuing the 
same policy. He did not press for the establishment of formal diplomatic 
relations but suggested a border regime which would oversee local 
inhabitants moving within the border zone.22 At the end of the visit, both 
countries signed a joint statement which expressed their mutual desire to 
observe the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence and to promote good 
neighbourly relations.23 The Sino-Laotian joint statement was hailed by 
the Vietnamese communists as a new success for the Five Principles and the 
Bandung spirit, which showed that cooperation was quite possible among 
countries of different regimes.24
On 28 August, the RLG delegation arrived in Hanoi from China. In his 
speech of welcome, Pham Van Dong said that the visit had opened a new phase 
in the good-neighbourly relations between North Vietnam and Laos. The North 
Vietnamese put on their most amiable appearance and did their best to deny 
that they had interfered in the internal politics of Laos. A joint- 
statement was also issued at the end of the one-day visit, which reaffirmed 
that the relations of the two countries would be based upon the Five 
Principles of peaceful coexistence and that outstanding issues between them 
would be settled by peaceful negotiations.25 The Chinese declared that the 
talks between the RLG delegation and the DRV were "a vital contribution to 
peace in IndoChina.1126
The main stumbling block which prevented a national reconciliation 
in Laos had been the intractability of the Pathet Lao. Souvanna Phouma had 
gone to Beijing and Hanoi because he and the Laotian leadership believed
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that in order to get the Pathet Lao on board, the most effective way was 
to deal directly with the Vietnamese and Chinese communists.27 During this 
period, as we have seen, the North Vietnamese and the Chinese, for their 
own reasons, were both keen to pursue a strategy of coexistence in the 
region. Consequently, the Pathet Lao became more cooperative and less 
obdurate. The Chinese appeared satisfied with the way their ties with 
Cambodia and Laos had so far developed. Compared to the Chinese, the North 
Vietnamese appeared more anxious to establish formal diplomatic relations 
with their two neighbours but were unsuccessful. The Cambodians and the 
Laotians remained wary of the North Vietnamese.28
Ill
In Hanoi in September, the 10th Plenary session of the Party Central 
Committee met to discuss ways of rectifying the errors that had been made 
in the course of the agrarian reform. According to Wilfred Burchett, the 
session lasted the whole of September and part of October.20 Hoang Van 
Hoan described it as "the longest meeting since the founding of the 
Party.1,30 That it was such a long session would indicate the gravity, and 
possibly the divisiveness of the issues. At the end, it was agreed, though 
not unanimously, that the Agrarian Reform Committee had failed to correctly 
implement the reform. A decision to draw up a resolution which would 
summarise the experiences gained from the debacle had to be shelved because
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of a lack of consensus.31 At the 10th Plenary session, it was decided that 
the unification of Vietnam would have to be further delayed and top 
priority was accorded to the improvement of the living conditions in the 
North.32
Meanwhile, on 20 September, the first issue of a dissident magazine 
entitled Nhan Van was published. (Between 20 September and 20 November, 
five issues were published.) Nhan Van was by no means the only dissident 
publication, although it was perhaps the best known. A collection of 
writings entitled Giai Pham which was seized by the cultural authorities 
when it was first published on the eve of Tet, 1956, was also reprinted. 
From late-September onwards, the situation thus became grave as 
intellectuals through their writings and publications started to discuss 
themes such as individual freedom and the pursuit of democracy.33 
Initially, the Party, following the lead of its two mentors, seemed 
prepared to accept a certain degree of openness, took the criticisms well 
in stride and in fact encouraged the spirit of self-criticism. This was 
particularly so in the wake of the agrarian reform crisis. Much time and 
energy were therefore channelled to quell unrest and criticisms of the 
Party leadership.34
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On 29 October, the conclusion of the 10th Plenary session was 
announced in the form of a communique in which the Central Committee 
admitted responsibility for the mistakes committed and stated that 
corrective measures had been and were being taken to rectify them. The
correction of errors was now to be one of the Party's major task.35 On the
same day, the Central Committee and the Hanoi Committee of the Fatherland 
Front assembled about 10,000 cadres, workers, peasants, officials, 
intellectuals, traders, etc., to listen to a two-hour speech by Vo Nguyen 
Giap on the topics of agrarian reform, democratic reforms, improvement of 
living conditions and only finally, the struggle for the reunification of 
the country.36 The Hanoi radio report of 30 October on the work of the
10th Plenary session also relegated the struggle for unification of Vietnam
to third place after democratisation and the improvement of living 
conditions.37
One significant result of the session was Truong Chinh's resignation 
as the Secretary-General of the Lao Dong Party which was announced on 29 
October. The resignation of Truong Chinh, who had been the Secretary- 
General of the Party since 1941, must have seriously tested the cohesion 
of the Hanoi leadership. As late as 25 October, it was Truong Chinh who 
addressed the National Congress of Vietnam Youth Union for National 
Salvation, on behalf of the Lao Dong Party. In his speech, although he 
called upon the Union to participate fully in the work of correcting the 
mistakes committed during the agrarian reform, he did not admit any 
responsibility for the mistakes.38 But the situation was sufficiently 
grave and the public had to be mollified. Truong Chinh being the main North 
Vietnamese leader responsible for the agrarian reforms had to bear the
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brunt of it.39 The choice of Giap, the victor of Dien Bien Phu, as the
Party spokesman on 29 October could be seen as due to the need to put
forward a popular figure in a bid to regain the confidence and support of 
the people. According to Bui Tin, Ho Chi Minh had two persons in mind who 
could replace Truong Chinh and carry out the rectification of the agrarian 
debacle, Giap and Le Duan. Ho's preference was for Giap because they had 
worked together for many years.40 However, there is no evidence yet to 
suggest that Giap's position was substantially strengthened by the fall of 
Truong Chinh. In the event, Truong Chinh was replaced by Ho himself, 
undoubtedly the most popular figure in the North, and probably the most 
acceptable choice amongst the Hanoi leadership. Although Truong Chinh had 
to relinquish his position as Secretary-General, he remained a member of 
the Politburo and played a significant role in the rectification of the 
agrarian reform. In 1957, he was appointed Head of the Rectification of 
Errors Campaign. Besides, the demotion of Truong Chinh, the other members 
of the Agrarian Reform Committee, both Le Van Luong and Ho Viet Thang were 
dismissed from their party and government positions, and Hoang Quoc Viet 
was dropped from the Politburo.
A question which needs to be addressed at this point is whether the
failure of the agrarian reform affected Vietnamese relations with China.
The Vietnamese communists' policy of land reform was patterned upon that 
of the Chinese and guided by Chinese advisers since 1953.41 According to 
Bui Tin, the land reform group which comprised Truong Chinh, Hoang Quoc 
Viet, Le Van Luong, Ho Viet Thang and Chu Van Bien were all "disciples" of 
Mao Zedong and they accepted the views of the Chinese advisers 
completely.42 The Chinese apparently did not agree with the conclusion 
regarding the agrarian reform arrived at the 10th Plenary session and felt 
that the Vietnamese leadership had over-reacted. According to one Chinese
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source, the different perceptions regarding the agrarian reform was one of 
the major points of divergence between the Vietnamese and the Chinese 
before 1965. However, it did not gravely affect Sino-Vietnamese 
relations/3 There is as yet no evidence to suggest that it led to a tilt 
away from China towards the Soviet Union at this time. At the 10th Plenary 
session, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi and Hoang Van Hoan were elected 
members of the Political Bureau.44 Of the three, we are now certain that 
Hoang Van Hoan had very close ties with the Chinese. During this time, he 
was the North Vietnamese ambassador to China/5 Nguyen Duy Trinh was also 
believed to be well disposed towards Beijing.46 Also, when Hanoi completed 
its economic restoration at the end of 1957 and began its socialist 
revolution in 1958 with the launching of its three-year economic plan 
(1958-1960), Chinese assistance remained considerable/7
On 21 October 1956, it was reported that Brigadier-General Nguyen Son 
died of cancer. Nguyen Son was the former Commander-in-Chief of Interzone 
IV, who had very close ties with the Chinese. He was a member of the CCP 
and had taken part in revolutionary activities in China, including the Long 
March/8 It was reported that Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong, Phan Ke Toai 
were among the leading members of the Party who paid their last respects. 
On 22 October, he was posthumously decorated with the War Cross. The rumour 
carried to the South by refugees from the North was that he had led a
Guo Ming, op.cit., p.101.
Hoang Van Hoan, op.cit., p.307.
According to Faligot and Kauffer, the pro-Chinese Hoang Van Hoan 
was particularly close to Kang Sheng who was for many years the 
head of the Chinese Secret Service. See Roger Faligot and Remi 
Kauffer, The Chinese Secret Service, (New York: William Morrow 
and Company, Inc., 1989), p. 179.
P.J.Honey, "Pham Van Dong's Tour", China Quarterly, October- 
December 1961, Number 8.
For statistical details of Chinese assistance in North Vietnam's 
economic development from 1958-1960, see Huang Guoan, et al, 
Zhongyue Guanxi Jianbian, (Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1986), 
pp.192-194.
For Nguyen Son's death and obituary, see Hanoi home service, 22 
October 1956, SHB/FE/608, p.42.
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rebellion and was actually executed on Truong Chinh's order.49 However, 
there was no evidence to ascertain that.50 Two years later on the 
anniversary of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1958, Nguyen Son was posthumously 
awarded the First Class Victory Order. Thus until the theory regarding 
Son's death is confirmed by factual evidence, the award can only show that 
Nguyen Son's death was due to illness as reported.
IV
At the time when the Lao Dong Party was holding its 10th Plenary 
session in September, the Chinese held their 8th CCP National Congress from 
September 15-27 in Beijing, the first since 1945. The proceedings of the 
Congress dealt mainly with internal and economic affairs. According to Liu 
Shaoqi, in his political report, China had followed the Five Principles of 
peaceful coexistence in her dealing with international affairs and would 
continue to carry out this policy in the future. In his words, "the Chinese 
people and all the peoples of the world need peace."51 Regarding Taiwan, 
Liu said that they would resort to force only if all possibilities of 
peaceful negotiations failed.52 At the 8th Congress, it was decided that 
the budget for defence and administration would be reduced and the economy 
would have priority over defence.
In Chen Yi's report on foreign policy delivered on 25 September, he 
made the following points: (a) China needed a peaceful international 
environment in order to build itself into a prosperous, happy, socialist 
and industrialised country; (b) the growing strength, unity and solidarity 
of the socialist camp would be the cornerstone to safeguard peace. China 
considered the consolidation and development of unity and cooperation with 
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as of prime importance; (c)
9 Saigon home service, 14 November 1956, SWB/FE/61A, p.33.
FO 371/123396, DF 1016/53, 12 November 1956, from Saigon to
Foreign Office (Secret).
1 See Liu Shaoqi's political report in SWB/FE/$eptember 1956,
Supplement, Number 1, pp.18-60.
Ibid.
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It was the firm conviction of China that countries with different social 
systems should live together in peace; (d) The Chinese government was 
willing to establish diplomatic relations with any government which was 
willing to observe the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence, and that 
included the United States.53 Chinese foreign policy therefore remained 
essentially the same as the foreign policy statement Zhou Enlai made on 28 
June 1956 during the 3rd session of the 1st National People's Congress. It 
was also consistent with what the Chinese had intimated to Sihanouk and 
Souvanna Phouma.
The role and responsibilities of the Chinese PLA were also discussed 
during the Congress.54 According to Peng Dehuai, the Minister of Defence, 
the most important task of the PLA was to fight imperialist aggression and 
to safeguard the construction of China. Peng said that China needed an 
environment of lasting peace to carry on socialist construction. At the 
same time, she needed a modern revolutionary army to meet any contingency. 
In order that the PLA could carry out its task effectively, there was a 
need for a strong reserve force as well as a regular army, which was the 
reason why China had introduced compulsory military service in place of the 
voluntary military system. In the modernisation of the PLA, Peng spoke of 
the need to master both modern military science as well as Marxism- 
Leninism. Learning from the Soviet Army was a short-cut towards the speedy 
modernisation of the PLA. But he also stressed that in the process of 
learning, the PLA should combine what it learnt from others with their own 
historic experiences.
Both Peng Dehuai and Tan Zheng, Director of the General Political 
Department in the PLA, maintained that political work remained the lifeline 
of the PLA. But there was a difference in the perceptions of the two men. 
To Peng, the military commanders and the political commissars were both 
leaders of the troops but once the Party committees had made their 
decisions, they should adopt a hands-off attitude and let the military
See Chen Yi's report on foreign policy, SWS/ff/September 1956, 
Supplement, Number 4, pp.20-22.
It is necessary to go into some detail of the discussion 
regarding the PLA here because it will help our understanding of 
the simi1iarities and differences between the VPA and the PLA, as 
well as the Soviet Army which would be discussed at the 
appropriate chronological junctures in this thesis.
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commanders exercise their initiative. It was therefore a mistake for the 
Party committees to interfere in the daily work of the army and to take 
everything into their hands. On the other hand, Tan Zheng felt that 
although the chain of command had become highly centralised, all parts of 
the army should still be subjected to the supervision of local Party 
organisations. They should not repudiate this supervision on the pretext 
of modernisation and the centralisation of the army's chain of command.'5
We now know that there were differences between Mao, on the one hand, 
and Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, on the other, as well as amongst other 
personalities in the Chinese leadership during this time.56 But at this 
stage, they remained muted. Chinese's policies as spelt out during the 8th 
Party Congress in 1956, were substantially similar to the policies the 
Russians adopted at their 20th Party Congress in February. In the words of 
Khrushchev, "I particularly admired Liu's report to the 8th Chinese Party 
Congress, in which he laid out the tasks confronting the Chinese people and 
party. He seemed to agree with the point of view held by the leaders of our 
own Party as reflected in the decisions of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd Soviet 
Party Congresses."57 In line with the Soviet policy of discouraging any 
form of personality cult, at the 8th Party Congress, the Chinese passed a 
resolution emphasising collective leadership and removing all references 
to "Mao Zedong Thought" from the Constitution. However, Mao's position was 
by no means seriously threatened by this.
What is particularly significant for us is that by the time of the 
10th Plenary session of Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party and the 8th 
Congress of the CCP, both North Vietnam and China had independently and for 
their own specific reasons concluded that they needed a period of peaceful 
coexistence.
For full text of the speeches of Peng Dehuai and Tan Zheng 
delivered at the 8th Congress of the CCP, see SNB/FE/October 
1956, Supplement, Number 5, pp.20-33; Peng's speech was delivered 
on 18 September 1956 and Tan's on 23 September 1956.
Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The inside story of 
the man who made modern China, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1994), 
p.175 and Chapter 18.
Strobe Talbot (translated and edited), Khrushchev Remembers: The 
Last Testament, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), p.280; Also see, 
Enver Hoxha, The Khrushchevites, (London: Workers' Publishing 
House, 1976), p.246.
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V
During the months of October and November 1956, a crisis developed 
in Eastern Europe, specifically in Poland and Hungary, which threatened the 
solidarity of the socialist bloc. In Poland, the appointment of Gomulka as 
First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party initially did not please the 
Russians. Gomulka had demanded that Polish national interests should be of 
over-riding importance. He planned to drop the Soviet Marshal Konstantin 
Rokossovsky from the Polish Political Bureau and Foreign Ministry as an 
indication of Polish independence and national integrity. The Soviets 
feared that this would jeopardise their position and set a dangerous 
precedent. On 19 October, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders flew to 
Warsaw. Soviet tank formations were positioned to move in as well. In the 
event, Gomulka was prepared to strike a deal with the Russians. In exchange 
for Soviet tolerance, Poland remained within the Soviet alliance. In the 
case of Hungary, the appointment of Imre Nagy on 23 October as the new 
Hungarian Premier was accepted by the Russians until Nagy proceeded to 
support the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and the holding of 
free multi-party elections. These the Russians could not tolerate and on 
4 November, Russian troops moved into Budapest and installed a new 
government under Janos KadBr.58
As members of the socialist fraternity, it was not surprising that 
the Vietnamese and Chinese communists followed the developments in Poland 
and Hungary closely. Both supported the Soviet Union to the hilt. The 
Chinese played a significant role in the two crises.59 According to Fedor 
Burlatsky, at the request of Khrushchev, Liu Shaoqi, who was respected in 
the Soviet Union as one of the most authoritative Chinese leaders flew to 
Moscow to discuss the matter. Liu Shaoqi was in Moscow probably between 22
Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity: A Political History of 
East Central Europe since World War Two, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989), pp.150-160.
For an account of Chinese interest in the Hungarian crisis, see 
Janos Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution 
and Realpolitik, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 
Chapter 2.
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October and 4 November.60 According to a Chinese source, on the request 
of the CPSU Central Committee, both Liu and Deng Xiaoping paid a secret 
visit to Moscow.61 Although Mao concurred with the Russian decision to 
move troops into Budapest, he believed that Khrushchev's secret speech at 
the 20th CPSU Congress was the root cause of the problem.62 This was the 
first time that the Chinese were involved in the political developments of 
an area which had always been regarded as within the Russian sphere of 
influence and it raised the status of the CCP in the socialist bloc.
The crisis within the socialist bloc was over by early November, but 
not without some ramifications for Soviet and Chinese interests in 
IndoChina. As a consequence of the events in Poland and Hungary, the 
Laotian leadership expressed doubts as to the sincerity of the peaceful 
coexistence policy espoused by the Chinese and North Vietnamese. We should 
recall that in June 1956, the Soviet Union made overtures to Laos regarding 
the establishment of diplomatic relations and an exchange of missions. It 
also granted de jure recognition to the Laotian government. The latter 
acknowledged Soviet recognition, without, at that time, taking any action 
on its own part. The Laotian cabinet had decided on an exchange of missions 
when the Hungarian crisis led them to have second thoughts.63 According 
to the British Ambassador, Souvanna Phouma had angrily commented to him 
then that if one of the communist Big Two did not hesitate to take ruthless 
action against a small country trying to be free, why should the other 
hesitate to do likewise in Asia.64 On 14 November, the Chinese reported 
the statement of the Prime Ministers of the four Colombo Powers calling for
Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the Russian Spring: The Era of 
Khrushchev through the eyes of his adviser, (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1991), pp.89-90; FO 371/120873, FC 10110/102, 14 
November 1956, from Beijing to Foreign Office.
Quan Yanchi, Mao Zedong Yu Khrushchev: 1957-1959 Zhongsu Guanxi 
Jishi, (Jiling Remin Chubanshe, 1990), p.6.
Ibid., p.7.
FO 371/123427, DF 10338/4, 20 November 1956, from Vientiane to 
Foreign Office; United States Department of State, Division of 
Research for Far East, report prepared as part of NIE 68-57, 8 
July 1957.
FO 371/123420, DF 1023/6, 15 November 1956, from Vientiane to 
Foreign Office.
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the Soviet Union to withdraw their forces from Hungary,65 But they failed 
to mention Tito's speech which described the Russian leadership as hardened 
Stalinists and blaming them for what happened in Hungary. The Hungarian 
crisis had inadvertently put China's credibility in the eyes of the non­
communist countries to the test. The Chinese would have to reconcile their 
support for the Soviet actions with their proclaimed support for the Five 
Principles of peaceful coexistence.
VI
Meanwhile in North Vietnam, the government had to squash the Quynh 
Luu uprising (2-14 November 1956) in Nghe An Province which arose as a 
consequence of the harsh practices of the agrarian reform and the 
discontent of the largely Catholic population there.66 It was said that 
the 325th Division of the VPA had to be called in to put down the 
rebellion.67 Order was apparently restored only on 19 November.68 The 
government also resorted to repressing the more outspoken intellectuals in
NCNA, 14 November 1956, SHB/FE/615, pp.37-40.
Reports in the British press of fighting in North Vietnam was 
confirmed by one Vietnamese morse transmission, one voice 
broadcast relayed on 16 November 1956 and a broadcast of 17 
November from South Vietnam based on AFP and UP reports received 
through diplomatic channels. See SMB/FE/6\b, p.25. The first 
report from North Vietnam was VNA, 16 November 1956, SNB/FE/616, 
p.28. More information became available on Hanoi home service, 18 
November 1956, SHB/FE/616, p.21 and Hanoi home service, 11 and 28 
November 1956, S M / F E / 618, p.18.
A broadcast from Saigon on 20 November 1956 said that the 
Vietnamese communist radio had just announced that in receiving 
the delegation attending the Conference of the Catholic Liaison 
Committee, Ho Chi Minh had said that in addition to the mistakes 
committed in agrarian reforms, they had infringed on the freedom 
of belief and promised to make amends. See SHB/FE/616, p.27. 
Also see Edwin Evariste Moise, op.cit., pp.410-415.
David Chanoff and Doan Van Toai, Portrait of the Enemy: The Other 
Side of the War in Vietnam, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1986), p.80; 
Pham Kim Vinh, Vietnam: A Comprehensive Hi story, (California: The 
Pham Kim Vinh Research Institute, 1992), p.338.
The Quynh Luu Uprising, (Saigon, 1958).
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the cities and on 18 December, the authorities confiscated and banned the 
"subversive" publications, most notably, the Nhan Van.6* The North 
Vietnamese government's move against the intellectuals coincided with the 
Chinese halting of their liberalisation drive in the wake of the Hungarian 
crisis. The policy of liberalisation in China was however not abandoned but 
was for the moment put on hold.70
The consequence of all these developments was that the struggle for 
the reunification of the North and South received less attention. According 
to US State Department sources, on top of all these problems, the Hanoi 
leadership also had to expend considerable effort on bolstering the morale 
of the cadres who had regrouped in the North as well as the cadres in the 
South who were anxiously waiting for reunification.71
On 18 November, a Chinese delegation led by Zhou Enlai arrived in 
Hanoi, the first stop of a series of state visits to eight Asian 
countries.72 Zhou was accompanied by Marshal He Long, Vice-Premier and 
Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Council. Travelling on the same plane 
as the Chinese delegation was Hoang Van Hoan and Yong Aun, Head of the 
Cambodian Economic mission to China. The first news of Zhou's visit was a 
brief announcement from the VNA on 16 November. A few hours later, the DRV 
Foreign Ministry issued a communique saying that the Chinese Premier would 
arrive on 18 November at the invitation of the DRV Government.73 This
FO 3/7/129706, DV 1016/2, 29 December 1956, from Hanoi to Foreign 
Office.
Elise Hawtin, "The Hundred Flowers Movement and the Role of the 
Intellectuals in China: Fei Hsiao-tung: A Case Study" in Papers 
on China (Volume 12), (East Asia Regional Studies Programme, 
Harvard University, 1958), pp.147-198; Edward Friedman, "The 
Revolution in Hungary and the Hundred Flowers Period in China" in 
Journal of Asian Studies, Volume 25, Number 1, November 1965, 
pp.119-122.
CUSSDCF: 751 G. 00/10-456, 4 October 1956, Department of State: 
Memorandum of Conversation.
North Vietnam, Cambodia, India, Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
Nepal and Ceylon (Sri Lanka).
VNA,' 16 November 1956, SNB/FE/615, p.25; for an account of Zhou's 
visit to Hanoi from two Chinese sources, see Huang Zheng, Ho 
Zhiming Yu Zhongguo, (Beijing: Jiefang Jun Chubanshe, 1987), 
pp.225-227 and Zhou Enlai Naijiao Huodong Da Shiji, (Beijing: 
Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1993), pp.169-170.
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gives the impression that Zhou's inclusion of North Vietnam, the only 
socialist country of the eight, in his itinerary was a late decision. The 
news of Zhou's impending visit came in the immediate aftermath of the Quynh 
Luu uprising. Indeed, as we have noted above, order was not restored in the 
province till 19 November. However, according to US officials in Saigon, 
Zhou's visit to Hanoi, though not well advertised, was known about in 
advance, although it was impossible to speculate as to whether an emergency 
stop would have been made in the light of the Quynh Luu uprising,74
On 17 November, the Hanoi Daily recalled the jubilant atmosphere 
during Mikoyan's visit in April and spoke of the same jubilant feeling for 
Zhou's visit.75 The Nhan Dan editorial on 18 November described the visit 
as of great significance for the development of the sacred friendship 
between the Chinese and Vietnamese people and a reflection of the 
solidarity and single-mindedness in the socialist camp.76 However, the 
British Consul-General made the observation that Zhou's visit was not 
nearly as widely heralded as that of Mikoyan.77
The VNA did not list Truong Chinh in its report of the welcoming 
party at the airport but the NCNA report listed him after Ton Due Thang. 
Truong Chinh was still described by the NCNA as the Secretary of the Lao 
Dong Party Secretariat but the subsequent report on the banquet in the 
evening described him only as a member of the Politburo.78 In his speech 
of welcome at the airport, Pham Van Dong spoke of the long history of 
friendship between the Vietnamese and the Chinese and said that the visit 
of Zhou would further enhance the relationship between them. Zhou, in his 
reply described the friendship of the two countries as unshakable, warm,
CUSSDCF: 751 G. 00/12-1156, 11 December 1956, from Saigon to 
Department of State.
Hanoi Daily, 17 November 1956, SNB/FE/615, p.25.
VNA, 18 November 1956, SNB/FE/615, p.22.
CUSSDCF: 751 G. 00/12-2156, 183, 21 December 1956, from Saigon to 
Department of State (Secret).
VNA, 18 November 1956, SNB/FE/615, p.25; NCNA, 18 November 1956, 
SNB/FE/615, p.5; Guo Ming et al., Xiandai Zhongyue Guanxi Ziliao 
Xuanbian, Volume I, (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 1986), pp.162 and 
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brotherly and firm.79 On the same day afternoon, Ho received Zhou at the 
Presidential Palace. With Ho was Pham Van Dong, Phan Ke Toai, Vo Nguyen 
Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Ung Van Khiem and Hoang Van Hoan.60 In the 
evening, Pham Van Dong gave a reception in honour of Zhou. In his dinner 
speech, Dong spoke of the selfless and effective help of the Chinese in 
Vietnam's economic reconstruction. Zhou, in turn, said that China would 
continue to give firm support to the Vietnamese struggle. He also referred 
to the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence.81 On the morning of 19 
November, Zhou attended a rally at Ba Dinh Square.62 That afternoon, there 
was a meeting between Pham Van Dong and Zhou. Phan Ke Toai, Vo Nguyen Giap 
and the two ambassadors were also present.83 Zhou, accompanied by Pham Van 
Dong, later visited the Vietnam-China Friendship Association. In the 
evening, he attended a banquet given in his honour by the Chairman of the 
Hanoi Administrative Committee, Tran Duy Hung.84 The next day morning, 
Zhou visited the Jade Mountain Pagoda, the Pioneers Club, the Temple of the 
Two Trung Sisters, Hanoi University. Addressing the staff and students of 
Hanoi University, Zhou said that every state and nationality had its own 
good points. China would send some students and experts to study in 
Vietnam,65 In the afternoon, Zhou visited the Unity Match Factory and Gia 
Lam railway works.
At a reception given by the Chinese ambassador in the evening, which 
Ho Chi Minh also attended, Zhou said that China would always abide by the 
Five Principles and opposed "great-nation chauvinism".86 In referring to 
"great-nation chauvinism", Zhou was alluding to the Russian handling of the
VNA, 18 November 1956, SNB/FE/615, p.26.
Ibid.
Hanoi home service, 19 November 1956, SHB/FE/616, pp.21-22.
VNA, 19 November 1956, SNB/FE/616, p.22.
VNA, 20 November 1956, SNB/FE/616, p.22.
NCNA, 19 November 1956, SUB/FE/616, p.23.
VNA, 21 November 1956, SUB/FE/616, p.23.
VNA, 21 November 1956, SNB/FE/616, p.23; For the definition of
"great-nation chauvinism", a phrase coined by the Chinese, see 
"Broadcast Talk on Chauvinism“ in Beijing Radio, 11 December 
1956, SMB/FE/622, p.11.
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recent crisis in Eastern Europe. The Chinese view was that cooperation 
amongst the socialist countries should be based on equality and non­
interference; and that while differences were to be expected, they should 
be resolved through friendly talks and consultation; if that was not 
possible, they should be minimised because the unity of the Bloc should 
never be undermined. We can infer from Zhou's speech that this would be the 
Chinese attitude regarding their differences with the North Vietnamese over 
the handling of the recent agrarian reform debacle in North Vietnam. That 
night at the Chinese embassy, Zhou met the representatives of the overseas 
Chinese community living in Vietnam.
On the morning of 21 November, Zhou and He Long paid a visit to the 
Zhonghua Middle School in Hanoi, which had been founded by Sun Yat Sen 
fifty years before. Addressing the students, Zhou urged the Chinese 
students to study the good points of the Vietnamese people and their 
language. He pointed out that education for overseas Chinese should be 
integrated with the practical conditions in China, as well as with those 
in the country where they resided.67 On that same afternoon, Pham Van Dong 
and Zhou resumed their talks which they had started on the afternoon of 19 
November.SB In the evening, Ho Chi Minh gave a banquet in honour of Zhou. 
In his speech, Ho described Zhou as a brother and a comrade-in-arms for the 
past thirty or more years who had shared the same joys and sorrows and 
worked for the revolution. Zhou thanked Ho for his speech and said that 
China's assistance to Vietnam referred to by Ho was not worth mentioning. 
The real strength of Vietnam came from her people. Zhou described Ho as his 
big brother and recalled that thirty-four years ago in Paris, Ho was his 
guide. They then pinned red roses on each others' coats.09 While in Hanoi, 
Marshal He Long also introduced Taiji Quan to Ho and in early 1957, he sent 
a Chinese instructor to Hanoi to teach Ho.90
At the end of the four-day visit, on the morning of 22 November, a 
joint-statement was signed in which both countries expressed deep concern
NCNA, 21 November 1956, SUB/FE/616, p.23.
NCNA, 21 November 1956, SWB/FE/615, p.22.
NCNA, 21 November 1956, SUB/FE/616, p.23.
Huang Zheng, Ho Zhiming Yu Zhongguo, (Beijing: Jiefang Jun 
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over events which had caused international tension brought about by the 
imperialists; their satisfaction with the developments in Cambodia and Laos 
as well as their relations with those two countries on the basis of the 
Five Principles of peaceful coexistence; their insistence that the 
agreements reached at Geneva in 1954 should be observed. The Vietnamese 
acknowledged the importance of Chinese technical assistance while the 
Chinese instructed their advisers in Vietnam to be industrious and as 
modest as the Vietnamese and not to expect special treatment. Both leaders 
reiterated their support for the Soviet statement of 30 October 1956 on 
developing cooperation between the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries. Lastly, they pledged that Sino-Vietnamese relations as well as 
their relations with other countries would be guided by the Five Principles 
and mistakes due to "chauvinism" would be resolutely prevented.91
Some observations on Zhou's visit were made by Canadian officials in 
Hanoi. A member of the Canadian delegation to the ISCC reported that Zhou 
was "demonstratably cool to Pham Van Dong and all but ignored him" at two 
receptions that the Canadian attended. Another Canadian present in Hanoi 
during Zhou's visit reported that the Chinese Premier "was friendly to all 
but DRV officials and appeared to have little use for the DRV Premier, Pham 
Van Dong". The free circulation of Truong Chinh at the receptions given for 
Zhou was also noted.92
Compared to Mikoyan's visit in April, Zhou's visit was admittedly 
less elaborate. But this was understandable given the domestic problems 
which were dogging the North Vietnamese. Zhou, in fact, arrived in Hanoi 
less than a week after the uprisings in Nghe An province. Many years later, 
the Vietnamese communists were to accuse the Chinese of preventing them 
from reunifying the country in 1956. In the W/?7te Book, the Vietnamese 
claimed that in November 1956, they were told that the partition of Vietnam 
could not be solved in a short time. It might take a long time; and if ten
VNA, 23 November 1956, SMB/FE/617, pp.23-24.
CUSSDCF: 751.G 00/12-1156, 11 December 1956, from Saigon to 
Department of State; 751 G. 00/12-2156, 183, 21 December 1956, 
from Saigon to Department of State: Weekly report on North 
Vietnam (Secret).
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years was not enough, they should be prepared for a hundred years.53 But 
as we have noted above, the Hanoi leadership had already on their own 
arrived at more or less the same conclusion as the Chinese that the 
partition could not be solved in a short time. The difference, perhaps, was 
that their Chinese mentor could afford to be more patient.
VII
After Hanoi, the Chinese delegation proceeded to Cambodia,54 Zhou 
was in Cambodia from 22-27 November. There, he declared his support and 
respect for the country's policy of peace and neutrality and reiterated 
China's commitment to conduct her foreign relations on the basis of the 
Five Principles. He also made a point to assure the Cambodians that China 
opposed "great-nation chauvinism". In his address to the Cambodian
Parliament on 23 November, Zhou said that China's economy was still very
I lbackward as a result of the long years of colonialist scourge. Chinese aim
was to transform the country from a backward agricultural land into an 
advanced industrial one as soon as possible. Zhou thought that the 
transformation process would take a fairly long time and China needed a 
peaceful international environment.55
Speaking at a reception to Chinese residents living in Cambodia, Zhou 
exhorted them to abide by Cambodian laws and decrees and those who have not 
taken Cambodian nationality to refrain from taking part in political 
activities.96 While in Cambodia, Zhou also referred to the issue of the 
unification of China. Once again, he spoke of China's intention to achieve
Socialist Republic of Vietnam Foreign Ministry White Paper on 
Relations with China, Hanoi home service, 4-6 October 1979, 
SWB/FE/6238/A3/11; Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for 
National Salvation 1954-1975: Military Events (JPRS 80968, 3 June 
1982), pp.20-21.
For a Chinese account of Zhou's visit to Cambodia, see Zhou Enlai 
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the liberation of Taiwan through peaceful means. According to Zhou, the 
Chinese communists had twice cooperated with the Guomindang so there was 
no reason why they could not cooperate a third time. We should recall that 
Zhou conveyed the same message regarding China's desire for a peaceful 
unification of Taiwan to Souvanna Phouma when the latter was in Beijing in 
August 1956. However there is no record of him mentioning Taiwan during his 
recent trip to Hanoi. Speaking to American reporters in Phnom Penh, Zhou 
reiterated the Chinese invitation to American journalists to visit China. 
(The invitation was first extended in August 1956.)97 At the end of the 
visit, a joint-statement was signed which reaffirmed the Five 
Principles.98 Sihanouk was clearly pleased with the Chinese attitude. In 
his speech at the farewell party hosted by the Chinese, he spoke of 
Cambodia's neutrality and how it had been misunderstood abroad except for 
"a number of wise people", of which he identified Zhou as one of the 
few.99 According to Nhan Dan, Zhou's visit to Cambodia had further 
strengthened Sino-Cambodian relations and contributed to the consolidation 
of peace in Asia.100
On the afternoon of 27 November, Zhou returned to Hanoi. He was met 
at the airport by a small contingent comprising Pham Van Dong, Hoang Van 
Hoan, the Chinese ambassador and the Indian Consul-General.101 It was 
rumoured that Zhou returned to Hanoi because of the tense situation in 
North Vietnam. But his return to Hanoi had been pre-arranged so that he 
could rejoin the long-range aircraft which was unable to land in Phnom 
Penh.102 According to Indian officials in Phnom Penh, Zhou would merely 
change planes in Hanoi but in the event, he stayed overnight and left for
NCNA, 27 November 1956, SNB/FE/618, p.l; Keesing's Contemporary 
Archives, 30 March-6 April 1957, pp.15463-64.
NCNA, 27 November 1956, SNB/FE/618, p.25.
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India the next morning.103
VIII
In North Vietnam, the Lao Dong Central Committee held its 11th 
Plenary session in December 1956. One of the most important lessons that 
the North Vietnamese leadership drew from the Hungarian episode was the 
necessity of leading governments to pay adequate attention to the people's 
living conditions and adopt a correct attitude when confronted with 
mistakes104, which further confirmed the validity of their stand that 
before anything else, it was necessary to put the North in order first. 
During this plenary session, it was asserted that the Party had not fully 
grasped the line and policy for economic restoration laid down by the 
Political Bureau in September 1954; the general task for 1957 was thus to 
conclude the work of restoration and to increase production, particularly 
agricultural production. Light industry and handicrafts were also key areas 
and trade was to play an important role. All economic policies were aimed 
at impressing the South.
The 11th Plenary session also affirmed that revolution was the 
correct way to liberate South Vietnam.105 At that session, it was agreed 
in principle that Le Duan's thesis, "Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam" would 
serve as the basis of the three-pronged strategy: (a) the consolidation of 
the North, (b) sustaining the struggle in the South and (c) winning 
international support for their cause.106 Although the available official 
Vietnamese sources concur that this thesis served as the basis for the Lao
FO 377/123423, DF 10310/50(B), from Phnom Penh to Foreign Office; 
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Dong Party's revolutionary line in the South, according to Tran Van Tra it 
was neither formalised nor fully implemented till three years later.107 
Thus the basic strategy for the unification of the country spelt out at the 
6th Plenary session in July 1954 remained essentially unchanged.108
Following the 11th Plenary session, the 2nd Conference of the Nam Bo 
Regional Committee took place in December. It was presided over by Le Duan 
and Nguyen Van Linh, the General-Secretary of the Nam Bo Regional 
Committee. The meeting passed a resolution on the organisation and 
activities of the self-defence forces drafted by Nguyen Minh Duong. The 
resolution stated that in this period during which South Vietnam was 
engaged in a political struggle, it was not yet time to carry out guerilla 
warfare. However, due to the needs of the revolutionary movement in the 
South, it was necessary to have self-defence and armed propaganda forces 
in order to support the political struggle and eventually to use those 
armed forces to carry out the violent revolution. The meeting decided on 
the following mission: build propaganda forces, set up secret armed units 
and create base areas in the forested mountains in eastern Nam Bo, the 
Plain of Reeds and U Minh; win over as many disaffected people as possible 
and kill traitors.109 Nguyen Huu Xuyen was instructed to remain in Nam Bo 
to oversee the building up of the armed forces in the South.110
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One of the most important decisions made at this meeting was the 
lifting of the restriction on the use of force in the South. According to 
the Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam, at this meeting armed propaganda 
was advocated. But, it was made very clear that until the North was ready,
the struggle in the South would not be intensified. In other words, the
Southern cadres, although they were now given more freedom of action, were 
cautioned against embarking on premature adventures which were not in line 
with developments in the North.
Soon after this meeting, some time around the end of 1956 or the
beginning of 1957, Le Duan left South Vietnam for the North to assume the
position of acting Secretary-General to assist Ho in the running of the 
daily affairs of the Party.111 William J. Duiker believed that Le Duan was 
in fact the de facto Secretary-General. Tran Van Tra, in his memoir, said 
that from the end of 1956, Le Duan was the Secretary-General.112 According 
to Hoang Van Hoan, Le Duan was chosen because he had advocated some form 
of agrarian reforms to improve the lot of the peasants in the South and it 
was therefore thought that he was the right person to assist Ho in the 
aftermath of the agrarian reform debacle in the North.113 Bui Tin revealed 
that Ho's preference for the post was Giap. But Le Due Tho, who was 
influential as head of the Party's Organisation Department, supported Le 
Duan. Le Due Tho's view in this matter was significant.114 According to 
Hoang Van Hoan, Le Due Tho was Le Duan's most trusted follower.115 
Apparently, it was felt that the many years that Le Duan had spent in
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imprisonment in Poulo Condore identified him as the most trustworthy person 
to oversee the implementation of the three-pronged strategy spelt out in 
his thesis "Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Mam" {which was broadly accepted at 
the recent 11th Plenary session) and the eventual reunification of North 
and South Vietnam. According to Bui Tin, Le Duan held on to the view that 
war was inevitable. Thus from 1957, Le Duan's role and responsibilities 
were no longer confined to the narrow perspective of the South but from a 
much wider vantage point encompassing not only the North and South but the 
international environment as well.
Chapter Three
I
Domestic concern was uppermost in the minds of the North Vietnamese 
communists in 1957. The 6th session of the DRV National Assembly (29 
December 1956 - 25 January 1957) amplified the decisions reached at the 
recent 11th Plenary session. Regarding the economy, the immediate task was 
to try to complete as quickly as possible the task of rectifying the 
mistakes made in the agrarian reform. In the area of defence, it was agreed 
that although peace had been restored, it had yet to be consolidated. The 
National Assembly approved the demobilisation of 80,000 volunteers and the 
introduction of compulsory military service. In his address to the National 
Assembly, Pham Van Dong stated that peaceful coexistence would remain the 
cornerstone of the DRV's foreign policy. Special mention was made with 
regard to further improving relations with Cambodia and Laos. As for the 
unification of the country, Dong reiterated the call for consultations 
between the North and the South.1
Just when the National Assembly was winding up its proceedings, the 
North Vietnamese were confronted with an urgent problem. On 23 January 
1957, thirteen states submitted two draft resolutions calling upon the 
Security Council to reconsider the applications of South Korea and South 
Vietnam for membership in the United Nations. The Soviet Union, evidently 
without consulting Hanoi, also submitted a draft resolution of its own, 
proposing that the Security Council should reconsider the applications of 
North Korea and North Vietnam as well, thus admitting all four states as 
members of the United Nations. According to Wang Bingnan, who was the 
Chinese ambassador to Poland from April 1955 to 1964 and also the Chinese 
representative at the Sino-US ambassadorial talks from 1955 till 1964, 
Khrushchev had been floating this proposal since 1956 through the Soviet 
ambassador in Washington. The Soviet idea was therefore well-known in
For details of the 6th session of the DRV National 
Assembly, see SWB/FE/629, p.21; SWB/FE/633, pp.24-26.
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diplomatic circles both in the United States and China.2 In November 1956, 
when Zhou Enlai was in Hanoi, he had reassured Ho Chi Minh that China would 
not agree to such a proposal. Describing Khrushchev's action as a "selling 
out", Zhou said that China would not be "a party to this betrayal."’ 
(China, of course, was not a member of the United Nations, and therefore 
had no opportunity to vote on the resolutions.)
Another draft resolution was submitted by India and Syria who 
considered that the matter required further examination and proposed that 
the Security Council be provided with all the relevant records so that it 
could consider all the applications for admission/ On 25 January, Pham 
Van Dong wrote to the members of the Security Council and the Chairman of 
the United Nations General Assembly arguing that South Vietnam was not a 
separate nation and its application for admission into the United Nations 
was at variance with the spirit of the Geneva Agreements. The next day, Ung 
Van Khiem, DRV's Deputy-Foreign Minister handed out copies of that letter 
to representatives of the diplomatic corps in Hanoi. Jean Sainteny, then 
the chief French representative to the DRV, was invited to the Foreign 
Ministry where the North Vietnamese protested against French support for 
the South Vietnamese/' In the event, the United Nations Special Political 
Committee on 30 January adopted the 13-power draft resolution and rejected 
that of the Soviet Union. In the light of the committee's decision, the 
representatives of India and Syria decided to withdraw their joint draft 
resolution. The recommendation of the Special Political Committee was 
subsequently adopted by the General Assembly on 28 February 1957. The next 
step was for the Security Council to reconsider the two 13-power
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resolutions/ The resolutions were eventually discussed at the 789th and 
790th meetings of the Security Council on 9 September 1957. The Russians 
vetoed the 13-power draft resolutions and insisted that the question of 
admission be postponed till after the unification of North and South 
Vietnam.7
Meanwhile, Zhou Enlai interrupted his Asian tour and returned to 
Beijing on 3 January 1957 after having visited North Vietnam, Cambodia, 
India, Burma and Pakistan/ On 7 January, he proceeded to Moscow, Warsaw 
and Budapest. The US State Department observed that following the crisis 
in Eastern Europe in the summer of 1956, Moscow seemed to have gone out of 
the way to publicise Chinese communist expressions of approval for Soviet 
courses of action/ Zhou's visit was hailed as "an important event in the 
friendship between China and the Soviet Union."10 The invitation of the 
Chinese Premier to visit Moscow, Warsaw and Budapest at short notice once 
again underscored the growing prestige of China in the socialist bloc.
After visiting Moscow, Warsaw and Budapest, Zhou resumed his Asian 
tour on 19 January, to Afghanistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka, before returning 
home on 6 February 1957. In all the Asian countries he visited, Zhou 
stressed the policy of peaceful coexistence and Asian-African solidarity 
in the fight against colonialism. After ensuring that the external 
conditions were conducive for China's economic construction, the Chinese 
refocused their attention back to their principal domestic concerns. In his 
report on foreign relations to the 2nd National Committee of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (5 March - 20 March 1957), Zhou 
expressed satisfaction with his recent Asian tour and visits to Moscow,
Annual Report of the Secretary-General..., op.cit., 
p. 52; Report of the Security Council to the General 
Assembly, 16 July 1956-15 July 1957, Official Records, 
12th session, Supplement Number 2 (A/3648), p. 74.
General Assembly: Official Records (13th session) - 
Report of the Security Council, 16 July 1957 - 15 July 
1958, Supplement Number 2 (A/3901), (New York, 1958), 
pp.53-55.
NCNA, 4 January 1957, SNB/FE/628, p.4.
Intelligence Report Number 7428: Zhou Enlai's Trip and 
Soviet Policy, (Department of State, Office of 
Intelligence Research), 30 January 1957.
B e i j i n g  h o m e  s e r v i c e ,  8 January 1957, S W B / F E / 6 2 9 , p.5.
Jan -Dec 1957 78
Warsaw and Budapest, He spoke of the general trend of the world situation 
towards relaxation and progress, of the varying roads to independence, the 
common desire for peace and friendship and the Bandung spirit. While 
reiterating China's determination to safeguard its sovereignty and liberate 
Taiwan, he once again expressed the willingness to settle the dispute 
between China and the USA through peaceful negotiations.11
Beijing did not support the Russian proposal to admit both Vietnams 
into the United Nations. However there were also no reports of any Chinese 
protest on behalf of the North Vietnamese. We have no indication that 
Khrushchev discussed the Soviet proposal with Zhou while the latter was in 
Moscow. The "United Nations episode" did not arise till after Zhou Enlai 
had left Moscow on 19 January 1957. In April 1957, Pham Van Dong went to 
Beijing for discussions with Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun regarding North 
Vietnam's economic plans. Also, a delegation from the Lao Dong Party 
Organisation Department led by Le Due Tho spent almost four months in 
China, from April 1957 to July 1957.12
In North Vietnam, apart from the economy and the UN episode, 
attention was also focused on the development of the VPA. We should recall 
that as early as the 6th Plenary session in July 1954, it had already been 
recognised that in order to deal effectively with the post-Geneva new 
revolutionary situation, there was the need to develop the army into a 
modern and regular one. The whole issue of modernising the army was 
reviewed at the 12th Plenary session of the Lao Dong Central Committee in 
March 1957, at which Le Duan would have been present. At the Plenary 
session, General Giap emphasised that for the VPA to be able to effectively 
carry out its missions of protecting the North and unifying the country, 
it must be gradually developed into a modern and regular army.13 The 
leadership, while acknowledging that necessity felt that the modernisation 
of the army should be in tandem with the pace of the economic
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One.
12 Guo Ming (ed.), Zhongyue Guanxi Yanbian Sishi Nian, 
(Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1992), p.66.
13 Ibid., pp.38-39; Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War 
for National Salvation 1954-197 5: Military Events
(printing completed 30 May 1980) (JPRS 80968, 3 June
1982), pp.21-22.
Jan -Dec 1957 79
reconstruction of the North. They cautioned against hasty and impractical 
changes. Taking into account the existing limitations of the army and the 
economic condition of the North, they anticipated that it would be a long 
and arduous process. The leadership also decided that the system of 
voluntary enlistment was to be replaced with the system of obligatory 
military service. The modernisation of the VPA was targetted for completion 
in 1959.” This target would suggest that Hanoi was not prepared for 
military action in South Vietnam or Laos before 1959 at the earliest.
The process of modernising the VPA was carried out with the 
assistance of the fraternal socialist countries. All aspects of the 
military -staffing, training, weaponry were gradually reconfigured along 
the lines of modern doctrines of warfare.15 In 1972, Giap recalled that 
the resolution of the 12th Plenary session of the Party Central Committee 
marked "a new step of development in the party's military theory in general 
and in its theory on building the armed forces in particular."16
Some months later, on 16 May 1957, Ho in an address to middle and 
senior ranking officers from the Ministry of Defence who were attending a 
re-education class to study the decisions of the 12th Plenary session of 
the Party Central Committee, disclosed that the leadership had carried out 
self-criticism at that session. From Ho's address, we can tell that the 
regularisation and modernisation of the army had not been smooth-sailing. 
Ho spoke of the responsibility of regularising and modernising the army, 
as well as the need to raise the level of socialist conciousness of the 
VPA. He warned against individualism, meritocracy, arrogance, envy, 
jealousy and the danger of dividing the people, party and army. He stressed 
the need for unity between the top and bottom hierarchy, cadres and 
fighters, North and South, within and outside the Party, the military and 
the people,17
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In a separate talk to the military units at the Military Region 
Department of Military Region IV, on 15 June 1957, Ho again warned against 
"falling into the hole of individualism", jealousy and envy. He emphasised 
the importance of manual labour. According to Ho, while mental labour was 
important, manual labour was even more important. To belittle manual labour 
was therefore the wrong attitude to adopt. In his view, Party consciousness 
was not yet sufficiently developed in the VPA. He called upon the army to 
raise their alertness, put more effort into their military training and 
political re-education, and to economise. Ho again spoke of the need for 
unity in every part of the army, and warned against divisions between the 
North and South fighters.18
When we compare the little we know of the VPA gleaned from the above 
account with what we know of the PLA gathered from the proceedings of the 
8th CCP National Congress in September 1956 (as recounted in Chapter 2), 
we can see that there was much in common in the state of affairs of both 
armies during this period.
The process of rectifying the mistakes made in the agrarian reform 
took a long time, as the Hanoi leadership had anticipated. At the end of 
May 1957, there were still pockets of unrest in the villages over the slow 
pace of re-dressing the injustices of the agrarian reform. Giap, Truong 
Chinh and even Ho Chi Minh, himself, had to personally go to the villages 
to give talks in the attempt to revive the flagging revolutionary 
spirit.19 In June, Ho visited four northern provinces of Central Vietnam - 
Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Quang Binh and Vinh Linh, and an army unit. Up till 
October 1957, Ho was still engaged in giving talks.20
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II
We have noted that peaceful coexistence was a cornerstone in the 
strategies of both the North Vietnamese and Chinese for the realisation of 
their respective goals. Whether there could be peaceful coexistence in 
IndoChina to a large extent hinged on developments in Laos. This is because 
of the geographical propinquity of Laos with North Vietnam and China. 
Cambodia, on the other hand, does not share any common borders with either 
North Vietnam or China. Also, whereas Cambodia had a strong and effective 
leader in Sihanouk who was determined to keep Cambodia neutral, the 
situation in Laos was more fluid and uncertain. After the successful 
conclusion of the Souvanna Phouma-Souphanouvong talks in August 1956 and 
Souvanna Phouma'a visits to China and Hanoi, it appeared that the Laotian 
problem in principle had been resolved. According to French sources 
reported in British diplomatic communications, there were signs that the 
Vietnamese communists were stepping up their indoctrination activities in 
Sam Neua and Phong Saly in preparation to pull out from the two 
provinces.21 During the last quarter of 1956, the RLG and the Pathet Lao 
sat down to work out the practical details of the August Agreement. Finally 
on 28 December 1956, Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong concurred that a 
temporary coalition government in which the Pathet Lao was to be given two 
portfolios in a broadened cabinet, would be formed prior to the holding of 
a supplementary election.22 On 31 December, Souphanouvong returned to Sam 
Neua to confer with his colleagues, promising to return to Vientiane in two 
or three weeks time to complete the negotiations.23 The joint communique 
was greeted with approval particularly by the Chinese, It was described as 
"helpful to the peace and independence of Laos" and "fully in keeping with 
the Geneva Agreements and the interests and wishes of all the people in
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Laos.” The Chinese further extended their "heartfelt congratulations to 
the Laotian people on their great achievements in realising the peaceful 
unification of Laos.1,2,1 To the North Vietnamese, the communique marked a 
new success for the Laotians in their struggle to uphold the Geneva 
Agreements,
Since August 1956, the Pathet Lao had been pressing for a quick 
agreement. They even threatened to renew hostilities if an agreement could 
not be reached. When the agreement was eventually achieved, both the 
Chinese and the Vietnamese also expressed their approval. Therefore, it is 
puzzling that Souphanouvong delayed for five weeks before returning to 
Vientiane on 4 February 1957, We still do not have the complete picture. 
Some observers thought that he was summoned to Hanoi during this time to 
explain why he did not manage to extract more concessions from the RLG.2S 
Given the close relationship between the Pathet Lao and the Vietnamese 
communists, it is not unlikely that they would have conferred with each 
other.
What we do know is that those five weeks before Souphanouvong 
finally returned to Vientiane coincided with the 6th session of the DRV's 
National Assembly (29 December-25 January 1957) and with Zhou Enlai's 
absences from Beijing. (We should recall that Zhou did not return to 
Beijing till 6 February from his Asian tour.) They also coincided with the 
period of the Soviet draft-resolution to admit both North and South Vietnam 
into the United Nations. A few days after the UN Special Political 
Committee rejected the Soviet proposal on 30 January, Souphanouvong 
returned to Vientiane on 4 February.
Those five weeks were crucial weeks because they gave Katay Sasorith, 
who had returned to Vientiane from New York on 10 January 1957, time to 
campaign against the 29 December agreement, which was essentially an 
understanding reached between the two half-brothers.26 The interval
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provided Katay with the opportunity to galvanise enough support to oppose 
the agreement. Consequently, the RLG demanded additional written guarantees 
from the Pathet Lao as proof of their good faith. They also insisted that 
the integration of the Pathet Lao forces should precede, rather than 
follow, the formation of the enlarged government. Unlike Sihanouk, Souvanna 
Phouma was only the head of a multiparty government and was therefore 
obliged to take into account the views of Phoui Sananikone, leader of the 
Independent Party, and of the pro-West Katay Sasorith, leader of the 
National Progressive Party. Unlike Souvanna Phouma, who was the half- 
brother of Souphanouvong, Phoui and Katay did not trust the Pathet Lao.
Souphanouvong was prepared to accede to the demand of the RLG for 
written guarantees only if the RLG in turn accepted Chinese aid.27 We 
should recall that when Souvanna Phouma met Zhou Enlai in Beijing in August 
1956, there was no pressure exerted on the Laotians to accept Chinese aid 
or to establish diplomatic relations. This sudden demand could be seen as 
a tit-for-tat response to the new demands of the RLG. A guarantee that Laos 
would be neutral was and had always been the concern of the Chinese in 
particular. As Souphanouvong put it in mid-May 1957, "It was not correct 
to say that the Pathet Lao had insisted on the RLG's acceptance of Chinese 
aid as a prerequisite for cooperation, but at the same time, they did 
believe that non-Western aid would be a guarantee of neutrality and 
independence..."28 Souphanouvong was however prepared to drop his call for 
Chinese aid if the RLG dropped its demands for additional guarantees.29 
But the RLG refused to compromise.
On 13 May 1957, the North Vietnamese ambassador to China, Nguyen 
Khang, met Zhou Enlai. Zhou told Khang that Laos must be neutral and that 
there should not be a revolution in Laos at that point of time. The 
immediate priority was to consolidate North Vietnam.30 Soon after, Hoang
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Minh Giam, the North Vietnamese Minister of Culture, who was a schoolmate 
of Katay when the latter was in Hanoi, stopped over in Vientiane from 19 
May to 20 May, on his way back to Hanoi from Cambodia. He visited Katay and 
Nhouy Abhay. British officials based in Vientiane were of the view that the 
North Vietnamese might have tried to obtain the assurance of Laotian 
neutrality from Katay.31 But nothing came out of that. The government of 
Souvanna Phouma was toppled on 30 May 1957 which led to the suspension of 
the negotiations. This was followed by a political crisis that lasted for 
almost two months, from 31 May to 9 August 1957, in which none of the 
leading Laotian personalities could form a new government. Meanwhile, the 
issue of national reconciliation was in limbo. Thus Laos remained a cause 
of concern for both North Vietnam and China.
Ill
Domestic affairs were also the focus of attention in the Soviet Union 
particularly during the months of June and July 1957 which witnessed a 
power struggle within the Russian leadership. During the three-day meeting 
of the Central Committee Presidium which began on 18 June 1957, Khrushchev 
managed to outmanoeuvre his opponents, namely, Molotov, Malenkov and 
Kaganovich who had tried to remove him from the post of First Secretary of 
the CPSU. Khrushchev then convened a special Central Committee Plenary 
session (June 22-29) and expelled his opponents. The outcome of the 
struggle was finally made public on 3 July.32
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According to Liu Xiao, who was then the Chinese ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, the Chinese did play a major although indirect role in the 
struggle. Khrushchev believed that the support of the Chinese was crucial 
to his cause and was therefore prepared to assist China's nuclear research 
programme in order to elicit Chinese backing. After Khrushchev's victory 
in July, it was said that he sent Mikoyan to brief Mao regarding the 
foreign policy differences between Molotov and himself and to secure 
Chinese support for the Soviet Union under his leadership. According to 
Liu, the Chinese endorsed Khrushchev's victory despite having serious 
reservations.33
As for the North Vietnamese, while the Soviet leadership was still 
in the balance, there was always the possibility that a hardliner policy 
in support of the reunification of Vietnam might prevail. Now with 
Khrushchev in complete control, the Soviet position regarding Vietnam 
seemed more than likely to stay unchanged. Nevertheless, the Nhan Dan 
commentary entitled, "Union within the Party is essential to its existence" 
of 5 July 1957, expressed support for the decision of the CPSU Central 
Committee. The news also received prominence in the other newspapers, the 
Hanoi Daily and Thoi Hoi .34
IV
It was against the backdrop of the above events that Ho Chi Minh 
decided to visit the fraternal countries in the socialist bloc. The news 
of Ho's impending tour was made known on 30 June 1957, almost immediately 
after the j political crisis in Moscow was clearly resolved in 
Khrushchev's favour. Pham Van Dong was entrusted with the government's
John Garver, "New Light on Sino-Soviet Relations: The 
Memoir of China's ambassador to Moscow, 1955-1962" in 
China Quarterly, June 1990, Number 122 (Liu Xiao, Chu 
Shi Sulian Ba Nian (Eight Years as Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union), (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao
Chubanshe, 1986).
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affairs during Ho's absence.35 Ho was supposed to have left for Pyongyang 
by way of Beijing on 5 July. He was accompanied by Hoang Minh Giam, 
Minister of Culture, Hoang Van Hoan and Pham Ngoc Thach, Deputy-Minister 
of Health. But the departure was delayed by a day because of bad 
weather.36 It was reported that he was sent off by a number of officials 
and members of the diplomatic corps, and specifically by Pham Van Dong, 
Phan Ke Toai and Vo Nguyen Giap.37 On the evening of 6 July, Ho arrived
in Beijing and was met by Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. After
reviewing a full guard of honour, he was driven to the guest house 
accompanied by Zhu De. That evening, he was the guest of honour at a dinner 
hosted by the CCP Central Committee. Mao was not around when Ho arrived in 
Beijing. He was in Shanghai at this time. On the evening of 7 July, Ho went 
to the cinema with Zhu De and Luo Guibo.
When Ho was in Beijing, the 4th session of the 1st National People's 
Congress was in session (26 June-17 July). During the months of May and 
June, Mao's "hundred flowers" policy had backfired. The CCP found its 
dominant position threatened by demands for the end of the CCP monopoly of 
power. At the 4th session of the 1st National People's Congress, there was 
not even, as there was in 1956, a full-dress report on foreign affairs. The 
deliberations dealt exclusively with the domestic crisis.38 During this 
period and for the rest of 1957, the Chinese communists were absorbed by 
their domestic and economic affairs and were content to leave their foreign 
policy as it was. The policy of peaceful coexistence would allow them to 
focus on straightening the mess which they had inadvertently created at 
home as well as to concentrate on economic development. Some time in July 
1957, Mao was said to have told the Vietnamese communists that 
reunification might take a long time and the immediate concern was to
35 VNA, 30 June 1957, SWB/FE/677 r p.46.
36 VNA, 3 and 5 July 1957, SWB/FE/679, p.27.
37 VNA, 6 July 1957, SWB/FE/680, p.36.
38 FO 371/127270, FC 1017/81, 19 July 1957, from Beijing
to Foreign Office; Telegram from the Consul (Hong
Kong) to Department of State dated 29 June 1957 in
Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume III: 
China, 1955-1957, (Washington: US Government Printing 
House, 1986), pp.567-569.
For details of the Congress, see SfVB/FjF/June 1957, 
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defend the existing frontier - the 17th parallel.39 The North Vietnamese 
did not disagree. They too were preoccupied with domestic problems.
Ho stayed in Beijing for two nights and a day before leaving for 
Pyongyang on the morning of 8 July. On that same day, the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign in China began.40 The Vietnamese delegation was in Pyongyang from 
8 July to the morning of 12 July when they left for Eastern Europe via 
Moscow.41 Because of bad weather, Ho had to stop at Harbin on 12 July.42 
He left on the morning of 13 July and arrived in Moscow on the same day. 
The next day, he visited the All-Union Agricultural and Industrial 
Exhibitions at the Luzhniki Stadium. He was received by Voroshilov and a 
lunch was given in his honour on 15 July. He met Khrushchev on 17 July and 
departed for Prague on the same day, the first leg of his visit to Eastern 
Europe.43 After visiting Czechoslovakia (17-21 July), Ho proceeded to 
Poland (21-25 July), the GDR (25 July-1 August), Hungary (1-5 August) and 
Yugoslavia (5-9 August). Two days before Ho arrived in Belgrade, it was 
disclosed that Khrushchev and Tito had signed an agreement of cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia after two days of secret meetings 
in Rumania.44 After Yugoslavia, Ho continued to Albania (9-13 August), 
Bulgaria (13-17 August) and Rumania (17-21 August) before returning to the 
Soviet Union where he visited Odessa, Stalingrad, South Crimea, Sebastopol 
and Leningrad, He arrived back in Moscow on 26 August and met Khrushchev
Socialist Republic of Vietnam Foreign Ministry White 
Book on Relations with China, Hanoi home service, 4-6 
October 1979, SWB/FE/6228/A3/11.
Zong Huaiwen (compiled), Years of Trial, Turmoil and 
Triumph, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989),
pp.80-82.
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again before leaving the Soviet Union on 27 August.45
We do not know what transpired between Khrushchev and Ho but it was 
likely that the issue of the two Vietnams' admission into the United 
Nations was discussed. Subsequently at the 789th and 790th meetings of the 
Security Council on 9 September 1957, the Russians insisted that the 
question of admission be postponed till after unification. Without the 
opposition of the Soviet Union in the Security Council, South Vietnam would 
have been admitted into the United Nations and the Vietnamese communists' 
cause would have been seriously affected.46
Ho was back in Beijing on the evening of 28 August.47 China was now 
into the second month of its Anti-Rightist Campaign which continued till 
July 1958. On the day of his arrival in Beijing, four leading papers in 
Beijing carried editorials welcoming him and also commented that during his 
tour, Ho had promoted mutual understanding between Vietnam and the other 
socialist countries as well as strengthened the unity of the socialist 
camp. The Chinese further expressed their resolute support for the North 
Vietnamese call for a consultative conference to discuss national 
unification through free general elections.48 On the evening of 29 August, 
Ho attended a banquet given in his honour.
The next morning he left for Hanoi via Wuhan. The Yangtze Bridge in 
Wuhan was nearing completion, two years ahead of schedule. Built with the 
assistance of the Soviet Union, the Yangtze Bridge is strategically 
important for China because it transformed the almost impassable natural 
barrier between North and South China into a broad thoroughfare thereby 
significantly enhancing the geographical integrity of China and reinforcing 
China's national defence. The bridge also improved communication between 
North Vietnam and China. On 15 October 1957 (just after it was officially 
declared open), at 1125h the first express passsenger train from Beijing
TASS, 27 August 1957, SWB/SU/858, p.24.
General Assembly: Official Records (13th session) - 
Report of the Security Council, 16 July 1957 - 15 July 
1958, Supplement Number 2 (A/3901), (New York, 1958), 
pp.53-55.
NCNA, 28 August 1957, SWB/FE/69 5, p. 2; Zhou Enlai
Waijiao Huodong Da Shiji, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi
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crossed the bridge bound for the town of Pingxiang situated at the Sino- 
Vietnamese border in Guangxi Province. Pingxiang is connected to Hanoi by 
rail. On that same day at 1525h, the first Beijing-bound train from the 
Vietnamese border also crossed the Wuhan bridge.49
Compared to the Vietnamese themselves, the Chinese appeared to have 
been particularly expressive about their closeness to the North Vietnamese 
during this time. Renmin Ribao, for example, had a fairly long commentary 
on the Sino-Vietnamese goods exchange and payment agreement and protocol 
on Chinese aid for 1957 signed on 31 July 1957, which it described as a 
manifestation of proletarian internationalism. According to the article, 
trade between China and North Vietnam took three forms: state trade which 
in 1956 had risen to thirteen times the level of 1952; direct trade between 
local trading companies on the Sino-Vietnamese border; and small-scale 
border trade. It also estimated that between 1955-1959, Chinese aid to 
North Vietnam would reach 800 million yuan. The article concluded that the 
close economic cooperation would continue with the growing friendship,50 
The Chinese media also devoted much attention to the DRV's National Day. 
There were reports of the greetings from the Chinese leadership, Zhou's 
speech at the reception given by the DRV ambassador in Beijing and the 
message from Lin Haiyun, the Chinese Deputy-Minister of Foreign Trade who 
recently signed the trade agreements with the North Vietnamese.51 Lin's 
message again referred to the close economic cooperation between the two 
countries. There was also a radio talk on the economic achievements of the 
DRV. Both Mao's message and Zhou's speech particularly expressed the 
Chinese approval of Ho's tour of the socialist countries.52
Ho's visit to the fraternal countries was for the purpose of 
strengthening ties and gathering support for the North Vietnamese cause. 
According to Nhan Dan, "to reinforce unceasingly the close union with 
friendly countries is the first duty of the Party, Government and our
For details of the opening of the Yangtze Bridge, see 
SWB/FE/709, pp.10-14; News from Xinhua News Agency, 16 
October 1957, pp.7 and 9.
NCNA, 1 August 1957, SWB/FE/687, p.5.
VNA, 2 July 1957, SWB/FE/679, p.27; Lin was in Hanoi 
from 2 July 1957.
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people. It is a factor ensuring all our successes...1,53 More importantly, 
Ho visited Beijing and Moscow at a key point in the internal developments 
of both countries. In China, the communists were trying to come to grips 
with the unintended repercussions of the Hundred Flowers Movement; whilst 
in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev had only just strengthened his position. 
By being there, Ho could personally assess the two situations and their 
implications for North Vietnam.
What he concluded from his visit, particularly to Beijing and Moscow, 
can be gleaned from his speech in Hanoi on the occasion of the 12th 
anniversary of the independence of North Vietnam on 2 September 1957. In 
that speech, he stated that as far as the North was concerned, the basic 
task was still to restore the economy and to progressively improve the 
living conditions of the people. There was the need to lay a strong 
foundation so that in 1958, they could proceed to build up the North under 
a long-term plan. As for the South, they should continue to persevere in 
their struggle. He again raised the proposal that contacts should be 
established as a first step towards a consultative conference on the 
general election. Ho referred specifically to the experiences of North 
Korea and the GDR which were also concerned about the reunification of 
their own countries.54 Thus after his visit to Beijing and Moscow, Ho 
concluded that it was still not the right time to step up the struggle in 
the South.
V
Meanwhile in Laos, during June and July 1957, there were three 
unsuccessful attempts to form a new cabinet. Two were made by Katay 
Sasorith and one by Bong Souvannavong. It was not till 9 August that the 
National Assembly approved another coalition government which was once 
again headed by Souvanna Phouma. The return to power of Souvanna Phouma was 
warmly received by both the North Vietnamese and Chinese. The North
VNA, 1 July 1957, SWB/FE/679, p.27.
VNA, 2 September 1957, SWB/FE/696, pp.55-58; Ho Chi 
Minh: Selected Works, Volume IV, (Hanoi: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1962), pp.238-247.
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Vietnamese saw it as "a success of the Laotian people"55 while the Chinese 
regarded it as a defeat for the United States which had tried every means 
to set up a pro-American government during the cabinet crisis since 30 May 
19 5 7 . 56 Souphanouvong in a statement of 13 August expressed his support 
for the new government under Souvanna Phouma and called upon all Laotians 
to support the new government,57 Back at the helm, Souvanna Phouma tried 
to get the negotiations started again. Negotiations between the Pathet Lao 
and the RLG eventually resumed on 16 September. The condition set by the 
Pathet Lao earlier in the year that the RLG must accept Chinese aid was 
quietly dropped. We should recall that the communists were never really 
serious about this requirement. It was proffered to counter Katay. 
Furthermore, the Pathet Lao had found that the insistence on accepting 
Chinese aid had arousecl doubts in many nonpartisans regarding their 
allegiance. On 22 October, Vientiane radio reported that both parties had 
reached an understanding regarding the formation of a coalition government. 
It was agreed that the Pathet Lao would return the two northern provinces 
on the day of the formation of the new government; the Pathet Lao fighting 
forces would be integrated into the national army; those that could not be 
integrated would be demobilised; the Pathet Lao would surrender all the
weapons in their possession; the NLHX would operate as a legal party in
Vientiane and lastly, Laos would adhere to a policy of neutrality. Souvanna 
Phouma and Souphanouvong finally issued a communique regarding the 
agreements on 2 November.58 Once it became official, the North Vietnamese 
described it as "an important advance in the unification of Laos in
conformity with the Geneva Agreements"59 and the Chinese hailed it as "a
great victory for the Laotian people in striving for the peaceful 
unification of their country".60 The Russians too, in contrast to their
VNA, 14 August 1957, SWB/FE/691, p.54.
NCNA, 11 August 1957, SWB/FE/690, p.5.
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silent reception of the December 1956 agreement, greeted it as a cause for 
"rejoicing among all peoples of goodwi 11.1,61
The reasons as to why the Pathet Lao yielded on points to which they 
had held firmly until October 1957 remain obscure. One possible reason is 
that the communists had come to the conclusion that any further 
intransigence on the part of the Pathet Lao would only result in the 
downfall of Souvanna Phouma. When Souvanna Phouma became Prime Minister 
again in August 1957, he committed himself to completing negotiations with 
the Pathet Lao in two months. If he should fail again, the National 
Assembly could call for his resignation. To the communists, Souvanna Phouma 
was their best bet since the alternative would have to be either Phoui or 
Katay, both strongly anti-communists and pro-US. Both North Vietnam and 
China wanted very much to concentrate on their domestic concerns and 
certainly had no wish for an anti-communist government in Laos.
According to United States Intelligence reports, the Pathet Lao's 
intention was to keep a nucleus of hardcore cadres in North Vietnam. A 
group of 600 had already left for North Vietnam. Souphanouvong would lead 
the "legal group", that was the NLHX in Vientiane, while Kaysone would be 
responsible for the "underground".62 This strategy was likely to have been 
agreed upon by the North Vietnamese, Chinese and the Pathet Lao. It was 
based on the assumption that an eventual armed struggle was a legitimate 
route to national liberation, a point which the Chinese strongly insisted 
upon at the Moscow Conference during the same month and which as we shall 
see was eventually enshrined in the Moscow Declaration of 22 November.
After the signing of the 2 November 1957 communique, the RLG 
proceeded to take over Sam Neua and Phong Saly in early December. The 
British ambassador to Laos was one of the foreign diplomats who was present 
in the official party led by Souvanna Phouma at the handing-over ceremony 
in Sam Neua. According to his report, the Pathet Lao regime in Sam Neua was 
modelled on the communist pattern and there were still communist slogans 
on the walls. Posters that were not yet removed showed Chinese and 
Vietnamese communist leaders and the Pathet Lao triumvirate of 
Souphanouvong, Kaysone and Singkapo. The few essential goods available came
Moscow in English for South East Asia, 24 October 
1957, SWB/SU/876, p.38.
FO 371/129477, DF 1015/302, 26 November 1957, from
Washington to Foreign Office.
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mainly from China and North Vietnam. Kaysone was said to be ill and was 
absent from the ceremony. His whereabouts were unknown. Also, the nominal 
roll of troops and lists of equipment were smaller than was admitted during 
the negotiations.63 The Canadian Commissioner who attended a similar 
ceremony in Phong Saly reported that the overt communist influence was even 
stronger there than at Sam Neua. There was also no sign of Kaysone.“ 
Kaysone finally appeared in Sam Neua some time in January 1958. He was 
reported to have come from Hanoi.65
Sam Neua and Phong Saly were completely taken over by the RLG by 19 
January 1958. The occupation of the two provinces by the Royal Laotian Army 
which began on 24 December 1957 proceeded speedily and smoothly without any 
incident, which came as a surprise to many foreign observers.66 Clearly 
the Pathet Lao had been instructed to be cooperative and not to create 
trouble.
VI
In North Vietnam, during the 
were rumours of dissension within 
Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap.67 
was that there was a clash between 
Chinh and the pro-Soviet faction
months of October and November, there 
the leadership, specifically between 
The generally-accepted interpretation 
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led by Giap.6P In those two months,
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except for a brief report of a congratulatory cable that jb® sent to Marshal 
Malinovsky on 31 October 1957, there was a publicity blackout of his 
activitiesfq, although there was nothing unusual about Truong Chinh's 
activities.
The last occasion when Giap was present was during the visit of the 
Bulgarian Government delegation from October 6-9. Giap was part of the 
reception party to welcome the Bulgarians at the airport on 6 October. On 
the same day, the delegation was received by Ho Chi Minh. Giap was also 
present. Ho Chi Minh also attended the luncheon for the Bulgarian 
delegation on that day where he made a welcome speech. On 8 October, the 
visiting Bulgarian Government and Party delegations had talks with their 
Vietnamese counterparts which included Ho, Truong Chinh, Giap and Le Duan. 
This was the first reported public appearance of Le Duan in Hanoi. On the 
same day, Ho gave a lunch in honour of the visitors which Truong Chinh, 
Giap and Le Duan attended.70 This was also the last reported public 
appearance of Giap till 22 December 1957 when he appeared at a public 
meeting to mark the 13th Army Day anniversary.71 At the evening reception
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to commemorate Army Day, he was accompanied by Truong Chinh.77
We still cannot fully account for Giap's long absence from public 
view during these two months. We now know from a Chinese source that in 
October 1957, Giap had led a military delegation to Beijing for discussions 
regarding North Vietnam's military plan and the issue of Chinese 
assistance.73 This would partially explain Giap's absence from view after 
8 October. It is also possible that Giap was in China to witness the 
opening of the Yangtze Bridge on 15 October 1957. We know that there were 
many foreign representatives, including North Vietnamese representatives 
although no specific names were given.74
The Vietnamese media was also unusually silent about the activities 
of Ho Chi Minh in the later part of October. On 12 October, it was reported 
that he would visit Burma in spring at the invitation of the Burmese 
Government.75 On 18 October, the delegation from the Supreme Soviet led 
by A.B. Aristov, member of the Legislative Commission of the Soviet of the 
Union and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee arrived in Hanoi. The 
delegation was received by Pham Van Dong and also met Truong Chinh and Le 
Duan. Although the delegation was in North Vietnam from 18-26 October, 
there was no report of it having any meeting with Ho. Giap was also 
conspicuously absent during this time.76 Ho however did receive the new 
Czech ambassador, Alexis Voltv on 21 October.77 Also around this time, two 
delegates from the Asian Socialist Conference were in Hanoi. They met Pham 
Van Dong as well as Truong Chinh and Hoang Van Hoan on 22 October.78
Ho was rumoured to be ill during this period. According to the
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British Consul^f^-General in Hanoi, K.J, Simpson, on 22 October, King 
Suramarit of Cambodia sent a goodwill message to the DRV and political 
observers read significance into his wishes of good health to Ho.79 This 
further fuelled rumours about Ho's state of health. But on 28 October, it 
was announced that Ho would personally lead the North Vietnamese delegation 
to attend the celebration of the October Revolution.60 He left for Moscow 
on 30 October accompanied by Le Duan and Pham Hung.81
Meanwhile, on 26 October 1957, the Soviet government issued a brief 
statement that Marshal Zhukov, the Soviet Defence Minister had been 
replaced by Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky.62 This announcement was reported 
without comment by NCNA on 27 October.63 But it was only on 31 October 
1957 that it was reported that Giap had sent a cable congratulating the new 
Russian Defence Minister.84 On 2 November, the CPSU Central Committee 
announced that Zhukov was also dismissed from the CPSU Central Committee 
and Presidium. The next day, the Central Committee issued the "Resolution 
of the Plenary session of the Party Central Committee on improving Party 
political work in the Soviet Army and Navy" which affirmed that the CPSU 
was the guiding and directing force of Soviet society and that the policy 
of the military departments must be pursued in strict accordance with Party 
directives. It also made public the reasons for Zhukov's removal. Zhukov 
was accused of promoting his own "cult of personality" in the army and for 
trying to eliminate party control over the military.
The dismissal of Marshal Zhukov was a purely Russian affair but it 
appeared to have had an indirect impact on North Vietnam. We should recall 
that on at least two previous occasions that we know of - on 16 May 1957,
FO 371/129707, DV 1016/42, 5 November 1957, from Hanoi 
to Foreign Office.
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in an address to middle and senior ranking officers from the Ministry of 
Defence who were attending a re-education class to study the decisions of 
the 12th Plenary session; and in a talk to the military units at the 
Military Region Department, Military Region IV on 15 June 1957, Ho Chi Minh 
commented that party consciousness was not yet sufficiently developed in 
the VPA. The regularisation and modernisation of the army had not been 
smooth and the Southern cadres in the North were anxious to return to the 
South. Ho called for unity within the military and exhorted everyone to 
consolidate their ideological viewpoint.85
According to Georges Boudarel, there were certain quarters within 
the military, believed to be close to Giap, who were sympathetic towards 
the intellectuals and the reformers (associated with the now-defunct 
publications, Nhan Pan and Giai Pham), and their ideas of a more open and 
liberal society. Giap's position regarding this issue is however still 
unclear.86 In the summer and autumn of 1957, many rehabilitation classes 
were organised to study the resolutions of the 12th Plenary session. All 
these political re-education and rehabilitation classes would indicate that 
Party leaders were not satisfied with the level of revolutionary 
consciousness in the military.
The text of the CPSU resolution was published in full on the front 
page of Nhan Dan of 5 November. Supporting the decision of the CPSU for 
sacking Zhukov, the Nhan Dan editorial stated that "...The Party's 
leadership constitutes the decisive factor of all our successes and 
progress. Yet, locally and occasionally in practical revolutionary 
activities, such a fundamental principle has not been thoroughly carried 
out...The leadership of the Party was the determining factor of all success 
and progress... and that there have been comrades who did not thoroughly 
understand the fundamental principles of the Party and thus deviated from 
and restricted the leadership principles and policies of the Party in
Ho Chi Minh: Toan Tap, Tap 7 (July 1954-December
1957), (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Su That, 1987), 674-677;
710-712; Ho Chi Minh: Selected Works (Volume IV),
(Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962),
pp.231-234; Lich Su.,., p.47.
For details, see Georges Boudarel, "Intellectual 
dissidence in the 1950s: The Nhan-Van and Giai-Pham
Affair" in The Vietnam Forum, 13, (Yale: Southeast
Asia Studies, 1990).
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contradiction to the policies of Marxism-Leninism."61
We do not know whether or not Zhukov's disgrace affected Giap 
personally. Giap was said to have been receiving relatively less publicity 
in the North Vietnamese media since late-1956,88 around the time when it 
was decided to recall Le Duan to the North. There is the possibility that 
Le Duan and Le Due Tho, who we now know did not have good relations with 
Giap, could have exploited the Zhukov affair to discredit Giap. That could 
explain Giap's "absence" from late-October till 22 December 1957. Zhukov 
and Giap shared some obvious similarities. Both were Ministers of Defence 
and they headed the army. Both were war heroes. Zhukov was known for his 
distrust of political intervention in military affairs and one of the 
reasons given for his dismissal was that he was trying to remove party 
control of the armed forces.89 The American officials based in Saigon 
believed that Giap too was sympathetic towards those who were in favour of 
a lessening of party control over the army. They further believed that the 
fall of Zhukov might encourage the Lao Dong Party to tighten its control 
over the army, through an intensification of the already on-going political 
education courses under the overall charge of Nguyen Chi Thanh, Head, VPA's 
General Political Directorate,90
If there had been differences within the leadership, particularly on 
issues related to the army, or if Giap was in any difficulty during this 
period, they seemed to have been resolved by the time Giap reappeared in 
public during the 13th Army Day anniversary on 22 December. In his Order 
of the Day to mark the occasion, Giap emphasised that in the process of 
gradually becoming a modern and regular army, the army must strictly 
implement every policy of the Party and law of the Government. He also
Hanoi home service, 5 November 19 57, SWB/FE/715, p.45.
CUSSDCF: 751 G. 000/11-857, 8 November 1957, from
Saigon to State Department.
Roger Pethybridge, op.cit., pp.72, 89-90, 128, 152-
161; Oleg Penkovsky, The Penkovsky Papers, (London; 
Fontana Books, 1967), pp.141-145.
CUSS DCF 751 G. 00/11-857, 987, 8 November 1957, from 
Saigon to State Department; In his study, William S. 
Turley also concluded that Giap favoured a lessening 
of party control over the VPA. See William S. Turley, 
"Civil-Military Relations in North Vietnam" in Asian 
Survey, Volume IX, Number 12, (December 1969).
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affirmed that a weak and small nation which stood united and struggled 
resolutely for self-1iberation could defeat a big imperialist power and 
that a small colonial country without any regular army could also defeat 
a big imperialist country.91
VII
Meanwhile in November, Ho, Le Duan and Pham Hung were amongst the 
communist leaders gathered in Moscow to celebrate the 40th anniversary of 
the October Revolution. After which, they assembled for a conference which 
dealt with the important issue of intra-bloc relations. This was an
important issue which had become particularly controversial since the 
Polish and Hungarian crisis of 1956. The Moscow Conference was divided into 
two parts: The first, from 14-16 November was attended only by the
representatives of the twelve communist and workers' parties of the
socialist countries (of which China and North Vietnam were two of the
countries). At the end of this session, a 12-party Declaration was signed. 
The second part of the conference from 16-19 November included all the 
other delegates which participated in the 40th anniversary celebration. At 
the end of the whole Conference, the fraternal countries affirmed their 
unity and solidarity in the communist bloc headed by the Soviet Union with 
the issue of the Moscow Declaration of 1957.92
It is notable that Ho was accompanied by Le Duan and Pham Hung who 
were both closely associated with the communist revolutionary movement in 
South Vietnam. In early 1957, Le Duan had returned to the North to assist 
Ho and in the following year during the 8th Congress of the DRV National 
Assembly (16-29 April 1958), Pham Hung was appointed Vice-Premier.93
Hanoi home service, 20 December 1957, SWB/FE/728,
pp.28-30.
For the full text of the 1957 Moscow Declaration, see 
G.F.Hudson, et al.(documented and analysed), The Sino- 
Soviet Dispute, (China Quarterly, 1961), pp.46-56; 
SPVB/SL//Supplement, 25 November 1957 contains the full 
texts of the 12-Party Declaration and the 64-Party 
Peace Manifesto.
V N A , 29 April 1958, S W B / F E / 764, pp.27-28.
Jan -Dec 1957 100
Unfortunately we still do not know about their activities in Moscow during 
this time except that on 17 November while the conference was still in 
session, Pham Hung left for Prague as head of a Vietnamese delegation to 
attend the funeral of the Czech President, Zapotocky, who died on 13 
November.94
Mao too had travelled to Moscow to attend both the celebration and 
the Conference to express his support for Khrushchev.95 When Mao arrived 
at Moscow airport, Ho Chi Minh was also there to welcome him. Ho stood 
behind Khrushchev. According to a Chinese source, Ho and Mao had 
established a close personal relationship since the Yenan days. After 
greeting Khrushchev, Mao next embraced Ho and had a brief conversation with 
him recollecting their last meeting in Beijing. Mao then told Khrushchev 
that he and Ho were relatives, implying that they were very close. In 
Moscow, Mao and Ho stayed in the Kremlin and he visited Ho on a few 
occasions.96
At the Conference, Mao took an extremely hardline which caught many, 
particularly Gomulka and Kadar by surprise. The Chinese had since the 
autumn of 1956 given the impression that they were sympathetic towards the 
idea of greater independence of the satellite countries vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union. But during the Conference, Mao was the one who made the 
strongest and most unqualified endorsement of Soviet leadership of the 
Bloc. Mao went even beyond the expectations of Khrushchev. According to 
Khrushchev, it was Mao who had demanded that the Russians revised the text 
of the Declaration to emphasise Soviet leadership.97 The Chinese volte-
Prague f 17 November 1957, SWB/Part 271/882, p. 28.
John Garver, "New Light on Sino-Soviet Relations: The 
Memoir of China's ambassador to Moscow, 1955-1962" in 
China Quarterly, June 1990, Number 122 (Liu Xiao, Chu 
Shi Sulian Ba Nian (Eight Years as Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union), (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao
Chubanshe, 1986), p.305.
Quan Yanchi, Mao Zedong Yu Khrushchev: 1957-1959
Zhongsu Guanxi Jishi, (Jiling Renmin Chubanshe, 1990), 
pp.38-41.
See Veljko Micunovic, op.cit., p.319; Jerrold 
L.Schecter (transl.), Khrushchev Remembers: The
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face regarding intra-bloc policy in November 1957 came in the wake of the 
successful launching of the two Sputniks (4 October and 3 November 1957). 
The two Sputnik successes added credibility to the Russian claim in late- 
August 1957 that they had succesfully tested the world's first ICBM. Also, 
on 15 October 1957, a secret agreement in which the Russians promised to 
assist the Chinese in their nuclear programme was signed. This secret 
agreement was reached after a 35-day discussion between the Russians and 
the Chinese delegation led by Vice-Premier and Head of the Scientific and 
Technological Commission, Nie Rongzhen who was in Moscow from September to 
mid-October 1957.98 During the duration of the 40th anniversary 
celebration and the Moscow Conference, a high level Chinese military 
delegation led by Marshal Peng Dehuai and which included General Su Yu, 
Chief of Staff of the PLA, and Marshal Ye Jianying was in Moscow from 6 
November to 3 December. One of the purposes of this visit was to discuss 
Soviet assistance in China's nuclear weapons programme.99 Mao's assessment 
was that the East was now stronger than the West as a result of the Russian 
technological successes, thus his famous slogan: "At present, it is not the 
west wind which is prevailing over the east wind, but the east wind 
prevailing over the west wind."100 He expected the Soviet Union to lead 
in the struggle against the West. The Russians, on the other hand, had a 
different view. While they did make political mileage out of their military 
and technological success, unlike Mao, they did not believe that the east 
wind had necessarily prevailed.
University Press, 1975), p.99.
Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen Huiyi Lu, Part III, 
(Beijing: Jiefang Jun Chubanshe, 1984), p.803.
Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-61, 
(New York: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp.170- 
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In Moscow, Mao warned Khrushchev that West Germany and Japan were the 
main dangers to the communist world.101 In the early 50s, China had tried 
to normalise relations with Japan based on the Five Principles of peaceful 
coexistence. One of China's objectives was to break the ties which Japan 
had with the United States and Taiwan. The appointment of Kishi Nobusuke, 
who was strongly committed to maintaining ties with the United States and 
Taiwan, as Foreign Minister in December 1956 and subsequently Prime 
Minister in February 1957 diminished the chances of a Sino-Japanese 
rapproachment. In June 1957, Kishi made his first state visit to Taiwan as 
Prime Minister, and in November the same year, he visited South 
Vietnam.102 Japan was therefore a concern of not only Beijing but Hanoi 
as well.
According to Khrushchev, it was either during the Moscow Conference
or earlier that he raised with Mao the subject of a division of labour in
the international communist movement. His proposal was that China 
concentrate on establishing closer contacts with the Asian countries and 
Africa while Russia would concern itself with Western Europe and the 
Americas. Mao had declined saying that the CPSU should be the one and only 
centre of the international communist movement. But in the words of
Khrushchev, "as we listened to Mao pay recognition to the Soviet Union and
the CPSU, we couldn't help suspecting that his thoughts were probably very 
different from his words."103
From the Journal of Antonov, S.F. (21 October 1959): 
Summary of a conversation with the Chairman of the CC 
CPC [Central Committee Communist Party of China] Mao- 
Tse Tung on 14 October 1959 reproduced in Cold War 
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1993, pp.55-58. Antonov was then the temporary Charge 
d'Affair of the Soviet Union in China.
For details on Sino-Japanese relations, see Lee Chae- 
Jin, Japan Faces China: Political and Economic
Relations in the Postwar Era, (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
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The Moscow Conference is pertinent to our present study for two 
reasons: What was especially significant for the Vietnamese communists was 
that in contrast to February 1956 during the 20th CPSU Congress, the 
Russians now accepted that under certain circumstances, there could be a 
non-peaceful transition to socialism. The North Vietnamese had the Chinese 
to thank for this change of mind on the part of the Russians.104 Not 
unexpectedly, both the Vietnamese and Chinese media had only praise for the 
outcome of the Moscow Conference.105 Secondly, according to Edward 
Crankshaw, the Moscow Conference was the first time the Chinese presented 
themselves as representatives of a great communist power with a strong 
voice in policy-making for the movement as a whole.106
Ho and the Vietnamese delegation was reported to have left Moscow on 
21 November, the same day as Mao.107 Before leaving, Ho gave a press 
conference in which he described the recent meeting as a significant event. 
According to him, before the second world war there were only 4,000,000 
communists, in 1957 there were 33,000,000 - a great force capable of 
defending peace and fighting against war. Ho also said that the Vietnamese 
communists were pleased that the Soviet Union was leading the world in 
conquering cosmic space and that American science had been left behind.106
The Vietnamese Party and Government delegation, with the exception 
of Ho Chi Minh, returned to Hanoi on 28 November. They were received at the 
airport by Truong Chinh.109 Ho, on the other hand, stayed in Beijing for 
almost a month. His prolonged stay in Beijing was attributed to his need 
for a rest. We have no idea whether Le Duan and Pham Hung spent a week in 
Beijing after leaving Moscow before returning to Hanoi. On 30 November, the
See "The Origin and Development of the Differences 
between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves" in 
Beijing Review, 13 September 1963, Number 37.
See for example, VNA, 24 November 1957 and NCNA, 24
November 1957, SWB/FE/720, pp.2-7 and 43.
Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Pekin, 
(London: Penguin Books, 1963), p.62.
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TASS in English, 21 November 1957, SWB/SU/883, p.38.
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North Vietnamese Politburo met to be briefed on the Moscow meeting by Le 
Duan and Pham Hung.110 Following that, on 4 December, an extraordinary 
meeting of the Lao Dong Party was held to hear Le Duan's report on the 
recently concluded meeting in Moscow.111 Three days later, it was again 
Le Duan who addressed 1500 party officials. He told them that the Moscow 
Declaration and Manifesto had not only confirmed the line and created the 
conditions for North Vietnam to advance towards socialism, they had also 
shown the path of struggle for the liberation of the South. According to 
Le Duan, the socialist revolution in the North had just started. Amongst 
other things, they had to build a new economy, industrialise and 
collectivise agriculture. Meanwhile, the South remained occupied by the 
imperialists. The task was therefore to struggle together for the
reunification of the country.112
On 2 December, Luo Guibo, who was the first Chinese ambassador to 
North Vietnam as well as the first diplomatic envoy credited to the DRV, 
returned to Beijing to assume his new appointment as one of the Deputy 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs. (On 18 October, Luo Guibo, the first Chinese 
ambassador to North Vietnam was appointed as one of the Deputy Ministers
of Foreign Affairs. We do not know for sure to what extent this move was
motivated by the Chinese decision to pay greater attention to Vietnamese 
affairs.) Luo was seen off by Truong Chinh. On 14 December, it was
announced that He Wei had been appointed as the new Chinese ambassador to 
North Vietnam.113 He Wei assumed his post in Hanoi on 13 January 1958.
We have no information on Ho Chi Minh's activities during his almost 
month-long stay in China. But he could not have failed to observe the 
Rectification Campaign which was sweeping across China and which involved 
all levels of Chinese society during this time. When he was briefly in 
Beijing in July and August 1957, the Rectification Movement had only just 
started. It was also very likely that he was aware of the CCP's plan to 
accelerate the economic development in China. During December, plans and
VNA, 1 December 1957, SWB/FE/7 22, p.35.
VNA, 4 December 19 57, SWB/FE/722, p.37
VNA, 8 December 1957, SWB/FE/724, p.51.
VNA, 2 December 1957, SWB/FE/724, p.37; NCNA, 10
December 1957, SWB/FE/72 5, p.15; VNA, 14 December 
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decisions for the Great Leap Forward were already in the pipe-line. On 7 
December 1957, Mao told the visiting Czech military delegation that it was 
China's responsibility to develop a new theory and practice of communism 
in Asia and that only by following this new route would China achieve the 
status of a first class power. According to Jan Seljna, the first high- 
level military delegation from Czechoslovakia to visit China returned home 
on 21 December 1957 with the first hint of the Sino-Soviet split.114 We 
do not know whether while Ho was in China, Mao informed him of his 
intention to establish China as an alternative centre within the communist 
movement.
Ho finally returned to Hanoi on 24 December 1957, two days after the 
reappearance of Giap and on the same day the RLG started the operation to 
resume control of Sam Neua and Phong Saly as agreed in the 2 November 1957 
communique. On his return, the Vietnamese media made a point to mention 
that he looked wel 1.115
Thus by the end of 1957, there was no longer any uncertainty about 
Ho's health. If there had been a tussle between Truong Chinh and Giap as 
rumoured, or any other differences within the North Vietnamese leadership, 
it was either resolved or temporarily put aside. By December 1957, Le Duan 
was most probably the number two man in the Vietnamese leadership hierarchy 
after Ho. The British Consulate-General in Hanoi had observed that since 
Le Duan's return from Moscow, he had always been named first among the 
representatives of the Lao Dong Party at public functions.116
Jan Seljna, We will Bury You, (London: Sidgwick and 
Jackson Limited, 1982), pp.56-58; The Czech military 
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VIII
At the 13th Plenary session of which took place soon after Ho Chi 
Minh returned from China on 24 December 1957, Ho made clear the intrinsic 
relationship between the two revolutionary strategies and the two 
revolutionary responsibilities. According to him, the Vietnamese were 
concurrently engaged in carrying out two equally important revolutionary 
strategies: a people's democratic revolution and a socialist revolution. 
To belittle either of the two strategies was a mistake. The responsibility 
to consolidate the North and gradually advance towards socialism was a 
decisive factor for the victory of the revolution. The North must become 
a socialist society so that it might serve as a solid base in order to 
guarantee the reunification of the country. At the same time, the 
revolutionary strength of the South must be maintained and developed for 
that would constitute the direct and decisive factor for the victory of the 
struggle in the South. In short, Ho was saying that the struggle in the 
South was now considered to be as important as the revolution in the North.
According to the Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam, Ho's speech at 
the 13th Plenary session was very significant as it clarified the path 
along which to carry out the socialist revolution in the North and the 
people's democratic revolution in the South.117 We should recall that in 
September 1957, Ho was still advocating a "North-first" strategy. It is 
highly likely that this shift was the outcome of the deteriorating 
situation of the communists in the South as well as his discussions in both 
Moscow and Beijing. A later North Vietnamese account noted that by the end 
of 1957 and early 1958, the revolutionary forces in the South: the Mekong 
Delta region (from Go Cong province down to the Ca Mau Peninsula), My Tho 
province, the Plain of Reeds (region in Kien Phong and Kien Tuong provinces 
and parts of Dinh Tuong, Long An and Hau Nghia provinces), U Minh jungle 
(the area extending along the coast of the Gulf of Siam in An Xuyen 
Province) and Resistance Zone D (the region 20 miles northwest of Saigon) 
suffered heavy losses as many cadres were arrested or massacred, the self- 
defence organisations in the countryside were broken up, the armed forces 
in the resistance bases had to be reduced and the resistance army of the
Lich S u ..., p . 49.
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religious sects dwindled into a token force.116 The Moscow Conference had 
implicitly acknowledged that non-peaceful means could be adopted to achieve 
the reunification of Vietnam. The situation in Laos was also progressing 
towards a conclusion that pleased both the North Vietnamese and Chinese. 
More attention could now be given to the struggle in the South.
The decisions made at the 13th Plenary session in December 1957 were 
carried out in 1958. At the start of the year, Ho announced that "the 
period of economic restoration has come to an end and the period of planned 
economic development has begun."119 The target of restoring the war- 
shattered economy in three years (1955-1957) as spelt out at the 6th 
Plenary session in July 1954 had therefore been achieved.
For 19 days, between 27 December 1957 and 14 January 1958, the Lao 
Dong Central Committee held a conference of high and middle level cadres 
of the Party to study the Moscow Declaration as well as to discuss the 
current situation of the country. At the conference, more than 200 cadres 
at the central and provincial levels were briefed by Le Duan and Truong 
Chinh. It was unanimously agreed that the people's democratic revolution 
in the North was over, the foundations for a socialist economy had been 
laid and the socialist revolution had begun.120 The new three-year 
economic plan (1958-1960) was subsequently spelt out in detail during the 
8th session of the National Assembly between April 16-29.
At the beginning of 1958, Le Duan also met with the cadres in 
charge of Interzone V (that is, the southern half of Trung Bo). The 
communist activities in Interzone V had declined considerably as a result 
of Diem's renewed efforts to exterminate the communists particularly at the 
end of 1957 and early 1958. During this meeting, Le Duan pointed out that 
Interzone V was divided into three regions: the towns, the deltas and the 
central highlands. If the highlands were strong and stable, the deltas 
would be strong. Therefore, according to Le Duan's analysis, there were 
real and strong reasons to quickly establish small squads or even better 
still platoon-sized armed forces to operate independently in the highlands
"How Armed Struggle Began in South Vietnam" in Vietnam 
Courier, Number 22, March 1974, pp.19-24.
VNA, 1 January 1958, SWB/FE/730, p.41.
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with the objective of controlling and maintaining the party's agricultural 
activities there. When the time was ripe, this guerilla movement could then 
complement effectively the main offensive. The cadres in charge of 
Interzone V were thus told to urgently build many safe base areas to assist 
the guerilla activities and to guide the economic struggle in the delta and 
towns.121
Lich Su..., pp.85-86.
Chapter Four
I
Vietnamese relations with China remained strong. On 11 January 1958, 
three protocols on the transport of goods and passengers from Yunnan along 
the Vietnamese railway to the other Chinese provinces and vice-versa were 
signed.1 These came into effect on 1 March.2 On 13 January, the new 
Chinese ambassador to North Vietnam, He Wei assumed his post. He Wei was 
one of the most important officials in Guangxi province from 1950-52. From 
1953-54, he was the mayor of Canton and a member of the standing committee 
of the South China Party Sub-bureau, which had jurisdiction over Guangdong 
and Guangxi provinces; and a member of the Central-South Administrative 
Committee (formerly, the Central-South Military and Administrative 
Committee) which was responsible for Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, 
Guangdong and Guangxi provinces. In all these capacities, he would have had 
contacts with the North Vietnamese. He was Assistant-Minister of Foreign 
Affairs before becoming ambassador to North Vietnam. On 20 January, a 20 
member government trade delegation headed by Phan Anh, the Minister of 
Commerce, arrived in Beijing.3 On 24 January, another protocol allowing 
the use of Haiphong to facilitate Sino-Vietnamese trade was signed.4
A twenty-member delegation representing seven nationalities in the 
Viet Bac Autonomous Region led by Chu Van Tan left for Guangxi on 2 March 
to attend the inauguration ceremony of the Zhuang Autonomous Region and to 
make a one-month tour of China.5 A protocol on Chinese aid to the North 
Vietnamese for 1958 and an agreement on assistance to the DRV in the 
construction and reconstruction of eighteen industrial projects were signed
1 VNA, 28 January 1958, SWB/FE/737, p.33.
2 Hanoi home service, 25 February 1958, SWB/FE/746, 
p.28; Beijing Review, 11 March 1958, Volume 1, Number
1, p.20.
3 NCNA, 20 January 1958, SWB/FE/736, p.4.
4 VNA, 28 January 1958, SWB/FE/737, p.33.
5 VNA, 3 March 1958, SWB/FE/748, p.35.
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on 31 March. The Chinese would help the Vietnamese to build or reconstruct 
18 industrial projects between 1958 and 1950 with part of the 800 million 
yuan which they had committed to the Vietnamese as a gift in 1955. An 
agreement on the exchange of goods and payment was also reached. The amount 
of trade in 1958 was expected to be greater then the previous year/
On at least three occasions, Ho Chi Minh made reference to China in 
his speeches. During a tour of Thai Nguyen, the capital of the Viet Bac 
Autonomous Region on 2 March, Ho told the residents there that China not 
only gave the Vietnamese pumps but also sent experts to help the Vietnamese 
peasants in handling the pumps. He thanked the CCP and Mao and encouraged 
the peasants to join mutual aid teams.7
Addressing the Enlarged session of the Vietnam Fatherland Front 
Central Committee on 19 March, he spoke of the mass gatherings and big 
parades held in China by the various democratic parties, showing their 
determination to follow the lead of the CCP.8
On 24 April, at a discussion on the line for North Vietnam's advance 
towards socialism during the 8th session of the National Assembly, Ho Chi 
Minh spoke on the socialist transformation in China. He expressed the hope 
that Vietnamese intellectuals, industrialists, traders and other patriotic 
personalities would follow the example of the Chinese in strengthening 
their unity to carry out the resolutions to be adopted by the National 
Assembly for the successful advancement of North Vietnam towards socialism. 
At the end of his talk, a Chinese documentary film, "Everything has 
Changed" which described the socialist transformation in China was 
screened.q
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Also in April 1958, the North Vietnamese and Chinese governments 
reached an agreement regarding the Sino-Vietnamese boundary question. The 
Chinese agreed to the Vietnamese proposal to adhere to the boundary line
between their two countries, which had been drawn up between France and
China in 1887 and 1895, until a new boundary agreement was negotiated by
North Vietnam and China.10
The Moscow Declaration signed in November 1957 had condemned 
revisionism and all dogmatic ideas contrary to Marxism-Leninism. The North 
Vietnamese Politburo now adopted an uncompromising attitude towards the 
intellectuals who were critical of the Hanoi leadership. Following the 
example of its Chinese mentor, the Politburo at the beginning of 1958 
passed a resolution for the launching of a literary rectification campaign, 
the main target being the literary circles. In January, the journal of the 
Association of Writers, Van, was banned. The last issue to be published was 
issue 37 on 17 January 1958. The North Vietnamese leadership had tolerated 
the criticism of the writers since the first issue was launched on 10 May 
1957 which coincided with the "Hundred Flowers Movement" in China. From 
March till June 1958, a campaign against the writers who had contributed 
to the Nhan Van and Giai Pham were carried out. In outlining the Three-Year 
Plan at the 8th session of the National Assembly in April 1958, Pham Van 
Dong made it very clear that it was absolutely essential for intellectuals 
to be loyal to socialism, which meant that they must "understand the 
position and the role of culture and cultural organisers during the period 
of transition in the North, and do so from the Marxist-Leninist standpoint 
and by means of a Marxist-Leninist methodology and viewpoint... This is so 
fundamental an issue that there is no room for compromise."11
We can almost be certain that by May Day 1958, Le Duan was the number 
two man in the Hanoi leadership. According to normal practice, the number
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two man in the Party would always preside at the May Day celebration in 
Haiphong while Ho would be in Hanoi. In 1957, it was still Truong Chinh but 
in 1958, it was Le Duan.15 Truong Chinh was appointed Deputy-Premier on 
29 April 1958 during the 8th session of the National Assembly (16-29 April
1958). But one should not think that his influence had as a consequence 
waned. According to the Indian Consul-General in Hanoi, all the new Vice- 
Ministers appointed during the National Assembly session in April were 
proteges of Truong Chinh.13 In fact, Truong Chinh was the acting Prime 
Minister for about two weeks in August 1958 when Pham Van Dong was ill.14 
In the collective leadership of North Vietnam, Truong Chinh would be most 
likely to pay closer attention to the socialist development in the North, 
while Le Duan would concentrate on preparing the South for the eventual 
offensive, thus carrying out the dual revolution spelt out by Ho Chi Minh 
during the 13th Plenary session in December 1957. Also, by virtue of their 
respective appointments, it would appear that Truong Chinh became more 
powerful in the government whereas Le Duan was gradually becoming the 
dominant personality within the Party. It is worth noting that Le Duan 
never held a government position in North Vietnam.
In China, attention remained focused on the development of the 
economy. The First Five-Year Plan ended in 1957. It was judged a success 
although it was felt that the economy could have developed even faster.15 
Mao, in particular, believed this to be so. In the "Sixty Articles on Mork 
Methods" which he signed on 31 January 1958, he envisaged an economic
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upsurge in three years.18 At the 5th session of the National People's 
Congress in February, it was agreed that China could make this great leap 
forward.17 One would notice that the economic development of both North 
Vietnam and China were moving on a parallel course. Both countries had 
decided upon a three-year economic plan instead of the standard five year 
plans. However, the North Vietnamese did not follow the Chinese example of 
a Great Leap Forward which was launched in May 1958. On 12 March, the DRV 
and the Soviet Union agreed to extend the most-favoured nation treatment 
to each other.18 A trade protocol was also signed which provided for an 
exchange of goods trebling that of 1957.19 According to Nhan Dan, the 
trade agreement marked "an important step forward in the development of 
trade relations between the two countries" and that it also testified to 
"the spirit of generous and wholehearted assistance of one of the most 
industrially advanced countries in the world towards a backward 
agricultural country which has just begun to build a new economy."20 
During this time, China and the Soviet Union too continued to have active 
trade relations.
Ho Chi Minh visited India from 4-13 February 1958 and Burma from 14- 
17 February to win support for the North Vietnamese cause. According to Ho 
before his departure, the objective of the trip was to further strengthen 
the friendship with the two countries and to enhance solidarity among 
countries in Asia and Africa.21 As Le Duan put it, "To unify the country,
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we must build a really strong Vietnam, intensify the revolutionary movement 
of our compatriots in the South and gain the approval of peace-loving 
peoples throughout the world."22 SarDesai noted that particularly after 
Ngo Dinh Diem's visit to New Delhi in November 1957, Indian policy towards 
Vietnam shifted from one of pro-North and anti-South to one of 
impartiality. On 7 February 1958, addressing the Indian Council of World 
Affairs, Ho advocated discussions between North and South Vietnam in 
preparation for the holding of free elections on the basis of universal 
suffrage and secret ballot under the supervision of the ISCC; a single 
Parliament which would choose a national coalition government and the 
gradual integration of the two armies; and finally, pending the 
reunification of North and South Vietnam, that parties and other 
organisations which supported peace, unity, independence and democracy be 
legalised, and normal economic, cultural and social relations and free 
communications between the two zones be established.23 In Rangoon, Ho 
repeated his proposals. It is notable that while both India and Burma 
endorsed Ho's call for the reunification of Vietnam, they did not condemn 
either South Vietnam or the United States for obstructing the process.24 
Returning to Beijing after a stay in Hanoi, Vladimir Popovic, the Yugoslav 
ambassador who was accredited to North Vietnam, disclosed that the 
objective of Ho's trip was to ascertain how much political support (not 
material support) Hanoi might have outside the socialist bloc. Popovic told 
the British officials in Beijing that the North Vietnamese realised that 
they were very dependent on the socialist bloc and would like to get away
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from this dependency.2r' The Indian and Burmese responses would indicate 
to Ho that North Vietnam had little choice but to count on the support of 
China and the Soviet Union.
The Chinese continued to give support to the North Vietnamese call 
to the South for a dialogue.26 On 7 March, Pham Van Dong again wrote to 
Diem condemning US presence in the South. He also called for a meeting to 
discuss the reduction of troops and the establishment of mutual trade so 
as to promote the eventual unification of the country,27 On 9 March, the 
Chinese government issued a statement giving strong support to "this 
opportune peace proposal initiated by the Government of the DRV."28 The 
Chinese statement showed that they were equally concerned about the growing 
American presence in South Vietnam.
II
The Vietnamese communists could not have managed the modernisation 
of the VPA without the help of the Soviet Union and China, although in the 
Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam (published in 1988), they failed to 
mention the Chinese at all. According to one Chinese source, between 1953 
and 1963, China assisted the VPA in establishing six anti-aircraft units, 
an engineer unit, a bridgehead unit, a tank unit and a fighter unit. 
Besides that, the Chinese also supplied the VPA with assault guns, military 
vehicles, engineering, communication and reconnaisance equipment.29
The VPA was close enough to the PLA for them to play football 
together. The August First Army football team was in Hanoi from 21 December 
1957 to attend the national sports meeting at the invitation of the Vietnam
FO 371/136118, DV 1016/8, 26 February 1958, from
Beijing to Foreign Office.
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Sports Commission and the VPA.30 It was reported that the Chinese August 
First Army Number 2 football team won one of two matches in Hanoi, beating 
the Vietnamese security forces 3-1 on 29 December 1957, and drew a game 
with the VPA on 1 January 1958. Pham Van Dong and Truong Chinh (whom the 
NCNA still referred to as the Secretary-General of the Lao Dong Party), 
were both present at the occasion.31
In mid-March 1958, the Central Military Committee produced a new 
military plan. The principal objective of this plan was to come up with 
concrete methods to increase the security and defence of the North, 
particularly in the north-west and west Interzone IV, so as to be ready for
the unexpected.32 It is instructive to note that north-west and west
Interzone IV adjoined the two Pathet Lao-controlled provinces of Sam Neua 
and PhongSaly. It was decided to adjust the target year for the
modernisation of the army from 1959 (decided at the 12th Plenary session 
in March 1957) to 1960. This was to complement the three year economic plan 
(1958-1960) that had been drawn up and would be in keeping with the
decision that military development must be in tandem with the country's 
economic development made at the 12th Plenary session (in March 1957). This 
would also imply that a campaign for reunification was not expected till 
at least 1960.
Also in mid-March 1958, the Council of Ministers met to discuss 
amongst other things, the subjects of military service, reward, military 
rank and salaries, the problems of building up the army reserve and the 
participation of the army in production work. It was decided that there was 
to be a further redeployment of troops so as to concentrate more forces in 
economic construction. Part of the armed forces were to be transferred to 
farm production units so that they could directly participate in 
production.33 In China, in January 1958, it was reported that many PLA 
units had started to discharge drafted personnel and transferred them to
NCNA, 21 December 1957, SWB/FE/728, p.7.
NCNA, 1 January 1958, SWB/FE/730, p.16.
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production work.3'
On the anniversary of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1958, Nguyen Son 
(formerly Commander-in-Chief of Interzone IV and a member of the CCP)35 
who had died in October 1956 was posthumously decorated,35 This second 
posthumous award to Nguyen Son could be seen as another indication of the 
close relationship between North Vietnam and China during this time.
In the PLA (as in the VPA), the Soviet Army was still considered to 
be the army to emulate. On the occasion of Soviet Army Day in February 
1958, Peng Dehuai spoke of the Soviet Army as possessing the "most up-to- 
date equipment in the world" and that it was "the example for the armed 
forces of all socialist countries..."37 But as the PLA became more deeply 
involved in the Rectification Campaign, it began to study Mao's military 
writings more intensively, although not exclusively.38 It was reported on 
18 May that the military academies, army schools and units were all 
studying Mao's military thoughts.
In May 1958, at the 2nd session of the 8th CCP Congress (2-23 May), 
the Great Leap Forward was officially launched. The Chinese people were 
told to "go all out, aim high and achieve greater, faster, better and more 
economical results in the building of socialism."39 At a reception on 19 
May, Foreign Minister Chen Yi had told the representatives of the foreign 
diplomatic and economic missions that as China wanted to complete its 
socialist construction successfully, she was keenly aware of the value of 
peace, and was working consistently and unswervingly for the safeguarding 
of world peace.40
Between 27 May and 22 July 1958, the second Enlarged Conference of
34 NCNA, 15 January 1958, SWB/FE/734, p.7.
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the Military Affairs Committee was held and was attended by more than a 
thousand high-ranking cadres. At the Conference, dogmatism and excessive 
reliance on foreign ideas were criticised and Mao instructed the army to 
draw up a new set of operational manuals and systems specifically based 
upon the PLA's own revolutionary experience. Mao also confirmed that China 
would develop an independent nuclear capability. In short, it was decided 
at this conference that China would chart an independent course in military 
and strategic matters. But it did not yet mean that the Chinese were 
forgoing their military ties with the Russians at this point,41
For three days from 31 July to 3 August 1958, Khrushchev was in 
Beijing on a secret visit.42 Khrushchev was accompanied by B.N. Ponomarev, 
member of the CPSU Central Committee and Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign 
Minister, who had also been the ambassador to China from 1953-55. As 
military issues were to be discussed, Khrushchev also brought along Marshal 
Malinovsky. The Russians travelled incognito and were met at the airport 
by Mao and Chen Yi. There were altogether four meetings between Mao and 
Khrushchev.43
In his memoir, Khrushchev did not elaborate on his discussion with 
Mao but he noted that: One, the Chinese, despite all the outward 
protestations of camaraderie with the Soviet Union did not trust the 
Russians. Two, Mao and the Russians disagreed fundamentally about the 
nature of a future war. To the Russian leadership, battles were no longer 
won by bayonets or bullets. Whereas Mao maintained that given the combined 
population of the Soviet Union, China and the socialist countries, the 
balance of power was in their favour. Mao once again warned Khrushchev of
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the dangers that West Germany and Japan posed to the communist camp." (By 
this time, any possibility of a Sino-Japanese normalisation had vanished 
completely. On 9 May 1958, China had suspended all economic transactions 
and other forms of relations with Japan in reaction to the flag incident 
at Nagasaki on 2 May 1958.)
According to one Chinese source45, during the second meeting which 
took place on 1 August by the swimming pool in Zhongnanhai (when Liu, Zhou 
and Deng were also present), Khrushchev once again proposed that China, 
being more familiar with the situation in Asia and Southeast Asia, should 
concentrate on that region whereas the Soviet Union would concentrate on 
Europe since it had a better understanding of European affairs. Mao once 
again objected to what, in his view, was a policy of divide and rule. 
During this meeting, Khrushchev reiterated Soviet support for the 
liberation of Taiwan. At the same time, he urged Mao to refrain from 
constantly thinking of resorting to military means to test the resolve of 
the West. Mao, in turn, told Khrushchev that he should drop all liaison 
with the United States and drop the idea of the Five-Power Summit 
Conference in Geneva which Khrushchev had proposed before coming to 
Beijing. On the Great Leap Forward, Khrushchev said that it was an extreme 
strategy.
Mao and Khrushchev failed to reach any agreement. Khrushchev had 
initially planned to stay in Beijing for a week but left after three 
days.46 Nevertheless, a communique had to be issued to cover their 
differences. In the communique which was signed on 3 August, both parties 
called for a summit conference on the Middle East question; they agreed to 
struggle against revisionism without compromise and they reiterated their 
support for peaceful coexistence with states of different systems, to do
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their utmost to ease international tension and prevent a new war 
disaster/7 All the Hanoi press on 5 August duly welcomed the communique 
as showing that the socialist countries and peace-loving countries in the 
world were definitely strong enough to crush the imperialists/6 Once 
again, the Chinese and the Russians managed to conceal their differences 
from the rest of the world. What is equally significant is that 
Khrushchev's trip to Beijing was a further indication that China was now 
an equal partner with the Soviet Union in the socialist bloc. This was in 
spite of the constant references and Chinese insistence that the Soviet 
Union was the sole leader of the socialist fraternity.
Ill
We should recall that in Laos, the November 1957 Agreement had 
specified that a nationwide supplementary election would be held on 4 May 
1958. There were 21 seats to be contested and it was the first test of the 
strength of the Neo Lao Hak Xat and the effectiveness of their united-front 
strategy. On the eve of the elections, the editorial in Remain Ribao 
expressed Chinese pleasure over the numerous major successes of the Laotian 
people in their fight for peace, unification and independence. It added 
that the formation of the Laotian coalition government and the 
implementation of the various agreements between the RLG and the Pathet Lao 
fighting units, including the forthcoming supplementary elections, were 
important steps to the further realisation and consolidation of peace, 
unification and independence of the country as well as in the interests of 
peace for the whole of IndoChina/9
The Neo Lao Hak Xat won 9 out of the 21 seats. They had allied 
themselves with the left-wing Peace Party (Santiphab)(founded in 1957 by 
Quinim Pholsena) which won 4 seats, thus giving them a total of 13 seats 
out of 21. Although this did not bring about any change in the overall
For full text, see NCNA, 3 August 1958, SWB/FE/792,
pp.2-4.
VNA, 5 August 1958, SWB/FE/792, p.37.
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composition of the National Assembly which was still controlled by the 
right-wing and neutralists, it showed that the Neo Lao Hak Xat should not 
be taken lightly. The results of the supplementary election jolted the 
disunited right-wing and neutralists and upset the United States 
considerably.50 But the Chinese were obviously pleased. To them, the 
result of the supplementary election marked a new important development in 
Laotian political life and a new victory in the implementation of the 
Geneva Agreements.51
As early as 20 March 1958, Souvanna Phouma had informed the ISCC that 
the cabinet had decided on 13 March 1958 to request the withdrawal of the 
Commission as of 4 May, the date of the supplementary election. Souvanna 
Phouma explained that the RLG considered the elections as the last act in 
the application of the Geneva Agreement.52 On 15 May, Souvanna Phouma 
informed the International Supervisory and Control Commission of the 
successful completion of the election. The members of the ISCC were unable 
to agree as to whether the Commission had in fact completed its task. The 
Vietnamese and the Chinese communists objected to the withdrawal of the 
ISCC. According to the Vietnamese, "the ISCC should continue with their 
task in order to defend the important provisions of the Geneva Agreements. 
If, as a result of foreign intervention, the situation in Laos became 
disturbed and if Laos were dragged into a military alliance and became a 
military base of a foreign power, peace in IndoChina would be seriously 
threatened. "53
The Chinese expressed their deep anxiety at the proposal to wind up 
the activities of the ISCC and were in total agreement with the Vietnamese 
position that it was imperative that the ISCC remain in Laos. They further 
stated that China as a participating country of the Geneva Conference and 
a friendly neighbour of the IndoChina states could not keep silent on the
For a first-hand account, see Sisouk Na Champassak, 
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question.54 An article in Guangming Ribao of 3 June argued that any 
unilateral abolition of the ISCC in Laos would affect the two other 
Commissions in Cambodia and Vietnam. The Commission must not be abolished 
if the Geneva Agreement on the Laotian question were to be thoroughly 
carried out and peace in IndoChina preserved.55 It was reported on 2 June 
that some Indian members of the ISCC had already left for home on 30 May 
and more would leave on 6 June.56 The Nhan Dan editorial of 8 June stated 
that dissolving the ISCC in Laos would only benefit the US imperialists.57 
The Chinese continued to oppose the dissolution of the ISCC in Laos in 
Guangming Ribao on 11 July and Remain Ribao on 14 July.58 After much 
deliberation, on 19 July, the Commission, with the Polish member 
dissenting, finally decided to adjourn sine die.59 The Poles were 
evidently in collusion with the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao. 
Souvanna Phouma told an Australian official in Saigon in July that he was 
aware that the Pathet Lao were keeping in touch with Hanoi through the 
Poles.60 On 9 August, the North Vietnamese issued another statement 
arguing for the maintenance of the ISCC in Laos, but to no avail.61
What worsened the situation for both Hanoi and Beijing was that after 
the election, Souvanna Phouma failed to form a new government. On 22 July, 
he resigned.62 The resignation of Souvanna Phouma must have disappointed 
both the North Vietnamese and Chinese and forced them to reassess their 
strategy regarding Laos. On 15 August, a new government was formed by Phoui
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Sananikone. According to Phoui, the objective of his government was to 
preserve the independence and unification of Laos, which meant that "we 
must guard against the most threatening danger which will undermine our 
independence and unification. This danger is communism."63 Nevertheless, 
on 21 August, Pham Van Dong sent a congratulatory message to Phoui on his 
formation of a new cabinet.64 Phoui, however, proved to be staunchly anti­
communist and abandoned the neutral policy that Souvanna Phouma had 
pursued. In September 1958, he invited Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother and adviser of 
Diem to Vientiane. He declared that the visit of Nhu signified "the 
identical points of view and the solid friendship of the two countries." 
This was shortly followed by the visit of the South Vietnamese Foreign 
Minister. The Laotian Legation in Saigon was subsequently elevated to an 
embassy in 19 5 9 . 65 Phoui also established diplomatic relations with 
Nationalist China. He approved the establishment in Vientiane of a Chinese 
Nationalist consulate which opened on 5 January 1959.66
IV
While the situation in Laos became more and more unpalatable to the 
Vietnamese and Chinese communists; and Sino-Soviet relations continued to 
deteriorate, that of Cambodia appeared more promising, at least to the 
Chinese. Sihanouk did not think that Beijing had formulated a forward 
policy with regard to IndoChina. Therefore, he believed that any Chinese 
subversive threat, in so far as Cambodia was concerned, was a very distant 
one. However, he did feel a sense of grave anxiety about the activities of
Vientiane home service, 15 August 1958, SWB/FE/795,
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the Vietnamese communists.67
Since the start of 1958, he had been attacking the Cambodian 
communists in his speeches. Although the Cambodian communists were 
particularly weak in the rural areas, they were fairly active and 
relatively successful in the capital. In Phnom Penh, the major communist 
newspaper, Pracheachon, had a relatively respectable circulation and was 
considered fairly influential. In the National Assembly elections in March 
1958, the Pracheachon Party was able to put up five candidates against the 
Sangkum. This is not to say that they had a chance against Sihanouk and the 
Sangkum. From the results of the elections, it was evident that they did 
not. But to Sihanouk, if their activities were not checked, the 
consequences would be serious.68 Fie was particularly annoyed by the 
activities of the North Vietnamese and Soviet ambassador whoj^he said^were 
working energetically to subvert the Cambodian intellectuals. The North 
Vietnamese and the Soviet ambassador had been bribing students who failed 
to obtain scholarships to either the United States or France to work for 
communism.69 Sihanouk believed that the Chinese could exert pressure on 
the North Vietnamese to lay off Cambodia.70
Nevertheless, in 1958, it was the Thais and the South Vietnamese 
rather than the communists which were perceived as the imminent threat.71 
On 29 and 30 May, the Cambodian government protested to the South 
Vietnamese government regarding the intrusion of South Vietnamese soldiers
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into its territory, near Kas Kong district of Peam Chor in PreyVeng.72 
More protests followed on 15 and 19 June. It was reported that on 15 June, 
South Vietnamese soldiers had crossed into Cambodian territory, occupied 
a number of villages and clashed with the Cambodian patrols. On 19 June, 
the South Vietnamese were said to have removed a frontier post on Route 
National 19 by three kilometres and subsequently by four kilometres.73 The 
South Vietnamese government denied that any of the incidents had taken 
place. On 27 June, a joint meeting of the Cambodian National Assembly and 
the Royal Council adopted a declaration appealing to foreign countries to 
send observers to Cambodia to establish the truth of what it described as 
a South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The King of Cambodia and Sihanouk 
also demanded that the United States order South Vietnam to withdraw its 
army from Cambodian territory immediately and unconditionally.74 The 
Cambodians revealed that South Vietnamese regular troops had penetrated 
seven miles into Stung Treng Province and that since the beginning of 1957, 
the South Vietnamese had intruded into Cambodian territory on 29 occasions 
and removed the border-marking post deep into that territory.75 On 30 
June, Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, Chen Vi condemned US-South 
Vietnam encroachment on Cambodian territory and expressed Chinese support 
for Cambodia.76 One Chinese Foreign Ministry source believed that Chen 
Vi's expression of support helped Sihanouk make up his mind to establish 
diplomatic relations with Beijing.77 The Stung Treng incident forced 
Sihanouk to recognise China in the hope of using Chinese support as a
NCNA, 31 May 1958, SWB/FE/773, p.43.
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leverage against the South Vietnamese™, and possibly the Thais as well.
On 18 July Sihanouk sent a letter to Zhou Enlai proposing that 
Cambodia and China establish diplomatic relations. The next day, Zhou sent 
Sihanouk a positive reply and added that China would do its utmost to 
support Cambodia's defend its independence.79 On 23 July (just one day 
after the resignation of Souvanna Phouma), it was made known that China and 
Cambodia had decided to exchange ambassadors and that embassies would be 
set up in Beijing and Phnom Penh. On 27 July, a statement was issued by the 
Royal Council which declared its support for the government's decision to 
establish diplomatic relations with China. The statement also revealed that 
"China with its 600 million people and efficient government was giving 
Cambodia disinterested aid."80
Soon after the announcement of the establishment of diplomatic 
relations, Sihanouk made his second visit to China. Before he left for 
China, a number of "high personalities" (we still do not know who they 
were) had tried to persuade him to make a stopover at Hanoi, even if only 
for five minutes. But Sihanouk firmly refused. He then instructed Son Sann 
to convey his reply to those "high personalities" saying that would be 
going too far in annoying South Vietnam and the United States.81
Sihanouk arrived in Beijing on the afternoon of 15 August 1958 and 
stayed in China till 25 August. The visit was accorded maximum coverage by 
the Chinese media. For example, all Beijing newspapers on 15 August carried 
editorials welcoming the visit and emphasised the brilliant example of 
peaceful coexistence shown by the friendly cooperation between the two 
countries. On subsequent days, the newspapers carried reports of the 
activities and speeches delivered. In his speech of welcome, Zhou Enlai
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said that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries and the visit of Sihanouk showed that a new page had been opened 
in the book of traditional friendly relations between China and Cambodia 
and it also marked the consolidation and success of the Five Principles of 
peaceful coexistence. Sihanouk and Zhou had two meetings, on 17 and 24 
August.82 Zhou Enlai told Sihanouk that China was willing to allow neutral 
and nationalist states in South East Asia to remain as a buffer area 
between China and the West. He specifically assured Sihanouk that China 
would not interfere in Cambodia's domestic affairs.83 Sihanouk met Mao 
Zedong on 16 August in Zhongnanhai and again on 20 August in Beidaihe.84 
In his conversations with Mao, Sihanouk observed that unlike his more 
flexible and moderate Prime Minister, Mao showed a "certain distrust for 
non-communist regimes" and seemed unable to compromise as easily.85 The 
Chinese also offered to provide Sihanouk with whatever military armaments 
and equipment he needed.86 A joint-statement was signed on 24 August which 
again emphasised both countries' adherence to the policy of Cambodian 
neutral ity.87
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The newspapers in Hanoi on 26 August carried on their front pages the 
news of the agreement reached between Cambodia and China. The Nhan Dan 
editorial described the joint-statement as a good expression of the Five 
Principles of peaceful coexistence. According to the North Vietnamese, the 
agreement was not only a living expression of the peaceful coexistence 
policy and of the Bandung spirit but also a document condemning colonialism 
and a warning to the US imperialists who were stubbornly interfering in the 
internal affairs and encroaching on the sovereignty of other countries.83
Despite Sihanouk's decision not to go to Hanoi, Cambodian-North 
Vietnamese relations were also making some progress during this time. In 
an interview with the VNA correspondent on 6 August, Touch Kim, the 
Cambodian Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, disclosed that 
negotiations on a trade and payments agreement between the two countries 
was likely to take place in September 1958.89 Trade talks finally took 
place on 12 November and the first trade and payments agreement between 
Cambodia and the DRV was signed on the afternoon of 18 November 1958 in 
Phnom Penh.90
V
Meanwhile in South Vietnam, beginning in mid-1958, Diem's renewed 
efforts to exterminate the communists began to adversely affect the 
revolutionary movement in the South.91 It was in this context that the 
proposal to launch the armed struggle in the South was raised. According 
to Hoang Van Hoan's account, in 1958 it was suggested inside the Lao Dong 
Party that armed struggle be launched against Ngo Dinh Diem and this 
proposal was put forward to the CCP Central Committee. But the Chinese were
88 VNA, 26 August 1958, SWB/FE/798, p.37.
89 VNA, 7 August 1958, SWB/FE/793, p.40.
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of the view that the time was not yet ripe and suggested that Hanoi 
reconsider whether it was opportune then to expose its armed forces in 
South Vietnam.92
According to a Chinese source93, after the North Vietnamese 
completed the restoration of their economy, in 1958 they began to give more 
attention to strengthening the struggle in the South. In that summer, the 
Lao Dong Central Committee sent two documents to their Chinese counterpart 
for their views. These were "Regarding the basic tasks of the Vietnamese 
communists in the new phase" and “Views on uniting the line of struggle 
with the revolutionary struggle in the South". The Chinese subsequently 
submitted a written reply to the Vietnamese. The same Chinese source also 
noted that Ho Chi Minh made a trip to Beidaihe in the summer of 1958 where 
he met Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping to discuss how the Chinese could assist 
the Vietnamese communists in their struggle against the Americans. At the 
meeting, Ho gave the Chinese a document regarding the strategy of the 
Vietnamese communists struggle against the Americans in the South, for 
their opinion. We do not know the substance of the Vietnamese documents or 
what transpired between Ho and the Chinese leaders. It is also unclear from 
the Chinese account as to when precisely the documents were sent, and 
whether Ho's trip was made before or after the Chinese reply to the two 
documents. The Chinese position was that the socialist revolution in the 
North was the fundamental and most urgent task. As for the revolutionary 
struggle in the South, they continued to hold the view that is*} the 
Vietnamese should lie low, build up and consolidate their military 
strength, win over the masses and wait for the opportunity to strike. The 
same Chinese source noted that events during this period indicated that the 
Hanoi leadership did not disagree with the Chinese view in principle.94
However, at the 3rd Conference of the Nam Bo Regional Committee in 
August 1958 chaired by Nguyen Van Linh, it was decided that because of the 
current revolutionary situation in South Vietnam, it was necessary to apply
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some degree of military force to assist the political struggle and 
gradually use the armed forces to defeat the enemy. This was conveyed to 
the Party Central Committee in Hanoi.95 The committee also decided to 
establish two revolutionary base areas: Zone A which was situated northeast 
of Saigon extending from Ma Da to Bu Champ in Thu Dau Mot Province; and 
Zone B which was situated northwest of Saigon in Duong Minh Chau District, 
Tay Ninh Province. It was also decided to establish the Eastern Nam Bo 
Command which was to be the centre of the armed struggle in the South. Some 
of the forces in the eastern Nam Bo provinces were grouped into four 
companies under this Command. Its formation helped the Regional Party 
Committee unify and centralise its leadership of the armed forces and their 
activities in the South.96
In the summer-fall of 1958, the Interzone V Party Committee held a 
meeting chaired by Vo Chi Cong to discuss their strategy. Bearing in mind 
the instructions of Le Duan at the beginning of the year, it was decided 
at this meeeting that they would step up their activities to develop the 
western parts of the lowland provinces in Interzone V and the Central 
Highlands. The objective was to recover and expand their base of support. 
The plan was to build up storage bases for rice, salt, etc., and to 
mobilise the people in preparation for the revolution. They would organise 
a number of platoons and armed them with whatever weapons they could 
muster. These armed troops would be used for self-defence, to support their 
political struggle, to protect their economic activities and the villages. 
They would also attempt to free their comrades who had been arrested by the 
government as well as kill those people that they considered were traitors 
to their cause. The committee decided that they could no longer rely solely 
on political struggle but "must use limited armed struggle coordinated with
"Tu Nghi quyet lich su den Duong Ho Chi Minh" in Su 
Kien Va Nhan Chung, Number 4 (17 January 1994), pp.4 
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political struggle" in order to annihilate the enemy.97
Some time in November 1958, the Lao Dong Party held its 14th Plenary 
session. It was reported on 8 December that the meeting had discussed the 
report by Le Duan on the world situation; the report on the three year-plan 
(1958-1960) for economic transformation and cultural development by Nguyen 
Duy Trinh; and Truong Chinh's report on land reform. The 14th Plenary 
session decided that "the immediate task is to step up the socialist 
transformation of the individual economy of the peasants and craftsmen and 
that of the privately-run capitalist economy, and at the same time to 
strive to develop the state-run economy which is the leading force of the 
whole national economy.1,98 Although it was not reported, it is highly 
unlikely that there was no discussion on the revolutionary situation in 
South Vietnam. After the 14th Plenary session, Le Duan was believed to have 
left for the South on an extended inspection tour to study the situation 
there.99 Meanwhile, the Southern revolutionaries were told that political 
struggle remained the basis of the revolution in the South. This is 
confirmed in a document (captured in July 1959) entitled "Situation and 
Tasks for 1959". This document issued by the Nam Bo Regional Committee 
despite its acknowledgement that the Diemist forces were getting stronger 
vis-a-vis the Southern revolutionaries nevertheless directed that political
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PVar for National Liberation 1954-1975: Military Events 
(printing completed 20 May 1980) (JPRS 80968, 3 June
1982), pp.25-26.
An Outline History of the Vietnam Workers' Party 
(1930-1975), (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 2nd Edition, 1978), p.81; VNA, 8 December 1958, 
SWB/FE/8 27, pp.53-54.
George Carver, "The Faceless VietCong" in Foreign 
Affairs, Volume 44, Number 3 (April 1966); United 
States Department of State "Working Paper on North 
Vietnam's Role in the South" (27 May 1968),
Appendices, Item 36: Interrogation of a Vietcong
infiltrator captured on 4 April 1964; Janos Radvanyi, 
Delusion and Reality: Gambits, Hoaxes and Diplomatic 
One-Upmanship in Vietnam, (Indiana: Gateway Editions, 
1978), p.23; Carlyle Thayer's interview with Phan The 
Ngoc from My Tho province, who was Le Duan's escort 
officer during part of his trip in late 1958. See 
Carlyle Thayer, War by Other Means: National
Liberation and Revolution in Vietnam 1954-1960, 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989), p.222, footnote 85.
Jan - Dec 1958 132
struggle should remain the basis of the revolution in the South.100
VI
The Chinese bombarded the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu 
(Jinmen and Mazu) on 23 August 1958.101 According to Liu Xiao102, the 
incident occurred because of the deadlock in the Sino-American talks, the 
Chinese wanted to force the Americans to take them seriously. In 1993, a 
Soviet document disclosed that on 14 October 1959, Mao told the Soviet 
diplomat and Sinologist, S.F. Antonov that his intention had not been the 
occupation of the islands but to add to the difficulties which the 
Americans were facing in the Middle East during that time.103 According 
to Li Zhisui, Mao's personal physician from 1954-1976, the shelling of 
Jinmen and Mazu was not for the purpose of retaking the islands but to 
demonstrate to both Khrushchev and Eisenhower that Mao could not be 
controlled and to undermine Khrushchev in his quest for peace.104
The North Vietnamese press was initially silent about the bombardment 
until 29 August. Thereafter, they supported the Chinese action to the hilt. 
A commentary in Nhan Dan on 29 August strongly condemned the US
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imperialists and their stooge Jiang Jieshi. According to the Vietnamese, 
Chinese territory covered Jinmen and Mazu as well as Taiwan, and the 
settlement of the issue fell entirely within the competence of China.101' 
Truong Chinh on 1 September blamed the tense situation in the Taiwan Strait 
on the US imperialists and reiterated Vietnamese resolute support for 
China.106 At a reception in Beijing to commemorate the founding of the DRV 
on 2 September, Nguyen Khang, the North Vietnamese ambassador to China 
stated that the Vietnamese people and government wholeheartedly supported 
the Chinese in their cause of liberating Taiwan which was a part of China's 
territory, and determinedly opposed the US imperialists' interference in 
China's internal affairs.107 In general, there was a tendency in all the 
Vietnamese and Chinese reports on the Taiwan Strait Crisis to see a 
parallel between American policy in that crisis and American intervention 
in South Vietnam, as in Pham Van Dong's statement demanding that the US 
imperialists withdraw all J,ts military forces from the Taiwan Strait area 
as well as end its intervention in South Vietnam106. The statement that 
"like the Vietnamese people's struggle for national liberation, China's 
struggle to liberate Taiwan enjoys the support of the whole world" was 
typical. On 14 September, the North Vietnamese government recognised the 
Chinese claim of 4 September 1958 to twelve nautical miles of territorial 
waters and accepted that the Spratlys and Paracel chain of islands belonged 
to China.109 On 21 September, the Vietnamese once more condemned the 
"blindfold" attitude of the American imperialists and quoted the saying of 
Mencius about someone who would see clearly a small feather in the wind but 
was unable to see Mount Taishan. According to the Vietnamese, the fact that 
the Chinese population was nearly four times that of the United States was 
a real factor compared to the "the small feather flying about in the 
autumn", a reference to the smallness of Jiang Jieshi. The Chinese could 
therefore liberate Taiwan any time it chose despite the presence of the
VNA, 29 August 1958, SWB/FE/799, p.45.
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American "paper-tiger”.110
The Chinese action evidently surprised the Russians.111 Although 
around the time of Khrushchev's visit to Beijing, there was a sudden 
proliferation of rather jingoistic propaganda circulating in China 
regarding the liberation of Taiwan, Mao did not tell Khrushchev of his 
intention to bombard the offshore islands. In early September, Liu Xiao met 
Khrushchev in Crimea to discuss the Taiwan Straits and Middle Eastern 
situations. Khrushchev was very troubled by the Straits crisis and felt 
that any further escalation of the situation was dangerous and must be 
prevented.112 Khrushchev sent Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, to 
Beijing on 6 September on a fact-finding mission. Mao and Zhou told Gromyko 
that China did not intend to attack Taiwan but only wanted to stop the 
United States from pursuing a "two Chinas policy", and that China alone 
would bear all responsibilities for the bombardment.113
During the crisis, the Russians duly supported the Chinese publicly 
but they were surpassed by the enthusiastic support shown by the North 
Vietnamese. Like the Vietnamese, the Russians were silent during the first 
few days of the crisis. Their first direct and authoritative statement came 
on 31 August in Pravda, three days after that of the North Vietnamese. In 
contrast to the Vietnamese, Russian support was very cautious.114 The
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Soviet Union only came out in strong and unequivocal support of the Chinese 
on 7 September after Zhou Enlai on 6 September offered to restart the 
dialogue between China and the United States in Warsaw. The Sino-American 
ambassadorial talks, suspended since 12 December 1957 eventually resumed 
on 15 September.115 The rather lukewarm and tardy Russian support during 
the Taiwan Straits Crisis was however not lost on the Chinese.116 Like Jan 
Se^na, Liu Xiao identified 1958 as a "turning-point" in Sino-Soviet 
relations and in addition, cited the Taiwan Straits Crisis as a significant 
contributing factor.117 The noted Mao-scholar, Stuart Schram observed that 
after the middle of 1958, Mao never again spoke positively of 
Khrushchev.116
A speech which Mao made at the 15th meeting of the Supreme State 
Conference on 5 September 1958 gives us some idea of Mao's thinking at this 
point of time: Mao did not think that there would be a war. However, the
"defensive insurance system." Therefore, China must prepare for war. Mao 
acknowledged that China only had hand mortars and grenades whereas the 
enemy had hydrogen and atomic bombs. That was why China (and the Soviet 
Union as well) did not want to fight, and opposed fighting, China would not 
strike first but if given no choice would fight fearlessly. He was 
optimistic that even after a nuclear war, there would be enough people left 
to form a new government and to negotiate.119
By the end of October, Mao's article, "Imperialism and all 
Reactionaries are Paper Tigers", as well as his speeches and interviews
NCNA, 14 September 1958, SWB/FE/803, p.2.
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Jan - Dec 1958 136
related to that theme were widely circulated and publicised.120 It was 
reported that Mao's collection of writings on "paper tigers" was sold out 
as soon as it appeared and the PLA were said to be keenly discussing Mao's 
writings and citing facts from their own fighting experiences to prove the 
correctness of Mao's conclusions. According to the Liberation Army Gazette, 
on 4 November, the PLA General Political Department arranged for all units 
to study Mao's works on "paper tigers".121 By 19 November 1958, it was 
reported that PLA personnel throughout the country were energetically 
studying Mao's writings.122
In the early 50s, the Soviet Union perceived the Chinese as 
ideological partners. But in 1958, the Chinese having achieved a degree of 
economic and political stability were gradually exhibiting their 
independence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.123 China began to pursue its own 
interests in the region. During Veljko Micunovic's last meeting with 
Khrushchev as the Yugoslavian ambassador to the Soviet Union on 8 October 
1958, Khrushchev argued that it was not a coincidence that the Russians had 
taken the north and the Chinese the south of Asia. The two great powers 
were protecting each others' rear; and that as long as both sides observed 
Marxist-Leninist principles, relations would continue as it has been.124 
But the Russians were already having second thoughts. According to 
Aleksandr Kaznacheev, a new period of Soviet policy began to emerge in 
1958-1959 when the Soviet Union gradually abandoned the earlier agreement 
on the division of interests.125 He cited many examples from his
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experiences while working in the Russian embassy in Burma to support his 
claim. The Russians were, however, not very successful in Burma. He also 
referred to the Soviet Union's generous military assistance in terms of 
weaponry to Indonesia. As for the Vietnamese communists, the growing Sino- 
Soviet rivalry could not have escaped their notice; but they were intent 
on not been drawn into the growing Sino-Soviet discord. Meanwhile, they 
were able to benefit from the competition between China and the Soviet 
Union, who were both ready to help their protege advance towards socialism.
VII
Sino-Vietnamese relations particularly in the autumn and winter of 
1958 were clearly very good. The Vietnamese communists were not just urged 
to learn from Mao's military writings, they were also called upon to learn 
from China's agrarian revolution. On 3 September, the VNA circulated an 
article written by Le Duan which described the Chinese experience in 
glowing terms. The article said that the infinitely rich experience of 
China had taught the Vietnamese "a brand new concept of the road to 
socialist construction" (a reference to the Great Leap Forward) and that 
it bore testimony to the fact that once the full force of the peasants had 
been reorganised and reactivated, once they were free ideologically, their 
revolutionary, positive spirit and their creative capabilities were 
immeasurable in socialist construction.126 On 18 October 1958, Nhan Dan 
published the first instalment of a lengthy article by Le Thanh Nghi, 
Minister of Industry, on some lessons to be drawn from the high tide of 
socialist construction in China. It evaluated very highly the Great Leap 
Forward on the basis of the rectification campaign and pointed out that 
learning from the Chinese, the Vietnamese people had made many new changes 
in their countryside and their enterprises. The second and final instalment 
was published on 20 October.127
In November 1958, the organ of the Vietnamese People's Army began to
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publish Mao's writings on "Imperialists and all Reactionaries are Paper 
Tigers". Serialised publication of a summary of the same collection started 
in the newspaper, Thoi Moi, on 10 November.128 It was also announced that 
the first volume of Mao's Selected Works in Vietnamese would be published 
on 26 December 1958. Mao's writings were praised as "classics of Marxism- 
Leninism linked with the practice of the Chinese Revolution.1,129
One of the major preoccupations of the PLA in 1958 and 1959 was the 
drive to strengthen party control over the armed forces.130 This was also, 
true of the VPA. In November 1958, the General Political Directorate, under 
Nguyen Chi Thanh, completed the study of the politico-military role of the 
VPA during the period of struggle against the French. The study confirmed 
the primacy of Party leadership. According to the study, the highest 
principle of party leadership was collective leadership. The history of the 
army was first and foremost the history of the Party leading the army both 
in times of war and peace. Even with the modernisation and regularisation 
of the army, this principle must always be respected. The study recommended 
the strengthening of party committees in the military. In the same month, 
the Central Military Committee held a conference for political commissars 
in the VPA to disseminate the guidelines regarding the role of politics in 
the military. The aim of the conference was to clarify the responsibility 
of the political organisation in the VPA and to affirm the leadership of 
the Party vis-a-vis the military.131
Chinese influence was evidently growing in North Vietnam. According 
to the Fiungarian diplomat Janos Radvanyi, who visited Hanoi in late-1958 
on a routine inspection tour to report on the functioning of the Hungarian 
Embassy there, he learnt of the growing Chinese influence from Jozsef 
Kertesz who was acting as the Hungarian Charge d'Affaires. Jozsef was 
particularly active on the diplomatic social scene and had learned from 
private sources that Chinese economic aid was beginning to exceed Russian 
aid and Chinese popularity was definitely growing. Back in Budapest, Janos
NONA, 13 November 1958, SWB/FE/821, p.33.
VNA, 14 November 1958, SWB/FE/821, p.33.
United States Department of State, Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research: Intelligence Report 8140
dated 29 October 1959,
Lich Su..., pp.60-61.
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Radvanyi reported what he thought was a novel but important observation but 
according to him, nobody seemed to take it seriously.132 The British
Consulate-General also noted this increase in Chinese influence. In his
annual report for 1958, he wrote, "Although no opportunity was lost of
stressing the essential nature of Soviet help and support, there was a
noticeable increase in Chinese influence over the years, almost certainly 
against the wishes of the Vietnamese people."133
Janos Radvanyi, Delusion and Reality: Gambits, Hoaxes 
and Diplomatic One-Upmanship in Vietnam, (Indiana: 
Gateway Edition, 1978), pp.14-16.
FO 371/144387, DV 1011/1, 7 January 1959, from Saigon 
to Foreign Office.
Chapter Five
1
1959 is a particularly significant year. Both communist and non­
communist sources regarded 1959 as the year which marked the 
intensification of the communist armed struggle against the Diem regime. 
The year began with the "Fiuong Lap Incident" which suddenly erupted towards 
the end of December 1958.1 On 28 December, Pham Van Dong sent a message of 
protest to Phoui Sananikone regarding Laotian violation of Vietnamese 
territory and air space since 13 October 1958.2 On 29 December, the North 
Vietnamese claimed that at the instigation of the United States, the 
Laotian armed forces had on several occasions encroached upon North 
Vietnamese land and air space. Planes of the Laotian air force were alleged 
to have repeatedly violated Vietnamese air space over Nghe An, Thanh Hoa 
and Son La provinces. Laotian troops were also alleged to have intruded 
into Quang Tri province, in particular the Huong Lap area, which the North 
Vietnamese claimed they had historical and documentary proof was Vietnamese 
territory. According to the Vietnamese, the Laotian authorities in the 
Tchepone area had recently established a number of military posts in the 
vicinity of Huong Lap and had massed troops there. In the last few days, 
they had also sent threatening messages to the Vietnamese local 
administration of Huong Lap. They further claimed that the situation was 
seriously threatening the security of Vietnamese living along the 
Vietnamese-Laotian border.3
The area in dispute was a mountainous, forested and 
sparsely-populated region situated just north of the 
17th parallel which divided North and South Vietnam, 
and about 15 miles from the highway between 
Savannakhet and the South Vietnamese port, Tourane.
VNA, 2 January 1959, SWB/FE/834 , pp.34-35; for a brief 
account of the Huong Lap Incident, see Arthur J. 
Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics of
Neutralisation, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 
pp.115-116.
V N A , 29 December 1958, S W B / F E / 8 3 3 , p.55.
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A second message of protest was sent on 1 January 1959 which claimed 
a new violation by the Laotian armed forces. Apparently at 0500h on 31 
December 1958, a unit of the Laotian army entered the territory of Tarua 
hamlet in the Huong Lap district and opened fire on the local Vietnamese 
guards. It was also claimed that the activities of the Laotian forces in 
the area had been intensified.4 The RLG in its reply of 2 January denied 
all the accusations and instead counter-charged that Vietnamese troops had 
occupied Laotian territory in Tchepone.5 On 5 January, Pham Van Dong sent 
a third note to his Laotian counterpart stating that the situation had not 
improved.6 On the same day, the RLG replied and asserted that the areas 
referred to by the Vietnamese were Laotian territory and therefore the VPA 
should withdraw immediately from the area concerned. On 6 and again on 7 
January, the RLG issued a statement which claimed that the DRV's 
accusations might be connected with the news being spread in Vientiane that 
the government "would exert pressure to dissolve a certain political party 
legally founded in Laos", an obvious reference to the NLHX. The North 
Vietnamese denied the allegation and again claimed that Huong Lap belonged 
to them. They also denied the reports of the last few days by a number of 
American, Thai and South Vietnamese news services and newspapers that three 
battalions of the VPA had penetrated ten kilometres into Laotian 
territory.7 A new note sent on 8 January claimed that the Huong Lap area 
had been Vietnamese territory since the Le Dynasty.8 On 9 January, Sisouk 
Na Champassak, Secretary of State for Information, RLG, said that the DRV 
troops had encroached upon Laotian territory in Tchepone because the NLHX 
was anxious about being outlawed and the DRV's motive was to compel the 
ISCC in Laos to resume its activities.9 This was denied by the Vietnamese 
on 14 January.10 The RLG on the same day announced that it had reported
4 VNA, 2 January 1959, SWB/FE/83 4 , p.35.
5 Laotian home service, 5 January 1959, SWB/FE/835,
p. 32.
VNA, 6 January 1959, SWB/FE/835, p.33.
VNA, 8 January 1959, SWB/FE/836, p.31.
8 VNA, 8 January 1959, SWB/FE/836, p.32.
VNA, 12 January 1959, SWB/FE/837, p.28.
1(1 V N A , 14 January 1959, S W B / F E / 837, pp. 28-29.
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the incident to the United Nations and was ready to welcome neutral 
observers to the disputed area at any time.11 At this point, the Huong Lap 
incident ended as abruptly as it started.
That the North Vietnamese and the RLG had unresolved border 
differences was not new; but the dispute over the Huong Lap area was 
unexpected. If we recall, during Souvanna Phouma's visit to Hanoi in August 
1956, it was agreed that any territorial disagreements between the two 
countries would be settled through peaceful negotiations. Soon after the 
visit, a North Vietnamese and a Laotian frontier investigation team arrived 
in Nong Het which was between the Vietnamese province of Nghe An and the 
Laotian province of Xieng Khouang.12 Commenting on this survey, an 
editorial in Nhan Dan had remarked that there were reasons for hope that 
agreement could be reached. It further added that the fixing of the border 
was a very complex question, aggravated by the fact that the two countries 
had so long been under foreign domination; but now conditions were 
favourable for the settlement of the border question.13 After a week of 
survey, the teams had issued a joint-declaration which stated that they had 
held their first meeting on 29 September 1956 and had agreed on a working 
routine. Both sides were said to have found their viewpoints had much in 
common. The last meeting had taken place on 4 October 1956 and it was 
reported that the teams would submit the results of their survey to their 
respective governments.14 The truth was that both sides could not agree 
to the proper line for the frontier and the only decision reached was that 
each delegation should report back to its own government. Apparently 
agreement could have been reached if the RLG had conceded to a plebiscite 
in the disputed border area; but as it was under the effective control of 
the Vietnamese communists, the result would have been against the RLG.:b
Nothing more was heard until September the following year when it was 
reported that on 14 September 1957, a delegation from the RLG arrived in
11 Laotian home service, 14 January 1959, SWB/FE/837,
p . 29 .
VNA, 28 September 1956, SWB/FE/601, p.44.
VNA, 3 0 September 1956, SWB/FE/601, p.44.
34 NCNA, 7 October 1956, SWB/FE/603, p.56.
FO 371/123440, DF 1043/19, 15 October 1956, from 
Vientiane to Foreign Office.
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Hanoi by special plane. The delegation was in Hanoi to discuss the question 
of the frontier between the two countries in the Muong Sok and the Nam Can 
areas.16 The arrival of the delegation was welcomed by the Vietnamese as 
"a good expression of the ever-improving relations between the DRV and the 
Kingdom of Laos."17 The discussion lasted from 16 September until 2 
October 1957. On 22 September, it was reported that agreement was reached 
on the temporary withdrawal of the armed forces of both sides from the 
Muong Sok and Nam Can areas. From the joint-communique issued on 4 October
1957, it was evident that there remained outstanding questions which were 
not resolved. Both parties deemed it necessary to consult their respective 
governments in order to carry on the talks in the near future.18 A Nhan 
Dan editorial on 5 October 1957 welcomed the communique as "the fruit of 
the spirit of frankness, cordiality and mutual understanding" and expressed 
the conviction that with the goodwill and efforts of both governments, the 
frontier problem could be settled in accordance with the joint-statement 
by the two premiers in August 1956.19 Again nothing more was heard about 
the issue; then in 1958 Souvanna Phouma was replaced by the anti-communist 
Phoui Sananikone.
According to British sources now available, during the time of the 
Huong Lap incident, there were North Vietnamese troops in the disputed 
area: the largest involved patrols up to two platoons in the area north of 
Tchepone near the 17th parallel.20 North Vietnamese troops had started 
moving into the Tchepone area about 20 December 1958 but their presence was 
only discovered some days later. Incursions were also reported in the 
region near Routes Nationales 12 and 7.21 Two other incursions by North 
Vietnamese troops were reported to have occurred on or about 29 December
1958. The first involved an area stretching some seven miles south of the
VNA, 14 September 1957, SWB/FE/700, p.49.
VNA, 17 September 1957, SWB/FE/701, p.52.
VNA, 4 October 1957, SWB/FE/706, p.44.
VNA, 5 October 1957, SWB/FE/706, p.45.
FO 371/143969, DF 10396/1, 2 January 1959, from
Vientiane to Foreign Office (Secret).
FO 371/143957, DF 1015/15, 10 January 1959, from
Vientiane to Foreign Office.
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frontier about twenty-one miles north east of Tchepone. There were elements 
of one battalion occupying three positions in the area. The forward troops 
were holding the line of Sephbang Hieng and the Nam Se rivers. A company 
of Laotian troops south of the river kept them under observation. The 
second was the occupation by North Vietnamese troops of unknown strength 
of a section about two miles south of Frontier Route Number 12. They were 
also kept under observation by a company of Laotian troops.22 According 
to French reports on 8 January 1959, three North Vietnamese penetrations 
in Laos were withdrawn, to be followed by three new ones - of which one was 
in the area south of Tchepone and the other two were at the latitudes of 
Vinh and Xien'g Khouang. These penetrations went 10-15 miles inside Laotian 
territory.23 However, according to US sources, these incursions by the DRV 
troops posed no serious military threat.24 The British embassy in Saigon 
was of the view that the DRV incursions into Laos were either for the 
convenience of communication with the North Vietnamese detachments there, 
or else they could be genuine mistakes in the dense jungle area.25 In my 
view, whatever the reasons for the North Vietnamese movement of troops into 
this part of Laos, Hanoi had no prior intention to start a border dispute 
with Laos during this time. But after North Vietnamese troops were 
discovered in the frontier area by units of the Laotian armed forces, Hanoi 
decided to quickly accuse the Laotians of intrusion before the latter could 
accuse them.
The immediate result of the Huong Lap incident was that it 
strengthened the hand of Phoui Sananikone in Laos. Addressing the Laotian 
National Assembly on 12 January 1959, he spoke of the serious threat caused 
by the concentration of North Vietnamese troops at certain points along the 
Laotian border. On 14 January 1959, the Laotian National Assembly voted 28-
FO 371/143969, DF 10396/2, 5 January 
Vientiane to Foreign Office (Secret).
FO 371/143957, DF 1015/11A, 8 January 
Washington to Foreign Office (Secret).
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16 to give his government special powers for a year.26 Ten days later, 
Phoui introduced his new cabinet which did not have any NLHX representative 
in it. On 11 February, at a press conference, he announced that his 
government considered the Geneva Agreement pertaining to Laos as fully 
accomplished; the ISCC had completed its task and henceforth Laos would not 
tolerate any interference in its internal affairs.27 The North Vietnamese 
and Chinese believed that Laos would either join SEATO or the Americans 
would set up a military mission in the country.28
II
In the midst of the Huong Lap incident, the Lao Dong Party held its 
15th Plenary session in Hanoi, less than two months after the 14th session 
was held in November 1958. The 15th Plenary session was divided into two 
parts: the first was a closed-door meeting followed by an enlarged one. We 
do not know the exact dates of the whole session except that it took place 
in January 1959. We can surmise that it must have taken place after Le Duan 
returned from his visit to the South in early January. It is highly likely 
that the closed-door meeting ended before 11 January 1959 because on that 
day Le Thanh Nghi, who was a member of the Politburo, arrived in Beijing 
to join the DRV economic delegation which had been in China since December 
1958.29 Nghi who was Minister of Industry and Director of the Industrial 
section of the DRV's Premier Office was also the leader of the economic 
delegation. He would have remained in Hanoi for the closed-door meeting 
before proceeding to Beijing.
We still have no knowledge of the proceedings of the closed-door 
meeting except that the resolution to liberate South Vietnam from 
imperialism and feudalism, and complete the people's democratic revolution
VNA, 16 January 1959, SWB/FE/838, p.36.
Vientiane in French, 11 February 1959, SWB/FE/84 5, 
pp.25-26.
NCNA, 14 February 1959, SWB/FE/846, p.56; VNA, 15
February 1959, SWB/FE/846, p.56.
N C N A ,  1 1 January 1959, S W B / F E / 8 3 6 , p.10.
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was adopted. The way to develop the foundation for the revolution in the 
South was to first use mass uprisings to seize power and after that let the 
current situation determine the course of the revolution. The most 
important factor was the strength of the masses. The armed forces should 
play a complementary and supportive role. Because of the American presence, 
it was anticipated that the struggle would be a protracted one.3C 
According to Tran Van Tra, Le Duan's thesis, "Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam" 
written almost three years ago, was finally adopted in full.31
According to the CRIMP Document, although the 15th Plenary session 
officially and concisely specified the responsibilities and strategic aims 
of the revolution in the South, there was insufficient information 
regarding the revolutionary movement in the South and the experiences of 
friendly nations to formulate a precise programme. Questions such as how 
the aims and responsibilities of the revolution were to be implemented; and 
what should be the main forms and procedures of the struggle were left 
unanswered. It was not until two years later that a clear programme was 
eventually formulated.32 The 15th Plenary session also discussed the need 
for a popular front in the South. It saw the struggle to reunite the 
country as part of the world revolution and believed that a Vietnamese 
victory would encourage struggles for liberation in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. The need to offer assistance to Laos and Cambodia was highlighted.
We do know now that the enlarged meeting which followed was chaired 
by Ho and attended by representatives from the Nam Bo Regional Committee, 
the interprovincial committee of Interzone V and representatives from all 
the party committees from the provinces in Central Vietnam33 and that it
"Tu Nghi quyet lich su den Duong Ho Chi Minh" in Su 
Kien va Nhan Chung, Number 4 (17 January 19 94), p.32.
Tran Van Tra, Nhung Chang Duong Lich Su Cua B2 Thanh 
Dong (Tap I): Hoa Binh Hay Chien Tranh, (Hanoi: Nha 
Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1992), p.153.
United States Department of State "Working Paper on 
North Vietnam's Role in the South" (27 May 1968), 
Appendices, Item 301: CRIMP Document.
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ended on 13 January 1959.34 In his closing address, Ho said, "The task of 
saving our country is a responsibility of the whole party... (We) must 
consider the southern region of Vietnam as part of our country's revolution 
and to see our country's revolution as part of the world's revolution... 
We must spread out and fly high the flag of peace because that has great 
benefit for us. But peace does not mean that we do not prepare our military
forces... If we organise our political strength well, when the need comes
to resort to arms, it will not be difficult."35
It is important to note that although the 15th Plenary session 
officially sanctioned the resumption of armed struggle, political struggle 
was still regarded as the most important. The strategy was to depend 
primarily on the political strength of the masses in the South, that is 
mass uprisings supported by the people's armed forces. How massive a 
military force to employ would depend on the circumstances and must be 
tailored to further the political cause. The Central Committee also 
anticipated that the mass uprisings would eventually develop into a 
prolonged armed struggle, in which they were confident of victory.
After the 15th Plenary session, all the southern members of the 
Central Committee who were in charge of the various regions in the South, 
the representatives from the Nam Bo Regional Committee and interprovincial 
committee of Interzone V, were entrusted with the urgent responsibility to 
return to the South to prepare and guide the revolution.36 Significantly, 
the decision of the 15th Plenary session was not made public until five
months later on 13 May 1959.
Cao Van Luong, Lich Su Cach Mang Mien Nam Vietnam: 
Giai Doan 1954-1960, (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa 
Hoi, 1991), p.120.
Lich Su..., pp.89-91; Cao Van Luong, Lich Su Cach Mang 
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III
Soon after the 15th Plenary session, Vo Nguyen Giap lodged a protest 
with the ISCC against the so-called Phu Loi incident. It was reported that 
on 18 January 1958, immediately on learning of the Phu Loi incident, Giap 
had met the Indian Chairman of the ISCC and the Head of the Canadian 
delegation.37 The very next day, a "Committee to Struggle against the Phu 
Loi massacre" was formed by the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland 
Front. Between 20-23 January, thousands of North Vietnamese participated 
in demonstrations against the incident.38
Apparently, on 1 December 1958, over a thousand political prisoners, 
either communists or communist-sympathisers were alleged to have been 
intentionally poisoned by the South Vietnamese authorities and to have died 
in the Phu Loi prison in Thu Dau Mot province, 33 kilometres from Saigon. 
On 27 January, Pham Binh, the DRV Charge d'Affaires to China held a press
I
conference in Beijing in which he described the Phu Loi incident as the 
most atrocious massacre ever recorded so far in the world in peace time, 
comparable only to the mass murders practised by the Hitlerite fascists and 
the outrages against prisoners of war in Koje Island committed by the US 
aggressors of the Korean War. The massacre...was part of the US plot to 
perpetuate Vietnam's partition and turn South Vietnam into an American 
colony and military base. It was also a typical example of the so-called 
"denounce and exterminate communists policy".38 The North Vietnamese 
protest against the Phu Loi incident lasted till March 1959.
According to the British Embassy observers in Saigon, the deaths in 
Phu Loi prison as a result of food-poisoning were caused either by 
negligence on the part of the prison authorities, by accident or both; but 
it was not a massacre and the number of deaths there did not approach^ the
VNA, 18 January 1959, SWB/FE/838, pp.35-36.
VNA, 20 January 1958, SWB/FE/839, pp.40-41; Vietnam: 
The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation 
1954-1975: Military Events (printing completed 30 May 
1980) (JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982), p.28.
N C N A , 27 January 1959, S W B / F E / 8 4 0 , p.14.
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scale alleged by Hanoi.40 Whatever the truth may be, the incident was 
exploited to its fullest and was used to fan widespread indignation in the 
North. The British Embassy in Saigon believed that the incident was blown 
up by the North because the North Vietnamese were discomforted by the 
calmness prevailing in the South and the satisfactory results of the Diem's 
security drive.41 According to a Vietnamese communist source, at the end 
of 1958 and early 1959, Diem's policy of terror in the South had reached 
its height.42 Wilfred Burchett described the period 1958-1959 as the 
"blackest, most hopeless years for the people in South Vietnam.43 The 
British-Consulate General in Hanoi thought that Hanoi wanted to use the 
incident to rally more support from the Soviet Union and China.44
We still do not have the facts to confirm either view. There is 
reason to believe that Hanoi knew about the Phu Loi incident before it took 
action on 18 January 1959. As we have noted above, Le Duan was in the South 
on an extensive inspection tour in December 1958 and returned to Hanoi in 
early January 1959. Also, many Southern cadres were gathered in the North 
in early January for the 15th Plenary session. It would be rather 
unbelievable if neither Le Duan nor any of the Southern leaders heard of 
the Phu Loi incident of 1 December 1958 until 18 January 1959. Thus there 
is reason to believe that the incident was deliberately magnified after the 
decision was taken at the 15th Plenary sessionto intensify the revolution 
in the South. It is also not unreasonable to believe that Hanoi wanted to 
use the incident to rally support from Beijing and Moscow. We should recall
FO 371/144404, DV 1041/6, 28 January 1959, from Saigon 
to Foreign Office.
FO 371/144404, DV 1041/10, 30 January 1959, from
Saigon to Foreign Office.
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Allen and Unwin, 1989), Chapter 7.
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that both the Chinese and the Russians had so far not supported the idea 
of the resumption of armed struggle in South Vietnam.
IV
According to the Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam, in early January 
1959, because of the Phu Loi incident, the VPA began intensifying their 
training. It is very likely that this decision to intensify military 
training was made at the 15th Plenary session. The 324th Division and the 
305th Brigade stepped up their military exercises to include mobile 
vehicles in the mountainous and delta terrains, combined assaults with the 
infantry, and combined infantry-artillery attacks on enemy key positions. 
A number of detachments from the 305th Brigade also began to train their 
troops in parachuting. The 330th Division carried out offensive and 
defensive exercises in delta terrain which had many villages and rivers. 
The 335th Battalion experimented with offensive and defensive manoeuvres 
in mountainous terrain under varied conditions in preparation to fight in 
Laos. In Military Zone IV, they were studying and practising the procedures 
of organising and protecting the cadres in the South. In short, the VPA 
during this time were gearing up for the order to launch the offensive in 
the South.45
The 338th Division which comprised the regrouped Southern cadres and 
a number of infantry regiments were responsible for the training of cadres 
and fighters for their mission in the South. Tens of thousands of cadres 
and fighters who either had lived in the South or were familiar with the 
terrain in South Vietnam started training in preparation to be sent to the 
South. A number of divisions, mobile-infantry brigades directly under the 
charge of Military Region IV, Northwest Military Region were in full 
battle-order. All military units were involved in studying the situation 
in the South and the duties of the revolution.46
It was during this time that DRV troops were reported to have 
encroached into the demilitarised zone between North and South Vietnam. The
Lich Su..., pp.74-76. 
Lich Su..., p .93 .
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South Vietnamese government had protested to the ISCC that on 10 January
1959, North Vietnamese troops had entered A Choc, situated in the 
demilitarised zone south of the demarcation line; and on 16 January, they 
had occupied Tchepone (to be distinguished from the Laotian town of the 
same name), a small village on the North Vietnamese side of the demarcation 
line. According to the Canadian delegate in the ISCC, the North Vietnamese 
appeared to have permanently occupied Tchepone.47 But as we have noted 
above, at the 15th Plenary session, the Hanoi leadership decided that while 
preparations should be made for an eventual military struggle, a military 
offensive was not anticipated for the forseeable future.
In February 1959, the Central Military Committee met in Hanoi to 
listen to Le Duan explain the decision of the 15th Plenary session. In the 
light of the decision to intensify the revolution in the South, the 
committee discussed the ways that they could quickly develop the base area 
and the revolutionary armed forces in the South, the role which the North 
would play in the revolution and the preparation of the armed forces in the 
North in readiness to respond to any contingency.
We do not know whether any of the senior military officers had 
reservations regarding the intensification of the struggle in the South 
before the modernisation of the VPA was completed. We should recall that 
in mid-March 1958, the Central Military Committee extended the target year 
for the completion of the military modernisation programme from 1959 to
1960. At this February 1959 meeting, Le Duan told the senior officers that 
they did not want to use war to unite the country. But if the Americans 
made war against them, they must be ready to fight. A war brought on by 
enemy provocation would be an opportunity for them to unite their country. 
The Central Military Committee decided that the modernisation of the army 
had to be accelerated.45 That the Central Military Committee felt it 
necessary to re-emphasise this point would suggest that they were not 
satisfied with the pace of modernisation and/or that given the recent 
decision of the 15th Plenary session, there was an urgent need to further 
speed up the pace.
In March 1959, the Political Bureau of the Party issued a directive
FO 371/144404, DV 1041/5, 27 January 1959, from Saigon 
to Foreign Offfice.
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on the mission of creating a revolutionary base in the Central Highlands, 
which included the mountainous areas of Interzone V and the jungle and 
mountain areas of northeast Nam Bo. According to the Political Bureau, the 
Central Highlands were a very strategic region and they had to secure it 
before the US-Diem regime could construct a military complex there. The 
directive instructed that the base area should be developed principally 
through political means, which included proselytising amongst the people, 
promoting ethnic solidarity and self-sufficiency, the construction of a 
political administration base, building up of revolutionary armed forces 
and campaigning among enemy soldiers. All tasks would be led by the Party.
The Political Bureau further instructed that the armed forces in the 
South must be developed since only a strong military could defend the 
bases. For the present, they should be used to help the political struggle 
advance to the stage whereby it could carry out limited guerilla warfare. 
The long range goal was to strengthen the revolutionary forces in the South 
and prepare the conditions for advancing to the overthrow of the US-Diem 
regime, and to become the main force in defending the future revolutionary 
administration.49
V
Ho Chi Minh was in Beijing from 20-24 January 1959 on his way to 
Moscow for the 21st CPSU Congress (27 January-5 February). He was welcomed 
at the airport by Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi. We should recall 
that this was soon after the 15th Plenary session. The Chinese were 
encountering problems of their own at this time. It had become apparent by 
now that the Great Leap Forward was running into problems. By the time of 
the 6th Plenary session of the 8th CCP Central Committee (28 November-10 
December 1958), it was becoming increasingly clear that they had over­
estimated the speed at which socialist development could proceed and the 
targets set in August had to be lowered. It was during this Plenary session
Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War For National
Salvation 1954-1975: Military Events (printing
completed 30 May 1980) (JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982).
pp.28-29.
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that Mao offered to step down as chairman of the People's Republic 
ostensibly so that he could devote more time to the study of theories and 
policies. At the first session of the Second National People's Congress 
(18-28 April 1959), Liu Shaoqi replaced Mao as Chairman.50 In Beijing, Ho 
told a journalist that North Vietnam had no intention of establishing 
communes on the Chinese model in the immediate future.51
Despite their economic problems, the Chinese remained very generous 
in their economic assistance to North Vietnamese. A DRV economic delegation 
was in China during December 1958 and as noted earlier was joined by Le 
Thanh Nghi, Minister of Industry and Director of the Industrial section of 
the DRV's Premier Office, on 11 January 1959,52 On 18 February, a long­
term trade and an economic and technical aid agreement was signed between 
the two countries. Seven separate documents were signed. Besides the usual 
exchange agreement, the Chinese provided a new loan of 300 million yuan. 
Repayment of the 300 million yuan loan would only begin in 1967 and in the 
form of commodities. The Chinese also offered a gift of another 100 million 
yuan to be used for economic development. If we consider the 800 million 
yuan gift which the Chinese gave in 1955, this was indeed a very generous 
gesture. At a banquet given in Beijing by Le Thanh Nghi on 19 February in 
honour of the signing of the agreements, Chen Yi expressed the Chinese 
people's great admiration for the Vietnamese. He praised the achievements 
scored by the Vietnamese people in their hard struggle: they were a result 
of the revolutionary struggle waged by the Vietnamese people themselves. 
Chinese aid was very small and merely secondary. He recalled that Ho Chi 
Minh and other Vietnamese comrades had taken part in China's revolution and 
that the Lao Dong and Vietnamese had extended help and support to China's 
revolution at every stage. Le Thanh Nghi said that the agreements marked 
a new and important development in the economic cooperation and fraternal
Zhong Huaiwen (compiled), Years of Trial, Turmoil and 
Triumph - China from 1949 to 1988, (Beijing: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1989), pp.90-95; Roderick 
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friendship between the two countries.53 The Renmin Ribao editorial on 20 
February declared that the signing of the agreements marked the further 
growth of mutual help and co-operation between China and North Vietnam in 
the economic field and the strengthening of the lasting, unbreakable 
fraternal friendship between them.54
The Vietnamese also signed two agreements on economic and technical
co-operation with the Soviet Union55 but in contrast, the amount of credit 
given by the Russians was very much less. According to the estimation of 
the Foreign Office, Russian credit amounted to approximately 9 million 
pounds as compared to the 57 million pounds loaned by the Chinese. The 9 
million pounds was also proportionately much less than the first Russian 
grant (a gift), which was about one third of the first Chinese grant.56
With regard to the Huong Lap incident, Chinese response was very 
restrained. Only on 17 January did NONA carry a report from Phnom Penh 
which said that political observers there believed that recent developments 
in the Laotian situation gave cause for anxiety.57 On 21 January while Ho 
was in Beijing, the commentary in Renmin Ribao urged a peaceful solution 
of the DRV-Laos border issue. Although the commentary on the whole came out 
in support of the DRV, the Chinese were non-committal as to which party was 
right. Their attitude was that the border issue between North Vietnam and 
Laos was not too complicated and that it was fully possible for both 
countries to settle it by peaceful negotiation on the basis of respect for 
each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity.56
As for the Phu Loi incident, whether the reports that came from the
South were accurate or otherwise did not appear to be important to the
North Vietnamese and Chinese. The Chinese were quick to join the North 
Vietnamese in the condemnation of the Diem regime. In support of Giap's
NCNA, 19 February 1959, SWB/FE/848, pp.10-11.
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NCNA, 14 March 1959, SWB/FE/854, p.34.
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demand for prompt investigation, the editorial in the Renmin Ribao on 20 
January 1959 declared that the Chinese people strongly protest against the 
inhuman crime of the South Vietnamese authorities. It stressed that the 
massacre of political prisoners was a violation of Article 14c of the 
Geneva Agreement and Paragraph 9 of the final declaration.59 Both the 
North Vietnamese and Chinese media carried numerous reports denouncing the 
Phu Loi incident: for example, a dispatch from Shanghai reported that over 
400 young Vietnamese studying there or undergoing training in the factories 
had held a meeting of protest on 25 January; and that students of Jiaotong 
University and the Xinhua stationery store, many of whose native home was 
South Vietnam, had said that their countrymen were being butchered by the 
Ngo Dinh Diem bandits simply because they loved their country and hoped for 
its unification at an early date.60
Judging from the media reports, neither the Huong Lap incident nor 
the Phu Loi incident appeared to have interested the Russians. At the 
beginning of 1959, the Russians were themselves preoccupied with their 21st 
CPSU Congress which began on 27 January 1959. It was only when the Congress 
was over that they paid some attention to the developments in distant 
IndoChina. At the 21st CPSU Congress, Khrushchev insisted that: the 
conclusion drawn at the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956 that war was 
not inevitable had been proven correct; economic progress in the Soviet 
Union and the socialist countries would lead to more countries outside the 
socialist bloc wanting to join the bloc, thereby consolidating the peace- 
loving forces of the world. War would be unnecessary as a means of solving 
international issues. When the Soviet Union became the world's leading 
industrial power and when China became a mighty industrial power, and when 
all the socialist countries together produced half the world's industrial 
output, the international situation would change radically. The new 
correlation of power would be so obvious that even the most obdurate 
imperialists would realise the hopelessness of any attempt to launch a war 
against the socialist camp.61 At the Congress, Khrushchev also announced
NCNA, 20 January 1959, SWB/FE/838, p.13.
NCNA, 25 January 1959, SWB/FE/839, p.14.
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a new seven-year economic plan for the Soviet Union.
Ho Chi Minh, in his speech during the Congress spoke of the tasks and 
goals of the Vietnamese which were to fulfil the three-year State Plan, 
consolidate the North and lead it towards socialism, and achieve national 
unification on the basis of independence and democracy. He spoke about the 
Phu Loi incident but made no reference to the recent decision taken at the 
15th Plenary session.62 We still do not know whether Ho disclosed the 
decision of the 15th Plenary session to the Russians privately while he was 
in Moscow.
Ho left Moscow on 8 February, three days after the end of the 21st 
CPSU Congress. He returned to Beijing on 9 February. On the evening of 10 
February, it was reported that Mao and Liu had "cordial and friendly 
conversations" with Ho and Hoang Van Hoan.63 We have no information about 
Ho and Hoan's activities on 11 February. It is notable that Ho's visit to 
Beijing were only briefly reported whereas that of Ajoy Kumar Ghosh, 
Secretary-General of the Indian Communist Party who arrived in Beijing from 
Moscow on the same day as Ho was better publicised. Ho and Hoan left 
Beijing on the morning of 12 February for Wuhan where they visited an iron 
and steel company and a meat-packing combine. They then proceeded to 
Nanning before returning to Hanoi on 14 February.64 Chen Geng, member of 
the CCP Central Committee and Deputy-Chief of the PLA General Staff, was 
part of the contingent that saw Ho off to Wuhan on 12 February 1959. We 
should recall that Chen was one of the Chinese military advisers sent to 
assist the North Vietnamese in June 1950 and that he and Ho Chi Minh had 
close ties.66 In April 1956, he led a Chinese military delegation to North
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Vietnam. From May 1957 till November 1958, Chen was a member of the State 
Council's Scientific Planning Commission. However, for the whole of 1958 
until his appearance on 12 February 1959, he had not been seen in China. 
The American speculation was that during that period, he could have been 
in North Vietnam66 (presumably, on a military-related assignment such as 
the modernisation of the VPA).
Chen Geng also met Vo Nguyen Giap when the latter passed by Beijing 
on his way to Warsaw on 3 March 1959.67 Giap was in Beijing for a week a 
month later, from 5-12 April. He was on his way home after visiting Poland, 
Hungary and Outer Mongolia. He was met by Peng Zhen, Chen Yi, Tan Zheng, 
Huang KeCheng, Gong ZiRong and Xiao XiangRong. We do not know of his 
activities in Beijing except that he lunched with Peng Zhen and Chen Yi.bS
The Chinese government trade delegation led by Chen Yu, the Governor 
of Guangdong, was in Hanoi from 5-19 March to discuss trade exchange for 
1959. The delegation visited the Hon Gay coal mines, Haiphong cement plant, 
Nam Dinh textile mill and some other enterprises. The delegation met the 
DRV Minister of Foreign Trade and an agreement on supplementary orders for 
1959 was signed. The British Consulate-General in Hanoi believed that the 
supplementary agreement was necessary because of the dislocation of 
transport in China that had come about because of the drive for backyard 
steel making. As a result, Guangdong was cut off from its normal source of 
supplies and could more easily import what it needed by rail from the 
DRV.69
According to a US State Department source, Fang Yi was also present 
in Hanoi during the visit of the Guangdong trade delegation. He was 
identified as the economic representative of the Chinese Foreign Trade 
Ministry stationed in Vietnam. Fang Yi had been an army commander under Ye
Impermissible" in Beijing Review, 7 December 1979, 
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Fei as well as the Vice-Chairman of the Fujian province People's Government 
from 1949-1952. This Hanoi report marked his first public appearance since 
13 October 1953 when he was the Vice-Chairman of the East China Committee 
on Financial and Economic Affairs. After the 1954 Geneva Conference, he was 
one of the economic advisers sent by China to help the North Vietnamese 
develop their economy.70 Fang was elected an alternate-member of the CCP 
Central Committee at the 2nd session of the 8th CCP Congress in May 1958, 
The stationing of an alternate member of the Central Committee in a foreign 
country was considered unusual. No Chinese communist diplomatic 
representative, except the ambassadors to the Soviet Union and India had 
an equivalent rank.71 The US State Department also noted the presence of 
Chen Geng in the delegation. We do not know whether it was merely a 
coincidence but his presence in Hanoi not long after the 15th Plenary 
session and the March 1959 Politburo meeting of the Lao Dong Party merits 
attention.
During this period, besides domestic worries, the Chinese were also 
concerned about all the developments that were taking place in the region 
during the early months of 1959, and they saw the US hand in all the 
activities. By contrast with the Huong Lap incident, the Chinese and the 
North Vietnamese strongly opposed Phoui's decision to terminate the ISCC 
in Laos. On 16 February 1959, a long commentary in Guangming Ribao stated 
that the RLG's unilateral action was a violation of the Geneva Agreement 
and that it was linked to the US scheme to intensify its military
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would join SEATO and the US would turn Laos into a military base. The 
commentary noted that China, a close neighbour of Laos and a participant 
in the Geneva Conference could not agree to the RLG's unilateral action to 
tear up the Geneva Agreements; and it opposed US military interference in 
Laos.77 On 18 February, Chen Yi issued a statement which declared the 
Chinese government's opposition to the unilateral repudiation of the Geneva 
Agreements. The Chinese government asked the co-chairmen of the Geneva 
Conference to take speedy action "in regard to this serious violation of 
the Geneva Agreements so as to check the US scheme of military intervention 
in Laos and safeguard peace in IndoChina.1173 On the following day, Chen 
Yi also addressed letters to both the Soviet and British Foreign Ministers 
regarding the situation in Laos.74 We should recall that since July 1958, 
the ISCC in Laos had been adjourned sine die. Both the North Vietnamese and 
Chinese emphasised that the letter sent by the co-chairmen of the Geneva 
Conference to the Government of India on 31 January 1959 confirmed that the 
ISCC in Laos, while adjourning its activities sine die, might be convened 
again according to normal procedure, and it did not mean its 
dissolution.75
The Soviet government sent two notes to the British government on 26 
February 1959 and 21 March 1959 suggesting that the two co-chairmen should 
request the ISCC in Laos to resume as soon as possible its supervisory 
duties there.76 On 25 March 1959, the Soviet Union issued a statement in 
response to the letters addressed to them as one of the co-chairmen of the 
Geneva Conference by both the North Vietnamese and Chinese foreign 
ministers regarding the situation in Laos. The Russians entirely shared the 
Vietnamese and Chinese concerns.77 On 7 April, the British government 
stated that it considered that the ISCC in Laos had completed its tasks and
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it was up to the Laotian government to request the resumption of its 
activities.78
Meanwhile, on 10 March 1959, the PLA crushed an armed rebellion in 
Lhasa. Three days later, on 13 March 1959, the Chinese accused the Laotians 
of abetting Jiang Jieshi's troops to invade the border areas in Yunnan 
province. According to the Chinese, the Laotian authorities had been 
colluding with these troops by permitting the latter to use the Muong Sing 
region in Laos for espionage and sabotage activities against China. They 
further revealed that in the past six months, members of the United States 
Military Advisory Group (MAAG) and economic mission had been active in the 
region of Muong Sing and Nam Tha and were supporting the troops. United 
States secret agents had also established permanent organisations in the 
region under the pretext of carrying out medical services. The Chinese 
believed that the United States, Taiwan and the pro-US elements in Laos 
hoped to provoke an armed conflict on the Sino-Laotian border to serve as 
a pretext for American intervention in Laos and the region.79
On 20-22 February 1959 and again on 26 March 1959, there were 
skirmishes between the South Vietnamese and the Chinese in the Paracel 
Islands.80 The Chinese claimed that on the evening of 20 February, a South 
Vietnamese gunboat, HQ 225, had conducted reconnaissance activities in the 
vicinity of the North Island in the Paracels. The next day, the gunboat 
intercepted Chinese fishing vessels of Southsand Island to gather 
information about the island group. On the morning of 22 February, the same 
gunboat sailed to Shenhang island and over ten armed personnel again 
boarded Chinese fishing boats. They landed on the island, tore up the 
national flags flying there, kidnapped 82 fishermen, stole five fishing 
boats and other property. The Chinese further claimed that a South 
Vietnamese reconnaissance aircraft was circling over the Paracels.
On 28 February, a Renmin Ribao commentary referred to the SEATO 
announcement of a large scale aerial exercise in Thailand at the beginning 
of March, as well as the joint Thai-US atomic warfare manoeuvre in North
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Thailand in early February in which representatives from South Vietnam, 
Laos, South Korea and Taiwan attended as observers; and the large scale 
SEATO naval exercise in the Far East scheduled for April 1959. These were 
perceived as indications of the US scheme "to drag South Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia into the SEATO bloc and turn them into bases for military 
provocation against China, the DRV and other peace-loving Southeast Asian 
countries."61 To the Chinese, the aerial exercise was intended as a show 
of strength to intimidate the people of Southeast Asia and a provocation 
against the Chinese people. They saw a US global plot in the making: "At 
the same time, the USA had concluded separate bilateral military agreements 
with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan which would enable it to dispatch troops to 
the territories of the signatory countries under the pretext of resisting 
direct or indirect aggression, and carry out indirect intervention... The 
USA was trying hard to undermine, even to tear up the Geneva Agreements. 
It had intensified its subversive activities against Cambodia, was 
furthering its infiltration into Laos and was conspiring to pull Laos into 
the SEATO bloc. At the same time, the USA was also instigating South 
Vietnam to invade China's territory..."82
Finally on 26 March, the Chinese again claimed that a South 
Vietnamese aircraft had intruded into the airspace over the Shenhang Island 
and that sixteen naval personnel landed on the island, searched and 
interrogated the Chinese fishermen there and threatened to destroy their 
houses. The Chinese believed that all these acts were committed under the 
direction of the US imperialists.83 This was how the international scene 
looked like to China in early 1959. Chinese condemnations and diatribes 
against western imperialism were noticeably more vocal than the North 
Vietnamese.
An interview which Mao gave to Anna Louise Strong on 13 March 1959 
gives us a glimpse of Mao's thinking during this time. Strong's account of 
the interview revealed that Mao did not believe that the United States were 
prepared to go to war with China. Mao explained that during the 1958 Quemoy 
crisis, the Americans would escort Jiang's ships but they always stayed
NCNA, 28 February 1959, SWB/FE/849, pp.10-11.
NCNA, 8 March 1959, SWB/FE/851, pp.7-8.
N C N A ,  27 and 28 February 1959, S W B / F E / 8 5 0 , pp.11-13;
N C N A , 5 April 1959, S W B / F E / 8 6 0 , pp.17-18.
Jan - May 1959 162
three miles away from them and watched while China shelled the ships. In 
his words, "they stopped at the brink. So now we regard Dulles as our 
teacher and we also stop at the brink... We learned from Dulles to avoid 
the brink of war." Mao conceded that there would always be wars but he did 
not believe that there would be a third world war. He also did not think 
that the stockpile of bombs could be set off by accident nor would the 
human race be destroyed by a nuclear war. He insisted that one should not 
be afraid of the imperialists because that would only provoke them to 
action. According to him, "one should oppose them, but with care." 
Regarding the Soviet Union, Mao thought that it would become revisionist 
and, in his words, try to "strangle" and "choke" China. However, neither 
of the superpowers would engage in war with China at that time because it 
would only provide a big advantage to the other. But it was possible that 
the United States and the Soviet Union together with India and Japan might 
attack China, although that would require a large amount of preparation.64
A month later, in his speech at the 16th Enlarged session of the 
Supreme State Conference on 14 April 1959, Mao explained why if the 
imperialist forces were but "paper tigers", China did not simply attack 
Taiwan. In November 1958, Mao had complained that many people both within 
and outside the party did not understand the "paper tiger" concept. He 
compared the Quemoy (Jinmen) Crisis of August 1958 and the Tibet problem; 
and explained that Taiwan had signed a treaty with the United States. Thus 
unlike the case of Taiwan, the Chinese military could easily move into 
Tibet which did not have such a treaty.85
It is very likely that Mao would apply the same logic with regard to 
Vietnam and discourage any military moves into South Vietnam on the part 
of the North Vietnamese which would provoke the involvement of the United
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States. But this does not mean that Mao advocated complete forbearance. As 
he told Louise Anna Strong at their meeting on 13 March 1959, one should 
oppose the imperialists but with care. Also, as we have noted above, the 
Chinese during this time were seeing security threats all around them. 
Hanoi was a strategic ally. It is thus probable that compared with the 
summer of 1958, Mao was more receptive to the rather moderate decision of 
the 15th Plenary session but at the same time continued to counsel caution.
From 25 March to 1 April, the CCP Political Bureau held an enlarged 
meeting in Shanghai to prepare for the 7th Central Committee Plenary 
session. The outstanding issue was again that of the people's communes. 
Meanwhile, the production figures were gradually being adjusted downwards. 
Despite these efforts, problems in the economy continued to surface. From 
29 March till about 6 May 1959, China's attention was shifted to Tibet. 
Despite all the recent protest and outcry over Laos and South Vietnam, at 
the 1st session of the 2nd National People's Congress which took place 
between 18-28 April 1959, there was remarkably little reference to 
IndoChina in Zhou's report on foreign policy. Attention was focused on 
Tibet and Sino-Japanese relations.86 Also at this session of the 2nd 
National People's Congress, Mao relinquished his position as Chairman of 
the People's Republic to Liu Shaoqi. China-scholars and Mao-specialists are 
in agreement that this move did not substantially diminish Mao's authority; 
and his influence particularly in the area of foreign affairs remained 
great.
It was also in March 1959 that the first signs emerged that the 
Soviet Union had decided to abandon its self-imposed policy of allowing 
Beijing to oversee the communist activities in Southeast Asia. This was 
when the Soviet Embassy in Burma received a strong order from Moscow in 
March to improve immediately relations with all Burmese aboveground 
communists and their National United Front. The control of the Burmese 
communists had since 1954 been in Chinese hands, with Soviet acquiescence. 
Aleksandre Kaznacheev recounted that for a long time the Soviet Union had 
refused to engage a qualified interpreter for the Soviet Embassy in Burma 
and the excuse was always a lack of funds. But in the Spring of 1959, funds 
became suddenly available: not only would the Embassy get interpreters but 
several Burmese language specialists as well. According to Kaznacheev, one
For the full text of Zhou's report, see 
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of the most significant features of the new Soviet policy in Southeast Asia 
was the almost open support of anti-Chinese actions by the governments of 
the area and attempts to establish closer ties with India which was the 
biggest natural anti-Chinese force in the region.87
VII
Meanwhile, in March 1959, there were further indications that Le Duan 
was the number two man in North Vietnam. A letter to the Polish Communist 
Party was signed by him as "secretary-general". This was the first time he 
had been publicly addressed as such. It was again Le Duan who headed the 
Lao Dong Committee which entertained the visiting Indonesian Communist 
Party delegation led by its Secretary-General D.N. Aidit from 28 March to 
4 April 1959. He was placed before Truong Chinh but was described only as 
a member of the Political Bureau.88 This would indicate that Truong Chinh 
had lost out to Le Duan in the party hierarchy although as Deputy-Premier, 
he remained powerful in the government.89 Truong Chinh was also made 
Chairman of the newly established National Scientific Research Board in 
December 1958. In spite of having suffered a setback over the agrarian 
reform debacle, it was he who delivered the report, on behalf of the 
government, on the issue of agricultural cooperation at the 10th session 
of the National Assembly in May 1959; and he also took the lead in the 
organisation of a new and all-embracing course of political education for
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party and government officials in July 1959.90
However, Le Duan was definitely the man in charge of South 
Vietnamese affairs. Janos Radvanyi was a member of the Hungarian party and 
government delegation which visited Hanoi between 19-26 April 1959. During 
one of the discussions, the subject of the situation in South Vietnam was 
raised. According to Radvanyi, Ho yielded the floor to Le Duan whom he 
explained was the Politburo member in charge of South Vietnamese affairs 
and had recently returned from an extended tour of the South. According to 
Le Duan, the situation in the South was gradually turning to the advantage 
of the North. Political workers and party cadres had been instructed to 
merge with the peasants in the countryside and the intellectuals in the 
cities, and when possible to infiltrate the army and government. In the 
sphere of political agitation and propaganda, party cadres were told to 
exploit every opportunity to expose the corruption of the Diem regime and 
to support popular grievances. Although he admitted that there were 
difficulties, Le Duan appeared confident that the Diem regime would 
eventually collapse.
During the conversation, Pham Van Dong disclosed that the South 
Vietnamese guerilla leaders residing in Hanoi were increasing their 
pressure on the Politburo to endorse unrestrained military action in the 
South. While he understood their feelings, Dong thought that it was folly 
to begin such an action before the North became strong enough to back it 
up and before the situation was ripe in the South. Then, according to 
Radvanyi, "in a half-finished sentence he hinted that the Southern comrades 
should not be asked to wait too long."91
Radvanyi also observed that the Northern leadership regarded the 
South Vietnamese living in Hanoi, in his words, "like poor relations - to 
be tolerated but virtually ignored." He had a brief opportunity to converse 
with Nguyen Huu Tho who flatly insisted that the South was ripe for 
revolutionary guerilla activity but the guerillas must stay their hand 
because Hanoi contended that the time was not right for action. According 
to the CRIMP Document, since the end of 1958 and particularly after the Phu
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Loi Incident, many felt that the situation was ripe for an armed movement 
against the Diem regime. But the leadership of the Nam Bo Regional 
Committee hesitated principally because it was against the Party line.92 
Tho had asked Radvanyi whether Ho, Pham Van Dong or Le Duan had divulged 
to the Hungarians any new plans regarding the liberation of the South.93
The Hungarian party and government delegation was in Beijing from 29 
April 1959 to 7 May 1959 after visiting Hanoi from 19-26 April. According 
to Janos Radvanyi, the Chinese were keen to hear about their experiences 
in Vietnam. Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, and Wang Youtien, Director 
of the Soviet and East European Department in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 
were particularly interested in what the Hungarians knew of the South 
Vietnamese situation. Also, Chen Yi expected Ho to begin the reunification 
process soon. The subject of Vietnam was raised again at a meeting with Mao 
Zedong. Mao spoke of Ho as an old friend with whom he had enjoyed 
harmonious relations and blamed Stalin for Ho's difficulties. It was Mao's 
hope that the communists would come to power in France, thus making 
possible the solution of the Vietnam problem within the framework of a 
French Union under Maurice Thorez and Jacques Duclos. Meanwhile, Mao stated 
that the Chinese would continue to back the Vietnamese in their efforts to 
liberate the country.94
According to Janos Radvanyi, when the Hungarian party and government 
delegation were in Moscow on 16-17 May 1959, after visiting China, 
Khrushchev showed no interest at all in Vietnam. If one considered the 
Russian response to the Middle East Crisis in the summer of 1958 and 
Khrushchev's address during the recent 21st CPSU Congress, it would only 
be logical to conclude that the Russians would hardly agree with the North 
Vietnamese's decision to intensify the struggle in the South. Indeed, a 
month later, on 20 June 1959, the Soviet Union rescinded on the Sino-Soviet 
agreement concluded in October 1957 in which the Russians had agreed to 
provide China with a sample of the atom bomb and technical data concerning
United States Department of State "Working Paper on 
North Vietnam's Role in the South" (27 May 1968),
Appendices, Item 3 01: CRIMP Document.
Janos Radvanyi, op.cit., pp.22-24.
Janos Radvanyi, op.cit., p.26.
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its manufacture.95 During the conversation with the Hungarians, Khrushchev 
spoke about the Berlin question, the current Conference of Foreign 
Ministers in Geneva and his low opinion of the Chinese Great Leap Forward, 
But when the Hungarian Prime Minister, Munnich, enthusiastically tried to 
tell him about some of the highlights of their Hanoi visit, Khrushchev all 
but yawned in his face. According to Radvanyi, he found that attitude 
rather strange "in as much as the 15th Plenum of the Central Committee of 
the Lao Dong Party in May(?) had for the first time called for an armed 
struggle against the Diem clique and the A m e r i c a n s . Y e t  Khrushchev, for 
reasons unknown to me, seemed totally unconcerned.1,96
"The Origin and Development of the Differences Between 
the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves" in Peking 
Review, September 1963, Number 37, p.12.
Janos Radvanyi, op.cit., pp.26-27. Radvanyi followed 
the American dating of the 15th Plenary session of the 
Lao Dong Party. We now know that the Plenary session 
took place in January 1959.
Chapter Six
I
Whatever the differences within the North Vietnamese leadership; or 
between the Hanoi leadership and the Southern cadres over whether the South 
was ready for a revolution, a consensus was reached soon after Ngo Dinh 
Diem promulgated Law 10/59 on 6 May 1959 in South Vietnam. This law 
provided for the establishment of special military tribunals to try anyone 
suspected to be involved in communist activities.1 Looking back to this 
period in 1965, Le Duan said, "Before the law was passed, there were only 
hundreds who were wholeheartedly prepared to fight the enemy. Since the 
passing of that law, masses regardless of their political inclinations rose 
against Diem."2 In his instructions to the Nam Bo Regional Committee on 7 
May, Le Duan emphasised the need to concentrate on the establishment of 
base areas in Nam Bo, particularly in the eastern part, through political 
work. At the same time, the armed forces and self-defence forces should 
also be developed.3
On 13 May 1959, a week after the passing of Law 10/59, the Hanoi 
leadership issued a communique regarding the decision made at the 15th 
Plenary session in January 1959 to reunify the country. According to the 
communique, North Vietnam had completed the people's democratic revolution 
and was going through a socialist revolution. This was an important change 
because it determined the direction and the next stage of the development 
of the Vietnamese revolution. For the North, building socialism was the
See Fascist Terror in South Vietnam; Law 10-59, 
(Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961);
"How Armed Struggle Began in the South" in Vietnam 
Courier, Number 22, March 1974, pp.19-24.
Le Duan, "We will surely be victorious, the enemy will 
surely be defeated" (no date given) cited in Lich 
Su,.., p .88.
Tran Huu Dinh, "Qua Trinh Hinh Thanh Luc Luong Vu 
Trang va Can Cu Dia O Nam Bo Trong Nhung Nam 1954- 
1960" in Tap Chi Nghien Cuu Lich Su, 6(277)(XI-XII), 
1994), pp.5-6.
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most urgent task and it was directly related to the struggle for national 
reunification which was the most earnest aspiration of the Vietnamese 
people. But while North Vietnam had all along respected the 1954 Geneva 
Agreements, the Diem regime and the Americans had constantly undermined the 
Agreements. The communique paid tribute to struggle of the southern 
compatriots and stated in very broad terms that the entire people would 
unite and strive to achieve reunification.4 The Nhan Dan editorial on the 
communique was somewhat more precise but equally circumspect. It stated 
that "the people were determined to struggle resolutely and gallantly and 
use every means and methods - if necessary - to attain their objectives."5
Soon after the communique was issued, a unit under the direct charge 
of the Central Military Committee was formed to research into how the North 
Vietnamese could open a road which could link them with the cadres in the 
South. On 19 May, about a week after the communique of the 15th Plenary 
session was made public, Vo Bam, Deputy-Director of the Office responsible 
for agricultural collectivisation was appointed to head this unit. The 
purpose of opening this road was to facilitate the movement of cadres, 
weapons and other necessary supplies to South Vietnam. This was the 
beginning of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.6
On the same day, Military Transportation Group 559 was formed. Its 
mission was to construct the first road connecting the North and the South, 
and to organise the transfer of weapons and supplies to the South, 
particularly Interzone V. Group 559 consisted of two battalions. The 301st 
Battalion was composed of 500 cadres and soldiers specially selected from 
the 305th Division who had previously fought against the French in 
Interzone V. The other formed in dune was the 603rd Battalion, codename
VNA, 13 May 1959, SWB/FE/27/A3/1-3.
VNA, 14 May 1959, SWB/FE/28/A3/3.
The following account is from Lich Su,.., pp.93-96; 
The Ho Chi Minh Trail, (Hanoi: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1982); Interview with General Vo Bam 
in The Economist, February 1983, p.70; Brigadier- 
General Vo Bam, "Opening the Trail" in Vietnam 
Courier, Number 5, 1984, pp.9-15; David Chanoff and
Doan Van Tai, Portrait of the Enemy: The Other Side of 
the War in Vietnam, (London: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd, 
1986), pp.147-148; "Chuyen xoi duong dau tien" in Su 
Kien Va Nhan Chung, Number 4 (17 January 1994), pp.6- 
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"Gianh River Fishing Team" which comprised 107 cadres and soldiers. The 
603rd Battalion was responsible for the sea-route to the South. According 
to another official Vietnamese source7, Group 759 was formed in July 1959, 
to study the problem of organising a maritime route to transport weapons, 
ammunition and equipment to the South; and was based at the coastal region 
of Do Son-Haiphong. It started off as a small group of cadres directly 
under the General Staff who were assigned to look into the matter. We know 
now that these included Vo Nguyen Giap, Hoang Tung and Tran Quang Huy.B It 
is likely that the 603th Battalion and Group 759 were part of the same 
outfit. US intelligence sources also identified the formation in May of the 
70th Battalion which was sent to the Laotian panhandle. The mission of the 
70th Battalion was to transport weapons, ammunition, mail and supplies 
along the Laotian trails into South Vietnam as well as guide infiltration 
groups and bringing the sick and wounded back to the North.9
Initially, the instruction given to Vo Bam was to extend the road no 
further than the northern bank of the Ben Hai River. But after a meeting 
in May with Hanh (a member of the Party Committee of Quang Tri Province) 
and Quyet (a member of the Party Central Committee of Interzone V at Vinh 
Linh district, on the northern bank of the Ben Hai River at the 17th 
parallel), Vo Bam agreed with the two southern comrades that the Trail 
would have to be extended as far as Highway 9 to be effective. By the first 
week of June 1959, a draft plan of the route, to go through the central 
region south of the 17th parallel, had been drawn up. The draft plan was 
for nine relay stations, two in the region north of the Ben Hai River and 
the remainder in Interzone V.
The point where the Trail crossed Highway 9, between Khe Sanh and 
Lower Laos, is described as the "neuralgic point" because that strategic
Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National
Salvation 1954-197 5: Military Events (printing
completed 30 May 1980) (JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982),
p. 32.
"Tu Nghi Quyet lich su den Duong Ho Chi Minh" in Su 
Kien 17a Nhan Chung, Number 4 (17 January 1994), p. 32.
United States Department of State "Working Paper on 
the North Vietnamese Role in the War in South Vietnam" 
(27 May 1968), Appendices, Item 73: Interrogation of 
a Senior Sergeant, 5th Military Region, captured in 
1964 in Tra Bong District, Quang Ngai Province.
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highway "bristled with enemy positions and was controlled day and night 
by armoured patrols".10 It was the most difficult and dangerous part of 
the Trail. By 20 August 1959, the 301st Battalion had constructed relay 
station 9 in Pa Lin, west of Thua Thien, which made it possible for the 
first time to transport 500 kilogram of material, including weapons and 
ammunition to Interzone V. To ensure absolute secrecy, the weapons and 
equipment were camouflaged as products meant for sale. The cadres and 
soldiers were also instructed to limit their contact with people and avoid 
unnecessary engagements with the enemy. By the end of 1959, the 301st 
battalion had transferred to Pa Lin 1667 rifles, 788 bayonets, 188 kilogram 
of explosives, some binoculars, compasses and topographic maps. This was 
excluding the 1174 rifles of all types, bullets and ammunition which the 
units carried with them when they manoeuvred into the South through the 
newly-built roads. All these weapons and equipment were meant for Interzone 
V and the newly formed self-defence forces in the Central Highlands and the 
plains, as well as the provinces in central Vietnam.11
Tran Van Tra recounted a meeting between himself, Nguyen Van Vinh, 
and Le Duan one evening in the summer of 1959. The meeting had its origin 
in a BBC news bulletin that Tra had chanced to hear. It was a report of a 
skirmish between a platoon of Diem's forces and a platoon of the Vietcong 
in the Plain of Reeds. After two hours of fighting, both sides withdrew. 
There was no report of any casualties. The news of this inconclusive two 
hour long fight amazed Tra who thought that either the BBC report was 
inaccurate or the training of the communist cadres in the South was 
inadequate. The next day, he visited his old friend, Nguyen Van Vinh, and 
they both agreed that there was an urgent need to train the communist 
cadres in the South. This could be done with the help of the regrouped 
Southern cadres still based in the North, who had been well honed 
militarily for the eventual reunification of the country. They then decided 
to convey their views to Le Duan, who according to Tran Van Tra, was at 
that point already the First Secretary of the Party Central Committee. The 
initial proposal by Tra and Vinh was for sending 100 young cadres to the 
South. After much thought, Le Duan said that that would be difficult as the
The Ho Chi Minh Trail, (Hanoi: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1982), p. 13.
Lich Su..., pp.93-96.
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Politburo had not arrived at a decision regarding this matter. Tran and 
Vinh pleaded for their cause. Le Duan then asked whether the number could 
be reduced. This time they proposed 50. Again Le Duan was deep in thought. 
Because this matter had yet to be discussed by the Politburo, by right, 
approval could not be given. But he was prepared to bear the responsibility 
if the number was smaller. Le Duan came up with the figure of 25. The team 
of 25 was selected by June 1959. By 25 December 1959, they were ready to 
move into the South. By this time, the Party Central Committee had given 
its blessing.12
Tra's account is particularly revealing for two reasons: Firstly, it 
showed that during this period, the Hanoi leadership was still very 
cautious about escalating the struggle in the South. Secondly, it gives a 
glimpse of the extent of Le Duan's authority and how decisions were made 
by the North Vietnamese leadership.
II
At about the time when the North Vietnamese made public their
decision to renew the struggle in the South, in Laos, 1500 Pathet Lao
troops refused to be integrated into the Royal Laotian Army.13 The
November 1957 agreement reached between the RLG and the Pathet Lao had
specified that the Pathet Lao troops would be demobilised and integrated
into the Royal Laotian Army and receive ranks and positions in accordance
2>with the procedures of the government. But there were disagreements between
* •
the two armies over the proportion Pathet Lao officers in the integrated
Tran Van Tra, Nhung Chang Duong Lich Su Cua B2 Thanh 
Dong (Tap I): Hoa Binh Hay Chien Tranh, (Hanoi: Nha 
Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1992), pp. 160-162.
The events of this episode can be obtained from Sisouk 
Na Champassak, Storm Over Laos: A Contemporary
History, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), Chapter 
8? Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos; The Politics of 
Neutralisation, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 
pp.117-118; Huge Toye, Laos: Buffer State or
Battleground, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 
pp.124-126; The following account is according to the 
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army; and the rank to be conferred on Colonel Singkapo Chounlamany14 of 
the Pathet Lao army.
On 11 May 1959, Singkapo Chounlamany refused to accept the rank of 
colonel given to him and failed to turn up for the award ceremony in 
Vientiane, on the pretext that there were irregularities in the integration 
procedure, Souphanouvong also made a similar charge. Over on the Plaine des 
Jarres, 500 Pathet Lao troops boycotted a similar ceremony on the same day. 
The government reacted by ordering an alert in the areas where the Pathet 
Lao troops were stationed. The two Pathet Lao units, stationed at Xieng 
Khouang and Luang Prabang were encircled by the Royal Laotian Army and 
their supply lines were cut. The Pathet Lao troops were given a choice of 
either accepting the new ranks and being integrated into the national army 
or surrendering their weapons in order to be discharged as civilians within 
24 hours. Failure to do either would be an act of treason. When the 
deadline had passed, only 50 of the Pathet Lao troops had come forward. It 
was reported on 17 May that the RLG had sent the police to encircle the 
residences of Souphanouvong and other NLFiX leaders in Vientiane. On the 
same day, the DRV Foreign Ministry issued a statement which accused Phoui 
Sananikone's government of serious violation of the Geneva Agreements and 
the creation of tension in IndoChina. The North Vietnamese proposed that 
the ISCC in Laos should resume its duties and called upon the co-chairmen 
of the Geneva Conference to take appropriate measures to prevent any
worsening of the situation in Laos. The statement further added that as a 
signatory of the Geneva Agreements and a neighbouring country which had a 
common boundary of over 1000 kilometres with Laos, the DRV was very anxious
over the gravity of the developments in Laos. On 18 May, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry issued a statement which was almost identical to that of 
North Vietnam's.
On 17 May at lOOOh, the first Pathet Lao battalion consisting of 750 
Pathet Lao troops stationed south of Luang Prabang surrendered. A letter 
from Souphanouvong written some weeks earlier found on the battalion 
commander instructed him to delay integration till after the Laotian
Biographical data of Singkapo is extremely scanty. He 
belonged to one of the prominent regional families of 
Laos - Khammouane/Thakhek. He was a member of the 
Central Committee of the Free Lao Front (Neo Lao 
Issara) in the 50s and a member of the Central 
Committee of the Lao Patriotic Front (NLHX) from 1956.
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elections; but Souphanouvong subsequently changed his mind and ordered the 
battalion to comply. During the night of 18-19 May, the second Pathet Lao 
battalion which was stationed in a former French Foreign Legion Camp on the 
Plaine des Jarres, the Thong Mai Hin camp, escaped into the mountains. 
Information provided by the RLG a n d , not contradicted by any foreign 
military attache showed that the battalion had fled into the virtually 
inaccessible mountainous areas in eastern Xieng Khouang, with many of them 
crossing over into North Vietnam.15 We do not know whether the escape of 
the second battalion was authorised by Souphanouvong or by higher echelons 
either in Sam Neua or Hanoi. What followed was a series of military 
engagements between the Royal Laotian Army and the Pathet Lao, with the 
assistance of the North Vietnamese.
In an interview on 21 May in Saigon, the Laotian Foreign Minister, 
Khamphan Panya, who was at the time visiting South Vietnam at the 
invitation of the South Vietnamese government, declared the RLG's intention 
to outlaw the NLHX. He also said that the RLG would seek help not only from 
SEATO but from any other international organisation or any stronger anti­
communist nation. According to an AFP report on 24 May, the South 
Vietnamese and Laotian governments had agreed on civil and military 
security cooperation and the transportation of supplies from South Vietnam 
to Laos through Saigon and Da Nang. On 25 May 1959, after a special cabinet 
meeting, the RLG announced that it would use force to annihilate the Pathet 
Lao. The Thai Foreign Minister then visited Laos at the invitation of the 
RLG from 27-29 May. On 27 May, the Deputy-Minister of Information stated 
that the NLHX leaders in Vientiane would be placed under closer 
surveillance16 and that Pathet Lao-sympathisers would be severely 
punished. The lines were clearly drawn between the Pathet Lao, North 
Vietnam and China on the one side and the RLG, the United States, South 
Vietnam and Thailand on the other.
On 28 May 1959, it was reported that there had been a clash between 
the RLG forces which had been deployed in the mountainous region between
CUSSDCF: 751 J. 00/8-1359, 13 August 1959, from
Vientiane to Secretary of State.
These included Souphanouvong, Singkapo, Phoumi 
Vongvichit, Nouhak Phoumasavan, Sithone Komadam, Phoun 
Sipraseuth, and the editor of Lao Hak Xat, Khamphay 
Boupha.
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Xieng Khouang and the Vietnamese border. Hanoi radio stated that the troops 
and police of the DRV had been ordered to strengthen their defence along 
the Laotian border and to be alert for any provocations. Fighting was again 
reported on 29 May in the Muong Ngan area. According to the Pathet Lao 2nd. 
Battalion, they had reached the Muong Ngan region by 30 May. The fighting 
was particularly serious on those two days. Not long after that, the 
battalion succeeded in moving to the south eastern part of Xieng Khouang 
province. On 10 June, it was reported that the Pathet Lao 2nd Battalion had 
safely reached its former revolutionary bases. Nhan Dan hailed the 
battalion's safe withdrawal as "a new epic of the Laotian people... Like 
fish returning to water, the Pathet Lao Battalion Number 2 is again 
enjoying the devoted help of the local people..." To the North Vietnamese, 
the Battalion was justified to continue their self-defence fight because 
the government of Phoui Sananikone on the orders of the US imperialists had 
reneged on the Geneva Agreements.17 Sporadic fighting persisted throughout 
May, June and July 1959.
Ill
While the Ho Chi Minh Trail was being built and the fighting in Laos 
was going on, Ho Chi Minh was in the Soviet Union, ostensibly on vacation. 
There was no report of Ho's departure from Hanoi for Moscow.18 The first 
knowledge that Ho was in Moscow was a one sentence report that he had 
arrived by TU 104 on 2 July 1959 to spend his summer holiday in the Soviet 
Union.19 At Moscow, he was met by Voroshilov (Chairman of the Presidium 
of the Supreme Soviet), Mukhitdinov (Secretary of the CPSU Central 
Committee), Mikhail Geogadze (Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR 
Supreme Soviet), and Vladmir Servemov (Deputy-Foreign Minister).20 We know
VNA, 10 June 1959, SWB/FE/50/A3/6.
FO 371/144391, DV 1016/28, 3 August 1959, from Hanoi
to Foreign Office.
SWB/FE/69/4 July 1959/(i).
T A S S  i n  R u s s i a n  f o r  A b r o a d ,  2 July 1959,
S W B / S U / 69/A3/4.
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that Ho spent the whole of July in the Soviet Union and that he arrived in 
Baku on 23 July.21 Other than that, we have no information of his 
activities. Khrushchev was in Poland for ten days in July, from 14-23 July; 
and US Vice-President, Richard Nixon, was in Moscow from 23 July till 2 
August. While in the Soviet Union, Ho could not have missed all the 
favourable publicity in the Russian media regarding Khrushchev's impending 
visit to the United States from 15-28 September 1959 at the invitation of 
President Eisenhower, which was announced in July. Khrushchev was so eager 
to visit the United States that he postponed an earlier invitation to make 
an official visit to Scandinavia during that time in order to accept 
Eisenhower's invitation without change.22
In China, from 2 July to 1 August, an enlarged meeting of the 
Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee was being convened in Lushan 
to review the progress of the Great Leap Forward, which as we have noted 
before, had run into trouble. It was during this meeting which witnessed 
a clash between Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai basically over the Mao-inspired 
economic construction of China - the Great Leap Forward - which 
consequently led to the disgrace of Peng.23 There was a Soviet dimension 
in the Mao-Peng dispute.29 During Peng Dehuai's visit to Eastern Europe 
from 22 April to 13 June 1959, he was believed to have expressed his 
opposition to the Great Leap Forward to Khrushchev when they met in Tirana
Moscow radio, 28 July 1959, STVB/TE/W16/A/4 .
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on 25 May 1959. Khrushchev subsequently made an anti-commune speech in 
Poland on 18 July 1959 which was published by the Soviet news media on 21 
July, while the Lushan Plenum was in session, thus giving the impression 
that he was supporting Peng Dehuai. The 8th Plenary session of the 8th 
Central Committee followed closely after the Lushan meeting from 2-16 
August 1959. At this session, Peng Dehuai and his supporters were relieved 
of all their administrative posts.25 Stuart Schram stressed that the 
Lushan Plenum was a turning point toward a greater emphasis on class 
struggle.26 According to Laszlo Ladany, the Plenum changed the political 
climate in China. Two months after the meeting, there was a blackout on 
news out of China. Prior to this, it was possible for non-Chinese to 
subscribe even to provincial newspapers but from November 1959, only the 
Renmin Ribao and Hongqi were allowed to be disseminated outside China.2'
Ho Chi Minh left Moscow on 1 August 1959, a day before Nixon 
concluded his visit to the Soviet Union. He arrived at Urumchi at 1015h on 
the same day.28 Because the 8th Plenary session was called by Mao at such 
short notice (on 23 July when Ho was in Baku), Ho took a leisurely tour of 
parts of northwest China while waiting for it to end.29 He toured Xinjiang
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(1-4 August), Jiuquan and Lanzhou in Gansu province (4-7 August) and Xian 
and its vicinity in Shaanxi province (7-8 August). Ho finally reached 
Beijing on 13 August. He was received by Chen Yi, Liu Lantao, alternate 
member of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee and He Wei.30 The 
Chinese sources did not disclose where Ho was between 8 and 13 August. It 
is possible that Ho was at Lushan during that time when the 8th Plenary 
session of the CCP 8th Central Committee was in still in session.31
While in Beijing and waiting for the 8th Plenary session to end on 
16 August, Ho visited the Ming Tomb Reservoir, the Summer Palace and the 
Temple of Heaven. On 18-19 August, it was reported that he was visiting 
places near Beijing and receiving Vietnamese students. On 19 August, he 
also visited the recently completed military museum.
As far as we can tell, it was not until 21 August that Ho met any of 
the Chinese leaders in Beijing. On that day, he met both Liu Shaoqi and 
Zhou En1 ai32; 'and attended a banquet in his honour in the evening given 
by Liu in which Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen, Nie Rongzhen, Wang Jiaxiang and He 
Wei were present. After 21 August, there was no further report of Ho's 
activities until his departure on 25 August. He was seen off by Zhou Enlai, 
Peng Zhen and Chen Yi. According to a Chinese source, Ho had discussions 
with Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and other Chinese leaders regarding Vietnam.33 
The British Consulate-General in Hanoi believed that Pham Van Dong might 
have joined Ho in Beijing during this time. Dong was absent from Hanoi
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between 15-26 August without explanation.39 While in China, Ho (and 
perhaps Dong as well) must have discussed with the Chinese the situation 
in South Vietnam.
The Chinese were concerned about the developments in South Vietnam 
and Laos. They believed that the United States was trying to make both 
South Vietnam and Laos part of SEATO. The increase of US military advisers 
and personnel, the shipment of US arms and ammunition, the number of US 
missions to South Vietnam; the proliferation of airfields and the 
construction of a highway system linking South Vietnam, southern Laos and 
Thailand were all perceived as "war preparations". The Chinese also 
suspected that the Pentagon was plotting to smuggle atomic weapons into 
South Vietnam and of using South Vietnam as a base to intervene in Laos and 
Cambodia.35
In Han Suyin's account, Ho, during his meeting with Zhou in August 
1959, expressed concern about the projected Khrushchev-Eisenhower summit 
and its implications for Vietnam. Ho also informed Zhou of the plan to form 
a liberation front in South Vietnam and the use of military means to 
achieve the reunification of the country. Zhou assured Ho that by the end 
of the year, that is 1959, China would give approximately $500 million 
worth of weaponry, equipment and funds to support the liberation 
struggle,36 A Chinese source noted that after the promulgation of Law 
10/59, when the North Vietnamese proposed an armed defence struggle in the 
South, China supported the idea.37 According to Hoang Van Hoan, when the 
North Vietnamese eventually made public the decision to renew the struggle 
to unify the country on 13 May 19593S, the Chinese considered it "a
FO 371/144391, DV 1016/33, 7 September 1959, from
Hanoi to Foreign Office.
"The Geneva Agreements Must be Upheld" in Peking 
Review, 28 July 1959, Volume II, Number 30, pp.6-8;
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reasonable idea and agreed to provide military aid."39
We do not know to what extent the Chinese promise of military aid to 
Ho at this time was a response to what they saw as American war 
preparations in the region or to emphasise to Moscow that Beijing was free 
to implement its own policies, regardless of Soviet views. But as far as 
we can tell, the Chinese did not deliver the military aid at the end of 
1959.
Ho returned to Hanoi on 26 August and was reported to have been met 
at the airport by Pham Van Dong and Truong Chinh.40 All in all, Ho was 
away from North Vietnam for almost two months at a time when the North 
Vietnamese were assisting the Pathet Lao in a civil war against the RLG.
A week after Ho's return to Hanoi, on 1 September which was also the 
occasion of the 14th anniversary of North Vietnam's National Day, seven 
senior officers in the VPA were promoted, including Nguyen Chi Thanh, Head 
of the General Political Department, promoted to General. The VPA now had 
two full generals, the other being Vo Nguyen Giap. Van Tien Dung (General 
Chief of Staff), Chu Van Tan (Political Commissar of the Viet Bac sector) 
were promoted to Senior-Generals; Nguyen Van Vinh (Deputy-Defence 
Minister), Hoang Van Thai, Tran Van Tra (both Assistant General Chief of 
Staff), and Song Hao (Deputy-Head of the General Political Department) were 
all made Major-Generals.41
IV
Meanwhile, the fighting continued in Laos. The DRV protested against 
the many aerial intrusions of the RLG's reconnaissance planes into its 
airspace. Fighting between the RLG troops and the Pathet Lao intensified 
in mid-July in the provinces of Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua. There was a 
brief two-week lull in the fighting from 11 August 1959 with both sides
Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan's 
Revolutionary Reminiscences, (Beijing: Foreign
Languages Press, 1988), p.324.
VNA, 26 August 1959, SWB/FE/115/ (i).
V N A ,  1 September 1959, S W B / F E / 1 21/C/l.
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claiming they had the upper hand. On 26 August 1959, the US government 
decided that it would provide the RLG with "emergency aid" in the form of 
weapons and money. Fighting then resumed in Laos towards the end of the 
month and into September 1959. It briefly stopped when the United Nations 
(UN) fact-finding mission arrived in Laos in mid-September.
In China, right up jfoxmt^kezm^tbf 27 July 1959, there was a steady 
stream of reports and commentaries regarding the developments in Laos, not 
unlike those of North Vietnam. The Chinese placed the blame for the crisis 
in Laos squarely on the Americans and the Phoui Sananikone government. 
After 27 July 1959, there was a notable absence of original Chinese 
comments. Most of the NCNA items were recapitulation of reports from Hanoi. 
Although the Chinese continued to report on Laotian developments, they were 
based on North Vietnamese and Western press reports.42 No doubt the 
Chinese continued to be interested in the happenings in Laos; but as we 
have noted, during this time, there were more important developments at 
home which required their immediate attention. But by the middle of August, 
the Chinese were able to turn their attention back to Laos and the new 
developments along the Sino-Indian border. The Sino-Indian border dispute 
had been brewing since early 1959 and relations between Beijing and New 
Delhi further deteriorated in the autumn.43
According to the US Embassy in Laos, a map study of the villages and 
military posts attacked since mid-July showed that all the military 
activities took place along the Laotian border adjacent to North Vietnam. 
There were no incidents reported along the borders which Laos shared with 
Thailand, Burma, South Vietnam, Cambodia or even China. It identified four 
salients in which military activities took place: southeast of PhongSaly 
province, starting at Sop Nao just inside the border and extending 
southwest to MuoncjxKhoua; northwest of Sam Neua province from Muong Peu 
through Muong Son t o \ s  far as Pong Sa Thone; north of Sam Neua town from 
Xieng Kho to as far soutFt as Muong Het; further east in Sam Neua province; 
southeast Laos; and the DRKborder east of Thakhek.44 Although the Embassy
FO 371/141246, FC 1015/12, 6 August 1959, from Beijing 
to Foreign Office.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 21-28 November 1959, 
pp.17115-17123.
CUSSDCF: 751 J. 00/8-1359, 310, 13 August 1959, from 
Vientiane to State Department.
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could not offer proof of any direct North Vietnamese involvement at that 
time, there was much circumstantial evidence.45 The US State Department 
however found no evidence of Chinese involvement in the fighting.
Throughout, Hanoi adamantly denied the charges that some of its 
military units were involved in the fighting in Laos. On 4 September 1959, 
the Permanent Mission of Laos to the United Nations requested that a UN 
emergency force be dispatched to Laos as soon as possible to halt the 
aggression along the north eastern frontier of Laos by elements of the DRV. 
On 5 September, the UN Secretary-General asked the President of the 
Security Council to convene urgently to consider the request. The Security 
Council met on 7 September to consider the request against the sole 
opposition of the Soviet Union whose representative objected to discussing 
the Laotian request. The Russians felt that the RLG in cooperation with the 
ISCC in Laos could and must restore order in the country on the basis of 
the 1954 Geneva Agreements and the Vientiane Agreements of 1956 and 1957, 
without interference from the outside. The Russians further charged that 
the Phoui Sananikone government had disregarded those agreements and 
hampered the work of the ISCC. In an oblique reference to the United 
States, the Russian representative claimed that the actions of the RLG were 
linked with foreign interference in the domestic affairs of Laos, designed 
to turn the country into a foreign base for strategic and military 
operations in Southeast Asia. This was also the position of both North 
Vietnam and China. The Soviet Union, however, did not exercise its veto on 
this occasion. According to British sources, the Soviet attitude in 
discussions with the British government from May 1959 to early September 
and in the Security Council on 7 September, indicated that the Russians 
were not deeply interested in Laos and would like to see the situation 
stabilised.46 Khrushchev was scheduled to make his first visit to the 
United States on 15 September 1959.
Russian objection notwithstanding, the Security Council decided to 
appoint a subcommittee, which included Argentina, Italy, Japan and Tunisia 
to look into the matter. The subcommittee visited Laos from 15 September 
1959 to 13 October 1959. It found evidence of rifles and submachine guns
CUSSDCF: 751 J . 00/8-1059, 271, 10 August 1959, from 
Vientiane to State Department (Secret).
FO 371/141261, FC 10338/21, 16 October 1959, from UK 
delegate to NATO (Paris) to Foreign Office.
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of Chinese origin, hand grenades wrapped in Chinese newspapers, uniforms 
typical of Chinese military attire and medicines labelled as Chinese 
government supplies/7 But the conclusion reached by the subcommittee was 
that ensemble of information assembled by the RLG did not clearly establish 
whether there had been crossings of the frontier by regular troops of the 
D R V / R
However, Langer and Zasloff in 1970 were able to establish that the 
North Vietnamese were involved in the fighting during the summer of 1959. 
Their principal source of information was an intelligence officer of the 
rank of captain in the G-2 section of the Royal Laotian Armed Forces whom 
they interviewed over an eight-month period/9 A North Vietnamese economic 
cadre's notebook also revealed that in May 1959 which coincided with 
Hanoi's announcement to resume armed struggle and the establishment of the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail, Hanoi began to pay greater attention to the 
revolutionary movement in Laos.50 In 1980, the North Vietnamese finally 
admitted their involvement. They revealed that in 1959, they and the Pathet 
Lao agreed to the organisation of a delegation of Vietnamese military 
specialists to work alongside the Pathet Lao forces. In September 1959, 
Group 959 was thus formed whose mission was to serve as specialists for the
Report of the Security Council Subcommittee 
established under the Resolution of 7 September 1959 
(Document S/4236), United Nations Security Council 
Official Records, 14th Year, Supplement for October- 
December 1959, (New York, 1960), cited in Lee Chae 
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the Organisation, 16 June 1959-15 June I960, Official 
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Security Council to the General Assembly, 16 July 1959 
-15 July I960, Official Records, 15th session, 
Supplement Number 2 (A/4494), (New York, 1960), pp.l- 
4.
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Pathet Lao forces, organise the logistics and the supply of Vietnamese 
material and to directly command the Vietnamese volunteer units operating 
in Sam Neua, Xieng Khouang and Vientiane. Group 959 continued to function 
till 1973.51 In 1994, a Vietnamese source recounted that from the moment 
the decision was taken to open the Ho Chi Minh Trail for the purpose of 
infiltration was taken, it was understood that Laos and Cambodia would be 
involved in the Vietnamese struggle.52
V
In China too, there were some major changes in the military. On 17 
September 1959, Lin Biao assumed the post vacated by Peng Dehuai as the new 
Defence Minister and Luo Ruiqing became the n e w (General/ch 
Four new Vice-Defence Ministers were also appointed of which one was Chen 
Geng, whom we have noted had very close ties with the North Vietnamese.5* 
As we have stated above, evidence to date suggests that the dismissal of 
Peng Dehuai was because of his disagreement with Mao over purely economic 
issues. However, one should note that unlike Mao, Peng was also in favour 
of reducing party control over the military and closer military 
collaboration with the Soviet Union. The dismissal of Peng and the 
appointment of Lin Biao provided Mao with another opportunity to ensure 
that the PLA forge an independent course in military and strategic matters, 
a goal, which we should recall, he had spelt qut at the second Enlarged
Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National
Salvation 1954-197 5: Military Events (printing
completed 30 May 1980)(JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982),
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Conference of the Military Affairs Committee on 28 June 1958. We should 
also recall that after the Taiwan Strait Crisis in autumn 1958, Mao's 
military writings were widely studied in the PLA.
Soon after Lin Biao became the new Minister of Defence, he put 
forward a plan to build China into one of the strongest socialist countries 
in the world. For the PLA, it meant diligently studying and applying the 
military teachings of Mao Zedong. This was the thrust of his article 
published in Hongqi on 1 October 1959 which was entitled, "Take Giant 
Strides, Holding High the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and the 
Military Thinking of Mao Tse-Tung."55 Lin Biao called for strict party 
control over the armed forces. According to him, political work remained 
the lifeblood of the army and the human factor, not equipment, was the 
decisive factor in warfare.
This was also the military line expounded by Vo Nguyen Giap in his 
article, "People's War, People's Army" published about two months later, 
on 22 December 1959 on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the VPA.5e 
However, this did not mean that the Vietnamese were following the Chinese 
line blindly. According to Giap in the same article, "in China and Vietnam, 
as well as in the USSR the revolutionary wars and armies have common 
fundamental characteristics: their popular and revolutionary nature, and 
the just cause they serve. The Vietnamese revolutionary war and army, 
however have their own characteristics" and "in combining the invaluable 
experiences of the Soviet Union and People's China with its own, our Party 
has always taken into account the concrete reality of the revolutionary war 
in Vietnam, which has enabled it to enrich the theories of the 
revolutionary war and army."57
In contrast, in the Soviet Union in December 1959, at a Central
Lin Biao's article in Hongqi, 1 October 1959, Number 
19 is translated in Peking Review, 6 October 1959, 
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Committee meeting, Khrushchev put an j!j|f end to the arguments regarding 
Soviet defence policy which had been going on since 1956. Khrushchev 
decided that in any future war, nuclear weapons would be decisive. Plans 
were made to reduce the Soviet military by 1,200,000 men. The Strategic 
Rocket Force was formed in the same month and it became the premier Soviet 
service branch. From 1960 onwards, until Khrushchev was ousted, the ground 
forces were gradually downgraded.58
One month after Flo returned from China, he made another trip to 
Beijing on 26 September as head of the DRV government delegation to 
commemorate the 10th anniversary of the PRC. He was accompanied by Vo 
Nguyen Giap and Ung Van Khiem, Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
a number of government officials and seven army officers. We do not know 
whether those seven army officers were the same ones that were promoted 
recently but it was very likely that they were. The visit would be an 
opportunity for the newly-promoted military officers of both countries to 
get to know each other better. In 1961, Marshal Ye Jianying recalled that 
this visit of the North Vietnamese military delegation led by Giap 
contributed immensely to enhancing the brotherly relationship of the VPA 
and the PLA.59
They travelled in two Chinese IL-14 planes. The North Vietnamese 
delegation led by Ho arrived in Beijing on the afternoon of 26 September 
and was met at the airport by Liu Shaoqi, Soong Jingling, Dong Biwu and 
Zhou Enlai. On the morning of 27 September, Ho visited the newly 
reconstructed Tiananmen grounds and the new Beijing Railway station. On the 
same day, there was a meeting between Lin Biao and the DRV military 
delegation. Also present at the meeting were other generals of whom Luo 
Ruiqing, Tan Zheng, Xu Guangta were specifically mentioned. The meeting was 
described as having taken place in "an atmosphere of warm friendship". That 
same evening, while Ho and Giap dined with Soong Jingling, Lin Biao feted 
the DRV military delegation. During the mass rally on 28 and 29 September, 
where eighty-three countries were represented and sixty congratulatory
For details see Thomas M. Nicols, The Sacred Cause: 
Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 
1917-1992, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 
Chapter 3.
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speeches were delivered, Ho Chi Minh was the second speaker after 
Khrushchev. In his speech, Ho described the relationship between North 
Vietnam and China as brotherly and as close^l as lips and teeth. He spoke 
of common struggle of both countries for independence and the special 
significance of the communist victory in China for the Vietnamese people. 
But he did not forget to acknowledge the Russian influence and help for the 
Vietnamese cause as well.
Sino-Soviet relations, however, continued to deteriorate.60 We 
should recall that on 20 June 1959, the Soviet Union suddenly rescinded 
the Sino-Soviet agreement on new technology for national defence concluded 
in October 1957 in which the Russians had agreed to provide China with a 
sample of the atom bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture.61 
The Soviet Union also failed to support the Chinese in the continuing Sino- 
Indian border dispute conflict which began in July 1959, but instead called 
upon both sides to settle their misunderstanding in a friendly way.62 
While the Chinese appeared prepared to condone Vietnamese neutrality in the 
Sino-Indian dispute (which was understandable since Hanoi needed to 
maintain the goodwill of India who was chairman of the ISCC), they felt 
that the Russians in siding with the Indians had brought the differences 
between China and the Soviet Union into the open before the whole world.63 
To crown them all, the Chinese were incensed by Khrushchev's visit to the 
United States.
Immediately after his visit to the United States from 15-28 
September, Khrushchev flew to Beijing to join in the celebration of the 
10th anniversary of the PRC on 29 September.64 Khrushchev came with a plan
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to solve the Taiwan issue, and to accomplish two missions on behalf of 
Eisenhower and Nehru which he conveyed to Mao on the evening of 30 
September 1959, but he was completely rebuffed by Mao. In the end, he told 
the Chinese that he would withdraw all the Russian experts in China and 
pressed the Chinese to repay their debts owed to the Russians.65 Gromyko 
recalled that during the talks with the Chinese during this visit, deep 
differences once again emerged between the two parties.66 In his memoirs, 
Khrushchev recalled that he did not relish this trip to Beijing67 and 
Jiang Qing described the visit as "tedious and painful".68
We do not know whether Ho Chi Minh had any discussions with 
Khrushchev in Beijing. We only know that Ho met with old friends and 
acquaintances of the 8th Route Army whom he had known during the period of 
the struggle against the French. On the night of 1 October, Liu Shaoqi and 
Zhu De visited Ho Chi Minh at his guesthouse and they had a warm and 
friendly conversation. On 3 October, Ho attended the first National Sports 
Meet at the People's Sports Stadium along with Zhou Enlai, Soong Jingling, 
Dong Biwu, Deng Xiaoping and He Long. In the evening, Ho met Mao and had 
a cordial conversation, before proceeding to a cultural performance.69
Ho and Giap returned to Hanoi after the celebration on 4 October
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1959, possibly without Ung Van Khiem and the army officers.70 Ho's 
departure was reported in great detail by the Chinese. He was sent off by 
Liu Shaoqi, Soong Jingling, Dong Biwu and Lin Biao. Ho reviewed a guard of 
honour of the army, navy and air-force; after which a group of Young 
Pioneers presented the Vietnamese delegation with bouquets. Before boarding 
the plane, Ho embraced Liu, Soong Jingling, Dong Biwu and Lin Biao. It was 
further reported that he mounted the plane amidst a burst of applause and 
at the door, Ho smilingly waved back at those seeing him off.71
Meanwhile in Hanoi, the North Vietnamese apparently made a very 
special effort to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Chinese Revolution 
and the founding of the PRC. As observed by the British Consul-General in 
Hanoi, "the praise, the thanks, the decoration in the streets, the special 
committes and the meetings all went far beyond the natural esteem of one 
free country for another... The Vietnamese succeeded in making very clearly 
their position as a Chinese vassal."72
VI
Given Khrushchev's preference for a policy of peaceful coexistence, 
it can be assumed that the Russians did not actively support the North 
Vietnamese decision to intensify the struggle in the South but there is no 
evidence that they did anything to stop them. The Chinese, on the other 
hand, accepted that there could be a non-peaceful transition to socialism 
and unlike the Russians, they did not fraternise with the US imperialists. 
According to Kenneth T. Young, some time in late 1959 or early 1960, 
Beijing decided to put struggle against imperialism before negotiation. 
This was evident in the Sino-American ambassadorial talks during this time
FO 371/144393, DV 10310/2, 8 October 1959, from Hanoi 
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where the Chinese rebuffed all American approaches to improve relations.
This Chinese attitude was in contrast to that of August 1956 and also that
of the first half of 1958 when the Chinese expressed grave concern when the 
were
Warsaw Talks wa-s suspended with the departure of Ambassador Alexis Johnson 
in December 1957 .73 Also in August 1959, the Chinese promised military aid 
for the Vietnamese communist struggle in the South. However, this did not 
mean that Beijing was prepared to go to war for the reunification of 
Vietnam. Beijing had its own reservations about Hanoi's decision to renew 
their struggle but was prepared to support it as long as it was limited in 
nature.
A conversation between Mao Zedong and the then temporary Soviet 
Charge d'Affaires to China, S.F. Antonov, on 14 October 195.9 reveals Mao's 
assessment of the international situation during this time. Mao told him 
that China had no intention of starting a war with the United States over 
Taiwan. According to Mao, the Chinese could wait 10-20 years, even 30-40 
years. From the experience of the shelling of Jinmen and Mazu in 1958, Mao 
felt that the United States too was not prepared to go to war with China. 
The most dangerous enemies, in Mao's view, were West Germany and Japan. As 
for the United States, United Kingdom and France, Mao thought that on the 
whole, they supported the maintenance of the status quo.74
On 17 October 1959, at the farewell banquet for the visiting Burmese 
Cultural and goodwill delegation, Chen Yi once again emphasised China's 
need for a peaceful environment and the continued relaxation of the world 
situation for her to engage in national reconstruction. In his speech, Chen 
Yi said, "China, a vast country and with a big population, needs a long 
period to solve its own problems completely...China needs all the more 
peaceful coexistence with the Southeast Asian countries that have common 
borders with China... Peaceful means can be sought to settle disputes
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between countries and disputes can definitely be settled by peaceful 
means.1,75
Notwithstanding the reservations of the Soviet Union and China, in 
South Vietnam, following the announcement of the communique of the 15th 
Plenary session in May 1959, the struggle for reunification was gathering 
a momentum of its own. The most outstanding of the uprisings took place in 
Tra Bong, a mountain-region district in the western part of Quang Ngai 
province. The Tra Bong uprising was regarded as one of the first local 
uprisings in the transition phase of the revolution in the South in 1959 
and it involved the Interzone Party Committee, Provincial Party Committee, 
the surrounding districts in Quang Ngai and Quang Nam provinces and the 
provincial and interzone armed forces.76 On 28 August 1959, 16,000 ethnic 
minority people in Tra Bong with the support of the 339th platoon started 
an uprising under the leadership of the District Party Committee and the 
Provincial Party Committee. Among other things, they eliminated the Diem 
administrations in sixteen villages, forced the abandonment of seven posts, 
killed 161 traitors and set up revolutionary administrations in the hamlets 
and villages. The uprisings then spread to the neighbouring villages in the 
districts of Son Tra, Ba To and Minh Long. On 26 September 1959, two 
companies of the 23rd Division were ambushed by the communists, twelve 
soldiers were killed and all the weapons were confiscated.77 The US 
Embassy in Saigon in a special report on the internal security situation 
in South Vietnam in January 1960 noted that for the first time, there were 
attacks by the communists on large South Vietnamese Army units.
Pham Van Dong was reported to have told the French Consul, Georges- 
Picot in a conversation on 12 September 1959, "You must remember we will 
be in Saigon tomorrow, we will be in Saigon tomorrow." Again in November
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1959, on two occasions, Dong told the Canadian Commissioner of the ISCC in 
Hanoi, Erichson-Brown, that the Vietnamese would drive the Americans into 
the sea. But Vo Nguyen Giap later saw Erichson-Brown to "reassure" him that 
the intentions of the DRV were peaceful.78
According to the CRIMP Document it was only in October 1959 that the 
armed struggle was launched.79 A recent Vietnamese source revealed that 
because of the difficulties of the journey, the Southern representatives 
to the 15th Plenary session did not return to the South till September 1959 
and it was not till the following month, in October that they began putting 
the decisions made in January into practice.80 The resolution of the 15th 
Plenary session was apparently not fully disseminated to the provinces in 
the Nam Bo and Interzone V until December 1959.81 According to the North 
Vietnamese historian, Tran Huu Dinh, by the end of 1959, the leadership 
organisation of the Nam Bo Regional Committee had returned from Cambodia 
to South Vietnam to organise the resistance movement in Nam Bo.82
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Chapter Seven
I
In January 1960, the decision of the 15th Plenary session of the Lao 
Dong Central Committee to launch mass uprisings in the South moved into 
full swing. 17-24 January 1960 was a week of uprisings in Ben Tre: 47 
villages in the districts of Mo Cay, Giong Trom, Chau Thanh, Ba Tri, Thanh 
Phu all revolted at the same time. By 19 January, the communists succeeded 
in taking control of the three villages. With the weapons captured at Binh 
Khanh, they were able to arm three squads to support the uprisings in the 
districts of Minh Tan, Thanh Phu and Mo Cay. They also managed to create 
a number of platoons and their first company, the 264th company. Although 
these started off as unarmed mass uprisings, in the process the people in 
Ben Tre acquired guns and were able to build up their armed forces. In this 
way, they were able to apply the strategy of combining the political and 
the armed struggle. On 21 January, the Diem regime sent an amphibious 
battalion into Phuoc Hiep village to recapture Dinh Thuy and Binh Khanh but 
were surrounded by the 264th company and armed squads of the three 
villages. A number of the marines were killed and the weapons were 
captured. In February, the Ben Tre provincial committee gathered all the 
armed soldiers at Bao Island, which comprised the districts of Giong Trom, 
Ba Tri and Chau Thanh, and formed their second company, the 269th company. 
On 4 February, the Ben Tre provincial committee and the Mo Cay district 
committee organised two hundred women from Phuoc Hiep village and five 
thousand women from the adjoining villages into resistance groups.1 
According to the Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam, the practice of 
attacking the enemy by combining the political struggle with the armed 
struggle was first applied during the Ben Tre uprisings.2 From the
Lich Su..., pp.107-115. For a first-person account, 
see Mai V. Elliot (transl.), No Other Road to Take: 
Memoirs of Mrs. Nguyen Thi Dinh, (Data Paper Number 
102, Southeast Asia Programme, Department of Asian 
Studies, Cornell University, June 1976), pp.59-77.
Lich Su..., p.114.
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uprisings in Ben Tre onwards, concerted uprisings swept across the 
provinces of Nam Bo.
According to Le Duan, "the simultaneous uprisings that broke out 
during this period [end of 1959 - beginning of 1960] marked an important 
leap forward. They moved the South Vietnamese revolution to the offensive 
and the revolutionary high tide developed in all areas with the 
coordination of both forms of political and armed struggles... Armed 
struggle and political struggle together are the fundamental form of 
violence of the South Vietnamese revolution, and coordinating armed 
struggle with political struggle is the fundamental law of the method of 
the South Vietnamese."3
Terrorism and guerilla actions which in the past had been considered 
by the US Country Team, as a long-term threat to the viability of the Diem 
regime were now South Vietnam's "number one problem."4 However, the 
Northern leadership at this time was not yet prepared to further raise the 
stakes with the Diem regime. Apparently in the first nine months of 1960, 
there were problems within the VPA. Unfortunately, that is as much as we 
can tell. There is a conspicuous information gap in the Lich Su Quan Doi 
Nhan Dan Viet Nam regarding what the army was doing for the first nine 
months of 1960. According to the Czech ambassador, as reported by British 
sources in April, there was "quite a serious malaise" in the army and many 
units were dispersed to different parts of the country. Giap had been 
travelling round the country inspecting them and finding out what was 
upsetting them.5 This would partially account for Giap's sporadic absence 
from public view during the large part of 1960. Giap was present at the 
meeting on the evening of 5 January 1960 to celebrate the 30th anniversary 
of the Party. He was reported to have paid a visit to cadres and combatants
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of the "Cuu Long" Division with Truong Chinh during Tet. He had urged the 
soldiers to continually raise their socialist awareness, step up their 
training and be prepared to protect peace and smash the enemies' plots. He 
spoke of the unification of the country and promised that the day would 
come when the North could spend Tet with the Southern compatriots. On 21 
January, Giap attended a press conference where he made known that he had 
written to the ISCC requesting it to intervene with the South Vietnamese 
authorities to rescind Law 10/59. He did not appear at all throughout the 
visit of the GDR government delegation at the end of January 1960. When the 
delegation visited the Army Museum on the afternoon of 26 January, they 
were attended to by Major-General Nguyen Van Vinh, Deputy-Minister of 
National Defence. NCNA, but not VNA, reported that Giap attended the 
meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation in Moscow (4-5 February 1960). From Moscow, Truong Chinh, who 
was head of the Vietnamese delegation to the meeting, went to Beijing where 
he stayed till 12 February 1960 before returning to Hanoi.6 We have no 
account of Truong Chinh's activities in Beijing. Nor is it clear whether 
or not Giap went to Beijing with Truong Chinh. Both Giap and Nguyen Chi 
Thanh were present at the Soviet Army Day reception in Hanoi hosted by the 
Soviet Military Attache on 23 February. After that, there was no news about 
Giap until 16 April when it was reported that he had written to the ISCC 
Chairman protesting the reinforcement of the MAAG in South Vietnam. Giap's 
disappearance coincided with the promulgation and implementation of the 
Military Obligation Law in April 1960. The decision on compulsory military 
service, we should recall, was made at the 12th Plenary session in March 
1957. The Military Obligation Law was part of the plan of the Hanoi 
leadership to transform the VPA into a professional army. Under this new 
law, the VPA was no longer a volunteer army. This meant that troops could 
now be recruited and mobilised to build up the armed forces as quickly as 
was needed in preparation for the eventual confrontation with the US-Diem 
forces. It was also now possible to have a large, powerful and trained 
reserve force, while reducing the standing army, thus economising on 
manpower and material which could then be channelled into economic
N C N A ,  12 February I960, S W B / F E / 259/A3/4.
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construction.7
In an effort to curb the enthusiasm and the over-confidence of the 
more militant group of Southern cadres, and to control the struggle in the 
South, on 28 March 1960, a letter was urgently sent by the Regional Party 
Committee to all the Party branches in the South, warning against any 
premature intensification of the military struggle. The letter reiterated 
that the Party's policy remained one of "strongly pushing the political 
struggle ahead and combining it to the right degree with armed activities". 
The time was not yet ripe for a direct revolution to overthrow the Diem 
regime because while the enemy was weak and demoralised, they still 
possessed the capacity to retaliate in a massive way. In short, the 
leadership felt that the balance of forces was still not to their advantage 
and any premature resort to violence would only put the communist forces 
in a dangerous and vulnerable position.8 At the same time, it was 
announced that the Party's 3rd Congress would be held in September 1960 and 
one of the items on the agenda was to discuss the line and task of the 
Party and the people at the present stage of the revolution.9
Meanwhile in Cambodia in mid-March 1960, Sihanouk had written what 
was described as an 1 important" editorial which was published in the 
newspaper, The Nationalist, as well as broadcast^ in full over Phnom Penh 
radio. He claimed that he had documentary evidence to prove that the 
Pracheachon Party and the Khmer communist paper, L' Observateur, were 
colluding with the Hanoi government in the attempt to carry out a 
revolution to end "the feudal regime of the princes".10
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II
However in 1960, it was neither the Vietnamese communists' 
intensification of the struggle in the South nor Sihanouk's concern about 
Hanoi's support for the communists in Cambodia that made the headlines. 
Rather, it was developments in Laos that were a major cause of concern. The 
crisis in Laos was essentially brought about by the struggle for power 
between the Pathet Lao and the RLG. Given the close link between the Pathet 
Lao and the Vietnamese communists, and the importance of the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail to the growing struggle in the South, it was to be expected that the 
North Vietnamese would be deeply involved in the events there. In early 
1960, the troops operating on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, started to take a 
short cut near Khe Sanh by crossing a privately-owned coffee plantation. 
But on one of the trips, a bunch of rifles was inadvertently left at relay 
station 5. This led to a regiment-sized sweep of the area by Diem's troops. 
When Vo Bam reported this incident to Le Duan, the latter proposed that 
they try to find an alternative route which would attract less enemy 
attention. The alternative route that Vo Bam came up with was to go south 
down the western side of the Truong Son Range, on Laotian territory.11
In Laos, on 25 December 1959, the pro-American Committee for the
Defence of National Interests (CDNI) and the Royal Laotian Army carried out
a coup which forced the Phoui Sananikone government to resign. The Nhan Dan
article of 3 January accused the US imperialists of instigating and
abetting the coup, and declared that Laos was threatened by fascism. On the
same day, the NCNA also carried a summary of the Nhan Dan article. On 5
January, a DRV government spokesman again accused CDNI of colluding with
the US imperialists to turn South Vietnam and Laos into US military bases.
A provisional government was formed on 7 January 1960 which was headed
ostensibly by the elder statesman, Kou Abhay .^.However, the real power
i k o (j *n I
behind the provisional government was General NesSrVfm and the CDNI. The 
first direct Chinese comment appeared in the R e m i n  Ribao of 8 January. The 
commentary which described the members of CDNI as warlords shared the views
Brigadier-General Vo Bam, "Opening the Trail" in 
Vietnam Courier, Number 5, 1984, pp.9-15.
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of the Vietnamese.12 On 11 January, the new government declared that it 
would uphold the policy of peace and neutrality.
Although the North Vietnamese continued to criticise the Laotian 
government as being run by extremist members of the military, Pham Van Dong 
on 14 January cabled the new Laotian Prime Minister greeting the formation 
of the new government. Dong also expressed the hope that under Kou Abhay, 
the Geneva Agreements would be upheld and relations with North Vietnam 
would improve.13 Pham Van Dong's reply of 15 January to Kou Abhay's
telegram (of 13 January) alleging that hundreds of Laotians had been 
abducted ff to North Vietnam was also exceptionally mild. In an interview 
with AFP, General the Laotian Defence Minister, stated that North
Vietnam had practically ceased its provocations and that the tone of the
Hanoi radio broadcasts had become less aggressive than during the past
months, particularly during the days when the High Command of the Laotian 
armed forces were running the country.14 As observed by the British
Consulate-General in Hanoi, in contrast to the hysteria of August-September 
1959 over the issue of the integration of the Pathet Lao forces into the 
Royal Laotian Army and the escape of the 2nd Battalion, this time the North 
Vietnamese took the coup fairly calmly.15
On 30 January 1960, the Laotian Council of Ministers announced that 
general elections would take place on 24 April 1960. By introducing 
extremely stringent electoral laws, the RLG did all it could to prevent a 
repetition of the 1958 supplementary election results. The NLHX, the 
Vietnamese and the Chinese .all denounced the new Laotian electoral laws. 
They also called for the release of Prince Souphanouvong and the other NLHX 
leaders who were still imprisoned. On 5 March, Pham Van Dong wrote to the 
co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference concerning the grave situation in 
Laos. On 8 March, he sent a letter to the Chairman of the ISCC in Laos 
regarding the elections. In his letter, Dong described the scheduled 
elections as completely contravening the Geneva and Vientiane Agreements. 
He accused the RLG and the US imperialists of trying to exclude the NLHX
12 NCNA, 8 January 1960, SWB/FE/22S/A3/2-3.
13 VNA, 14 January 1960, SWB/FE/234/(i).
14 Vientiane in French, 19 January 1960, SWB/FE/238/A3/3.
15 FO 371/152323, DF 1015/86, 11 February 1960, from
Hanoi to Foreign Office.
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Party and prevent its legal political activities. He also called for the 
unconditional release of the jailed leaders of the NLHX.16 On 18 March, 
it was reported that there were no NLHX candidates? 1isted for the coming 
elections. The Vietnamese accused the Laotian authorities of having 
practically banned the NLHX. The next day, it was reported that a certain 
number of NLHX members who submitted their candidacies before 1700h on 20 
March would be allowed to stand as candidates.17 After all the complaints 
that the electoral law was unfair and weighted against them, the NLHX in 
the end fielded nine candidates. According to British sources, the NLHX had 
on 8 March asked permission to see their imprisoned leaders to obtain their 
ruling whether the NHLX should take part in the election or not. The RLG 
government refused to accede to the request but agreed to transmit their 
written communication. Souphanouvong had subsequently given his permission 
and also expressed his keenness to stand for the elections as well. 
However, the RLG ruled that none of those imprisoned were allowed to 
participate in the elections.18 We do not know whether Hanoi approved of 
the NLHX taking part in the elections, or even whether it was consulted. 
But there is also no indication that they objected. The Chinese showed 
their reservations after the nominations had closed in a Renmin Ribao 
commentary of 23 March which accused Phoumi Nosavan of trying to inveigle 
the other members of the NLHX Party into laying down their arms by allowing 
the NLHX to participate in the elections without any handicap.19
According to British Embassy sources in Vientiane, over the past few 
months, the 2nd Battalion as well as other elements that had been trained 
in North Vietnam had returned to Laos and spread thinly in advantageous 
position all over the country. It was reckoned that between 200-400 regular 
units had been infiltrated into Southern Laos and that Central and Northern 
Laos could have been similarly reinforced. The British officials were of 
the view, based on the disposition of the guerilla forces that was taking 
place, that the Pathet Lao were either preparing to launch an immediate 
offensive or holding their resources in reserve for early action at short
lf' VNA, 11 March I960, SWB/FE/282/A3/3.
17 Vientiane home service, 19 March I960, SWB/FE/290/B/7.
FO 371/152325, DF 1015/111, 18 March 1960, from
Vientiane to Foreign Office.
19 N C N A ,  2 3 March 196 0, S W B / F E /29 2/A3/3.
Jan - Jul 1960 200
notice.70
The decision of those NLHX members to participate in the elections 
despite the odds against them, intentional or not, provided a cover for the 
Pathet Lao forces to perfect their insurrectional machinery. It also fitted 
in with Hanoi's decision during this time not to embark on an open 
offensive.
Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese continued to profess their desire to 
improve relations with the RLG. On 19 April 1960, Pham Van Dong wrote again 
to Kou Abhay reiterating the DRV's desire to normalise relations. The 
letter noted with regret that relations were not good because of the 
interference of foreign imperialism. Dong further expressed concern over 
the continued detention of the NLHX leaders and the conduct of the 
electoral campaign.21
Not surprisingly, the RLG won a landslide victory on 24 April 1960. 
On 21 April, General Phoumi Nosavan had told the British Ambassador that 
the results of the elections were already a foregone conclusion.22 
Besides the promulgation of the new electoral laws, which were deliberately 
weighted against the left-wing parties, and the mopping-up operations 
conducted by the Royal Laotian Army during the course of the election 
campaign, the election itself was blatantly rigged, apparently with 
assistance from CIA agents. To cite just one example, in Sam Neua, the 
Pathet Lao home base, the NLHX candidate was reported to have received only 
13 votes compared to the 6,508 votes of the RLG candidate.23
In short, Hanoi's unwillingness to allow the situation in South 
Vietnam and Laos to develop into a full-scale war was because the 
leadership recognised that the North was still not ready for a 
confrontation against a Diem-American or a RLG-American combination. North 
Vietnam had yet to complete its socialist transformation after which it 
could serve as a firm, reliable and powerful rear base for the revolution
FO 371/152328, DF 1015/144, 13 April 1960, from 
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in the South.
Ill
Apart from the internal constraints which inhibited an escalation of 
the armed struggle in the South and in Laos, the Hanoi leadership also 
could not ignore the views of Beijing and Moscow. Any direct military 
confrontation with the Diem regime or the RLG would necessarily involve^ 
the Americans. The North Vietnamese realised that they could only take on 
the Americans with the backing of both the Soviet Union and China.
The Chinese did not object to the Vietnamese struggle in the South 
in principle. According to Kenneth T. Young, some time in late 1959 or 
early 1960, Beijing decided to put struggle against imperialism before 
negotiation. This was evident in the Sino-American ambassadorial talks 
during this time where the Chinese rebuffed all American approaches to 
improve relations.24 But they did not approve of escalating the fighting 
in South Vietnam. We should recall that in August 1959, at a meeting with 
Ho Chi Minh in Beijing, Zhou had agreed to support the struggle in the 
South by providing the Vietnamese communists with military aid at the end 
of 1959. As far as we know, the Chinese did not keep their promise. It is 
very likely that Beijing was concerned that giving military aid to the 
Vietnamese communists at this time would further fuel the fighting in the 
South. Two occurences at the end of 1959 and early 1960 seemed to suggest 
that Sino-Vietnamese relations during this period was not as warm as it was 
during autumn 1959: One, Pham Van Dong's report on foreign policy at the 
11th session of the DRV National Assembly (18-31 December 1959) made only 
passing reference to China whereas much emphasis was placed on the 
achievements of the Soviet Union.25 And two, according to the French 
Delegate-General, Monsieur Chambon, Ho Chi Minh in his speech at a new year
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gathering with the diplomatic corpjon 1 January 1960, made no mention at 
all of China but went out of his way to lavish praise on the Soviet Union. 
At that gathering, Ho personally asked Chambon, who was the only western 
representative, whether he had understood his speech as though Ho was 
trying to draw Chambon's attention to his remarks,26 British officials in 
Hanoi observed that until March 1960, North Vietnamese reports on China 
were perfunctory and scarce whereas much publicity was given to 
Khrushchev's activities.27
The message which the CCP Central Committee sent to its Lao Dong 
Party counterpart on 5 January 1960 on the occasion of the latter's 30th 
anniversary gave credit to the Lao Dong Party for leading the Vietnamese 
people in carrying out the land reforms, in rehabilitating the economy, in 
waging the socialist revolution and in the struggle for the peace, 
reunification, independence and democracy of Vietnam. The Chinese believed 
that the Vietnamese leadership would attain even greater achievements in 
the socialist transformation in the North and in the struggle against the 
sabotage of the Geneva Agreements and obstruction of the realisation of the 
country's reunification by US imperialism and the Ngo Dinh Diem clique, in 
the cause of building a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic and 
prosperous Vietnam. No specific comment was made regarding the decision of 
the 15th Plenary session or about armed struggle.28 NolTdid the Chinese 
media carry any report or comment about the developments in the South.
At the pre-Summit meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of 
the Warsaw Treaty Organisation held in Moscow on 4-5 February 1960 which 
Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap attended29, the Chinese representative, 
Kang Sheng in his speech also failed to mention the communist struggle that 
was intensifying in South Vietnam. There was a brief reference to US 
support for the reactionary forces in Laos. Sino-Indonesian and Sino- 
Burmese relations received special mention but there was no reference to
FO 371/152745, DV 1016/5A, 11 January I960, from Hanoi 
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Vietnam. Kang Sheng's speech was extremely anti-Soviet both in tone and 
implications.30 He argued that the strategy of the United States, to win 
victory through peace, was actually aimed at wrecking the unity of the 
socialist camp. China sympathised with and supported the national 
democratic movement of the peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America and 
strived to have long-term friendly relations with the nationalist countries 
in Asia and Africa on the basis of the Five Principles of peaceful 
coexistence. The Declaration of member-states of the Warsaw Treaty issued 
at the end of the meeting also stressed that all states should do 
everything in their power to create a situation facilitating the success 
of the coming East-West talks and urged all other countries to promote the 
success of the talks by refraining from any steps capable of complicating 
these negotiations.31
In the early months of 1960, the Chinese were reassessing their 
foreign policy strategy. In the first three months of the year, three work 
conferences on foreign affairs were held: in Shanghai in January, Canton 
in February and Hangzhou in March. At the Hangzhou work conference, Mao 
delivered a speech which indicated that there were some in the Chinese 
leadership who were concerned about China's increasing isolation.32 Sino- 
Soviet relations were strained; China had been very critical of the peace 
overtures of the Soviet Union to the West; it had border problems with some 
of its neighbours and there was still an outstanding dispute with Indonesia 
over the overseas-Chinese population there. Efforts were made to resolve 
some of these problems: for example, border agreements in principle were
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signed with Burma in January 1960 and with Nepal in March 1960. It was also 
reported that a Sino-Indonesian joint-committee for implementing the treaty 
of dual nationality had been set up and had held its first meeting on 27 
January 1960. On the last morning of the 2nd session of the National 
People's Congress (30 March-10 April 1960), Zhou Enlai delivered an 
unscheduled foreign policy report behind closed-doors. According to British 
sources, Zhou's report was not on the agenda and was included at the last 
minute.33 Only a summary of what Zhou said was made public and no hint of 
what was not publicised had leaked out. In the published report, there was 
almost no mention of Laos, Vietnam, Korea or the Middle East. The stress 
was on China's peaceful foreign policy and its willingness to develop 
friendly cooperation on the basis of the Five Principles.34 Thus China too 
was not in favour of any conflict in the region during this time. Soon 
after the Congress and in the wake of Khrushchev's trip to Asia - India, 
Burma, Indonesia and Afghanistan between 11 February 1960 and 5 March 1960 
- Zhou embarked on a tour of Burma (15-19 April), India (19-25 April), 
Nepal (26-29 April), Cambodia (5-9 May) and North Vietnam (10-14 May). 
While Khrushchev did not visit Cambodia and North Vietnam in his Asian 
tour, Zhou Enlai included both countries in his.35 The two objectives of 
Zhou's Asian tour were to publicise China's foreign policy of peaceful 
coexistence and to resolve outstanding issues with its neighbouring 
countries.36
Zhou's visit to Cambodia from 5-9 May 1960 at the invitation of 
Sihanouk merits attention. Burma, India and Nepal all had common borders 
with China and the visits to these countries were essentially to resolve
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as much as possible the boundary questions, conclude treaties of friendship 
and mutual non-aggression.37 There was however no serious problem between 
Beijing and Phnom Penh. Indeed, Sino-Cambodian relations were described as 
a stabilising factor in Cambodia's neutrality.38 According to a Chinese 
Foreign Ministry source, this was both a return visit on the part of the 
Chinese (Sihanouk paid his second visit to Beijing in July 1958) and the 
first Chinese visit to Cambodia since the two countries established 
diplomatic relations in July 19 5 8 . 39 According to one article in Realites 
Cambodgiennes, "at a time when our nation was threatened, it would be 
comforting to see the arrival of the representative of a great power. This 
would serve as a reminder that Cambodia was not alone."40
Zhou arrived in Phnom Penh on 5 May.41 On the same day, the Phnom 
Penh home service reported that a violent clash which lasted three hours 
had taken place on the morning of 3 May 1960 between two battalions of the 
Khmer Royal Armed Forces in cooperation with a provincial guard unit and 
"an important group of Vietnamese" who had crossed the Cambodian border 
opposite Chau Doc. The report specified that Type-81 mortars and machine- 
guns of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces were used in the attack,42 
According to British officials in Saigon, the group were probably Hoa Hao 
insurgents (Regiment Nghia Quan) who were also attacked by South Vietnamese
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troops when they recrossed the border/3
In his welcome speech, Sihanouk alluded to the difficulties that 
were created by "certain powerful neighbouring countries" and expressed 
concern about the threat of armed conflicts in the region/4 In his press 
article on Cambodia's foreign relations published in The Nationalist, 
Sihanouk stated that he neither had the time nor the means to be critical 
of China's problems with Tibet and the Sino-Indian border issue. He 
explained that Cambodia was faced with a serious threat from South Vietnam 
and Thailand; whereas China had never threatened Cambodia/5 In the joint- 
statement issued at the end of the visit, both parties expressed 
satisfaction with their relationship so far, the Chinese endorsed 
Cambodia's policy of strict neutrality and Zhou again encouraged the 
overseas Chinese in Cambodia to abide strictly by the laws and regulations 
of the country/6 The Chinese again offered to provide Sihanouk with 
whatever armaments and military equipment he needed. According to US 
intelligence, Zhou Enlai offered to supply fighter planes to Cambodia/" 
On 2 July 1960, Sihanouk disclosed that during his visit, Zhou had given 
an informal guarantee that China would support Cambodia in the event of any 
threat to her frontiers. On 10 July, Sihanouk^three of his sons to 
Beijing for their education/9
FO 371/152706, DV 10396/7, 21 May 1960, from Saigon to 
Foreign Office (Secret).
For the full-text of Sihanouk's welcome speech, see
NCNA, 5 May 1960, SWB/FE/327/A3/1-3.
NCNA, 8 May 1960, SWB/FE/329/A3/4-5.
NCNA, 8 May 1960, SWB/FE/329/A3/2-3.
Memorandum from Director of Intelligence and Research 
to Secretary of State dated 21 June 1960 in Foreign 
Relations of the United States, Volume XVI: Cambodia 
and Laos, 1958-1960, (Washington: US Government
Printing House, 1992), p.364.
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1-8 April 1961, 
p. 18013.
FO 371/152697, DV 10310/8, 28 July 1960, from Phnom
Penh to Foreign Office.
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IV
Zhou's inclusion of North Vietnam in his tour was said to be in 
response to an invitation extended to him to visit the country by Pham Van 
Dong on 4 April I960, In his letter to Zhou, Dong said that the visit would 
help strengthen further the friendship and relations of cooperation between 
the two brotherly countries and would greatly inspire the Vietnamese people 
in building socialism and in their struggle for national reunification. In 
his letter of acceptance, Zhou replied that he was very happy to visit 
Vietnam again at a time when "the brotherly Vietnamese people, under the 
leadership of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party and the DRV government have won 
brilliant achievements in socialist construction and transformation and are 
striving to achieve the three-year plan successfully." Zhou did not mention 
the struggle in the South.50
Shortly before Zhou's visit, on 20 April, Le Duan, in a speech on 
the occasion of Lenin's 90th birthday anniversary, made it very clear that 
Hanoi was not yet ready to risk a full-scale war in the South at this time. 
According to Le Duan, the situation in the South was complex. Although the 
law governing the South was that of a colonial and feudal regime and should 
logically follow the road to liberation prescribed by Lenin, the people's 
democratic revolution of the South was taking place at a time when the 
world and internal situation had undergone fundamental changes. In the 
world, the forces of socialism were gaining supremacy while capitalism was 
weakening. This meant that there were growing possibilities to frustrate 
imperialism and maintain a lasting peace. Also, North Vietnam, the firm 
base for the revolution in the South, had already been completely liberated 
and was advancing towards socialism. Therefore, according to Le Duan, "in 
the present conjuncture when the possibility exists to maintain a lasting 
peace in the world and create favourable conditions for the world movement 
of socialist revolution and national independence to go forward, we can and 
must guide and restrict within the South the solving of the contradiction 
between imperialism and the colonies in our country."51
VNA, 1 May 1960, SWB/FE/323/A3/2.
Le Duan, "Leninism and Vietnam's Revolution" in On the 
Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, Volume I, (Hanoi: 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965), pp.9-56.
Jan - Jul I960 208
On 1st May, it was announced that the Chinese delegation led by Zhou 
Enlai would visit the DRV from 9-12 May I960.53 Because of poor weather 
conditions, the Chinese delegation rested for a day in Nghe An province 
before arriving in Hanoi on the morning of 10 May 1960. The Chinese 
delegation included Chen Yi {Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs), 
Chang Hanfu (Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs), Wang Guangwei (Vice- 
Chairman, State Planning Commission), Chang Yan (Deputy-Director, Office 
of the State Council in charge of Foreign Affairs), Qiao Guanhua (Assistant 
Minister of Foreign Affairs), Lo Jingzhang (Deputy-Director, Secretariat 
of the Premier of the State Council) and Chen Shuliang (Director, Second 
Asian Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
The delegation was met at the airport by Pham Van Dong, Le Duan, 
Truong Chinh, Phan Ke Toai, Pham Hung and Ton Due Thang, Giap was 
conspicuously absent during Zhou Enlai's visit from 10-14 May. When he had 
re-appeared on May Day, it was thought that his pressing work in the army 
might have come to an end.53 Between 4-6 May, he headed the Vietnamese 
delegation which entertained the visiting Algerians. A joint-communique was 
signed by Bil Qasim Karim, leader of the Algerian delegation and Giap on 
6 May. After that, there was again no news of his activities.
From the airport, the Chinese delegation proceeded to the 
Presidential Palace where they were received by Ho Chi Minh. In the 
afternoon, Zhou visited the Thang Long cigarette factory, the Sao Vang 
rubber goods factory and the Hanoi soap factory as well as attending a 
joint-rally sponsored by the three factories. (All three factories were 
built with Chinese aid.) After that he laid a wreath at the grave of 
Vietnamese heroes in Mai Dich. The day ended with a state banquet given by 
Pham Van Dong. Pham Van Dong's banquet speech is illuminating for its 
details regarding the assistance given by the Chinese in the economic and 
cultural development of Vietnam. According to Dong, the Chinese had helped 
in the repair of railways, irrigation systems and factories; given large 
quantities of consumer goods to stabilise prices and ensured the livelihood 
of the people; built industries for producing farm produce which was 
practically non-existent in Vietnam in the past, as well as consumer goods
VNA, 1 May I960, SWB/FE/323/A3/2.
FO 371/152746, DV 1016/19, 2 May 1960, from Hanoi to
Foreign Office.
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factories; built farms for cultivating tropical industrial crops and 
livestock farms; built many conservancy projects such as the large scale 
Bac Hung Hai irrigation system. Currently, the Chinese were helping to lay 
the preliminary foundation of the metallurgical and chemical industries, 
and to build more electrical power enterprises. They were,also helping to 
draw up plans for the taming and developing of the Red River. Of the 72 
factories built with Chinese aid, 31 had been completed and put into 
operation. Zhou, in his speech, recalled the pledge made by the United 
States at the 1954 Geneva Conference that they would not resort to armed 
force to undermine the Geneva Agreements and expressed the firm conviction 
that the sacred aspirations of the Vietnamese people to reunify the country 
would be fulfilled. In general, the speeches professed the friendship and 
solidarity between the two fraternal countries.
The next morning was taken up by talks between the two governments. 
There is strong evidence that Chinese economic assistance was a major topic 
of discussion. Besides the very strong economic representation on the North 
Vietnamese side, the Chinese delegation included Wang Guangwei, Vice- 
Chairman of the State Planning Commission, who apparently only joined the 
delegation for the trip to Hanoi; and Fang Yi, China's economic 
representative in Vietnam. On the same day, Chen Yi, accompanied by Deputy 
Premier, Pham Hung, visited the scenic spot in Vinh, passed through 
Haiphong and toured several islands on board a Vietnamese gunboat.
In the afternoon, the first of three meetings between the Chinese 
delegation and the Lao Dong Party delegation led by Ho Chi Minh took place. 
In the evening at the Chinese Embassy, Zhou met the Chinese specialists 
working in North Vietnam.
On the morning of 12 May, Zhou visited the Hanoi Polytechnic College 
where he suggested a friendly emulation drive between the Chinese and 
Vietnamese students for training more proletarian intellectuals who were 
both "red and expert". At noon, Zhou visited the Nhan Chinh agricultural 
cooperative where he stressed the value of more and bigger cooperatives and
the importance of the local people's militia.
In the afternoon, a second round of talks took place between the 
Chinese delegation led by Zhou and the Vietnamese Communist Party 
delegation led by Ho Chi Minh. Also present at the talks were Chen Yi and
Chang Hanfu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. They discussed the current
international situation and bilateral relations. The report on the high-
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level talks gave no details except that both sides arrived at completely 
identical views on all questions discussed.54
On 13 May, the last day of the Chinese visit, the Chinese delegation 
attended a large rally in Ba Dinh Square, at which Ho spoke of China 
achieving its economic plan in three years instead of five, of the smooth 
progress of the Soviet Union's seven-year plan and the successful 
completion of North Korea's five-year economic plan and exhorted the 
Vietnamese to learn from the examples of the three countries. After the 
rally, the third and final round of talks between the two parties took 
place. Lunch was held at the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi at which Ho Chi Minh 
was also present. During lunch, it was reported that Chen Yi and Ton Quang 
Phiet had recited "poems of friendship". Later in the day, Zhou received 
representatives of the Vietnam-China Friendship Association and overseas 
Chinese in Hanoi. In the evening, the Chinese delegation attended a 
farewell banquet at the Presidential Palace hosted by Ho, after which they 
watched a cultural performance. At the end of the visit, a joint-communique 
was signed.55 From the many press reports and commentaries, the visit was 
clearly successful. Sino-Vietnamese relations were described as "close as 
the teeth and the lips".
The three rounds of talks on 11, 12 and 13 May are significant. This 
series of high-level meetings between the North Vietnamese and Chinese is 
most likely the same as the one referred to in the official Vietnamese 
source published in 1980. In that Vietnamese account, during the Sino- 
Vietnamese meeting in May 1960, the Chinese had told the North Vietnamese 
that both military struggle and political struggle were equally important. 
But whether it was a political or a military struggle, there was no 
question of winning political power immediately. Even if Diem was 
overthrown, there were still the Americans to contend with. The struggle 
would therefore have to be protracted. The North could support the South 
politically and help them in formulating policies, but it must principally 
nurture in them the spirit of self-reliance. When the chances of success 
were certain, the North could then aid the South militarily by secretly
N C N A ,  13 May I960, S W B / F E / 3 33/A3/1.
N C N A ,  14 May 1960, S W B / F E / 334/A3/2-6.
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supplying arms. But in general, it should not lend direct assistance.56
The Chinese delegation left Hanoi for Nanning on the morning of 14 
May. On arrival, they were received by Wei Guoqing, Secretary of the CCP 
Committee of the Guangxi Zhuangzu Autonomous Region and Chairman of the 
Region. The Chinese delegation was in Wuhan on 16 May and returned to 
Beijing on the morning of 17 May.57
Meanwhile, the US U-2 spy-plane was shot down by the Russians on 1 
May 1960. The incident was only made public on 5 May when Khrushchev 
disclosed that the Russians had shot down the plane near Sverdlovsk in 
central USSR. At this point of time, there was no indication that the 
forthcoming Paris summit between Khrushchev and Eisenhower would be 
cancelled as a result of the U-2 incident. Khrushchev arrived in Paris on 
14 May as scheduled for his meeting with Eisenhower. On 16 May, it was 
evident that the Paris summit was not beginning on schedule. On 17 May, the 
final decision to cancel the Paris summit was taken. At 22QQh, it was made 
known that the much-heralded summit meeting in Paris between Khrushchev and 
Eisenhower which was supposed to have begun the day before would not take 
place.58 The Chinese had all along opposed Khrushchev's attempts for a 
rapprochement with the Americans. The U-2 incident which scuttled the 
summit must have vindicated the Chinese, who had consistently argued that 
the US imperialists were unreliable and untrustworthy, as well as those 
within the Soviet leadership who had reservations about the summit. The U-2 
episode raised questions about the infallibility of Khrushchev's strategy 
of peaceful and friendly competition with the West, which he had 
persistently championed since the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956, and
Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National
Salvation 1954-1975: Military Events, (Hanoi, 30 May 
1980)(JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982), pp.44-45.
For Zhou Enlai's visit to Hanoi, see SWB/FE/331/A3/1- 
4; SWB/FE/332/K3/1; SWB/FE/333/A3/1-2; Zhou Enlai
Waijiao Huodong Da Shiji, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi
Chubanshe, 1993), pp.279-280.
For details of the U-2 Incident leading to the 
aborting of the Paris summit, see Khrushchev's 
memoirs; Fedor Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the Russian 
Spring: The Era of Khrushchev through the eyes of his 
adviser, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991),
pp.155-157; Harold Mamillan, Pointing the Way 1959- 
1961, (London: Macmillan, 1972), Chapter 7.
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provided Khrushchev's opponents within the Kremlin with the opportunity to 
remove some of Khrushchev's staunchest supporters in the Central Committee 
Secretariat. It also strengthened the position of Kozlov and Suslov. Unlike 
Khrushchev, they were more inclined to improving Soviet relations with 
China than with the West.59 Soon after the aborted summit, the Soviet 
Union began to adopt a more aggressive and uncompromising foreign policy. 
This was characterised by "less reliance on negotiations with the West in 
favour of mass propanganda campaigns, political agitation, and other forms 
of direct action by communist forces in the free world, backed up by 
vigorous missile-flexing diplomacy..."60 Some examples include the 
breaking off of the 10-nation disarmament talks in Geneva on 27 June 1960, 
championing the Castro regime in the United States-Cuban dispute and
renewing Soviet pressure on the Berlin issue. But Khrushchev had not
abandoned his goal for peaceful coexistence with the West.
On 17 May, Ho Chi Minh accompanied by He Wei arrived in Nanning for
a three-day visit where he also spent his 70th birthday. On 20 May, Wei
Guoqing, who we should recall was head of the Chinese Military Advisory 
Mission to North Vietnam in the early 50s and a very old friend of Ho, 
delivered to Ho a birthday telegram from Mao, Zhu Teh and Zhou Enlai. It 
was a very complimentary telegram: Ho was described as the founder and 
leader of the Lao Dong Party, the most beloved leader of the Vietnamese 
people, the most outstanding fighter in the international communist 
movement and China's favourite friend. It praised Ho for dedicating all his 
energy and revolutionary experience in fighting to achieve peace, unity, 
independence and democracy for the Vietnamese workers. As such he was loved 
and respected by everyone in the world.61
We do not know whether in the wake of the aborted Paris summit, Ho 
also made a trip to Beijing for further discussions with the Chinese 
leaders. According to a Chinese source, in mid-May 1960, the North
Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 
1957-1964, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966),
pp.93-104.
United States Department of State, Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research: Intelligence Report Number 
8306 dated 21 July 1960.
For details of Ho's visit, see NCNA, 25 August 1979, 
SfV£/F£/6208/A3/3; Huang Zheng, Ho Zhiming Yu Zhongguo, 
(Beijing: Jiefang Jun Chubanshe, 1987), pp.160-161.
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Vietnamese and Chinese leaders met first in Hanoi and then in Beijing to 
discuss the question of revolutionary struggle in the South. During their 
discussions, Zhou Enlai told Pham Van Dong that the South must be 
liberated. Both Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were of the view that there 
must be a combination of political and military struggle. Because the 
situation in the cities and the countryside were different, there must be 
flexibilty in the strategy. In the cities, political struggle should 
dominate but it must be supplemented by military strength. In the 
countryside, military struggle could take precedence but there was also the 
need for political support. Pham Van Dong was in agreement.63 In 1980, at 
the nadir of Sino-Vietnamese relations, the Vietnamese chose to interpret 
this as evidence of Chinese opposition to the uprisings in the South. 
However, in May 1960, the Chinese viewpoint coincided with the thinking of 
the Hanoi leadership.
These meetings in May could be the point in 1960 referred to by Hoang 
Van Hoan, in which, according to Hoan, the Chinese, after being fully 
apprised of the situation in South Vietnam, expressed explicitly that they 
were not as well-informed as the Vietnamese were which was why they had 
held on to the view that the time was not ripe for the Vietnamese 
communists to expose their strength; but they now saw the correctness of 
the Vietnamese position for armed struggle in the South and would fully 
support it,63
Not long after the discussions between the North Vietnamese and 
Chinese leaders in Hanoi and Beijing, and the failure of the Paris summit, 
on the night of 23-24 May 1960, after being detained for ten months, 
Souphanouvong and the other 15 NHLX prisoners escaped from Phone Kheng 
police camp outside Vientiane. We have no evidence to implicate either the 
North Vietnamese or the Chinese in the escape.64 The British Ambassador
Guo Ming (ed.), Zhongyue Guanxi Yanbian Sishi Nian, 
(Guangxi Remain Chubanshe, 1992), p.67.
Hoang Van Hoan, "Distortion of Facts about the 
Militant Friendship between Vietnam and China is 
Impermissible" in Beijing Review, 7 December 1979, 
Number 49, p.15.
For Souphanouvong's account of the escape, see Wilfred 
Burchett, The Furtive War: The United States in
Vietnam and Laos, (New York: International Publisher, 
1963), Chapter X.
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in Laos was of the view that Prince Souphanouvong feared assassination and 
the escape was planned and executed without the knowledge and against the 
wishes of the Hanoi leadership.66 The consequence of the escape of the 
NHLX leaders was that it heightened the already highly tense relations 
between the Pathet Lao and the RLG. According to a British assessment, the 
Pathet Lao were now - and before the escape of the NLHX leaders - in a
position to launch a very effective military campaign.66 At the end of
June 1960, British sources again confirmed that the Pathet Lao were in a 
position to score rapid successes against the Royal Laotian Army and 
administration if they chose to step up the level of their military 
activity.67
V
About a month after the aborted Paris summit, on 14 June, a North 
Vietnam-Soviet Union economic agreement was signed in Moscow. The Soviet 
Union would assist the North Vietnamese in the production of perennial 
tropical crops and their industrial processing; by providing technical 
assistance in the organisation of state farms and in the reconstruction of 
existing state farms; in organising a repair workshop to serve the state 
farms; building a tea factory and enterprises for processing coffee and 
canning fruits. The Soviet Union also gave a long term loan of 350 roubles 
on "very favourable conditions" to cover the supply of Soviet equipment, 
machines and other material. The loan was to be returned in kind in ten
years beginning in 1970 at an interest rate of 2%.ee The Nhan Dan
FO 372/159811/. DF 1011/1, 23 June 1961, from Vientiane 
to Foreign Office.
FO 371/152335, DF 1015/265, 25 May 1960, Record of
Conversation between Lord Lansdowne and Prince 
Khammao, Laotian Ambassador to the United Kingdom.
FO 371/152339, DF 1015/321, 30 June 1960, from Foreign 
Office to Vientiane (Secret).
H a n o i  r a d i o  i n  F r e n c h ,  15 June 1960, S W B / F E /3 6 2/A2/1-
2 .
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editorial of 16 June 1960 said that the aid was all the more valuable since 
the DRV was still economically backward, lacked equipment and technical 
workers.69 According to an assessment by the US State Department, the 
impact of the Soviet aid programme on North Vietnam's economy had been 
substantial, although it was probably exceeded by the Chinese assistance. 
However, it was difficult to accurately pinpoint the Soviet contribution 
because of the paucity of available information and also because several 
of the projects were being jointly assisted by the USSR and the Eastern 
Bloc countries. In the view of the State Department, China was more 
appropriate to the technological capabilities of the North Vietnamese 
because of the inability of the backward Vietnamese economy to fully absorb 
the complex type of Soviet industrial assistance offered under the 1955 
grant and 1959 credit. Also, being the only bloc country in the tropical 
region, the Chinese experience was more applicable to the North Vietnamese; 
for example the Russians lacked experience in tropical agriculture.70 It 
was not reported who negotiated the agreement on behalf of the North 
Vietnamese but we do know that Le Duan was in Moscow during this time. On 
15 June, the day after the economic agreement was signed, the Vietnamese 
delegation led by Le Duan left Moscow for Bucharest to attend the 3rd 
Congress of the Communist Party of Rumania.71 Le Duan was absent 
throughout the visit of the Albanian delegation to North Vietnam from 12 
June. It is possible that he was in Moscow where he would have the 
opportunity to assess the mood of the Russians in the wake of the aborted 
Paris summit. As far as we can tell, the failure of the Paris summit did 
not alter Moscow's preference for a peaceful solution to the Vietnam 
problem. Although there is no report of Le Duan in Beijing, it is very 
likely that Le Duan stopped over in Beijing before proceeding to Moscow.
On 20 June 1960, the 3rd Congress of the Communist Party of Rumania 
was convened.72 It was initially just a routine congress of a minor
VNA, 16 June I960, SWB/FE/362/A.2/2.
FO 371/152772, DV 1338/1, 2 September 1960, US
Embassy: US State Department Information Brief on
Soviet aid to North Vietnam, Number 319.
VNA, 16 June 1960, SWB/FE/362/A2/2.
For details of the Bucharest Congress, see Edward 
Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Pekin,
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1965), Chapter 10;
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communist state. Therefore, very few parties besides Eastern Europe sent 
their top leaders. Ho, himself did not attend but was represented by Le 
Duan.73 Khrushchev's intention to attend the congress was only announced 
when he arrived in Bucharest on 18 June, two days before the congress 
commenced. The Bucharest conference is significant because the Russians 
used the occasion for a major attack on the Chinese. At the conference, 
they distributed an eight-page circular letter detailing the shortcomings 
of the Chinese. This was the first detailed presentation of the Soviet case 
against China intended for the eyes of senior party members in the 
communist bloc. The Chinese communists were accused of reneging on what was 
agreed upon at the 1957 Moscow Conference. Peng Zhen, the leader of the 
Chinese delegation rebutted the accusations and countercharged the Russians 
with the same transgression. The communique issued at the end of the 
Bucharest conference on 24 June 1960 was couched in such a way as to 
conceal the differences in the bloc. It reaffirmed the correctness of the 
Marxist-Leninist theses of the declaration and the manifesto of peace, 
adopted by the communist and workers' parties in Moscow in November 1957. 
At the same time, it was decided that during the annual celebration of 
Lenin's revolution in November 1960, a conference of all the parties would 
be convened in Moscow to settle their outstanding differences. The 
Vietnamese refused to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute. On 28 June, 
Nhan Dan published the full text of the Bucharest communique with an 
editorial entitled "To strengthen solidarity and unity of mind among the 
brother-parties is constantly our foremost task".
Crankshaw's sources include material published by the 
French, Italian and Belgian Communist Parties; Allen 
S. Whiting, "The Sino-Soviet Split" in John Fairbank 
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Workers' Party Central Committee. He was accompanied 
by Nguyen Van Kinh, member of the Lao Dong Central 
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About a month after the Bucharest Conference, on 16 July 1960, while 
the Central Committee of the CCP was in session (5 July-10 August 1960) 
discussing the economy, the Soviet Union informed the Chinese that it was 
withdrawing all Soviet advisers from China. According to the Chinese,
without prior consultation, the Soviet government recalled 1,390 experts 
working in China as well as terminating 343 contracts for the service of 
Soviet experts and 257 projects of scientific and technical cooperation. 
The Soviet government also ordered their experts to take back with them all 
blue prints and technical data, thus leaving large numbers of construction 
projects uncompleted.7* August 1960 thus saw a large exodus of Soviet 
experts from China.75 The Russian decision compounded the already
difficult economic situation in China brought about by the Great Leap 
Forward and recent severe natural calamities. According to the official 
Chinese account, this was the most difficult period in its history.76
We do not know whether Le Duan went to Beijing after leaving 
Bucharest but he was back in Hanoi for the first session of the 2nd 
National Assembly from 7-15 July 1960, On the first day of the session,
Pham Van Dong delivered his report on the government's work in the first
six months of 1960, which amongst other things covered the subjects of 
national reunification and the DRV's foreign policy. Dong did not expect 
an easy and quick victory in the struggle for reunification but he believed 
that under the leadership of the Soviet Union and China, the collapse of 
imperialism was inevitable. He again highlighted the significance of the 
1957 Moscow Declaration which was recently reaffirmed in the Bucharest 
communique. On 9 July, Nhan Dan once more published the full text of the 
Bucharest communique together with the complete 29 June 1960 editorials of 
Pravda and Renmin Ribao concerning the Bucharest communique.77
Zong Huaiwen (compiled), Years of Trial, Turmoil and 
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With regards to North Vietnamese-Cambodian relations, Dong stated 
that the DRV was resolved to support Cambodia's policy of peace and 
neutrality. As for Laos, the DRV was clearly concerned about the situation 
there because it directly threatened the security of the DRV and peace in 
IndoChina. Nevertheless, it would appear from Dong's report that Hanoi was 
adopting a wait-and-see policy in the hope that the situation in Laos would 
improve. On the subject of reunification, Pham Van Dong emphasised that the 
reunification of the country was a sacred task of the Vietnamese people. 
He identified the United States as the enemy. According to Dong, to fulfil 
the task of reunifying the country, the Vietnamese had to struggle against 
the US imperialists for "the US imperialists and their lackeys are 
precisely the source of the misery and poverty and all other disasters 
which our compatriots in the South are enduring." He refuted the accusation 
that the anti-Diem struggle in the South was initiated by the North. Dong 
explained that the patriotic and anti-Diem movement in South Vietnam had 
a tradition of revolutionary struggle.78
During the Second National Assembly, Giap was elected in absentia to 
the Presidium of the Asssembly and Truong Chinh was appointed Chairman of 
the National Assembly Standing Committee. Giap was also appointed Chairman 
of the National Scientific Research Commission with Truong Chinh as the 
Vice-Chairman. There had been no news on Giap since 6 May 1960. He was 
absent during the visit of the Albanian delegation in June. It was General 
Nguyen Chi Thanh who attended the banquet for the Albanian visitors on 12 
June.79
That the Hanoi leadership did not see the need for the North to 
involve itself directly in the Southern struggle at this point of time was 
also highlighted in a speech by Major-General Nguyen Van Vinh at the High 
Command Office, published in the VPA's newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan on 8 
July 1960. Vinh said that there was no need for the North to organise the 
overthrowing of the US-Diem administration because it was the task of the 
South Vietnamese. Citing examples of the recent successes in the Southern
VNA, 7 July I960, SWB/FE/381/B/1-8.
FO 371/152747, DV 1016/29, 26 August 1960, from Hanoi 
to Foreign Office. Giap was not mentioned as having 
been present at the opening of the 2nd National 
Assembly on 7 July. See VNA, 7 July 1960,
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struggle, he added that the South Vietnamese communists were more than 
capable of doing it.80 This was true up to a point but the North continued 
to provide indirect assistance to the struggle in the South. In a Special 
National Intelligence Estimate of 23 August 1960, the US Country Team 
reported that in the first five months of 1960, Vietnamese communist 
terrorism had continued to intensify, and support from North Vietnam 
appeared to have increased. In particular, senior cadres and military 
supplies such as communication equipment were believed to be moving South 
through Laos and Cambodia and by junk along the eastern coastline.81
Some time around the end of July 1960, the Central Committee of the 
Lao Dong Party held its 18th Plenary session to hear Le Duan's report on 
the Bucharest Conference. Again Giap was not mentioned as being present at 
this Plenary session. Nor was he reported to have attended the All-Army 
Party Congress from 17-21 July, although Ho Chi Minh was present at the 
closing of the Congress. The main speech at the congress was delivered by 
Nguyen Chi Thanh. According to a British source, Giap could be visiting 
Algeria.82 The decisions of the 18th Plenary session were published in a 
communique on 14 August 1960. The communique emphasised the need for 
solidarity and unity of the socialist camp and stated that the Vietnamese 
communists would do their best to strengthen the unity of the socialist 
camp. While conceding that peace was possible and a new world war could be 
avoided, the Hanoi leadership at the same time stressed the need to be 
constantly watchful of the perfidious imperialist schemes. As long as 
imperialism persisted, there was always the likelihood of war. The 
Vietnamese communists would also do their utmost to preserve their national 
unity against US imperialism. The 18th Plenary session also decided that 
the 3rd Party Congress would be held from 5 September I960.83
In South Vietnam, in July 1960, the Nam Bo regional committee held 
its 5th Plenary session in War Zone D to evaluate the uprisings carried out
VNA, 8 July I960, SWB/FE/382/A3/3.
US Department of Defence, United States-Vietnam 
Relations: US Perceptions of the Insurgency 1954-1960,
(Washington, 1971), pp.48-52.
FO 371/152747, DV 1016/29, 26 August 1960, from Hanoi 
to Foreign Office.
V N A , 14 August 1960, S W B / F E / 4 1 2/B/1-2.
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so far. Encouraged by the successes so far, the committee decided that 
pressure should be intensified, opportunities should be created for even 
more uprisings. The date 23 September 1960, the 15th anniversary of the 
resistance in the South was chosen for the start of a salvo of simultaneous 
uprisings throughout the country. A similar decision to launch a new wave 
of armed activities from September 1960 to assist the masses to attain 
self-rule was also made by the provincial committees of south Central 
Vietnam and Interzone V. Thus from the middle of September 1960 till the 
beginning of 1961, mass uprisings instigated and led by the communists, and 
supported by armed units, swept over the South.84
Lich Su...f p.115; 23 September 1940 was when the Bac 
Son uprising broke out. The first guerilla unit under 
the Lao Dong party leadership was also formed on that 
day.
Chapter Eight
I
In Laos, at 0300h Vientiane time on 9 August 1960, the "revolutionary 
forces" led by Captain Kong Lae, Commander of the 2nd Paratroop Battalion, 
successfully carried out a coup in Vientiane.1 It is believed that Kong 
Lae had no political affiliation and he carried out the coup on his own 
initiative.2 His stated reasons for the coup were to put a stop to the 
civil war, to eliminate corruption amongst public servants, including 
military commanders and officials and to rid the country of foreign armed 
forces, specifically those of the United States. He believed that it was 
the Americans who had bought Government officials and army commanders and 
brought about civil war and dissension in the country. The Revolutionary 
Committee would maintain the neutrality of Laos and establish friendly and 
neighbourly relations with all countries.3
Hanoi radio first broadcast the news of the coup at llOQh (GMT) on 
9 August providing a summary of the communiques issued by the Revolutionary 
Committee. A VNA report of the coup at 1400h (GMT) on the same day was 
based on the monitoring of Vientiane radio.4 Also on 9 August the Central 
Committee of the NLHX issued a statement in support of the Revolutionary 
Committee which was also published in the Lao Hak Xat Bulletin of the same 
day.5 We cannot be sure whether this statement by the NLHX was issued with 
the prior approval of Hanoi or Beijing. Until 10 August, no report of the
Vientiane home service in French (0515h GMT), 9 August 
I960, SWB/FE/406/B/1.
Interview with Kong Lae in Wilfred Burchett, The 
Furtive War: The United States in Vietnam and Laos,
(New York: International Publishers, 1963), pp.188-
191? United States Senate, Committee of Foreign 
Relations Top-Secret hearings: Briefing by Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State, 28 February 1961.
Vientiane home service, 9 August 1960, SWB/FE/407/B/2. 
SWB/FE/407/(1).
N C N A , 12 August 1960, S W B / F E / 410/B/10-11.
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coup in Laos had been monitored from Beijing radio or the NCNA. The NLHX 
statement was not reported by the VNA and NCNA until 12 August.
At this time, the Pathet Lao was under the charge of Kaysone 
Phomvihan and his close associate Khamtay Siphandon. Kaysone had very close 
ties with the Hanoi leadership. Souphanouvong and the other members of the 
Pathet Lao leadership who had escaped from prison were still making their 
way back to Sam Neua. According to Souphanouvong's account, after his 
escape on the night of 23-24 May 1960, he along with Singkapo and Nouhak 
Phoumsavan headed back towards Sam Neua on foot. On the morning of 9 
August, they heard the news of the Kong Lae-coup on the transistor radio 
which they had with them. It was then decided that he should go ahead as 
quickly as possible and try to re-establish contact with Kong Lae. After 
another seven days of travel with only snatches of sleep, he managed to get 
close enough to Vientiane to establish contact with Kong Lae who sent a 
helicopter to fetch him.6 That would have been some time around 16-17 
August. It is not clear from Souphanouvong's account whether he went to 
Vientiane or Sam Neua.
On 10 August Vientiane home service announced that the military coup 
had been successfully accomplished.7 At 1117h (GMT), Hanoi radio carried 
a two-minute dispatch on the coup quoting the Revolutionary Committee and 
at 1448h (GMT), it gave a background talk on the sufferings of the Laotians 
brought about by the Somsanith government.8
On the afternoon of 11 August, at a rally, Kong Lae announced that 
Souvanna Phouma had been chosen to be the Premier of the Revolutionary 
Government. The choice of Souvanna Phouma would certainly please both the 
Chinese and Vietnamese communists. We should recall that Souvanna Phouma 
had all along been the preference of the Chinese and the Vietnamese to lead 
Laos in the short term. Kong Lae's announcement was followed by the first 
direct indication of support by the North Vietnamese in a Hanoi home 
service commentary of 11 August 1960 at 1452h which stated that the coup
Wilfred Burchett, The Furtive War: The United States
in Vietnam and Laos, (New York: International
Publishers, 1963), pp. 186-188.
V i e n t i a n e  h o m e  s e r v i c e  i n  F r e n c h  (0346h GMT), 10
August 1960, S W B / F E / 4 0 8 / B / 3 .
S W B / F E / 4 0 8 / (i ).
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and the policy of peace and neutrality were compatible with the Laotian 
people's aspirations. The commentary added that the Vietnamese people were 
following the developments in Laos and were confident that the 
Revolutionary Committee would achieve its goals.9
It was also not till II August at 1712h (GMT) that the NCNA informed 
the local press that information about the coup was to be transmitted. The 
first mention of the coup in the Beijing home service was in a news 
bulletin at 2105h (GMT). The coup was the only foreign news and it 
consisted of reports from Hanoi on the coup, Kong Le's message to the 
people and a report on developments on the Laotian situation.10 At 1820h 
(GMT), the NCNA gave a report of the coup which included summaries of the 
communiques and messages issued by the Revolutionary Committee, emphasising 
the anti-US parts of Kong Lae's statement. Other NCNA reports covered all 
the developments that had taken place since the coup. On 12 August, the 
Beijing papers gave prominence to the Laotian coup stating that a 
Revolutionary Committee had seized power and had announced a policy of 
neutrality, opposition to US interference in Laotian affairs and the ending 
of the civil war. The papers also published Kong Lae's message to the 
nation.11 Also on 12 August, the VNA and NCNA finally reported the 9 
August 1960 statement of support by the NLHX. Subsequent Chinese reports 
consisted of similar straightforward reporting of the developments in Laos, 
datelined Hanoi. From the Chinese response to the coup, the British Embassy 
in Beijing was of the view that the Chinese were taken by surprise by the 
events in Laos and did not immediately support Kong Lae.12
On 15 August, it was reported that the incumbent government had 
submitted its resignation to the King and the latter had appointed Prince 
Souvanna Phouma to form a new government. The next day Souvanna Phouma 
presented his new government to the National Assembly. In his policy 
statement, Souvanna Phouma declared that he planned to implement the 
agreements he had reached with the Pathet Lao in 1957 which had been
Hanoi home service, 11 August 1960, SWB/FE/409/B/5, 
SWB/FE/4 0 9/(i).
SWB/FE/409/B/5.
FO 371/152343, DF 1015/390(E), 15 August 1960, from
Beijing to Foreign Office.
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derailed by his predecessors. This was good news for the communists. On 17 
August, the paratroopers handed over the administrative functions to 
Souvanna Phouma and his cabinet. On 18 August, Pham Van Dong sent his 
greetings to Souvanna Phouma expressing the DRV's readiness to establish 
friendly relations in all fields with Laos. On the same day, the DRV 
government issued a statement supporting Souvanna Phouma.13 There followed 
negotiations between Phoumi Nosavan and Souvanna Phouma at Savannakhet on 
the one hand and between the Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phouma on the other. 
The first clear indication of Chinese support came in the form of a very 
long commentary in the Renmin Ribao of 19 August.14 The coup was hailed 
as a blow to US imperialism.
On 23 August, a twelve-minute statement by Souphanouvong which 
endorsed the Revolutionary government's domestic and foreign policies was 
broadcast. Souphanouvong also stated that the NLHX was ready to negotiate 
with the RLG on all outstanding issues in the spirit of the 1957 Vientiane 
Agreement. He further called upon all the Laotian people to support 
Souvanna Phouma against US imperialism and the Phoumi Nosavan "rebels".15 
By now, Souphanouvong would have arrived back in Sam Neua.
During this period, there were reports that the US-backed Phoumi 
Nosavan was regrouping his forces in preparation for an offensive to retake 
Vientiane. There were reports too that the Thais who had not recognised the 
new Laotian government might intervene militarily to forestall a communist 
takeover of Laos. If Phoumi Nosavan were to launch a counter-offensive, a 
war in Laos would be inevitable. Also, American or SEATO involvement could 
not be discounted. The North Vietnamese would find it difficult not to be 
embroiled in a war. It was at this time that, after almost four months of 
absence from public view, Vo Nguyen Giap, the most well-known Vietnamese 
military figure, finally reappeared on 27 August at a "cordial evening 
party" given by the State Scientific Research Board.16 It was reported
VNA, 18 August I960, SWB/FE/414/B/6.
NCNA, 19 August 1960, SWB/FE/415/A3/1-3.
Voice of the Pathet Lao, 23 August I960, 
SWB/FE/419/B/6.
FO 371/152747, DV 1016/29, 26 August 1960, from Hanoi 
to Foreign Office. On 1 August, the Chairman of the 
ISCC visited Hanoi but did not manage to interview
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that he was replacing Truong Chinh as Chairman of the Board.
II
It was in the midst of the uncertainties in Laos and the worsening 
Sino-Soviet relations, which we noted in the previous chapter, that Ho Chi 
Minh made a secret trip to Moscow. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hanoi 
denied knowledge that Ho had even visited Moscow.17 But Ho's presence in 
Moscow on 15 August 1960 was inadvertently revealed by the Hungarian Party 
newspaper, Nepszabadsag/* In Moscow, he visited the Hungarian 
exhibition.19
In 1983, Hoang Van Hoan disclosed that in August 1960, Ho Chi Minh 
accompanied by himself and Xuan Thuy made a trip to Yalta where they met 
Khrushchev. Ho's intention was to help reconcile the two communist giants. 
However, the trip was a failure. During their meeting, Ho was constantly 
interrupted by Khrushchev who clung to his anti-Chinese position.?c
There was no indication that the North Vietnamese were preparing to 
involve themselves directly in Laos at this stage. British officials in 
Vientiane also reported that the Pathet Lao had shown astonishing 
forbearance during this time when they could have easily taken advantage
Giap. There was speculation that he could have gone to 
Algeria but we do not have any evidence to 
substantiate this.
FO 371/152747, DV 1016/36, 24 September 1960, from
Hanoi to Foreign Office.
P.J. Honey, "The Position of the DRV in the Sino- 
Soviet Dispute" in China News Analysis, 16 March 1962.
FO 371/150425, FC 10338/70, 10 October 1960, from
Beijing to Foreign Office; FO 371/152752, DV 10338/2,
2 November 1960, from Hanoi to Foreign Office.
Hoang Van Hoan, "Ho Chi Minh's Last Will Was Tampered With" in 
Beijing Review, Number 37, 14 September 1981; Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop 
in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan's Revolutionary Reminiscences,
(Beijing; Foreign Languages Press, 1988), p.314.
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of the crisis in Laos to seize power/1 They were hoping that Souvanna 
Phouma who had all along been their choice amongst the non-communist 
Laotian leaders would succeed. The situation appeared to have improved for 
the Pathet Lao soon after Souvanna Phouma became Prime Minister. Besides 
the decision to adhere to the 1957 Vientiane Agreement, on 3 September the 
Prime Minister's Office announced that all charges made against 
Souphanouvong and the other NLHX leaders would be dropped because of lack 
of sound evidence. The communists however were acutely concerned about US 
or SEATO interference. On 5 September 1960, Ung Van Khiem, Vice-Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, told the French Consulate-General that the DRV was 
against American presence in Laos, but they did not mind French military 
advisers there.22
The Chinese were at this time even less prepared for any upheavals 
particularly near their borders. In a speech on 1 August 1960 at the Swiss 
National Day reception, Zhou expressed the Chinese concern about being 
encircled by hostile military bloc, specifically SEATO, and floated the 
idea of a peace pact of mutual non-aggression amongst countries in Asia and 
around the Pacific, including the United States, which would turn the whole 
region into a nuclear weapons free area. Chen Yi, in his speech at the same 
reception once again emphasised China's need "for a peaceful international 
environment for a long time to come."23 Zhou in a conversation with Edgar 
Snow on 30 August 1960, said that the idea of a peace pact of mutual non­
aggression was not a new one. But to mention it again in August 1960 had 
its significance because there were rumours that China had abandoned its 
policy of peaceful coexistence, which was untrue. But at the same time, the 
Chinese made a 180 degree turn regarding negotiations with the Americans. 
The Chinese were no longer prepared to discuss any other matter until the 
primary issue of Taiwan was settled. This was apparently conveyed to Edgar 
Snow in the same interview even before the US State Department was aware 
of it. During that interview, Zhou told Snow that a peace pact of mutual 
non-aggression could not be concluded without the participation of China
21 FO 3/7/152353, DF 1015/563, 3 September 1960, from Vientiane to
Foreign Office.
22 FO 371/1522353, DF 1015/570, 5 September 1960, from Hanoi to Foreign
Office.
NONA, 1 August 1960, SWB/FE/m/M/1.
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and the United States. He expected that it would take a long time for both 
countries to resolve their differences, but China still wanted to settle 
disputes through peaceful negotiations.24
The 100th meeting of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks which 
took place on 6 September 1960 was in the words of Kenneth T. Young, "an 
historic occasion in the twelve year history of the talks, for it marked 
their transition from the diplomacy of negotiation to that of stalemate. 
That day was the dividing point."25 However, regarding the situation in 
Laos, the British Embassy's assessment was that the Chinese were not 
inclined to intervene, even politically to any extent, as long as the 
United States did not intervene more directly. The British observed that 
the Chinese were confident that the strength of the Pathet Lao could 
prevent the RLG from gaining a firm grip on the country and thus frustrate 
any attempts by the United States to turn Laos into an effective anti­
communist base.26
Ill
In Hanoi, the 3rd Party Congress of the Lao Dong Party opened as 
scheduled on 5 September 1960. According to the Lich Su Quart Doi Nhan Dan 
Viet Nam, the Congress was a milestone in the country's revolutionary 
struggle. It took place at a very opportune time. After five years of 
struggle, the North had completed the restoration of its economy and was 
on the road towards socialism while the uprisings in the South were 
expanding and progressing satisfactorily. The dual revolutionary strategy 
envisaged by the Central Committee was th/s becoming clearer by the day.
Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River, (London: Victor Gollancz 
Limited, 1963), p.77 and 85-92.
Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The 
United States Experience, 1953-1967, (New York: MacGraw Hill Book 
Company, 1968), p.233; for the Chinese version of the meeting, see 
Wang Bingnan, Nine Years of Sino-US Talks in Retrospect, (JPRS-CPS- 
85-079, 7 August 1985), pp.44-45.
F0 377/152359, DF 1015/683, 26 September 1960, from Beijing to 
Foreign Office.
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In Laos, after the escape of the 2nd Battalion, a political-cum-mi1itary 
struggle was developing. In the world, the socialist system was in the 
ascendant. The VPA was also intensifying its preparation for the 
eventuality that it was called upon to move into South Vietnam and Laos.27
As stated by Le Duan in his political report, the objective of the 
3rd Party Congress was to define the line for carrying out the socialist 
revolution in the North, the completion of the national people's democratic 
revolution throughout the country and the struggle to achieve national 
reunification. The Congress would also decide upon the basic orientation 
for the building of the Party and the strengthening of the Party leadership 
to meet the new requirements of the revolution. According to Le Duan, 
Vietnam's revolution at the present stage had two strategic tasks: One was 
to carry out a socialist revolution in the North, and two was to complete 
the national people's democratic revolution through the eradication of the 
colonial and semi-feudal regime in South Vietnam, These two tasks were 
closely connected. They exerted mutual influence upon each other and also 
stimulated each other's development. They shared a common goal which was 
the reunification of the country.
The immediate task of the revolution in the South was to achieve the 
unity of the whole people, to strive to achieve a united bloc of workers, 
peasants and soldiers, and to bring into being a broad national united 
front with the worker-peasant alliance as the basis, directed against the 
US-Diem regime. The struggle for national reunification would be gradual 
and it might take different forms depending on the changing circumstances. 
As for the North, the task was to carry out the socialist transformation 
of agriculture, handicraft, small trade and private capitalist industry and 
commerce, and to carry out socialist industrialisation by giving priority 
to the rational development of heavy industry while striving to develop 
agriculture and light industry.28
Pham Van Dong, in his speech on the DRV's foreign policy stated that 
the DRV were determined to strengthen further the brotherly friendship, the 
solidarity and unity of mind, cooperation and mutual assistance within the 
socialist bloc. He praised the Soviet Union and China alike for their
Lich S u ..., p.115.
26 For the full text of Le Duan's political report, see Sh'B/FF/431/C/2-
6.
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unflinching struggle against US imperialism. He reiterated the desire of 
the DRV to establish friendly relations with Cambodia on the basis of the 
Five Principles of peaceful coexistence. He said that the DRV was also 
willing to establish friendly relations with Laos if the Laotian government 
respected the Geneva and Vientiane Agreements.29
According to Vo Nguyen Giap in his speech at the Congress, economic 
construction in the North had become the central task of the Party which 
was why it was necessary for the defence budget to be reduced and military 
effectives cut appropriately so that manpower and material resources could 
be concentrated on economic construction. This is the strongest indication 
that the modernisation process of the VPA had slowed down since around 
January 1960 and priority had been shifted back to the economic 
construction of the North.30 This could explain the malaise in the VPA we 
noted in 1960. There is also some indications that there was confusion 
within the VPA regarding the pace of military modernisation. We should 
recall that the decision to modernise the army was made at the 12th Plenary 
session of the Lao Dong Central Committee in March 1957. The understanding 
then was that military development must be in tandem with the country's 
economic development. In mid-March 1958, the Central Military Committee 
decided to accelerate the process of modernisation but it was still tied 
to the pace of the country's economic performance. The target year for the 
completion of the military modernisation programme was adjusted from 1959 
to 1960 in line with the three year economic plan (1958-1960). Soon after 
the 15th Plenary session of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee, in 
February 1959 it was decided that the process of military modernisation had 
to be further accelerated. At the 3rd Party Congress, it was decided that 
the modernisation of the VPA would need to be intensified. The dual 
revolutionary strategy spelt out during the Congress was to be the military 
objective and the basis on which the VPA set its direction in the new 
period.31
During the Congress, the Vietnamese communists were caught between
VNAt 9 September 1960, 5W£/F£/435/C/3-4; for full text of Pham Van 
Dong' speech, see SW8/FE/439/C/1-3.
VNA, 9 September 1960, SW0/FF/435/C/5.
Lich S u ..., p.128.
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their two mentors who used the occasion to present once again their 
divergent views regarding the correct global strategy for the socialist 
camp.32 Publicly, the North Vietnamese tried their very best to keep a 
balance between the Soviet and Chinese points of view, as was evident in 
Pham Van Dong's foreign policy speech and the balanced treatment in the 
Vietnamese press of both the speeches of the Soviet and Chinese 
representatives to the Congress.
Xuan Vu, a former North Vietnamese war reporter and propaganda chief, 
recounted that in 1960, the people in the North began to learn about the 
differences between China and the Soviet Union through loud street corner 
radio speakers. From 8.00 to 8.30 each night, the loudspeakers would 
broadcast Radio Peking on a direct hookup. From 8.30 to 9.00 pm, it would 
be Radio Moscow. The two stations began to abuse each other, the Chinese 
would insult Khrushchev, and the Russians in turn would insult Mao. Some 
nights the programmes would be serious - dealing with issues of revisionism 
and abstract political analyses. On others, the mutual denunciations would 
get vitriolic and crude. This apparently continued through the year until 
the North Vietnamese authorities finally cut it off. The huge billboard 
above the corner of Pho Hue and Trang Tien streets, the city's biggest 
intersection, which read "See full communism in this generation " and 
displayed three happy faces of a Caucasian worker, peasant and intellectual 
was also removed. "Maybe the Caucasian faces were too symbolic. Someone 
might think we were taking sides," Xuan Vu remarked.33
The Chinese representatives to the 3rd Lao Dong Party Congress were 
Li Fuchun (Beijing's top economic official) who was also head of the 
Chinese delegation, Marshal Ye Jianying and Liao Chengzhi (Deputy-Director 
of the State Council's Office of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the 
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission). The delegation from the Soviet Union 
was headed by Mukhitdinov, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and 
full-member of the Presidium. It was reported by 77155 that on 11 September, 
a meeting took place between the Soviet delegation and the Party and
FO 371/152747, DV 1016/36, 24 September 1960, from Hanoi to Foreign 
Office; also see speeches by Li Fuchun and Mukhitdinov, the Chinese 
and Soviet representatives to the Congress in SWB/FF/435/C/10-11.
David Chanoff and Doan Van Toai, Portrait of the Enemy: The Other 
Side of the Mar in Vietnam, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1986), p.81.
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government leaders of the DRV. The further expansion of relations between 
the DRV and the Soviet Union, the international communist and workers' 
movement and international relations were discussed in an "exceptionally 
warm and cordial atmosphere."34 On the same day, in the afternoon, Ho Chi 
Minh attended a farewell lunch at the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi hosted by 
the Chinese delegation.36 It is notable that these two events were not 
reported by VNA.
According to Bui Tin, within the $8$ Lao Dong leadership, there were 
serious arguments regarding the Russian and Chinese positions. Truong Chinh 
was one of those who from the beginning supported the Russian position 
regarding peaceful coexistence and anti-Stalinism expounded by Khrushchev 
at the 20th CPSU Congress. On the other hand, Le Duan was inclined towards 
the Chinese point of view which opposed the resolutions of the 20th CPSU 
Congress; and he was able to carry the Politburo and the Central Committee 
with him. Those who held contrary views were branded as "revisionists" and 
"opponents of the Party".36 The confirmation of Le Duan as the First- 
Secretary of the Lao Dong Party at the 3rd Party Congress put to rest for 
the moment any more doubts as to who was next in line after Ho Chi Minh in 
the Hanoi leadership. One other point worth mentioning is the elevation 
of Tran Quoc Hoan, Minister of Public Affairs, to alternate-member of the 
Lao Dong Party Politburo. Like Hoang Van Hoan, Tran Quoc Hoan, as far as 
we know, was very close to the Chinese, particularly with his Chinese 
counterpart Kang Sheng.37
Unknown to most at this time, in Cambodia, the Khmer People's 
Revolutionary Party (KPRP) held its 2nd Party Congress at the end of 
September I960, about two weeks after the 3rd Lao Dong Party Congress in
TASS in English, 11 September 1960, SWB/FF/435/C/11.
Huang Zheng, Ho Zhiming Yu Zhongguo, (Beijing: Jiefang Jun
Chubanshe, 1987), pp.196-197.
Thanh Tin, Hoa Xuyen Tuyet (Hoi Ky), (California: Saigon Press,
1991), p.130. Also, according to Hoang Van Hoan, Le Duan during the 
early 50s and 60s was inclined to the Chinese view regarding the 
strategy for unifying Vietnam and only much later was he persuaded 
to drift with the anti-China tide. See Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the 
Ocean, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1988), p.325.
For details, see Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, The Chinese Secret 
Service, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989).
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a room at the Phnom Penh railway station. This meeting was convened under 
orders from Hanoi. At this Congress, the name of the Party was changed to 
the Workers' Party of Kampuchea. The existence of the Party however 
remained a secret. We now know that at this meeting, there were differences 
between Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) and his group who championed a more militant 
struggle against imperialism and Sihanouk,/ and the senior leaders of the 
Party who continued to„pdvocate political struggle within the framework of 
Sihanouk's regime/. Tlespite Sihanouk's moves against individual Cambodian 
communists during the months July to September 1960, the latter view 
prevailed. Again, this was in line with the policy advocated by Hanoi. One 
other significant point to note is the addition of Son Ngoc Minh in the new 
central committee which already included Tou Samouth (the secretary of the 
party), Saloth Sar, Nuon Chea, Keo Meas, Sao Phim and Ieng Sary. Except for 
Ieng Sary, all of the others were already members of the IndoChina 
Communist Party. Son Ngoc Minh was appointed in absentia as he was still 
in Hanoi, having recently attended the 3rd Lao Dong Party Congress 
incognito.38
Not long after both the Congresses, in early October, Ho Chi Minh
left for a vacation on Hainan Island where he stayed for almost a month.
At Hainan, he visited factories, farms, various organisations, military
cunits, shops, kindegartens and the Institute of Tropical Condiments. He
A
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also visited the foot of Wuzhishan (Mt. Five Fingers), Luhuitao Peninsula 
and Tianya Haijiao (literally, "edge of the sky, rim of the sea"). It was 
said that throughout his stay at Flainan Island, he was constantly mingling 
with the local people and was always in the public eye.39
IV
While the Lao Dong 3rd Party Party Congress was in session, in Laos, 
tension continued to mount. But the situation now was more advantageous to 
the Pathet Lao than in 1957. This was particularly so when the negotiations 
between Souvanna Phouma and Phoumi Nosavan came to naught and armed 
confrontation was imminent. On 10 September, Phoumi Nosavan broadcast from 
Savannakhet the formation of a Revolutionary Committee headed by Prince 
Boun Oum. Without sufficient troops of his own, Souvanna Phouma needed the 
Pathet Lao forces. Thus on 16 September, Souphanouvong, in his message to 
Souvanna Phouma, could confidently declare that the NLHX was ready to 
cooperate with the government headed by Souvanna Phouma and that the Pathet 
Lao armed units would resolutely oppose the Phoumi Nosavan-Tiao Boun Oum 
rebel clique. He also called upon all military units and administrative 
organisations in Laos to obey the orders of Souvanna Phouma's government. 
Finally, he proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam/0
The Phoumi Nosavan offensive to retake Vientiane began with the move 
on Paksane on 19 September. Two days later on 21 September, the Soviet 
Union which had so far only made brief reference to the situation in Laos 
issued a government statement condemning the US and their allies in the 
aggressive bloc for interfering in the domestic affairs of Laos.4: The 
next day, the Soviet government issued another statement which accused the
Huang Zheng, Ho Zhiming Yu Zhongguo, (Beijing: Jiefang Jun
Chubanshe, 1987), pp.158-159.
Pathet Lao radio, 16 September 1960, 5/V£//r/f/440/B/5-6.
77155 in English, 21 September 1960, 5W5/5C7/444/A3/1 -2.
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Thais of aiding the forces of Phoumi Nosavan/' That the Russians had 
suddenly taken a very active interest in Laos deserves attention. We have 
noted that after the aborted Paris summit in May 1960, the Soviet Union 
began to adopt a more aggresive and uncompromising foreign policy/'3 It 
was believed that Khrushchev confirmed this policy shift at the 3rd 
Congress of the Communist Party of Rumania in Bucharest in June 1960. By 
adopting a more militant foreign policy, Moscow also hoped to undercut 
support for the Chinese within the communist b loc/4 According to 
President Eisenhower, there was some indication that the Soviet Union was 
concerned over communists pressures in Laos and in Southeast Asia emanating 
form China and North Vietnam/6 Perhaps by taking an active role in Laos, 
the Soviet Union hoped to forestall any Chinese-North Vietnamese 
initiatives which they might not approve of. Indeed, on 2 May 1961, the 
Soviet ambassador to Thailand told Marshal Sarit that Soviet activities in 
Laos were in part meant to keep China from intervening in that country/6 
On 27 September, the Pathet Lao radio hailed the Soviet statement of 22 
September and called upon the government of Souvanna Phouma to establish 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union as soon as possible because that 
would benefit the Laotian people.
The Phoumi Nosavan offensive failed and his troops were forced by 
Kong Lae's paratroopers with the assistance of the Pathet Lao to retreat 
down the Mekong Valley to the south bank of the Ca Dinh River. On 26 
September, the Pathet Lao armed forces, in coordination with Vietnamese 
* volunteer*troops captured the city of Sam Neua and controlled almost the 
whole province. This gave the Pathet Lao a large base area which bordered
Bangkok home service, 6 October 1960, SNB/FE/458/A2/3.
United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research: Intel 1igence Report Number 8306 dated 21 July 1960.
United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research: Intel!igence Report Number 8307 dated 3 August 1960.
US Department of Defence, United States-Vietnam Relations 1956-1960: 
Memorandum of Conference on 19 January 1961 between President 
Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy on the subject of Laos in 
United States Department of Defence, pp.1360-1364.
F0 371/159846, DF 1015/734, 4 May 1961, from Bangkok to Foreign 
Office.
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North Vietnam and which could be expanded north, south and west. According 
to an Official Vietnamese source, the capture of Sam Neua placed Hanoi in 
an advantageous position to organise and coordinate the revolution in Laos 
until complete victory in 1975.47 According to British officials at 
Vientiane, with the retreat of the Savannakhet forces, Souvanna Phouma now 
saw no urgency to seek a compromise with Phoumi Nosavan. But at the same 
time, the Pathet Lao strength had increased throughout the country. The 
British assessment was that Souvanna Phouma had lost any control he had 
over Kong Lae and Kong Lae was completely dependent on the Pathet L a o / B
Although the Pathet Lao were in an even stronger position to take 
control of a large part of Laos, on 3 October the NLHX Central Committee 
appointed Phoumi Vongvichit, Nouhak Phoumsavan and Singkapo Chounlamany to 
negotiate with Souvanna Phouma's government on the basis of the 1957 
Vientiane Agreement. The proposal of the NLHX for immediate negotiations 
with the government of Souvanna Phouma was welcomed by Nhan Dan as "fully 
conforming to the interests of Laos and peace in IndoChina.1149 This was 
consistent with the strategy pursued by Hanoi at this time. On 19 October, 
during the negotiations with the Laotian government, the NLHX delegation 
put forward a six-point proposal which included the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with China and North Vietnam.50 The negotiations 
dragged on for almost a month.
Meanwhile on 6 October, it was announced that Laos had opened 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. We should recall the Russians 
had been hoping for this diplomatic foothold in Laos since June 1956. The 
Soviet ambassador to Cambodia, A.N. Abramov would concurrently serve as 
ambassador to Laos. The next day, the United States suspended its cash- 
grant to Souvanna Phouma's government. Graham Parsons, US Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs flew into Laos on 12 October to 
meet Souvanna Phouma. The United States presented Souvanna Phouma with
Vietnam: 1 he Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation 1954-
1975: Military Events (Hanoi, 30 May 1980)(JPRS 80968, 3 June 1982), 
p.44.
FO 371/152359, DF 1015/685, 5 October 1960, from Vientiane to 
Foreign Office.
VNA, 2 October 1960, SNB/FE/AbS/B/14.
NONA, 30 October 1960, SNB/FE/477/B/5.
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three conditions before they would resume aid to Laos. These were: 
suspension of the negotiation with the NLHX, reconciliation with the Phoumi 
Nosavan-faction, and the transfer of the Laotian capital from Vientiane to 
Luang Prabang, all of which Souvanna Phouma found unacceptable.51 By 15 
October, it was clear that the talks between Graham Parsons and Souvanna 
Phouma had failed. This was the turning point because Souvanna Phouma could 
no longer balance the communists with the Americans, which was crucial for 
realising his policy of neutrality. Furthermore, the Americans were 
supporting the Phoumi Nosavan-faction. Slowly but reluctantly Souvanna 
Phouma, isolated by the Americans, was pushed closer and closer to the 
communists. On 27 October, Souvanna Phouma stated at a press conference 
that he had in principle accepted Soviet aid.
V
During the Laotian crisis, important developments were taking place 
within the communist bloc. We should recall that at the Bucharest 
Conference in June, it was decided that a major conference to settle the 
dispute between the Soviet Union and China would be held in November 1960 
to coincide with the October Revolution celebration. A preparatory 
commission was set up to formulate a new policy declaration which would 
reconcile both the Chinese and Russian differences. The commission met in 
Moscow from 30 September until 22 October. The Chinese were represented by 
Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen. The North Vietnamese were also represented but 
we do not know by whom. As in Bucharest, but to an even greater extent, 
high Soviet functionaries were told to convince the delegates of the 
correctness of the Soviet position. The preparatory commission was unable 
to draft a declaration which satisfied all parties. Before the November 
Conference began, the delegates were told that at the preparatory meeting, 
China had been supported by Albania, North Vietnam and Indonesia; on the 
issue of the personality cult, the Chinese, Albanians and Indonesians had 
disagreed with the Russians; on the question of whether or not factional 
activities within the bloc should be reflected in the declaration, the
Vientiane home service, 15 October 1960, SWB/FE/465/B/6.
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Chinese had been supported by the Japanese, North Korean, Indonesian, North 
Vietnamese and Australians.52
The Vietnamese apparently also found Mao's ideas of revolutionary 
warfare appealing. On 30 September 1960, Volume IV of Mao Zedong's works 
was published in China. Volume IV covers the civil war period of 1945-1949. 
According to John Gittings, while Mao's writing on the "Paper Tigers" had 
appeared to be intended mainly for a domestic audience, this particular 
volume was regarded as equally relevant for all who were fighting for 
national independence and who might be corrupted by Soviet modern 
revisionism.53 According to Lin Biao, the publication of the book was of 
great importance not only to the Chinese people but also to the 
international working class movement. This was because Volume IV was a 
reflection of the victory of Marxism-Leninism in a big country which had 
the largest population in the world. Mao's ideas of revolutionary warfare, 
of how people's revolutionary forces which were inferior numerically and 
in equipment could defeat the counter-revolutionary forces which were 
numerically superior would always remain vitally relevant.54 In Hanoi, it 
was reported that Volume IV was completely sold out as soon as it appeared 
in the bookshops on 29 October I960,55
On the afternoon of 2 November, Ho Chi Minh arrived in Beijing on his 
way to attend the October Revolution anniversary celebration and the Moscow 
Conference. His stopover in Beijing was prominently reported in the Chinese 
press.56 While in Beijing, he met Mao, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping
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and Peng Zhen. Liu, Deng and Peng Zhen would also be attending the Moscow 
Conference. It was reported that he had a cordial talk with Mao, Liu, Zhou 
Enlai, Deng Xiaoping,^Zhu De, Peng Zhen, Chen Yi, Li Fuchun, Li Jingquan 
and Yang Shangkun; and^was guest-of-honour at a banquet given by Mao. Ho 
left for Moscow on 4 November with Le Duan, Nguyen Chi Thanh and Tran Quang 
Huy, an alternate-member of the Lao Dong Central Committee.57
The Moscow Conference lasted from 10 November to 1 December.
According to Oleg Penkovsky, ninety percent of the conference time was 
spent on the Soviet-Chinese differences.58 The issues were very complex 
and I shall therefore focus on the points that mattered most to the
Vietnamese communists: The Chinese accused the Russians of helping the 
national bourgeoisie to seize power. The Russians argued that in the 
present phase, manoeuvring was necessary; but it did not mean that they had 
lost sight of the ultimate objective of destroying imperialism. While 
military preparedness was necessary, the ideal was disarmament. The Chinese 
believed that the correct way forward was to support local wars for 
national liberation. The Russians thought this would only lead to another 
world war. They attacked the Chinese for paying lip service to the idea of 
peaceful coexistence while insisting that war was inevitable. To the 
Russians, it was either peace or war, there was no middle way.59
On 21 November, Ho was received by Khrushchev and it was reported
that they had a "cordial and friendly conversation," In his memoirs 
Khrushchev recounted that this meeting took place during the concluding 
stages of the Conference when the Chinese were refusing to sign the 
declaration because they objected to one point in the document. Ho Chi Minh 
appealed to Khrushchev to accede to the Chinese because, according to Ho, 
China was a big country with a big party and they could not allow a schism 
in the communist movement. Khrushchev retorted that the Soviet Union was
AO/I, 2 November 1960, SWB/FE/480/A2/1; Guo Ming, et al., Xiandai 
Zhongyue Guanxi Ziliao Xuanbian, Volume I, (Beijing: Shishi
Chubanshe, 1986), p.437.
Oleg Penkovsky, The Penkovsky Papers, (London: Fontana Books, 1967), 
p.242; Allen S. Whiting, op.cit., pp.518-519.
For the Belgian, French and Italian communist accounts of the 
debates that took place during the Conference, see David Floyd, Mao 
against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict, 
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), pp.286-295.
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by no means a small country, to which Ho replied, "For us, it is doubly 
difficult. Don't forget, China is our neighbour."60 Ho also successfully 
persuaded Liu Shaoqi to meet privately with Khrushchev so as to produce an 
agreed conference statement.61
Sino-Soviet differences were not resolved. But Ho's intervention may 
have ensured that the 1960 Moscow Statement issued at the end of the 
Conference was a compromise between the Russian and Chinese positions, 
which suited the North Vietnamese well enough. The Five Principles of 
peaceful coexistence were once again emphasised as the correct policy to 
pursue while at the same time, national-liberation wars were recognised as 
progressive and had revolutionary significance, and thus should be 
supported. How these two policies were to be reconciled in practice was not 
made clear. It was also accepted that colonial countries could achieve 
their independence through armed struggle as well as by non-military 
methods, depending on the specific conditions of the individual countries. 
The Moscow Statement declared that in the countries where the imperialists 
had established war bases, it was necessary to step up the struggle for 
their abolition, which was an important factor for fortifying national 
independence, defending sovereignty, and preventing war. The Statement 
noted that there could be no true independence unless a determined struggle 
was waged against imperialism and the remnants of feudalism by all the 
patriotic forces of the nations united in a single national-democratic 
front. But again there was no indication of the concrete steps that should 
be taken within the bloc to help achieve all the above.62 Nevertheless, 
the Moscow Declaration of 1960 in principle provided the North Vietnamese 
with the "licence" to continue with their policy.
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VI
While the Moscow Conference was going on, the forces of Phoumi 
Nosavan gained control of Luang Prabang on 10 November. The NLHX submitted 
a new three-point proposal on 14 November which again included the 
condition that the government should receive aid from the Soviet Union and 
conduct trade with China and North Vietnam.63 On 16 November, it was 
confirmed that General Ouane Rattikone, one of the only two generals in 
Vientiane, had defected to Savannakhet. On the same day, it was announced 
that the NLHX and the government of Souvanna Phouma had reached an 
agreement on the basis of the Vientiane accord. Besides the immediate 
inclusion of the Pathet Lao in a Government of National Reconciliation, it 
was also agreed that a delegation would be sent to China and the DRV for 
the purpose of establishing friendly relations.64 Events then moved on at 
a fast pace.
On 18 November Pham Van Dong, referring to reports that the Laotian 
government had decided on 16 November to take steps to improve Lao-DRV 
relations, declared that the DRV would do the same.65 The next day, the 
Chinese expressed similar sentiments. The Chinese statement made no mention 
of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Laos and the Soviet 
Union and the acceptance of Soviet aid.66 The Souvanna Phouma- 
Souphanouvong joint communique was issued on 23 November. On 24 November, 
Souvanna Phouma in a message to Pham Van Dong proposed to send a friendship 
mission to Hanoi. He also sent a telegram to Zhou Enlai with a similar 
proposal. As a first step in the promotion of good relations with the DRV, 
the Laotian government permitted border trade with the DRV. This move could 
not have pleased the North Vietnamese more. Not surprisingly, the decision 
was warmly welcomed by the Pathet Lao. On 28 November, Souvanna Phouma
63 Pathet Lao radio, 17 November 1960, 5W£/££/493/B/4.
64 Vientiane home service, 17 November 1960, SNB/FE/493/B/4; FO
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VNA, 18 November 1960, 5W£/££/494/A3/l.
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cabled Pham Van Dong thanking him for allowing the border people to barter 
across the DRV-Lao frontier.
The next day, NONA carried a broadcast from Vientiane (dated 21 
November) stating that the Laotian government delegation led by Souvanna 
Phouma would be visiting China, North Vietnam and Burma.67 We noted above 
that the decision to send friendship missions to China and North Vietnam 
was taken at a cabinet meeting on 16 November. On 2 December, it was 
announced that the plane carrying the delegation to Beijing would stop over 
in Hanoi on 10 December for refuelling and that the Laotian delegation 
would be visiting North Vietnam from 18-21 December after their trip to 
Beijing.68
Some time during the last week of November, Souvanna Phouma had 
requested the Soviet ambassador for supplies of petrol and oil.69 On 23 
November, Abramov informed Souvanna Phouma of the Soviet government's 
decision to provide fuel and other lubricating oils which would reach 
Vientiane in the next few days. Souvanna Phouma then made a request for 
sugar which Abramov promised to convey to the Soviet government.70 On 29 
November, it was announced that the first shipment of the Soviet gift of 
5000 tons of petrol, which was approximately equivalent to four months of 
normal consumption in Vientiane, was expected to reach Vientiane via Hanoi 
at the end of November. The first supply eventually arrived on 3 December
1960. Regular flights delivering fuel from Hanoi to Vientiane began on 4
December.
The Chinese followed the developments in Laos very closely but until 
the end of 1960, the Laotian situation was not accorded front page 
treatment in the Chinese papers.71 They were unwilling to take any
initiative of their own which might involve them deeply in the civil war
and were obliged at this time to let the Russians and North Vietnamese take
NONA, 29 November 1960, 5Wfi/FE/503/A3/l.
VNA, 2 December 1960, 5W£/f£/506/A3/5-6.
FO 371/152382, DF 1022/2, 2 December 1960, from Vientiane to Foreign 
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the lead. The Chinese ambassador in Moscow told his British counterpart at 
the end of November that China was satisfied with the developments so far. 
There was reasonable hope that Laos would become a genuinely neutral state 
which was all that China wanted of her. China had objected to previous 
attempts to turn Laos into a base against her. But the Chinese were not yet 
entirely convinced that the danger had been removed.72
Meanwhile, Ho and his delegation left Moscow on 2 December and 
arrived back in Beijing on 3 December. In Beijing, he was treated with the 
highest ceremony.73 Ho, Le Duan, Nguyen Chi Thanh and Tran Quang Huy had 
a cordial meeting with Mao in the evening. Also at the meeting were Zhou 
Enlai, Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Chen Yi, Li Fuchun, He Long, Luo 
Ruqing, Hu Qiaomo and Liao Chengzhi. The same evening, Ho also attended a 
banquet in his honour, Hoang Van Hoan was also in Beijing at this time.74 
In the afternoon, Le Duan and Nguyen Chi Thanh met members of the CCP 
Central Committee.
The DRV economic and trade delegation led by Ly Ban and Ngo Minh Loan 
(both Deputy-heads of the delegation) was apparently already in Beijing 
when Ho arrived. It was reported that Nguyen Duy Trinh, head of the 
economic and trade delegation who arrived in Beijing on the same day as Ho, 
was met by Ly Ban and Ngo Minh Loan.75 On the evening of 4 December, it 
was reported that Ho, Mao and some Chinese leaders had attended a concert 
together. The next day, Ho and the Vietnamese delegation met Vietnamese 
students and trainees at the DRV Embassy. Le Duan, accompanied by Bo Yibo 
visited the National Industrial and Communications exhibition.
Zhou Enlai met the North Vietnamese economic delegation on 5 
December. The economic delegation stayed in China till 11 December when it 
then proceeded to the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries. 
Meanwhile Ho, Le Duan, Nguyen Chi Thanh and Tran Quang Huy left Beijing for
FO 371/150425, FC 10338/83, 30 November 1960, from Moscow to Foreign 
Office.
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Office.
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home on 6 December. A large send-off party included high-ranking officers 
of the PLA. Before boarding the plane Ho, accompanied by Zhou, reviewed a 
guard-of-honour .76
VII
Two days after the Vietnamese left Beijing, at 0500h (GMT), 
Savannakhet radio announced that the "Vientiane Revolutionary Committee" 
had seized power from the Souvanna Phouma government that morning.77 The 
coup was led by Colonel Kouprasith Abbay and the objective was to help the 
Phoumi Nosavan-faction assume power. The fight for Vientiane between Kong 
Lae's paratroopers and the forces of Phoumi Nosavan began,78 As a 
consequence of the coup, the friendship visit to Hanoi was led by Khaamsouk 
Keola, Minister of Public Health, instead of by Souvanna Phouma; and the 
trip to Beijing had to be shelved.79 Pham Van Dong cabled to Souvanna 
Phouma stating that the DRV would continue to support him as the only legal 
government of Laos.80 The DRV government issued a statement on 10 December 
condemning the Americans for interfering in Laos.
On 9 December, Souvanna Phouma left for Phnom Penh. According to 
British officials in Vientiane, Souvanna Phouma had been resisting pressure 
from the Pathet Lao to ask the Russians for arms. But as soon as he left, 
Quinim Pholsena flew to Hanoi to negotiate for the supply of Soviet arms. 
Three days later, the first consignment reached Vientiane.81
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On 12 December, the Laotian National Assembly withdrew its support 
for the Souvanna Phouma government and the Laotian King temporarily 
entrusted the administration of the country to the Revolutionary Committee 
headed by Prince Bourn Oum.82 The new government was immediately recognised 
by the United States and Thailand. The North Vietnamese ambassador to China 
met Zhou in Zhongnanhai to discuss the Laotian situation on 12 December.83 
The following day, Pham Van Dong sent a message to Vientiane stating that 
the DRV continued to regard Souvanna Phouma as the only legitimate 
government and condemned the US plot to set up a new puppet government.84 
The Soviet Union also sent a note to the United States protesting their 
intervention in the domestic affairs of Laos.85
According to British sources in Vientiane, the Pathet Lao did not 
participate in the fighting for Vientiane.86 American officials in 
Vientiane also did not find any evidence of direct North Vietnamese 
intervention in the battle for the city of Vientiane. On the other hand, 
there were evidences of Thai support which included participation of troops 
and provision of supplies for the attack on Vientiane, as early as 9 
December.87 According to the US State Department, however during the 
battle for Vientiane, Soviet IL-14 aircraft flew in 105mm howitzers, 
ammunition, gasoline, combat rations and other war materials. North 
Vietnamese military personnel were also landed and parachuted in to augment 
Kong Lae's forces outside, but not in Vientiane itself. Soviet heavy 
transport aircraft had been transiting China into Hanoi and Haiphong, 
backing up the airlift into Laos.88 On 15 December, Kong Lae and his
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forces withdrew from Vientiane.
VIII
While the situation in Laos deteriorated, Sino-Cambodian relations 
continued to improve. The first report that a Cambodian delegation led by 
Sihanouk would be visiting China was made on 9 December. Sihanouk paid a 
state visit to China from 14-26 December at the invitation of Liu Shaoqi 
and Zhou Enlai.89 This was his third visit to China since February 1956. 
(The second visit was in August 1958.) The main purpose of this trip was 
to sign a treaty of friendship and non-aggression between the two 
countries, as proposed by the Chinese side during Zhou Enlai's visit to 
Phnom Penh in May. In a series of conversations with Malcolm MacDonald in 
Cambodia, some time during the week before 19 August 1960, Sihanouk told 
him of his intention to sign such a treaty along the lines as those signed 
between the Chinese and the Burmese, Indonesians and Nepalese on his next 
visit to Beijing. Sihanouk described the proposed treaty as "innocuous 
documents that he could not refuse". He asked MacDonald to pass the 
information to the British and American governments. Sihanouk emphasised 
that he was still staunchly anti-communist. The Cambodians had nothing in 
common with the Russians, did not understand them and did not like them. 
He did not wish for any closer relations with Moscow than were necessary 
and prudent. On the other hand, the Cambodians did feel friendly towards 
the Chinese. This was partly because there was some Chinese blood in many 
Cambodianjs*veins. Morever, the Chinese were behaving very correctly and 
cooperatively with Cambodia and he hoped to maintain this attitude. In 
Sihanouk's calculation, if he made some innocuous concessions to the 
Chinese proposals for friendlier relations, Cambodia's independent future 
would be more secure. He was however very concerned about Thai and South 
Vietnamese designs on Cambodian territory. He believed that it was the 
Thais and the South Vietnamese which were the cause of all the difficulties 
in Cambodia's relations with the West. The only real communists in
For details of Sihanouk's visit to China, see BBC: Summary of World 
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Cambodia, in his view, were a number of young though clever intellectuals. 
Sihanouk told MacDonald that he did not wish to get any military aid from 
the Soviet Union or China, preferring Western assistance. Moscow and 
Beijing had for the last two years offered to send him any type of modern 
armaments he liked, but he had consistently and firmly refused. He needed 
to train pilots but did not want to send them for training in the Soviet 
Union or China.90 By the time of Sihanouk's visit to China, he was still 
more concerned about the threats to Cambodian security from Thailand and 
South Vietnam than from the communists.91
In Beijing, Sihanouk had talks with Liu Shaoqi on 15 December, Zhou 
Enlai on the afternoon of 16 December and Mao Zedong on 17 December which 
were all described as cordial and/or friendly. In all the speeches made by 
both parties during the visit, the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence 
were constantly emphasised. The situation in Laos was a major concern for 
both the Chinese as well as the Cambodians. In his banquet speech on 18 
December in honour of Sihanouk, Zhou Enlai said that the Chinese as a close 
neighbour of Laos and one of the guarantors of the Geneva Agreements 
resolutely opposed any aggressive acts aimed at subverting and splitting 
Laos. He further added that the Chinese were closely following the 
developments there.92 According to British sources in Beijing, the Chinese 
press were following the events in Laos closely but did not give the 
situation particular prominence.93 In contrast, Sihanouk's visit to China 
was accorded much publicity and the Chinese made great efforts to extend 
the warmest hospitality to Sihanouk and his delegation.
In line with its policy of peaceful coexistence, during this period, 
Beijing also signed the Arrangement for the implementation of the Treaty 
concerning the question of dual nationality with the Indonesians, in 
Djakarta on 15 December 1960; and the Instruments of ratification of the
FO 371/152692, DU 1015/107, 20 August 1960, from Saigon to Foreign 
Office; FO 371/152692, DU 1015/108, 25 August 1960, from
Commonwealth Relation Office (CRO) to Foreign Office (Secret).
Sihanouk's speech in Paris on 19 November 1960 to an audience of 
Cambodians living in France, SWB/FE/523/B/3-4.
AO/I, 18 December 1960, 5W£/F£/519/A3/3-4.
FO 371/152379, DF 1015/1049, 24 December 1960, from Beijing to 
Foreign Office.
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Sino-Burma Boundary Treaty with the Burmese in Rangoon on 4 January
Y"
1961.94 Thus, apart from their border dispute with India, Laos was emeging 
as the immediate security problem for the Chinese. ^
IX
Meanwhile, the situation in Laos was such that the Kong Lae forces 
and the Pathet Lao were receiving military supplies from North Vietnam and 
the Soviet Union95 while the Phoumi Nosavan-faction was receiving supplies 
from the United States. Both sides claimed to be the legitimate 
government.96
On 14 December, in a message to the co-chairmen of the Geneva 
Conference, Nehru proposed that the International Commission in Laos be 
reactivated.97 On 15 December as the Kong Lae forces withdrew from 
Vientiane, the Chinese government issued a statement which said that they 
would do their utmost to uphold the Geneva Agreements and check US 
imperialist interference in Laos. The statement further added that the 
Chinese supported the Vietnamese and Soviet positions regarding Laos. 
Another meeting took place between Zhou Enlai and the North Vietnamese 
ambassador to China in Zhongnanhai on 16 December to discuss Laos.96 On 
17 December, the DRV Foreign Ministry issued a statement which called for 
the reconvening of the Geneva Conference.
On 22 December, the Soviet Union delivered a note to the British 
government proposing that a new conference involving all the participants
Peking Review, 27 December 1960, Volume III, Number 52, pp.9-12; 6 
January 1961, Volume IV, Number 1, pp.13-18.
FO 371/152379, DF 1015/1057, 27 December 1960, from Hanoi to Foreign 
Office.
Documents relating to British Involvement in the IndoChina Conflict 
1945-1965, (Cmnd. 2834), p.26.
Documents relating to British Involvement in the IndoChina Conflict 
1945-1965, (Cmnd. 2834), pp.154-155.
Zhou Enlai Mai jiao Huodong Da Shiji, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi
Chubanshe, 1993), p.296.
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of the 1954 Geneva Conference be convened to resolve the situation in Laos 
and that the ISCC should resume its activity as suggested by the Indian 
Prime Minister.” On 24 December, Pham Van Dong wrote to the co-chairmen 
of the Geneva Conference with the same purpose. The Renmin Ribao of 25 
December carried the full text of the Soviet note in its foreign news page 
along with an editorial in support of it. The next day, Renmin Ribao 
carried the full text of Pham Van Dong's letter to the co-chairmen of the 
Geneva Conference. On 27 December, the day after he returned from China, 
Sihanouk in his opening address at the 10th National Congress of the 
Sangkum stated that the countries which were responsible for the Laotian 
situation and the participants of the 1954 Geneva Conference should hold 
a conference as soon as possible. He also proposed that the United States, 
Thailand, Burma and South Vietnam should attend the conference.100
On 1 January 1961, Sihanouk wrote to the two co-chairmen of the 1954 
Geneva Conference and other heads of government regarding the need for a 
new enlarged conference on Laos which would include Thailand, South Vietnam 
and Burma. On 6 January, Ho Chi Minh responded positively to Sihanouk's 
proposal. Khrushchev also expressed support for a new conference in his 
letters of 7 January to Sihanouk, Pham Van Dong and Souvanna Phouma.101 
The British Prime Minister replied on 13 January 1961 stating that the 
proposal would be seriously considered. However, in the interim, it was 
necessary to stop the fighting in Laos. The British preference was for an 
immediate reactivation of the ISCC. After that, if a conference was still 
deemed necessary, it could then be convened. On 14 January, Zhou Enlai 
replied to the letter from Souvanna Phouma of 30 December 1960 and the 
telegram from Pham Van Dong of 4 January proposing an international 
conference on Laos. Zhou condemned US aggression in Laos and expressed
Documents relating to Brtish Involvement in the IndoChina Conflict 
1945-1965, (Cmnd. 2834), pp.156-158; President Eisenhower, was 
however certain that the Soviet Union did not want the ISCC to go 
into Laos. See "Memorandum of Conference on 19 January 1961 between 
President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy on the subject of 
Laos" in US Department of Defence, United States-Vietnam Relations 
1956-1960, pp.1360-1364.
AICNA, 27 December 1960, SHB/FE/526/B/3.
TASS in English, 12 January 1961, SWB/SU/b38/A3/3.
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support for the idea of a new conference.10" The next day, on 15 January, 
in the Chinese reply to Sihanouk's letter of 1 January 1961, Zhou concurred 
with Sihanouk that an enlarged conference should be urgently convened. 
Khrushchev wrote to the British Prime Minister on 20 January stating that 
while the Soviet Union supported the reactivation of the ISCC, the existing 
situation in Laos differed from that of 1954 and therefore it was necessary 
to urgently convene a conference. The next day, the British sent to the 
Russians a proposed joint-message from the co-chairmen of the Geneva 
Conference which requested that India, as Chairman of ISCC send a 
representative to Laos as soon as possible on an exploratory mission to 
propose to the Laotian King the reactivation of the Commission. The Russian 
reply on 18 February 1961 was that there was no necessity to consult the 
Laotian King as he was at the present time a prisoner of the Phoumi 
Nosavan-Boun Oum rebels and in any case the legal government of Souvanna 
Phouma had already agreed that the ISCC should resume its duties.103
Meanwhile, the Vietnamese communists' revolutionary struggle to 
reunify Vietnam and the developments in Laos were becoming increasingly 
inter-related.1011 We should recall that the North Vietnamese operating on 
the Ho Chi Minh Trail were now using the route going south down the western 
side of the Truong Son Range in Laotian territory. The Pathet Lao had 
requested their Vietnamese communist counterparts to transport some of 
their supplies to southern Laos and to build up revolutionary organisations 
wherever the Trail extended.105 At that time, of course, the North 
Vietnamese vehemently and persistently denied being directly involved in 
the fighting in Laos, We now know that at the beginning of 1961, the North 
Vietnamese sent a number of infantry, artillery and engineer battalions 
belonging to the 316th and 335th Brigade (Northwest Military Region), the 
325th Division and 271st Regiment (Military Region IV) into Laos. A total
NCNA, 17 January 1961, 5WB/FE/543/B/3.
The above sequence of events can be followed in the BBC: Summary of 
World Broadcast for this period.
United States Department of State "Working Paper on North Vietnam's 
Role in the South" (27 May 1968), Appendices, Item 301: CRIMP 
Document.
Brigadier-General Vo Bam, " Opening the Trail" in Vietnam Courier, 
Number 5, 1984, pp.9-15.
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of 12,000 North Vietnamese troops were in Laos at this time serving as 
military advisers, assisting in the creation of armed units and training 
the Pathet Lao. The North Vietnamese also helped the Pathet Lao establish 
a military training school. They also provided arms and ammunition. 
According to the Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam, the united struggle 
of Laos and Vietnam against the common enemy - the American imperialists, 
was a special relationship based on the traditional closeness of the two 
countries and the spirit of proletarian internationalism between the two 
parties and armies. And it was this unity which created the condition for 
the success of both the revolutions in Vietnam and Laos.106
Since the November 1960 agreement between Souvanna Phouma and Pham 
Van Dong to open the DRV-Laos border for frontier-trade, it had become very 
much easier for the North Vietnamese to carry out their plans in Laos. At 
the end of January 1961, it was reported by Pathet Lao radio that trade 
relations between Laos and the DRV were developing favourably. The local 
government in Phong Saly, Luang Prabang, Sam Neua, Xieng Khouang, Cammon 
and other provinces was said to have organised the Laotian people to take 
their goods to the borders in exchange for daily necessities, table salt, 
farm implements and "other items".107 It is very possible that "other 
items" such as small arms and ammunition could have been smuggled across 
the border as wel1.
According to US State Department sources, since the withdrawal of the 
neutralists from Vientiane on 15 December 1960, at least 180 sorties had 
been monitored in the general area of Vang Vieng, Phong Hong, Sam Neua and 
Xieng Khouang. Besides war material, substantial numbers of North 
Vietnamese personnel were also parachuted into those areas.108 Pathet Lao- 
North Vietnamese forces captured Tha Vieng and Tha Thom on 12 and 18 
January respectively. Both places were regarded as the southern gateway of 
Xieng Khouang. Thabun, the strategic point controlling the approaches to 
Xieng Khouang and the Plaine of Jarres also fell into their hands.
Lich Su..., pp.152-153; FO 371/159812, DF 1015/2, 1 January 1961, 
from Washington to Foreign Office; F0 377/159824, DF 1015/243, 10 
February 1961, from Vientiane to Foreign Office (Secret).
VNA, 27 January 1961, SMB/FE/55l/B/4.
FO 371/159813, DF 1015/21, 3 January 1961, from Washington to 
Foreign Office.
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Souvanna Phouma passed through Hanoi on 21-22 February and 24-26 
February 1961 on his way to Xieng Khouang and then to Phong Saly but no 
publicity was given to his visits. In February too, Pham Van Dong and 
Souvanna Phouma agreed to the exchange of economic and cultural missions 
between the two countries. He was again in Hanoi on 30 April 1961.109 
Sisana Sisane, editor of the Pathet Lao newspaper, Lao Hak Xat also visited 
Hanoi and Beijing in February after attending the Afro-Asian Solidarity 
conference at Cairo. In March, Quinim Pholsena, the neutralist Laotian 
Minister of National Defence, Finance and Foreign Affairs, and He Wei, the 
Chinese ambassador to the DRV, agreed on the exchange of economic and 
cultural missions between Laos and China.110
On 7 March, the Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese forces took control of 
Xala Phukhun, an important road junction north of Vientiane. The North 
Vietnamese-Pathet Lao forces were assisted to a large extent by the 
continued Soviet airlift into Laos. While the fighting continued, the North 
Vietnamese kept up the call for a new conference to resolve the Laotian 
crisis. According to Australian intelligence sources, the Pathet Lao were 
not taking advantage of the slow pace of Phoumi Nosavan's advance. If the 
Pathet Lao had wanted to, they could probably have defeated Phoumi 
forthwith with Vietnamese assistance but they were holding back.111
Thus at the end of 1960 and early 1961, it was Laos rather than South 
Vietnam that was the focus of international concern. In the view of 
President Eisenhower, if Laos should fall to the communists, then it would 
just be a matter of time before South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma 
would follow. Laos was the key to the entire area of Southeast Asia. 
Vietnam, in comparison, was considered less critical.112
FO 371/159826, DF 1015/300, 26 February 1961, from Hanoi to Foreign 
Office; FO 377/159845, DF 1015/6641, 30 April 1961, from Hanoi to 
Foreign Office.
NONA, 9 March 1961, SHB/FE/586/(i).
F0 371/159824, DF 1015/241, 10 February 1961, from Office of the 
High Commissioner for Australia (London) to Foreign Office.
"Memorandum of Conference on 19 January 1961 between President 
Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy on the subject of Laos in 
United States Department of Defence" in US Department of Defence, 
United States-Vietnam Relations 1956-1960, pp.1360-1364; The 
Pentagon Papers, Volume II, (Senator Gravel Edition),(Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1971), pp.635-637.
Chapter Nine
I
While the world's attention was focused on Laos, in South Vietnam, 
the mass uprisings continued unabated. We should recall that the 5th 
Plenary session of the Nam Bo regional committee in July 1960, had decided 
to launch a new series of simultaneous uprisings from 23 September 1960. 
But on 14 September uprisings had already started in the provinces of Ca 
Mau, Rach Gia, Soc Trang, Vinh Long, Chau Doc, Long Xuyen, Can Tho (in west 
Nam Bo). This was followed on 23 and 24 September by the provinces of Long 
An, Ben Tre, Kien Phong and Kien Tuong (in central Nam Bo). Uprisings also 
occurred in east Nam Bo from Tay Ninh, Ben Cat, Dau Tieng, Cu Chi, Hoc Mon 
to Lai Thieu, Thu Due, Tan Binh, Di An, Nha Be, Binh Chanh surrounding the 
cities of Saigon-Gia Dinh, Trung Bo and Interzone V, All these uprisings 
were along the lines of the Ben Tre uprisings which had taken place at the 
beginning of the year. It was still predominantly a political struggle 
supported by guerilla squads which served as assault teams. Their role was 
to assist the mass uprisings by protecting the people, killing the enemy, 
destroying the enemy's administrative apparatus, thus compelling the enemy 
to capitulate.1
On 20 December 1960, two weeks after Ho returned from Beijing, the 
National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLFSV) was formed at Tan Lap 
village, Chau Thanh district (now, Tan Bien district, Tay Ninh province).2 
The Chinese were the first to recognise it. We should recall that the
Lich S u ..., pp.116-117.
Cao Van Luong, Lich Su Cach Mang Mien Nani Vietnam: Giai Doan 
1954-1960, (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1991), p.156; 
Lich S u ..., p.120; Truong Nhu Tang, Journal of a Vietcong, 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), pp.79-80.
According to Tang, on the morning of 21 December 1960, a special 
broadcast from Hanoi announcing the formation of the NLF and the 
good wishes of the Lao Dong Party and North Vietnamese government 
reached every part of South Vietnam. But the first communist 
broadcast monitored was that of VNA and NONA, 29 January 1961, 
SNB/FE/553/A3/2 which cited a Reuter report, and various papers 
published in Phnom Penh, as the sources for the "recent" 
formation of the NLF.
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united front strategy was discussed during the 15th Plenary session in 
January 1959 and it was raised during the meeting between Ho Chi Minh and 
Zhou Enlai in Beijing in August 1959. Subsequently in autumn 1959, Nguyen 
Van Hieu went to North Vietnam to discuss the platform of the united front 
with Ho Chi Minh. By the end of that year, the manifesto and political 
programme was completed and the date for the inaugural meeting was also 
decided.3 The intention to establish a united front was officially 
announced by Le Duan in his political report during the recent 3rd Party 
Congress in September.
Some form of organisation was also clearly needed to coordinate those 
armed forces mentioned above. A military committee for all the zones, 
provinces, hamlets and villages was therefore established as the command 
centre to help the Party to provide guidance to all the armed units in the 
South. It was also responsible for recruitment and logistics. In accordance 
with the decision of the Party Central Committee, the armed forces in the 
South were to be called "the Army for the Liberation of South Vietnam".
According to the directive of the Central Military Committee of 1 
January 1961, the Army for the Liberation of South Vietnam was a part of 
the VPA, founded, developed, educated and led by the Party. It was to be 
both a fighting army as well as a production army, and was expected to 
continue with the tradition of heroic struggle, the spirit of uprisings and 
service to the people. To accomplish its task, the army was to form three 
categories of soldiers, a main force, a regional force and a guerilla 
force. Its mission was to resolutely realise the programme and line of the 
Party which was to liberate the South from imperialist oppression and 
feudalism, to attain independence and freedom. Although this was an urgent 
task, it must be carried out realistically depending on the circumstance 
and the existing practical capability of the army.4
Eisenhower was perhaps right to be more concerned about Laos than 
South Vietnam falling to the communists during this time, but the communist
Truong Nhu Tang, Journal of a VietCong, (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1986), pp.70-74. Also see Carlyle A. Thayer, War by Other Means: 
National Liberation and Revolution in Vietnam 1954-60, (Sydney: 
Allen and Unwin, 1989), pp.187-188, and 227 ftn.28.
Lich Su..., pp.120-121.
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threat in South Vietnam was by no means insignificant.5 Brigadier-General 
Lansdale paid an intensive visit to South Vietnam between 2-14 January 
1961. In his report to the US Secretary of Defence, he remarked that the 
Vietnamese communists were much further along towards accomplishing their 
objective of controlling South Vietnam than he had realised from the 
reports received in Washington. Lansdale's findings indicated that the 
communists dominated much of South Vietnam's 1st and 5th Military Regions, 
as well as other areas. Thousands of communists had infiltrated the most 
productive area of South Vietnam and controlled most parts of it except for 
the narrow corridors protected by Diem's military and paramilitary forces. 
The communists also controlled most of the region from the jungle foothills 
of the High Plateau north of Saigon all the way south down to the Gulf of 
Siam. The only area still not controlled by the communists was the Saigon- 
Cholon area.6
The gap between the formation of the National Liberation Front of 
South Vietnam on 20 December 1960 and the first VNA and NONA reports of 29 
January 1961 on its formation deserves attention. From about the end of 
December 1960 to the beginning of January 1961, the Lao Dong Party Central 
Committee met to review the work of the three-year plan (1958-1960) and to 
decide on the tasks for 1961. During this session, Le Duan presented a 
report on the November 1960 Moscow Conference and expounded on the Moscow 
Statement which we should recall affirmed the validity of national 
liberation struggles. He also spoke of the need for creating a "broad 
front... to create conditions for the seizure of power by the working class
"Memorandum of Conference on 19 January 1961 between President 
Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy on the subject of Laos" in 
US Department of Defence, United States-Vietnam Relations 1956-
1960, pp.1360-1364; The Pentagon Papers, Volume II, (Senator 
Gravel Edition, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp.635-637.
United States Department of Defence: United States-Vietnam 
Relations 1945-1967, (Book II/IV/A5/Table IV), (Washington, 
1971), pp.66-77; The NLF Provisional Committee decided to 
strengthen its presence in the Saigon-Cholon area with the 
formation of the Saigon/Cholon/Giadinh Committee on 31 January
1961. See Truong Nhu Tang, Journal of a VietCong, (London: 
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and for socialist transformation."7
On 5 January 1961, Khrushchev gave a report of the November 1960 
Moscow Communist Conference at the general meeting of Party organisations 
of the Higher Party School, Academy of Social Sciences and the Institute 
of Marxism-Leninism attached to the CPSU, which could not have pleased the 
North Vietnamese more. In his speech, Khrushchev addressed the issue of the 
wars for national liberation which he argued would continue to exist as 
long as imperialism and colonialism existed. Wars for national liberation 
were not only admissible but inevitable. The Vietnamese situation was cited 
as an example. Khrushchev posed the question of why the US imperialists, 
while wanting to help the French colonialists in every way, nevertheless 
decided against a direct intervention in the war in Vietnam. The answer, 
according to him, was because the US knew that if they helped France with 
armed forces, Vietnam would get appropriate aid from China, the Soviet 
Union and other socialist countries, which could then lead to a world war. 
The position of the Soviet Union was that it would "fully support such just 
wars and march in the front ranks of the peoples waging liberation 
struggles." This was the strongest ever indication of Soviet support for 
the North Vietnamese cause.8 But soon after J.F. Kennedy's inauguration on 
20 January 1961, Khrushchev began dropping hints of a meeting with the new 
President. With the exception of this 6 January speech, the other signals 
Khrushchev sent to the newly-elected US President were the most 
conciliatory since the U-2 incident.9
Sino-Soviet relations however continued to sour beneath the surface. 
According to Jan Sejna, in early 1961, Soviet intelligence obtained copies 
of a secret letter circulated to Party cadres in China which marked the 
opening of an internal propaganda campaign to brief the cadres on the 
subject of Sino-Soviet disagreements. The letter blamed the Soviet Union
SWB/FE/539/(i); Lao Dong Party Central Committee resolution on 
Moscow Conference, VNA, 12 January 1961, SWB/FE/539/A2/2-6.
Only an extract of Le Duan's report is available. See Le Duan, On 
Some Present International Problems, (Hanoi: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1964), pp.9-55.
Moscow home service, 19 January 1961, SWB/SU/544/C/1-29.
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in 
the White House, (London: Mayflower Books Limited, 1967), pp.254- 
255; Michael R. Beschloss, Kennedy v. Khrushchev: The Crisis 
Years, 1960-63, (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), pp.63-65, 69.
Dec 1960 - Oct 1961 256
for the disunity in the communist movement, for planning a military attack 
on China, for being the cause of China's economic problems and for 
abandoning communism while falsely claiming to be the vanguard of
Marxism.10
We are only just beginning to learn of the different perceptions of 
the Soviet Union held by various personalities within the Chinese
leadership, and the roles they play in determining the development of Sino- 
Soviet relations. For example, it is believed that Mao, Deng, Peng Zhen and
Kang Sheng were most suspicious of the Russians, whereas Zhou and Liu
Shaoqi favoured a more cautious and moderate approach towards the Soviet 
Union.11 We know even less of the Soviet side except that Khrushchev 
distrusted his Ministry of Foreign Affairs which had many officials who 
were loyal to Molotov and were uneasy about Khrushchev's overtures to the 
West. He also did not trust the KGB. The KGB Chairman was thought to oppose 
Khrushchev's tough policy towards China and his rapproachment with the 
United States. According to Beschloss, on 11 February 1961, Khrushchev was 
suddenly called back to Moscow while he was touring the Soviet farming 
regions. It was believed that his rivals in the Presidium had convened a 
meeting and demanded a more tough-minded policy towards the United 
States.12
On 20 January 1961, Nguyen Duy Trinh and the North Vietnamese 
economic and trade delegation returned to Beijing13, after having only 
been to Moscow, Budapest and Bucharest. Hoang Van Hoan was still in Beijing 
during this time. We should recall that the delegation led by Trinh had 
been in Beijing from 3-11 December 1960 before it left for the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe. On 29 January, while Trinh was still in Beijing, both 
Hanoi and Beijing finally reported the "recent" formation of the National
Jan Seljna, We Will Bury You, (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 
1982), pp.58-59.
John Byron and Robert Pack, The Claws of the Dragon: Kang Sheng - 
The Evil Genius Behind Mao and his Legacy of Terror in People's 
China, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 247.
Michael R. Beschloss, Kennedy v. Khrushchev: The Crisis Years 
1960-63, (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), pp.77-78, 157-158. 
Beschloss however did not cite the source for this episode.
NCNA, 20 January 1961, SWfi//rf/546/A3/3.
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Liberation Front of South Vietnam.1'1
Two days later, on 31 January an economic agreement and protocol 
with China was signed. According to a Chinese source, the start of North 
Vietnam's first five-year economic plan (1961-1965) coincided with the 
period of China's "three economically difficult years." Despite that, the 
Chinese continued to assist North Vietnam's economic development.15 Under 
the economic agreement, the Chinese would provide the DRV with a long-term 
loan of 141,750,00 RMB. The DRV would use this loan within seven years 
(1961-1967) to pay for the equipment and technical assistance to be 
provided by China. China would also help the DRV build or expand 28 
industrial and transport enterprises in fields such as metallurgy, power 
generating, light industry and railways. According to the protocol on the 
mutual supply of goods for 1961, the Chinese would supply the North 
Vietnamese with steel products, cotton, automobile tyres, bituminous coal, 
raw material for the chemical industry, mechanical equipment, medicines, 
etc. In return, the DRV would supply China with anthracite, apatite, 
timber, cement, chromate, poultry, livestock, fruits, etc.16
In his speech at the farewell banquet for the Vietnamese delegation 
on 31 January, Zhou again referred to Laos. He said that the peace in 
IndoChina had been destroyed in recent months by the US imperialists, 
Thailand and South Vietnam. The expansion of the civil war in Laos was 
threatening the peace in Southeast Asia and the security of North Vietnam 
and China. As such, the Chinese could not but attach great importance to 
the developments in Laos. Zhou believed that even with the reactivation of 
the ISCC, it was necessary to convene an international conference.
The editorial in Remain Ribao on 1 February hailed the Sino- 
Vietnamese aid agreement as evidence of the further strengthening of the 
unbreakable friendship between the two interdependent fraternal countries. 
The Nhan Dan editorial of the same day gave details of the agreement and 
expressed North Vietnamese gratitude for the Chinese assistance. The 
editorial also referred in passing to the economic cooperation agreement
VNA and NCNAt 29 January 1961, 5Wfi/f£/553/A3/2.
Huang Guoan, op.cit., p.194.
Huang Guoan, et a!., Zhongyue Guanxi Jianbian, (Guangxi Renmin 
Chubanshe, 1986), pp. 194-195.
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signed with the Soviet Union and the other socialist bloc countries.17 In 
an article in Nhan Dan on 3 February 1961, the DRV Minister of Light 
Industry said that in the last three years, China had not only given the 
DRV long-term loans but also helped to build and restore many enterprises 
in the country.18
After Beijing, the North Vietnamese economic delegation led by Nguyen 
Duy Trinh returned to Eastern Europe via Moscow. This included another 
visit to Bucharest, followed by Tirana, where Trinh represented the Lao 
Dong Party at the 4th Albanian Workers' Party Congress; then Warsaw. He 
also visited the Leipzig Fair in the GDR before proceeding to Sofia and 
Prague. We do not know whether the delegation stopped in Moscow again (but 
it was mostly likely that it did.) According to British sources, economic 
aid from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for North Vietnam in 1961 was 
greater than that from China.19 This is not surprising given the economic 
crisis in China during this period.
Also on 31 January 1961, the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party issued 
a directive regarding the direction and tasks of the struggle in the South. 
In the assessment of the Politburo, the North was gradually becoming more 
capable of defending itself as well as serving as a base area for the 
revolution to liberate the South. At the same time, the revolution in the 
South was developing along the path of a general uprising and there was no 
possibility that the revolution would develop in a peaceful manner. The 
strategy was to step up both the political and military struggles until 
they were at par, and to attack the enemy both politically and militarily. 
Taking into consideration the variation in strengths in different areas and 
the diverse topographical characteristics in the South, the Politburo 
instructed that in the jungle and mountainous areas, the emphasis should 
be on military struggle; in the lowland areas, military and political 
struggles should go hand in hand; and in the urban areas, the stress should 
be on political struggle. According to the official North Vietnamese 
account, the 31 January 1961 resolution "provided very important strategic
NONA, 31 January 1961, SNB/FE/bbb/l\3/l-b.
VNA, 3 February 1961, 5NB/FE/bb8//\3/Z.
FO 371/166697, DV 1011/2, 15 February 1962, from Saigon to 
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guidance for the revolution in the South".20
In a letter of 7 February 1961 to the comrades in the South, Le Duan 
presented his conception of the revolutionary struggle in the South which 
essentially amplified the recent 31 January 1961 resolution. According to 
him, the revolutionary struggle at this point of time should not follow the 
Chinese pattern of protracted armed struggle in which the countryside would 
first surround the cities to be followed by the military forces liberating 
the whole country. Rather, in South Vietnam and Laos as well, the strategy 
would include separate but coordinated uprisings with the objective of 
establishing base areas, the use of guerilla warfare, building up to a 
general mass uprising in the final stage. The most important aspect was to 
use political struggle supported by armed struggle to regain the authority 
for the masses. Political struggle was to play the leading role at this 
present stage.
According to Le Duan, the immediate task was to build up the armed 
forces. In his assessment, although at that time the communists had the 
absolute advantage over the US-Diem clique in the political struggle, their 
armed forces were still relatively few in number. For example, they did not 
have the forces to control the strategically important Central High1ands. 
Even if they were able to capture the cities, they would still not be able 
to keep them. Le Duan was ever conscious that it was not just the Diem 
clique that they were confronting but the Americans as well.
In his letter, Le Duan once again emphasised the need to control the 
Central Highlands. The region of the Central Highlands was pivotal to the 
communist strategy. It was from this region that any attack against the 
enemy would be launched. It was also important as a base area to build and 
protect the revolutionary forces. The countryside and the delta areas in 
the vicinity of the Central Highlands were their main strategic objectives, 
the cities could be left to the last. Regarding this matter, he had already 
discussed it with the comrades in Interzone V. Finally, Le Duan revealed 
that in 1961 the Party Central Committee would assist Interzone V and Nam 
Bo to establish twelve battalions. In addition it would supply Nam Bo with
Vietnam: The Anti-US Resistance War for National Liberation 1954- 
1975: Military Events (JPRS 80968), pp.45-46.
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sufficient cadres for seven battalions.21 A week later, on 15 February 
1961, the revolutionary armed forces in the South were united under the new 
name, "the Armed Forces for the Liberation of South Vietnam".22
On 25 February the Politburo in Hanoi approved the military plan 
prepared by the Central Military Committee and the Ministry of National 
Defence. The plan identified four main tasks: One, to increase the military 
strength to enhance the defence of the North, establish an air-defence 
force, lay the foundation for an air-force and navy, and to complete the 
regularisation and modernisation of the VPA. Two, to construct the armed 
forces in South Vietnam. Infantry troops in the districts were to be 
organised into platoons. Infantry troops in the provinces were to be 
organised into companies and battalions. It was also proposed that ten to 
fifteen regiments should be combined with a number of artillery units to 
counter the enemy's defence, tanks and aircrafts. Three, to assist the 
Pathet Lao to train and develop its armed forces, to consolidate and 
construct the liberated areas. Vietnamese troops would be sent to Laos 
whenever the need arose. Four, to organise the military command system in 
South Vietnam so as to improve communication from the Central Committee 
to the provincial and district committees down to the village cells. The 
Military Regions in South Vietnam were also to be quickly organised. The 
Politburo entrusted the Central Military Committee with the responsibility 
for the military task in South Vietnam. Speaking at the Politburo meeting 
on 25 February, Ho reiterated that the VPA was a people's army. The war was 
a people's war. The army must always be close to the people. While weaponry 
and technical skills must be constantly improved, the army must always live 
just like the ordinary people.23
In March 1961, the General Staff decided on a new battle order: the 
325th Division, 341st Brigade, 244th Regiment would operate in Military 
Region IV; the 316th and 335th Brigades and 148th Regiment would operate 
in the Northwest Military Region. This was to ensure that troops were ready
Le Duan, Thu Vao Nam, (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Su That, 198.5), pp.31 - 
38.
Lich Su..., pp.116-122. On 15 February 1971, the Vietnamese 
communists celebrated the 10th anniversary of the unification of 
the South Vietnamese People's Liberation Armed Forces. See 
Liberation Press Agency, 15 February 1971, 5WB/7T/3612/A3/5-9.
23 Lich Su..., pp.130-135.
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at hand to move into Battlefield "B", which was South Vietnam, and 
Battlefield "C", which was Laos, at short notice. The 338th Division was 
established as a special training division for the training of all soldiers 
who were assigned to operate in South Vietnam. In the years 1959-1963, the 
majority of the cadres and soldiers that fought in the South were
Vietnamese forces recruited in the South, regrouped troops in Interzone V
and those who had previous experience fighting in the South, armed with 
rifles and a number of DKZ trench mortars.24
In the same month, the Central Military Commission formed a 
Committee to review the overall strategy of the VPA. The task of the 
Committee was to sum up the experiences of the armed struggle, the military 
strategy in the resistance war against the French, and the role of the VPA 
in the dual missions of national construction and warfare. Lieutenant-
General Hoang Van Thai, member of the Party Central Committee and Deputy-
Chief of Staff, was appointed to head the Committee.25 We should recall 
that a similar study had already been carried out by the General Political 
Directorate under Nguyen Chi Thanh and its conclusions disseminated at a 
conference of political commissars in November 1958. One of the 
recommendations of the Thanh's study had been the strengthening of party 
committees in the military.26
According to British intelligence, the Army's military role was given 
more emphasis after March 1961 .27 According to the Lich Su Quart Doi Nhan 
Dan Viet Nam, the first five years in the development of the Vietnamese 
People's Army, from 1955-1960, had seen the army grow from many scattered 
units of infantry equipped with inferior weaponry, to a regular and 
relatively modern army. Those five years were the foundation years. In 
1961, the many new military commitments which the VPA had to undertake 
revealed the limitations of the VPA in the areas of organisation, weaponry, 
military science and strategy. The objective of the second five-year plan 
for the military, from 1961-1965, was to produce a truly modern army which
Lich Su..., pp.136-138.
Hoang Van Thai is believed to be a close friend of Vo Nguyen 
Giap. See Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, (Document Number
114, Part 1, July 1973): VWP-DRV Leadership, 1960-1973, pp.60-61.
Lich Su..., pp.60-61.
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could fight effectively in the battlefields of Vietnam and IndoChina. 
Another objective was to speed up the development of military units so that 
they would be ready when the war expanded.28
It is worth noting that in 1961 when the VPA's military role was 
given more attention, Nguyen Chi Thanh, the only other four-star North 
Vietnamese general besides Vo Nguyen Giap, was transferred from the army 
where he was Director of the VPA General Political Directorate, to manage 
the Ministry of Agricultural Cooperatives.29 He was replaced by his 
deputy, General Song Hao.30 According to P.J. Honey, from early March 
1961, the North Vietnamese press ceased to refer to Thanh by his military 
title but as the "Rural Affairs Chairman of the Party Central Committee.31 
We should recall that four months earlier, in November 1960, Nguyen Chi 
Thanh (together with Le Duan and Tran Quang Huy) had accompanied Ho Chi 
Minh to Beijing and the Moscow Conference. We do not know whether Thanh was 
given any other undisclosed assignments. Six months later, from 28-30 
September 1961, he was in Beijing after attending the 4th National Congress 
of the Nodong Dang (North Korean Workers7 Party in Pyongyang. While Thanh 
was in Pyongyang, he would have met Deng Xiaoping and Kang Sheng, who were 
also in the North Korean capital to ensure that the North Koreans did not 
swing to the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet dispute.32 In contrast, Giap 
appeared to have become more influential. An English edition of his essay, 
People's War, People's Army, first published on 22 December 1959, was 
issued in 1961.33
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II
On 7 March 1961, the Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese forces captured Xala 
Phukhun, an important road junction north of Vientiane. What followed were 
a series of diplomatic manoeuvrings between Washington and Moscow. In the 
United States, preparations were made for a gradual increase of American 
military involvement in Laos. At the same time, Kennedy through the 
American ambassador to the Soviet Union, Llewellyn Thompson, informed 
Khrushchev that the United States was prepared to withdraw completely from 
Laos and accept a genuinely neutral Laos if the communists agreed to do the 
same. This message was also conveyed to the Chinese through the Warsaw 
channel34 and to the North Vietnamese via the Soviet channel.
China's perception of Laos and the Laotian situation during this 
period is revealed in a document entitled "Concerning the Struggle of the 
Laotian People" distributed with Issue Number 13 (20 March 1961) of the 
Bulletin of Activities circulated by the General Political Department of 
the PLA. According to the document, the geographical position of Laos was 
very important. The United States described Laos as the "stopper of the 
bottle of the IndoChina Peninsula". Because of this, the United States was 
doing all it could to prevent China from having any influence in Laos. 
Although the United States had yet to develop a modernised military base 
in Laos, the Chinese were convinced that it was planning to use Laos as a 
base to attack China. Reference was made to the 1954 Geneva Conference 
which foiled the American plan of extending imperialism into the region. 
The document also recalled with approval the attempts of Souvanna Phouma 
to establish a neutral government in 1957 and the integration of the Pathet 
Lao forces with the Royal Laotian Army. It blamed the American imperialists 
for interfering in the internal affairs of Laos and the subsequent collapse 
of the neutral government.
Regarding the forces of Kong Lae and the Pathet Lao, the Chinese were 
of the view that they were stronger than those of Phoumi Nosavan but their 
numbers did not compare with the latter. The Kong Lae-Pathet Lao forces 
still needed a period of time to increase their strength and to conduct
Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The 
United States Experience, 1953-1967, (New York: McGraw Hill Book 
Company, 1968), pp.248.
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military training. Although the political situation seemed favourable, the 
enemy forces still occupied a fairly strong military position. The Chinese 
believed that the Laotian question depended for its solution on how the 
armed struggle developed: Could the Kong Lae-Pathet Lao forces prevent the 
enemy's strength from increasing? Could they destroy the enemy? Would it 
be soon or not? All these questions would affect the situation in the 
political struggle. The Chinese answer was that a solution could not be 
seen for some time and the difficulties were still very numerous.
According to the same document, China, the Soviet Union and North 
Vietnam wanted a peaceful solution to the Laotian question in accordance 
with the principles and spirit of the Geneva Conference. But because the 
current situation was very different from what it was in 1954, the Chinese 
government believed that there ought to be a conference to discuss the 
peaceful neutrality of Laos. China approved of reviving the activities of 
the International Supervision and Control Commission but only after the 
international conference which would lay down the duties and power of the 
ISCC. Also, whether it was the International Conference or the ISCC, those 
involved must deal only with the de jure government of Souvanna Phouma. On 
the prospect of an international conference, the Chinese believed that the 
United States was dragging its feet until such time that it had the 
military advantage before agreeing to a conference.35
It was not till April 1961 that the two co-chairmen finally reached 
a consensus regarding the issue of the ISCC and the international 
conference on Laos. We should recall that on 7 March, the Pathet Lao-North 
Vietnamese forces captured Xala Phukhun which led to a series of diplomatic 
manoeuvrings between Washington and Moscow. While American military forces 
were put on alert in Okinawa and Thailand thus giving the impression that 
the United States would intervene in Laos, Kennedy in a press conference 
on 23 March expressed support for an international conference on Laos on 
the condition that there was an immmediate ceasefire. On the same day, the 
British handed the Russians an aide memoire with the same proposal. From 
their conversations with Khrushchev, both the American ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, Llewellyn Thompson, and the British ambassador, Frank 
Roberts, believed that Khrushchev did not want the conference indefinitely
J. Chester Cheng (ed.), The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 
1966), pp.365-369.
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postponed.36 On 1 April, Moscow replied to the British aide memoire of 23 
March 1961 suggesting that Great Britain and the Soviet Union should issue 
an appeal for a ceasefire simultaneously with the commencement of the 
international conference.37 Four days later on 5 April, the British 
ambassador gave the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for 
Southeast Asia, Georgi M. Pushkin, draft texts for an appeal for a 
ceasefire in Laos, a report to Nehru concerning the ISCC and an 
announcement of the conference. Roberts made it very clear that the 
ceasefire must be verified before the commencement of the conference.38 
After a delay of over two weeks, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko finally 
handed a draft message to the British ambassador calling for a ceasefire 
in Laos and a draft text of a proposed message to the government of India 
on recovening the ISCC for Laos on 16 April.39
Meanwhile in Hanoi, the Central Military Committee, with the consent 
of the Central Committees of the Lao Dong Party and the NLHX, approved the 
plan for Military Region V and Transportation Group 559 to expand the 
military campaign into the region of Route Number 9 and southern Laos, in 
order to support the Pathet Lao in south Laos and Group 559 to the west of 
Truong Son.40 Taking part in this operation were the 325th Infantry 
Division, the 19th battalion border defence troops in Military Region IV, 
the 927th Battalion from Ha Tinh province and the Pathet Lao forces. The 
campaign was under the command of the 325th Division and Group 559. The 
operation began on 11 April 1961 despite an appeal on 4 April by the
Telegram 2366 from Moscow to Department of State dated 1 April 
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XXIV, 1961-1963: Laos Crisis, (Washington: US Government Printing 
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Russians to the Vietnamese "to help create a favourable atmosphere for 
negotiations."41
However, this did not mean that the Vietnamese communists had decided 
to launch a full-scale war in both South Vietnam and Laos. On 20 April 
1961, Le Duan wrote another letter to the comrades in the South in which 
he once again emphasised the primary role of the political struggle and the 
supportive role of armed struggle in the current situation in the South. 
He reiterated the necessity of building up the armed forces. According to 
Le Duan, previous experience showed that uprisings would not be successful 
if the enemy's military was not defeated. He pointed out that the Diem 
regime had advocated an increase of 450,000 troops. However, he was certain 
that the communists would finally defeat the Diem troops. At the same time, 
he cautioned against taking the enemy's strength lightly or despising the 
enemy. It is clear from Le Duan's letter that the North Vietnamese 
leadership did not expect an early or an easy victory. Le Duan stressed 
that the cadres must understand that the struggle would be long and 
difficult, and therefore everyone must be psychologically prepared for 
hardships and sacrifices in the process of liberating their country.42
Ill
While the military activities in Laos were going on, a Laotian 
delegation which included Souvanna Phouma, Souphanouvong and Quinim 
Pholsena visited the Soviet Union (16-21 April), China (22-26 April) and 
Hanoi (26-28 April). The Russians impressed upon Souvanna Phouma that they 
sincerely desired a neutral Laos.43 In Beijing on 23 April, the Laotian 
leaders had talks with Zhou Enlai "in a cordial and friendly atmosphere."
See Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign 
Policy in the Admin strati on of John f. Kennedy, (New York: 
Doubleday, 1967), p.133.
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It was revealed in the joint-statement issued at the end of the visit that 
the subject of remnant KMT troops in the Sino-Laotian border areas was 
discussed and that both parties had agreed that the troops had to be 
cleared from Laotian territory. The Chinese also agreed to assist the 
Laotians to build a highway that would link their countries. Both countries 
also established formal diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.44 
Despite Gromyko's 19 April assurance to the British that there would be an 
immediate ceasefire45, on 23 April North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao troops 
captured Vang Vieng which lay on the road connecting Vientiane and Luang 
Prabang. The Laotian delegation met Mao Zedong in Hangzhou on 24 April. 
From Hangzhou, the Laotians went to Kunming on 25 April before proceeding 
to Hanoi.
A secret document entitled "Several Important Problems Concerning the 
Current International Situation" issued with Issue Number 17 of the 
Bulletin of Activities on 25 April 1961 (for the study and reference of 
cadres at and above the regimental level) throws light on the thinking of 
the Chinese leadership with regards to their foreign policy during this 
period. The document raised the question of how China could solve the world 
problems such as the issues of imperialism and decolonisation, the question 
of disarmament, the ban on nuclear tests, East-West relations and the re­
organisation of the United Nations. From the Chinese point of view, there 
were three possible ways: One, by sharing the spoils. China would not 
accept this arrangement and was determined to object to it. China did not 
want "one inch of land from others." Two, through peaceful coexistence. The 
present position was to stand firm against the United States and maintain 
peaceful coexistence with as many other countries as possible. The Chinese 
were pleased with their achievements in this respect but the document went 
on to state that "peaceful coexistence is a transitional form; peaceful 
neutralism is also a transitional form, and sooner or later imperialism
For Souvanna Phouma's visit to Beijing, see SWB/FE/621/B/3; 
SM/FE/61Z/B/l-4; SWfi/FE/623/B/3-4; Zhou Enlai Haijiao Huodong Da 
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will conclude (sic) its life, and sooner or later Socialism will be 
realised throughout the world." The third way was to help increase the 
strength of the socialist camp and to develop and deepen national 
independence movements.
On the issue of national democratic revolutionary movement, the PLA 
document of 25 April discussed the situation in Africa which it described 
as both the current centre of the anti-colonialist struggle and the East- 
West struggle for the control of an intermediary zone; and went on to the 
problems of the Congo, Cuba and Laos. No mention was made of the North 
Vietnamese struggle.46
While the Laotian delegation was in Beijing, on 24 April the Geneva 
co-chairmen finally issued a joint-appeal for a ceasefire; they proposed 
that the Indian Government convene the ISCC and announced that an 
international conference for settling the Laotian problem would be convened 
in Geneva on 12 May 1961. On the morning of 25 April, senior members of the 
ISCC for Laos who were in Moscow on their way to New Delhi and IndoChina, 
had a consultative meeting with officials of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, presided over by Deputy Foreign Minister, Georgi M. Pushkin. From 
the meeting, it was clear that the principal objective of the Russians was 
a political settlement to the Laotian problem. They feared that the 
conflict might escalate into a world war and were determined to avoid a 
military confrontation with the United States. To achieve this end, the 
Russians were prepared to make concessions in favour of the neutral 
elements in Laos at the expense of the Left. They expected the new Geneva 
Conference to last no longer than six weeks. The ISCC was instructed by the 
co-chairmen after arriving in Laos to contact all the parties and arrange 
an effective ceasefire, and to ensure that lines dividing the different 
groups were clearly fixed and controls instituted. The Russians did not 
invite representatives from Beijing, Hanoi or the NLHX to this meeting. In 
fact, the Soviet Government did not even hold preliminary discussions about 
the responsibilities of the ISCC with them.47
The Laotian delegation reached Hanoi on 26 April. That morning, they
J.Chester Cheng (ed.), op.cit., pp.480-487.
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met Ho Chi Minh. In the afternoon, they had talks with Pham Van Dong "in 
an atmosphere of cordiality, friendship and mutual understanding". There 
was no report of their activities on 27 April. According to the joint- 
communique issued at the end of the visit, Souvanna Phouma expressed
understanding and support for the Vietnamese efforts to reunify their
country. Pham Van Dong, in turn, stressed Hanoi's desire for a neutral and
independent Laos. Both pledged to uphold the Five Principles of peaceful 
coexistence. Hanoi also agreed to help build and repair a number of 
communication lines in Laos, to train Laotian technicians and to send 
specialists to Laos/8
On 27 and 28 April 1961, the British made two approaches to Gromyko 
warning him that any further military moves by the Pathet Lao would
endanger the chances of a conference and that an effective ceasefire should 
be arranged at once. The British further added that it was becoming hourly 
more difficult to avoid the impression that the delay was deliberate/9 
According to Kenneth T. Young, Kennedy used the ambassadorial channel in 
Warsaw to warn the Chinese that if a ceasefire did not precede the/Geneva 
Conference, the United States would be compelled to intervene militarily. 
Beijing replied that it was serious about wishing to negotiate and that it 
hoped that the Americans would cooperate in working out a satisfactory 
agreement for the neutralisation of Laos.50 The North Vietnamese-Pathet 
Lao operation in southern Laos which began on 11 April 1961 was 
successfully completed by 0800h on 3 May 1961, the ceasefire deadline.
The ISCC arrived in Laos on 8 May 1961 and on 11 May reported to the 
co-chairmen that there had been a general and demonstratable cessation of 
hostilities since the ceasefire order of 3 May 1961. By this time, the 
combined North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao forces were already in control of the 
provinces of Sam Neua, Phong Saly, Xieng Khouang, a large part of Luang 
Prabang, the strategic Plaine of Jarres and Highway 7, 8, 9 and 12. The 
control of these highways was particularly important because it would
For Souvanna Phouma's visit to Hanoi, see 5W8/Ff/625/B/7; 
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safeguard the Truong Son Road and the activities of the Transportation 
Group 559.51 Highway 7 was the main supply route leading from North 
Vietnam, through the villages of Ban Ban and Khang Khay, to the Plain of 
Jarres. Highway 9, just south of the seventeenth parallel, connected 
Savannakhet (where the Vietnamese set up a storage depot), through 
Tchepone, with Quang Tri Province. Any intention to build a land-bridge 
through Laos linking Thailand and South Vietnam would require the use of 
this particular highway. According to Denis Warner, "thanks to the 
lightning campaign before the ceasefire, the Pathet Lao in this region now 
holds all the interior trails and roads leading to South Vietnam and 
Cambodia. It would require a considerable military campaign to dislodge 
them, especially since the area is vital to the success of any uprising in 
South Vietnam."52
It is worth noting that in June 1951, a Soviet military mission led 
by General Antinov, the Soviet Army Chief of General Staff, was in Hanoi 
to study means of strengthening the DRV armed potential. One hundred new 
tanks were to be sent to the Vinh region, an aerodrome was also to be 
constructed there and a subterranean depot was to be built in the Thanh Hoa 
sector to conceal armaments. The North Vietnamese had constructed a railway 
at Lao-Kay to allow the passage of Soviet war material into North Vietnam 
from China. These included tanks and MIGs which were transported in its 
component parts by night. Soviet specialists would then reassemble them in 
factories in the jungles of Thanh Hoa and Vinh. British sources also 
revealed that in July, a thousand communist cadres from South Vietnam 
returned to the North. These cadres were to be to sent to the Soviet Union 
to undergo training in subversive warfare. At the same time, three thousand 
other cadres were to replace them in the South, passing through Laos.53 
On 27 July 1961, the Party Command and Command of Interzone V were formed; 
and the first main force regiment of the revolutionary armed forces, 
designated $.761 was established in eastern Nam Bo.54 It would appear that
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as long as the North Vietnamese did not aggravate the situation in Laos or 
allow their struggle to escalate into an international conflict, the Soviet 
Union was prepared to assist in the modernisation of the VPA.
IV
On the eve of the Geneva Conference on Laos, Ho Chi Minh again took 
a vacation in China where he spent his 71st birthday. This was the second 
year in succession that he spent his birthday in China. He arrived in 
Guilin on 15 May by plane. Travelling with him on the same plane was He 
Wei. On that afternoon, he climbed the Diecai Shan (Folded Brocade Hill), 
sailed down the Li River and visited the Rong Caves. On reaching the town 
of Yangshuo, Ho climbed the WangJiang Tower. The next day was spent sailing 
up the Li River back to Guilin. On 17 May, Ho went to Nanjing where he paid 
his respects at the Sun Yat Sen Memorial. From Nanjing, he continued to 
Wuxi, north of Suzhou, to visit the Taihu Lake. Ho's next stop was Hunan. 
There he visited Shaoshan village where Mao was born, Changsha, the Yuelu 
Hill, Aiwanting (Loving Dusk Pavilion), the Hunan Number One Teacher's 
Training School, which Mao attended between 1913-1918, and where he taught 
in 1920-21, sailed down the Xiang River and visited the Long Island or Long 
Sandbank situated in the middle of the Xiang River. During this trip to 
China, Ho visited all the places he had been to during his younger 
revolutionary days.53
The International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian 
Question began on 16 May 1961 and only ended on 23 July 1962. The 
Conference dealt essentially with the international aspects of the Laotian 
problem. Running parallel to the Conference in Geneva was a separate series 
of meetings and negotiations amongst the factions in Laos, represented by 
the three Laotian princes. Their task was to work out a compromise for a 
coalition government in the country. The Chinese delegation was headed by 
Chen Yi, China's Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister. The Soviet delegation 
was led by Deputy Foreign Minister, Giorgi Pushkin. Unlike the Russians,
Huang Zheng, Ho Zhiming Yu Zhongguo, (Beijing: Jiefang Jun
Chubanshe, 1987), pp.161-163.
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who expected the conference to be over in about six weeks, the Chinese 
arrived in Geneva expecting a prolonged stay.56
The North Vietnamese delegation was led by the Foreign Minister, Ung 
Van Khiem; but the pro-Chinese Hoang Van Hoan, a veteran of the 1954 Geneva 
Conference, was the special adviser to the North Vietnamese government 
delegation.57 Souvanna Phouma's Laotian Government delegation was led by 
the neutralist, Quinim Pholsena, and the delegation of the NLHX was headed 
by Phoumi Vongvichit. Throughout the duration of the Geneva Conference, the 
communist bloc presented a facade of complete solidarity.
While the Geneva Conference was going on, Khrushchev and Kennedy met 
in Vienna on 3-4 June 1961, We now know from the private discussions at 
Vienna that Khrushchev was keen on improving relations with the United 
States and wanted to avoid any international conflict. He was not very 
interested in Laos and told Kennedy that the Soviet Union had no desire to 
assume responsibilities in remote geographical areas, such as Laos. Both 
Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed to prod their clients to cooperate with the 
commission policing the ceasefire. Khrushchev also pledged to do his utmost 
to influence the Laotian forces to establish a truly neutral government. 
At Vienna, Khrushchev and Kennedy did not discuss Vietnam.sa
Marek Thee, op.cit,, pp.18-19; The Chinese believed that the 
United States was using the negotiation and the ceasefire to gain 
time, increase the military strength of Phoumi Nosavan and wait 
for an opportunity to resume its assault against the Pathet Lao 
and neutralist forces. See document entitled "The Plan and 
Strategy of the United States, Britain and France with respect to 
the Laotian Question'1 distributed with the Bulletin of 
Activities, Issue Number 22, 1 June 1961.
Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean, (Beijing; Foreign Languages 
Press, 1988), p.384.
Memorandum of Conversation: Vienna Meeting between the President 
and Chairman Khrushchev, Vienna, 3 and 4 June 1961 in Foreign 
Relations of the United States, Volume XXJV, 1961-1963: Laos 
Crisis, (Washington: US Government Printing House, 1994), pp.225- 
236.
Michael R. Beschloss, Kennedy v. Khrushchev: The Crisis Years 
1960-63, (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), pp.205, 211-213.
Beschloss's account of the private Kennedy-Khrushchev 
conversations in Vienna is based on the official memoranda of 
conversations drafted by Kennedy's interpreter, Alexander 
Akalosky, released by the Archivist of the United States on 5 
September 1990.
Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy
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However, two days after the Vienna meeting, on 6 June 1961, the North 
Vietnamese-Pathet Lao forces captured Ban Padong, a base of the Royal 
Laotian Government situated a few miles southwest of Xieng Khouang. The 
North Vietnamese did not inform the Russians nor elicit their assistance 
in the battle at Ban Padong during May and early June 1961.59 The non­
communist countries accused the communists of breaking the ceasefire 
agreement and as a consequence of this attack, the Geneva Conference had 
to be adjourned; it only resumed on 12 June 1961. Souvanna Phouma and 
Souphanouvong who were on their way to Geneva arrived in Moscow from 
Beijing on the day that Ban Padong was captured. It was reported that they 
were received by Khrushchev in the Kremlin. Khrushchev would presumably 
have told them that Moscow supported a truly neutral Laos and wanted the 
Geneva Conference to succeed.
From the account by Marek Thee, the Polish representative on the 
ISCC, of a three-day visit to Hanoi from 9-11 June 1961 we have an idea 
of Hanoi's perception of the Laotian crisis during this period. Marek Thee 
had discussions with a number of North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry 
officials, with Vietnamese specialising in Laotian affairs and most 
notably, with Pham Hung, the Acting Prime Minister and also a member of the 
Politburo. (Thee did not provide the date for this meeting with Pham Hung 
but it was most likely on 11 June when Prime Minister Pham Van Dong was 
leading a government delegation to China from 11-16 June.)
According to Pham Hung, Laos and Vietnam were bound together by fate. 
The current problem was not one of strategic planning but historical 
inevitability. The North Vietnamese saw the developments in Laos within the 
context of the developments in South Vietnam. To them, IndoChina formed a 
unified strategic arena. In their assessment, the situation was fluid and 
the struggle was expected to be protracted. According to Thee, the 
Vietnamese on principle avoided linking the Laotian problem with East-West 
negotiations. They were determined that considerations other than those 
which were a direct consequence of the IndoChinese struggle should not be 
allowed to interfere with "local" strategy. Hanoi also suspected that the 
negotiations on Laos were meant to disguise the growing American
in the Administration of John F. Kennedy, (New York: Doubleday 
and Company, Inc., 1967), p.136.
Marek Thee, op.cit., p.131.
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intervention in South Vietnam. Thus any agreements reached at the Vienna 
summit meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy on 3-4 June 1961 did not 
alter their own priorities. Nor should such agreements be allowed to hamper 
military operations such as the battle for Ban Padong, which was to protect 
their liberated areas.
Thee learnt that Hanoi had very close contacts with the Pathet Lao 
and that strategic planning was a joint enterprise. The North Vietnamese 
bore the brunt of the struggle in Laos and they were involved in giving 
military support and economic and technical help, as well as political 
counsel. In Hanoi there was an interdepartmental body in constant touch 
with Laos. Hoang Van Hoan was from 1961 in charge of the secret CP38 
Committee responsible for directing operations in Laos and Cambodia.60 
Apart from the publicly known economic and cultural representation, there 
was a confidential military aid committee responsible for channelling 
supplies and aid to Kong Lae's forces and the Pathet Lao. North Vietnam 
also provided the nucleus for assault units in the main battles and 
military staff officers assisted in military planning, for example the 
battles at Tha Thom and the most recent at Ban Padong. About twenty 
thousand Vietnamese were employed in Laos, cleaning and repairing roads, 
and also as drivers. Between February and May 1961, because of the 
intensification of the fighting, the Vietnamese had lost some seven hundred 
dead and wounded soldiers and auxiliary personnel in Laos. Regarding the 
Sino-Soviet rift, the North Vietnamese avoided talking about the subject 
in public. But in private conversations, they admitted that the rift was 
detrimental to their struggle.61
Soon after the battle at Ban Padong, which almost led to a breakdown 
of the Geneva Conference, a DRV Government delegation led by Pham Van Dong 
visited China from 11-16 June 1961, on the first leg of a tour to North 
Korea, Mongolia, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria.62
Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean, (Beijing: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1988), p.382.
Marek Thee, op.cit., Chapter 9.
For the economic reason of Pham Van Dong's tour, see P.J. Honey, 
"Pham Van Dong's Tour" in China Quarterly, October-December 1961, 
Number 8, pp.42-44. Also see, Vietnam Press, 12 September 1961, 
5MS/££/742/B/l which cites an article in Nhan Dan (23 August 
1961) regarding a DRV National Assembly meeting on 19 August 1961
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The delegation included Deputy-Premier Le Thanh Nghi, Le Van Hien {Vice- 
Chairman of the State Planning Commission), Pham Binh (Chief of the General 
Affairs Department of the Foreign Ministry), Ftoang Bao Son (Chief of the 
Asian Department of the Foreign Ministry), Nguyen Viet Dung (Chief of the 
Protocol Department of the Foreign Ministry) and Phan Van Su (Deputy Chief 
of the Soviet Union and East European Department of the Foreign Ministry). 
They arrived in Wuhan on 11 June. Deputy Foreign Minister Luo Guibo (who 
was also the first Chinese ambassador to North Vietnam) had gone from 
Beijing to Wuhan to meet Pham Van Dong and accompany him to Beijing. The 
next day in the afternoon, the delegation met Liu Shaoqi and had talks with 
Zhou Enlai, Li Fuchun, Luo Ruiqing, Luo Guibo, Fang Yi and He Wei (the 
current Chinese ambassador to North Vietnam). This was followed by a 
reception given by Liu Shaoqi. The delegation also attended a banquet given 
by Zhou, a party given by the China-Vietnam Friendship Association and the 
Ministry of Culture, and saw a Beijing opera.63 Pham Van Dong and Zhou 
Enlai had another meeting in the Diaoyutai Guesthouse on 13 June. We have 
no information of the delegation's activities on 14 June but it was 
reported that Mao had a cordial and friendly talk with Pham Van Dong and 
the other Vietnamese delegates on the morning of 15 June, the last day of 
the visit. According to Chinese sources, during this meeting, Mao expressed 
firm support for the armed struggle being waged in the South. Zhou Enlai 
said that the South must be liberated but the strategy must be flexible and 
take different forms. He again stressed the need to combine both political 
and military struggle, and the use of legal as well as non-legal means of 
struggle. Pham Van Dong was of the same view.6* On the afternoon of 15 
June, the Vietnamese called at the China-Vietnam Friendship Association and 
attended a rally in the Great Hall of the People.
Before the farewell banquet, Zhou and Dong signed a joint-communique 
which stated that the two Premiers "held intimate talks and reached
which discussed the shortcomings in the National Budget and the 
State Plan for the current year; and the need to overcome 
economic "difficulties" (not specified in the article).
NCNA, 12 June 1961, SWfl/f£/664/A3/l.
Xinhua News Agency, 21 November 1979; Huang Guoan, et a 1., 
Zhongyue Guanxi Jianbian, (Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1986), 
p.205, 209; Guo Ming (ed.), Zhongyue Guanxi Yanbian Sishi Nian, 
(Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1992), p.67.
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complete identity of views on important international questions of common 
interest to the two countries and on the question of further consolidating 
and developing the friendship and cooperation between the two countries." 
Both Premiers reiterated firm support for the liberation movement of the 
oppressed nations. Regarding Vietnam, Zhou Enlai stated that the Chinese 
government fully supported the DRV's opposition to US interference and 
aggression and resolutely supported the peaceful unification of Vietnam. 
The communique further added that for the people in the southern part of 
Vietnam to struggle against US aggression and the suppression and 
persecution by the Ngo Dinh Diem clique was their sacred right in striving 
for national liberation, democracy and freedom.65 Zhou invited the 
Vietnamese delegation to visit China again on their way back from Europe. 
From Beijing, the delegation proceeded to Pyongyang (16-22 June 1961), Ulan 
Bator (22-26 June 1961) and then to the Soviet Union (26 June-5 July 1961).
Pham Van Dong was thus in Moscow about three weeks after the Vienna 
meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy. His delegation arrived in Irkutsk 
on 26 June and proceeded to Moscow where they met Khrushchev on 27 June. 
It was officially reported that they discussed the question of cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and North Vietnam, and international questions of 
interest to both countries.66 On the same day, Dong called on Leonid 
Brezhnev and attended a luncheon in his honour. On 28 June, there was a 
Soviet-Vietnam Friendship rally in the Kremlin. The Vietnamese delegation 
then visited Leningrad from 29 June to 1 July. Meanwhile, on 30 June, 
Souphanouvong arrived in Moscow from Geneva on his way back to Laos and was 
received by Khrushchev. It was reported that they had a "warm and friendly 
talk". He left Moscow for Beijing on 1 July.
On 3 July, another meeting took place in Moscow between Khrushchev 
and the Vietnamese delegation. We have no knowledge of what transpired at 
this meeting but given what we now know of the conversations between 
Khrushchev and Kennedy in Vienna, it is very likely that Khrushchev made 
clear to Dong his views regarding Laos and the need to prevent the 
revolutionary struggle in Vietnam from escalating into a major war. They
NONA, 16 June 1961, 5W#/££/668/A3/l-3; For an account of the 
visit, also see Peking Review, 16 June 1961, Volume IV, Number
24, pp.6-8; Zhou Enlai Maijiao Huodong Da Shiji, (Beijing: Shijie 
Zhishi Chubanshe, 1993), pp.313-314.
TASS in English, 3 July 1961, SHB/SU/682/A3/1.
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signed a joint communique on 4 July. In his farewell speech at the airport, 
Khrushchev said that they were very satisfied with the results of the talks 
and that basically the communique confirmed once more the unanimity of 
their views, both with regard to Soviet-Vietnamese relations as well as 
international problems.6'7 But according to British sources, nothing 
conclusive seemed to have resulted from the visit; Pham Van Dong failed to 
spark Russian enthusiasm for Hanoi's stepped-up campaign against the 
"American-Diem authorities".68 According to A.N. Abramov, the Soviet 
ambassador to Laos, Khrushchev's primary concern was to do everything 
possible to cement the alliance between the Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phouma 
to achieve a coalition government. Souphanouvong while not in disagreement 
was more hardline and less prepared to make concessions which disadvantaged 
the Pathet Lao. The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, were particularly 
concerned about South Vietnam and tended to ignore the international 
context.69
A week after Dong left the Soviet Union, on 12 July another 
delegation from North Vietnam arrived in Moscow at the invitation of the 
CPSU central Committee. This time it was the Lao Dong Party delegation led 
by Le Due Tho, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Lao Dong 
Party Central Committee.70 We do not have any information regarding this 
visit other than that its purpose was for the Vietnamese to acquaint 
themselves with the organisational work of the CPSU.71
After Moscow, Pham Van Dong and the Vietnamese delegation proceeded 
to Prague (5-17 July 1961) and Warsaw (17-23 July 1961). The last stop of 
the delegation was Sofia but for reasons still unknown, Pham Van Dong did 
not go to Bulgaria: The Vietnamese delegation to Sofia was led by Le Thanh 
Nhgi.72 A communique issued by the DRV Council of Ministers on 31 July
Moscow home service, 5 July 1961, 5W8/S£/683/A3/4-5.
FO 371/160127, Number 47, 1021/24/7, 24 July 1961, from Moscow to 
Foreign Office.
Marek Thee, op.cit., p.124.
TASS in Russian for Abroad, 12 July 1961, SITB/SU/690/A3/2.
VNA, 14 July 1961, SblB/FE/693/(i).
Sofia home service, 23 July 1961, S/V8/££/700/A3/l; Sofia home 
service, 28 July 1961, SHB/EE/706/f\3/2.
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1961 stated that Dong's tour had ended successfully on 23 July 1961.73
Pham Van Dong was later reported to have returned to the Soviet Union 
some time at the end of July for a vacation and stayed till 12 August. He 
was reported as being received by Khrushchev on 27 July at Sochi where they 
both had a friendly conversation. Khrushchev also gave a dinner in honour 
of Pham Van Dong.74 The previous meeting between Khrushchev and Pham Van 
Dong had been exactly a month before on 27 June, In the interval, the 
Russians had become deeply concerned about developments in NATO and Berlin. 
Speaking at a Kremlin reception for graduates of Soviet military academies 
on 8 July 1961, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet government had decided 
to suspend its unilateral reduction of armed forces and would increase 
defence expenditure in the current year in response to the growing military 
budgets in the NATO countries. On 25 July, Kennedy in a televised address 
reaffirmed the rights of the Western allies to be in Berlin and announced 
that the United States was taking steps to prevent the communists from 
driving the Western allies out of Berlin either gradually or by force. What 
followed was a mass exodus of East German refugees seeking asylum in West 
Berlin. Two days after Kennedy's televised address, he met Pham Van Dong. 
Robert M. Slusser in his 1973 study of the Berlin Crisis suggested that 
after Kennedy's announcement, Khrushchev decided to encourage the struggle 
in South Vietnam by increasing Soviet aid to North Vietnam/5 We now know 
from declassified US material that Khrushchev was "very upset" by Kennedy's 
speech because he regarded it as an "ultimatum""6; but Slusser's 
hypothesis still cannot be validated.
The day after Dong left Moscow, on 13 August, the East German 
authorities sealed off the border between East and West Berlin, and began 
erecting a barbed-wire barrier, the precursor of the Berlin Wall. Thus from
VNA, 1 August 1961, S W B / F E / 1 0 1 .
TASS in English, 27 July 1961, 5W5/5D/706/A3/1.
Robert M. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet-America 
Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, June- 
November 1961, (Baltimore; John Hopkins University Press, 1973), 
pp.92-93. Also see, P.J. Honey, "Pham Van Dong's Tour" in China 
Quarterly, October-December 1961, Number 8, pp.42-44.
William Burr, "New Sources on the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962" in 
Cold War International History Project, Issue 2, Fall 1992, p.23, 
Burr did not provide specific references.
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July until September 1962 when both Khrushchev and Kennedy took steps to 
move back toward negotiations, Moscow as well as Washington were more 
concerned about Berlin than IndoChina.7" According to Cyrus L. Sulzberger 
who was then Paris correspondent of the New York Times, on 5 September 1961 
Khrushchev had asked him to convey a message to Kennedy proposing direct 
contact with the President to resolve the Berlin issue. Khrushchev was of 
the view that a settlement of the Laotian issue would appeal to Kennedy and
(jWQwW-e-
thus'/the atmosphere for Berlin.
Meanwhile, Souphanouvong was in Beijing from 2-6 July. He met Zhou 
on the night of 3 July in the Diaoyutai Guesthouse. During the meeting, 
Zhou expressed the view that the Geneva Conference was unlikely to break 
down because the Americans did not want that to happen.79 After Beijing, 
Souphanouvong flew to Hanoi. On 7 July, Hoang Van Hoan, special adviser of 
the North Vietnamese delegation to the Geneva Conference, and Chen Yi 
arrived back in Beijing from Geneva. The next day Hoan attended a Foreign 
Ministry reception where Zhou was present and on the morning of 8 July, 
there was a meeting between Zhou and Hoang Van Hoan regarding Laos.80 Hoan 
left Beijing for home on 11 July; it was subsequently reported that he 
returned to Geneva on 2 August presumably by way of Beijing.81 We now know 
that on 5 August 1961, he and Kaysone Phomvihane met Zhou in Zhongnanhai.
The sequence of events of the Berlin Crisis can be followed in 
Keesing's Contemporary Archives; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A 
Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, (London: 
Mayflower Books Limited, 1967), pp.329-336; Robert M. Slusser, 
The Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet-American relations and the 
Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, June-November 1961, 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973), Chapters 4-8.
C.L. Sulzberger, "The Two K's and Germany", New York Times, 6 
November 1966, p. 10 cited in Robert M. Slusser, op.cit., pp.209- 
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During the meeting, Zhou told them that victory must depend on the strength 
of the masses: foreign assistance was secondary. Laos had the advantage of 
being situated near China and North Vietnam, and therefore could depend on 
both countries for some assistance; but ultimately, as in China's own 
experience, the Laotians must depend on themselves.82
Pham Van Dong was back in Beijing on 12 August 1961 and on the same 
day had a meeting with Zhou regarding Laos. It was reported that Dong 
visited the Ring Tombs outside Beijing on 15 August and that he left 
Beijing for Kunming the next day. Dong spent a day at Xian before reaching 
Kunming where he stayed till his return to Hanoi on 21 August. Meanwhile 
Le Thanh Nghi, the DRV Deputy-Premier and a member of the DRV Government 
delegation who had arrived in Beijing before Dong, left for home on 15 
August. On 20 August, Ung Van Khiem, Foreign Minister and formal leader of 
the North Vietnamese delegation to the Geneva Conference, arrived in 
Beijing from Moscow and met Zhou Enlai on 21 August before returning to 
Hanoi on 23 August. From 25-27 August, Souvanna Phouma paid an unoffical 
visit to Hanoi .B3
The situation in Laos was still rather precarious during this period. 
Progress at the Geneva Conference was slow and the on-going negotiations 
amongst the three Laotian factions in Ban Na Mon were ineffectual. The 
possibility of renewed fighting cannot be discounted. In 1979 and again in 
1984, the North Vietnamese disclosed that in August 1961, the Chinese had 
advised them that the greatest care must be taken to avoid being directly 
involved in the war in Laos. They also warned of the possibility of US 
military involvement and its consequences for North Vietnam, Yunnan and 
Guangxi. The Vietnamese also claimed that Beijing advocated partitioning 
Laos horizontally into two zones: a north zone situated along China's 
southern border which would be controlled by the revolutionary forces; and 
a south zone controlled by the Phoumi Nosavan-faction. To the Vietnamese, 
the Chinese proposal was aimed at securing the Laotian revolutionary 
forces' dependence on China and ensuring their own security; while 
isolating the revolution in South Vietnam. The Laotian revolutionary forces
Zhou Enlai Uaijiao Huodong Da Shiji, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi 
Chubanshe, 1993), p.317.
F0 371/159867, DF 1015/1105, 25 August 1961, from Hanoi to 
Foreign Office (secret).
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however proposed an east zone and a west zone, centred respectively along 
the Mekong river and the IndoChinese Cordillera. The revolutionary forces 
would control the east zone, which would run north to south and serve as 
a corridor linking North and South Vietnam, through Laos. This was the 
existing ceasefire line. An east-west division would benefit the revolution 
in Vietnam.84
If this account is true, it would suppport Malcolm MacDonald's 
observation that for the first several months of the Geneva Conference, the 
Chinese were not so keen for an agreement establishing a neutral Laos but 
gradually became more supportive of it.85 We do not know exactly when the 
Chinese changed their minds. It is plausible that their failure to reach 
an agreement with Hanoi regarding the division of Laos in August 1961 could 
have led Beijing to reconsider their strategy. As for the North Vietnamese, 
MacDonald believed that they never wanted an agreement but were 
compelled by the Russians and the Chinese to accept the neutrality of Laos. 
(In 1968, Averell Harriman asked the North Vietnamese why they did not 
honour the 1962 Geneva Agreement regarding Laos, The Vietnamese reply was 
that they would respect any agreement that they reached voluntarily but not 
one which was "forced down our throats by the Russians" .86)The British 
officials at Geneva reported that in the last week of August 1961, there 
were the first signs that the communist countries might be ready to 
negotiate seriously with the non-communist delegation.87
At the beginning of September, the Central Committee of the CPSU sent 
to its Chinese and Vietnamese counterparts a detailed memorandum on the 
Laotian problem. The memorandum stressed that political errors had been
Socialist Republic of Vietnam Foreign Ministry White Paper on 
Relations with China, Hanoi home service, 4-6 October 1976, 
5M3/F£/6238/A3/13; The Chinese Rulers' crimes against Kampuchea, 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of Kampuchea, 
April 1984), pp.30-31.
F0 371/166504, DF 2331/166, 30 July 1962, from MacDonald to 
Foreign Office: Report on the Geneva Conference on Laos (Secret).
Interview with Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State 
for Far Eastern Affairs, in Michael Charlton and Anthony 
Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why: The American Involvement in Vietnam, 
(London: Scolar Press, 1978), pp.63-64.
F0 371/159947, DF 2231/397(A), 30 August 1961, from Geneva to 
Foreign Office (Secret).
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committed, particularly in the alliance between the Pathet Lao and the 
Neutralists. According to the Russians, Souvanna Phouma and the Neutralists 
had received inadequate support thereby causing a weakening in the 
alliance. The Russians also expressed their dissatisfaction with Hanoi's 
handling of Soviet aid to Laos: for example out of 23,000 tons of gasoline 
delivered by the Soviet Union to Hanoi for Laos, only 990 tons had so far 
reached the gasoline-starved country. Last, but not least, the Russians 
were impatient with the slow pace of the NLHX's move towards agreement for 
a coalition government. The Soviet Union wanted a neutral Laos as quickly 
as possible.88
Following the Soviet memorandum, a consultative conference which 
included representatives from China, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam and 
the NLHX was held in Hanoi to iron out the differences. The conference 
decided that all aid to Laos would continue to be supplied through Hanoi. 
Hanoi, in turn, would improve on its management of the aid. Quotas were 
established for both the Neutralists and the NLHX. As for speeding up the 
agreement to form a coalition government which the Russians were pushing 
hard for, the response was lukewarm. The NLHX was fearful, in the words of 
Marek Thee "of being unable to cope with the exigencies of a leading role 
in a sustained alliance with the Neutralists.1,89
In a meeting on 14 September between the Soviet Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Giorgi Pushkin, and Averell Harriman, the head of the US 
delegation at Geneva, Pushkin said that the Soviet Union wanted a truly 
independent Laos and was ready to come to an agreement which would not only 
assure the establishment of a really neutral government under Souvanna 
Phouma, similar to that of Finland, but also ensure the maintenance of the 
neutral regime. This was regardless of any developments in Berlin. Pushkin 
added that the Soviet Union would control the North Vietnamese and would 
support Souvanna Phouma against any political or military aggression from 
the Pathet Lao. In reply to Harriman's query on how long the neutral regime 
would be expected to last, Pushkin said that it would be longer than five 
years and that Laos would be the last country to become communist. Pushkin 
also offered to bring Harriman's delegation together with Phoumi Vongvichit 
in order to talk over Pathet Lao policies. When Harriman emphasised that
Marek Thee, op.cit., pp.193-194. 
Ibid., pp.193-194.
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both the Pathet Lao and Phoumi Nosavan must be compelled to be loyal to the 
neutral government under Souvanna Phouma, Pushkin was in full agreement.90
During a conversation on 7 September 1961 between the British Charge 
d'Affaires in Beijing, Michael Stewart, and Chen Yi, the latter said that 
Laos should be a buffer state like Cambodia, and should be neither a 
communist nor an American base. It was therefore inconceivable that either 
Phoumi Nosavan or Souphanouvong could be prime minister of Laos. The only 
possibility was Souvanna Phouma.91
In conversations in Rangoon on 15 and 16 September 1961, when 
Harriman briefed Souvanna Phouma about his meeting with Pushkin, Souvanna 
Phouma said that he would not have depended on the Soviet Union and China 
if he had not believed that they were sincere in desiring a neutral Laos. 
Souvanna Phouma was confident that the North Vietnamese could be controlled 
once a neutral government was formed.92
According to Souvanna Phouma's Chef de Cabinet, Khamchan Pradith, in 
a conversation with M. Brown (First Secretary, Head of British Chancery and 
Consul, Laos) in Khang Khay on 23 October 1961, both the Russians and the 
Chinese wanted a settlement in Laos; but not the North Vietnamese, who had 
their own reasons for keeping Laos in turmoil. South Vietnam was cited as 
the reason.93 Arthur Lai 1, Head of the Indian delegation at the Geneva 
Conference, in his informal conversations with the Laotian and Chinese 
delegates at Geneva formed the impression that the Chinese were sensitive 
to the Laotian desire for independence. As such, they refrained from 
sending in Chinese forces because that would only result in a loss of face 
and influence for China in Laos. He was of the view that both the United 
States and the Chinese, though looking at the Laotian problem from very 
different points of view, demonstrated a continuing will to reach
FO 371/159870, DF 1015/1178, 15 September 1961, from Washington 
to Foreign Office (Secret).
FO 371/159948, DF 2231/412, 9 September 1961, from Beijing to 
Foreign Office.
FO 371/159872, DF 1015/1204, 21 September 1961, Conversations 
held in Rangoon between Mr. Harriman and Prince Souvanna Phouma 
(15-16 September 1961) (Secret).
FO 371/159877, DF 1015/1317, 27 October 1961, Account of M. 
Brown's visit to Khang Khay on 23 October 1961.
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agreement.94
Meanwhile, according to US intelligence, Pathet Lao and North 
Vietnamese forces already controlled most of southern Laos, except for 
towns along the Mekong. And in South Vietnam, a major Hanoi-directed 
Communist offensive against the Diem regime was under way.95 According to 
British intelligence reports, there were grounds for believing that the 
attacks since early September 1961 in the Pieiku and Kontum areas were 
carried out by forces from across the North Vietnam-Laotian border. The 
Vietnamese communists appeared to be concentrating more forces in the 
Central Highlands to which the easiest supply routes run through southern 
Laos. Movement of the communist forces to this area from the South were 
observed in August 1961. The South Vietnamese authorities were of the view 
that the objective of the Vietnamese communists was to establish sufficient 
control in the area of the Central Highlands to enable them to set up a 
government which could receive aid from the North.96
Some time in October 1961, the Nam Bo Central Committee held an 
enlarged conference to assess the current struggle against the Diemist- 
regime and to spell out the tasks ahead.97 The conference affirmed the 
primary importance of the political struggle and the supportive role of 
armed struggle. It was recognised that the process of advance towards the 
general uprising required pushing armed struggle to an equal level with 
political struggle. However, they were acutely concerned that in the 
process of building up to a general uprising, they must avoid a full-scale 
war. They were well aware that the enemy still had strong military forces
Arthur Lall, How Communist China Negotiates, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1968), pp.142 and 176.
NIE 14.3/53-61, "Prospects for North and South Vietnam", 16 
August 1961 in US-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, Book 17, pp.245- 
246 reproduced in Gareth Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive
Documentation of Human Decisions (Volume 2), (London: Heyden and 
Son, 1979).
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Commissioner-General for South East Asia (Singapore) to Foreign 
Office (Secret).
Gareth Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human 
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and despite communist successes, they still did not have the advantage over 
the Diemist-regime. The possibility of a full-scale war could come about 
in two ways: it could be brought about either by the United States, in its 
efforts to thwart the political struggle, or when the communist party 
"strayed from the path leading to the general uprising". This was seen to 
be a crucial stage in the struggle against the Diemist-regime because the 
leadership would need to decide on the correct balance between armed and 
political struggle. The decision was that political struggle would persist 
while armed struggle would be increased till it was equal with the 
political struggle. The pace would depend on the circumstances and the 
relationship of forces in the different regions. It was proposed that in 
the plains, political and military struggle could be of the same proportion 
while in the cities, political struggle was to continue. However, in the 
mountainous region, military struggle would be primary. The objective was 
to annihilate the enemy there so that they could expand their base areas. 
Laos would therefore be an important strategic zone.
Chapter Ten
I
On 11 October, President Kennedy in a news conference in Washington 
announced that he was sending General Maxwell Taylor to Saigon that week 
to discuss with Ngo Dinh Diem and American officials on the spot how the 
United States could better assist South Vietnam against the communist 
threat.1 The announcement added fuel to the prevailing rumour that Diem 
had written to Kennedy to request for American combat troops. Taylor and 
Walt Rostow, a key foreign and defence adviser to the White House, visited 
South Vietnam from 18-24 October 1961.2 According to Arthur M. Schlesinger 
Jr. the composition of the mission, which was headed by a general and a 
White House aide and which did not include any high-ranking State 
Department representative, signified a shift in Washington's perspective 
of the Vietnam problem from a political to a military one.3 Thereafter, 
"the projected American solution (to the Vietnam problem) in 1961-1963 was 
increasingly framed in military terms."4
The mission took place at a time when the Geneva Conference was
Public Papers of the President of the United States: John F. 
Kennedy, 1961, (Washington: US Government Printing House, 1962), 
pp.414-415.
In two cables to the President on 24 October and 1 November, 
Taylor recommended to Kennedy amongst other things the dispatch 
of US troops to South Vietnam. See The Pentagon Papers, Volume 
II, (The Senator Gravel Edition), (Boston: Beacon Press 1971, 
pp.73-127.
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in 
the White House, (London: Mayflower Books Limited, 1967), p.435.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and 
American Democracy, 1941-1968, (New York: Fawcett Publications, 
Inc., 1968), p.40. Also see, Michael W. Cannon, "Raising the 
Stakes: The Taylor-Rostow Mission" in Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Volume 12, Number 2 (June 1989), pp. 125-165.
286
Oct 1961 - Jul 1962 287
within sight of an international agreement.5 During the 40th Restricted 
session of the Geneva Conference on 1 November 1961, Chang Hanfu - 
referring to the visit of General Maxwell Taylor to South Vietnam - claimed 
that developments in South Vietnam were bound to affect Laos. He accused 
the United States of ignoring international agreements by sending military 
personnel into South Vietnam. Chang posed the question: "if the US was 
allowed to tear up the international agreements on Vietnam and disregard 
the international machinery with them, of what use is it for the fourteen 
countries now gathered in Geneva to reach another international agreement 
on the Laotian question?" Harriman in turn declared that the Chinese 
delegate was out of order for raising the subject of South Vietnam at the 
Laos Conference.6
When Kennedy made his announcement, Ho Chi Minh was in Beijing. Ho, 
accompanied by Le Duan and Xuan Thuy, had arrived in Beijing on 10 October 
on their way to Moscow to attend the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. We have no 
information about Vietnamese activities in Beijing on this occasion except 
that Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan had a "cordial" meeting with Mao, Liu Shaoqi, 
Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen on 12 October. 
This was followed by a banquet.7 We do not know what was discussed but it 
is likely that one topic was the implications of the impending visit of 
General Maxwell Taylor to Saigon. They left for Moscow on the morning of 
14 October.
The 22nd Congress of the CPSU took place from 17-31 October 1961, At 
the Congress, Khrushchev denounced Albania as the bastion of Stalinism and 
for opposing the anti-Stalinist policies which the Soviet Union had 
initiated since 1956. In a speech on the evening of 19 October, Zhou made
FO 371/159950, DF 2231/455, 26 October 1961, from Geneva to 
Foreign Office: Personal letter from MacDonald to Sihanouk 
(Secret); FO 371/159951, DF 2231/467, 4 November 1961, from 
Geneva to Foreign Office: Harriman and MacDonald's meeting with 
Nehru during his hour's stop at Geneva airport on the morning of 
2 November 1961 (Secret).
George Modelski, International Conference on the Settlement of 
the Laotian Question, 1961-62, (Department of International 
Relations, ANU, Working Paper Number 2, 1962), pp.128-129.
Guo Ming, et al., Xiandai Zhongyue Guanxi Ziliao Xuanbian, 
(Volume II), (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 1986), pp.439-440; Zhou 
Enlai Waijiao Huodong Da Shiji, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi
Chubanshe, 1993), p.324.
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clear the Chinese view that any quarrels within the socialist camp should 
be settled bilaterally and a public denunciation would not contribute to 
the cohesion of the Socialist bloc. China also disagreed with the programme 
spelt out by Khrushchev at the Congress, which ran counter to the 1957 
Declaration and 1960 Statement on many important questions of principle.6 
Zhou had talks with Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders on 22 October in 
an attempt to resolve their differences but in vain. The next day, 23 
October before the Congress closed, Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing and was 
warmly welcomed at Beijing airport by Mao personally. After Zhou's 
departure, the Chinese delegation left Moscow to tour Leningrad and only 
returned on 31 October, the final day of the Congress.
Meanwhile, in his speech on the morning of 21 October, Ho Chi Minh 
made no reference to the Albanian question. Both he and Le Duan also went 
on a tour to Estonia (22-23 October), Latvia (24-26 October) and was 
reported to be in Lithuania on 27 October.9 The Soviet Union broke off 
diplomatic relations with Albania in December 1961. Neither China nor North 
Vietnam followed suit. The Taylor-mission to Saigon thus also coincided 
with a very tense period in the communist camp.
Le Duan and Xuan Thuy returned to Beijing on 3 November on their way 
home from the 22nd CPSU Congress and remained in China until 7 November 
before returning to Hanoi. Of their activities in Beijing, we only know 
that they met Zhou and Deng Xiaoping on 6 November.10 It is very likely 
that they would have discussed with the Chinese the implications of the 
Taylor-mission to South Vietnam and Hanoi's attitude towards the Sino- 
Soviet disagreements.
Also on 7 November, the Hanoi papers published appreciations of the 
"great and far-reaching changes in the Soviet Union over the past 44 years"
For details, see "The Origin and Development of the Differences 
Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves" in Peking 
Review, Number 37, 13 September 1963, pp.6-20; Lester A. Sobel, 
Russia's Rulers: The Khrushchev Period, (New York: Facts on File 
Inc., 1971), pp.212-256.
For Zhou's activities in Moscow, see Zhou Enlai Waijiao Huodong 
Da Shiji, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1993), pp.325-326.
VNA, 25 October 1961, SUB/FE/780/C2/2; VNA, 27 October 1961, 
SHB/FE/781/C/3.
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Oct 1961 - Jul 1962 289
and praised the new CPSU programme spelt out at the just ended Congress. 
The front pages of the newspapers all carried photographs of Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev. Nhan Dan reproduced an article written for Pravda by Ho Chi Minh 
in which he expressed his "firm belief that under the leadership of the 
glorious CPSU headed by Comrade Khrushchev, the valiant Soviet people will 
succeed in building communism..."11
Meanwhile, Ho Chi Minh had remained in the Soviet Union. He attended 
a Kremlin reception on the night of 7. November12 and was received by 
Khrushchev on 9 November.13 About a month ago at the meeting at Ban Hin 
Heup on 8 October, the three Laotian princes had agreed that Souvanna 
Phouma would be the prime minister of a provisional coalition government 
but they failed to reach agreement on the actual composition of the 
government. Since then there were no further meetings because three princes 
could not agree on a venue. At the Kremlin reception on the night of 7 
November, Ho reportedly told the Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union 
that the prospects at Geneva seemed good, if the three Laotian princes 
could be brought to complete their recent agreement.14 (This was also the 
view of MacDonald and Harriman.15) Then on 11 November 1961 just as Ho 
ended his stay in the Soviet Union, Souphanouvong in an attempt to force 
Bourn Oum and Phoumi Nosavan back to the negotiating table suddenly 
compromised on the conditions for a coalition government and agreed to 
accept Vientiane, the headquarters of Phoumi Nosavan, as the meeting place. 
This news was welcomed by Moscow and initially by Hanoi as well.
Ho Chi Minh arrived back in Beijing on 12 November. On 14 November, 
he had a meeting with Mao, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. 
Whereas the Taylor-mission had increased the Russian desire for a quick
VNA, 7 November 1961, S M / F E / 7 91/C2/6.
FO 371/159879, DF 1015/1341, 8 November 1961, from Moscow to 
Foreign Office.
TASS in Russian for Abroad, 11 November 1961, 5WS/57//793/A3/3.
FO 371/159879, DF 1015/1341, 8 November 1961, from Moscow to 
Foreign Office.
FO 3/7/159951, DF 2231, 4 November 1961, from Geneva to Foreign 
Office: Harriman and MacDonald's meeting with Nehru during his 
hour's stop at Geneva airport on the morning of 2 November 1961 
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solution to the Laotian problem so as to avoid a confrontation with the 
United States, it hardened the Chinese attitude as they prepared for a 
protracted struggle.16 Beijing was of the view that Souphanouvong should 
not make any compromises. He Wei, the Chinese ambassador to Hanoi, visited 
Khang Khay from 14-17 November17, to argue that the concessions would 
undermine the gains achieved so far in the negotiations. Besides, having 
a meeting in Vientiane was a security risk for Souvanna Phouma and 
Souphanouvong. But the main reason for the Chinese opposition was the 
continued presence of the Americans in Laos. The Chinese believed that the 
United States aimed to partition Laos so that it could turn southern Laos 
into a bridgehead linking South Vietnam and Thailand.18 The editorial of 
the 7a Kung Pao of 15 November stated that the activities of the US in 
South Vietnam were closely related to its plan for military intervention 
in Laos. South Vietnam served as a springboard for its intervention in 
Laos. The Chinese were therefore seriously concerned over the extension of 
US intervention in South Vietnam.19
Ho Chi Minh was in China till 16 November before returning to Hanoi. 
He Wei returned to Hanoi from Khang Khay the day after Ho's return. Soon 
after He Wei's visit to Khang Khay, the NLHX reversed its previous 
concession, stating that time was not ripe for a coalition government and 
that they would be prepared to meet in Vientiane only when they were 
satisfied with the security arrangements. Hanoi also changed its position. 
Some time between 21 and 24 November Pham Van Thuyen, Chief of North 
Vietnam's Economic and Cultural Mission to Laos told Marek Thee that the 
balance of forces at that time "did not favour a conclusion of the 
negotiations" and that "only a demonstration of military supremacy could 
break the deadlock". In this new turn of events, Marek Thee recognised He 
Wei's line of thinking. But Thee subsequently realised that the situation 
was more complicated. After a series of discussions in Khang Khay from 21- 
24 November, Thee discovered that there were subtle differences between the
Marek Thee, op.cit., pp.191-192, 196-201.
AO/i, 14 November 1961, sm/FE/796/C/1-2. In Khang Khay, He Wei 
met Souvanna Phouma, Pheng Phongsavan and Kong Lae.
Marek Thee, op.cit., pp.197-198,
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perceptions of the Chinese, North Vietnamese and NLHX. According to Thee, 
the Chinese were of the view that a new military operation might be 
unavoidable and was perhaps desirable. The North Vietnamese preferred a 
status quo, which meant neither a coalition government nor another military 
operation. As for the NLHX, they thought that they could consolidate and 
strengthen both their political and military gains achieved so far. 
Souvanna Phouma, however, was convinced that only military pressure could 
compel the Boun Oum-Nosavan clique to negotiate. Thee also disclosed that 
it was after this rift with the Chinese, the Vietnamese and the Laotians, 
the Soviet Union decided on a gradual disengagement from Laos.20
On 29 November the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement asking 
all the countries which participated in the 1954 Geneva Conference and all 
other concerned countries to "pay attention to the grave activities of the 
US violating the Geneva Agreements and threatening peace". It also called 
upon the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference and the ISCC in Vietnam 
to take measures to check US aggression.21
Meanwhile, the Geneva Conference was making progress. On 25 November, 
there were eight items left on the Conference agenda; and by 2 December, 
only four items remained to be resolved,22 On 1 December the Chinese seem 
to change their mind and assented to the three Laotian princes meeting in 
Vientiane, the venue which they had previously objected. When Marek Thee 
arrived in Khang Khay on the same day, he found the Laotians, Vietnamese 
and Chinese all in agreement for a meeting in Vientiane. It was to be a 
test of US-Vientiane intentions. The meeting of the Laotian princes was 
eventually scheduled for 27 December 1961.23
At a lunch with Marek Thee on 9 December, Nguyen Chinh Giao, chief 
of the Laos desk in the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, revealed 
that Hanoi's position regarding Laos was closer to that of Beijing than 
that of the Soviet Union, Beijing insisted that in any coalition
Marek Thee, op.cit., pp.191-192; 196-201.
Peking Review, Number 48, 1 December 1961, pp.9-10.
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government, the NLHX-Neutralists must retain two-thirds of the portfolios. 
The Soviet Union was prepared for larger concessions. Both Hanoi and 
Beijing felt that in view of the Vientiane-Thai sch'emes to preserve 
Vientiane's military strength, the NLHX must also preserve its own military 
strength. The Soviet Union advocated immediate unification of the armed 
forces. Hanoi was apprehensive that Souvanna Phouma might swing to the 
right; the Soviet Union argued that he should be trusted. Hanoi was also 
very concerned about the transport difficulties created by the partial 
withdrawal of Soviet airplanes and the reduction of Soviet aid. The Soviet 
Union had ceased air deliveries to Tchepone some time in November-December 
because it suspected that the North Vietnamese were using the deliveries 
to support their struggle in South Vietnam, rather than the intended 
purpose of serving the Laotian units in south Laos.24
By 18 December, there were only two items left on the Geneva 
Conference agenda, namely (a) SEATO protection of Laos and (b) the 
integration of the Pathet Lao forces in the Laotian Army which could only 
be resolved when there was a united Laotian delegation representing a 
government of national unity in Laos, Both China and North Vietnam called 
for the complete abolition of SEATO. The Soviet Union was adamant only 
about the abolition of SEATO protection over Laos. The pivotal issue was 
the formation of a coalition government. Without a coalition government, 
neither the above two items nor the agreements reached at Geneva so far 
could be finalised.25
II
Meanwhile in Hanoi, the 6th Plenary session of the Lao Dong Party 
Central Committee took place between 30 November-2 December 1961 to hear
Marek Thee, op.cit., pp.205-209.
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Ho Chi Minh's report on the recent 22nd CPSU Congress.26 It was very 
likely that Laos and the Taylor-mission as well as the Sino-Soviet rift and 
its implications for the Vietnamese communist struggle, were also 
discussed. According to Marek Thee, some time in early December 1961 the 
North Vietnamese Politburo met to discuss the Laotian problem. 
Subsequently, the Polish Commissioner residing in Vientiane, Albert Morski, 
and Marek Thee were invited to Hanoi for a discussion on 16 December.
Not long after the 6th Plenary session, the NCNA and Beijing home 
service reported that a Chinese military delegation led by Marshal Ye 
Jianying would be paying a visit to North Vietnam on the invitation of Vo 
Nguyen Giap. It was further reported that on 6 December, the delegation 
attended a banquet given by the Vietnamese Charge d'Affaires in Beijing.27 
On 8 December, a DRV National Defence Ministry communique issued a similar 
statement, adding that the visit was to coincide with the 17th anniversary 
of the VPA on 22 December 1961.
Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1961 thus culminated in the visit of the 
most high-powered military delegation to North Vietnam to date.28 Four 
days before the visit, on 11 December 1961, two American helicopter 
companies landed in Saigon, accompanied by 400 American troops. On 15 
December, the Chinese military goodwill mission led by Marshal Ye Jiangying 
(Inspector-General, PLA) arrived in Hanoi. The mission included: Generals 
Liu Yalou (Commander, Chinese Air Force), Xiao Hua (Deputy-Director, PLA 
Political Department; Director of Personnel), Yang Chengwu (Deputy-Chief 
of General Staff), Huang Yongsheng; Lt.General Xiao Xiangyong (Director, 
General Office of the Ministry of Defence); Vice-Admiral Wu Ruilin; Major 
General Lei Yingfu and Senior Colonel Liu Zhongkui. The Vietnamese 
welcoming party included General Vo Nguyen Giap, Lt.General Van Tien Dung, 
Song Hao, Hoang Van Thai and Tran Van Tra; Brigadier-Generals Tran Quy Hai 
and Pham Kiet; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoang Van Tien and Tran 
Duy Hung, Mayor of Hanoi. That evening, in both their banquet speeches,
VNA, 4 December 1961, SHB/FE/812/A2/1.
S m / F E / 816/(i).
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Giap and Yeh spoke of the fraternal closeness of China and Vietnam which 
was as "close as lips and teeth, sharing the same weal and woe". They also 
highlighted the close ties between the PLA and the VPA.
The arrival of the Chinese military delegation coincided with the 
revelation of an exchange of letters between Kennedy and Ngo Dinh Diem on 
the same day. In his letter, Kennedy agreed with Diem that the current 
campaign of force and terror waged against the South Vietnamese government 
was supported and directed by Hanoi. The letter also stated that the United 
States would immediately increase its assistance to defend South Vietnam. 
According to Kennedy, he had already given orders to get the programmes 
under way.29
The next day, on 16 December, a VPA spokesman was reported by VNA to 
have said that the situation in South Vietnam had become "more serious than 
ever owing to the US's first step of armed aggression".10 On the same day, 
the military goodwill mission met Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong. They also 
visited the Vietnamese Revolutionary Museum and in the evening, attended 
a dinner hosted by Ho.
Also on 16 December, the Polish Commissioner residing in Vientiane, 
Albert Morski, and Marek Thee were in Hanoi for a discussion with the North 
Vietnamese. Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem summed up succinctly Hanoi's 
perception of the situation. The North Vietnamese believed that the 
international climate at the time favoured a political settlement rather 
than a renewal of the fighting. However, the balance of forces in Laos was 
still uncertain, and had not tipped decisively in favour of the NLHX- 
Neutralists. The intentions of the United States was a key factor. Hanoi 
was of the view that the US opposed a compromise solution and that the 
United States intended to re-assert its dominance in Laos.31
We have no knowledge of the activities of the Chinese delegation on 
17 December. But on 18 December the delegation accompanied by Lt.General 
Tran Van Tra visited an artillery officer's school. On the same day the 
military delegation travelled to Nghe An on a visit to the Fourth Military
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. 
Kennedy, 1961, (Washington: US Government Printing House, 1962), 
pp.505-506.
VNA, 16 December 1961, 5WS//T/827/A3/4.
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Region of the VPA. They stayed in Nghe An from 18-20 December. The 
delegation attended a welcome banquet hosted by the Fourth Military Region 
on 19 December at which Yeh Jianying stated that "the US imperialist 
intervention in and aggression against South Vietnam have become extremely 
serious" and "the Chinese people would never be indifferent to this 
adventurist action".32 They also visited places of historic interest such 
as Ho Chi Minh's native village, Nam Lien, and attended a performance given 
by an ensemble of the Fifth Interzone. On 20 December they flew back to 
Hanoi where they attended a programme of songs and dances presented by an 
art ensemble of the General Political Department of the VPA. There was 
again no report of their activities on 21 December.
The next day, 22 December was the 17th Anniversary of the VPA. It is 
notable that the Soviet Minister of Defence did not send a message on this 
occasion as was customary. Ye Jianying, in his personal capacity and on 
behalf of his four sons, presented Ho with a mottled bamboo fan made during 
Ming Dynasty. The military delegation visited a VPA unit on that day and 
attended the anniversary reception in the evening at which Ho, Pham Van 
Dong, Truong Chinh, Le Duan were also present. General Xiao Hua visited the 
General Political Department on 23 December and again on 24 December. Also 
on 24 December, General Yang Chengwu, Major-General Lei Yingfu and Senior- 
Colonel Liu Zhongkui met Lt.General Van Tien Dung. That evening, the 
delegation was entertained to a "big banquet" by Major-General Bang 
Giang.33 On the 25th, the delegation visited Dien Bien Phu, after which 
they proceeded to Haiphong where they were joined by Vo Nguyen Giap. That 
evening, they attended a banquet in their honour hosted by the Cholon 
Military Region of the VPA. On 26 December, they visited the Hon Quang coal 
basin, a PAVN naval unit and the Cue Tho coal mine.
The meeting of the Laotian princes which was scheduled to take place 
in Vientiane on 27 December failed to materialise because of the 
intransigence of Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan, which meant that a government 
of national unity could still not be formed and the new Geneva Agreement 
could not be signed. We should recall that Hanoi and Beijing regarded this 
meeting as a test of US-Vientiane intentions. The situation in Laos 
therefore remained uncertain and dangerous. It is notable that we have no
NCNA, 20 December 1961, 5W5//r£/827/A3/3-4,
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information about the activities of the Chinese military delegation on 27 
and 28 December.
The next report we have of the delegation's activities was the 
reception given by He Wei on the evening of 29 December. On 30 December, 
the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party received the Chinese military 
delegation. From the report, it appeared that every member of the Party 
Central Committee was present except Pham Van Dong and Le Duan. The 
reception was reported to have proceeded in an atmosphere of extreme 
cordiality. A farewell reception was held on the same evening. The Chinese 
military goodwill mission left Hanoi for Canton on 31 December 1961 after 
spending two weeks in North Vietnam. In a farewell speech, Giap said that 
the mission's visit had provided a powerful stimulus to the Vietnamese 
people's struggle to build socialism and to reunify the country peacefully. 
Marshal Ye, in his reply, declared that the visit had once again vividly 
demonstrated that the profound friendship between the Chinese and 
Vietnamese peoples and armies, based on victorious Marxism-Leninism and 
proletarian internationalism, was unbreakable, and that they were united 
by a common ideal and a common cause.
It is reasonable to think that such a high-powered visit must have 
more important designs than just strengthening goodwill. According to Bui 
Tin, during the visit the Chinese advocated guerrilla warfare in the 
mountains and suggested that the southern communists should only fight at 
section or company level in order not to provoke American counterattack.34 
Unfortunately, there is not much more that we know. It has been suggested 
that the visit was a riposte to that of General Maxwell Taylor to South 
Vietnam in October 1961 and the increasedunited States build-up in the 
South. Although Kennedy had not (yet) endorsed Taylor's recommendation of 
sending ground troops to South Vietnam, by the end of 1961, the strength 
of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in South Vietnam was three 
times the number allowed for in the 1954 Geneva Agreements.35 Given the 
acute concern of both China and North Vietnam about the military activities 
of the United States in South Vietnam during this period and the aborted
Judith Stowe and Do Van (translated and adapted), Following Ho 
Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel [Bui Tinj, 
(London: Hurst and Company, 1995), p.45.
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27 December 1961 meeting of the Laotian princes, it was highly likely that 
there were discussions on contingency plans in the event of any threat from 
the United States. One Chinese source disclosed that after the visit of the 
military delegation, a meeting took place between the Chinese and North 
Vietnamese leaders in early 1962 regarding Chinese military assistance for 
the struggle in the South.36
One point that we can be certain of is that the visit did not lead 
to any Sino-Vietnamese military alliance, to the exclusion of the Soviet 
Union. An editorial in the Quart Doi Nhan Dan of 3 January 1962 hailed the 
recent visit as a "brilliant success" and a contribution to the "brotherly 
solidarity among countries of the socialist camp with the great Soviet 
Union as centre",37 According to another Chinese source, apart from their 
difference with the Vietnamese over the handling of the 1956 agrarian 
debacle, the other significant point of divergence between them before 1965 
was the unwillingness of the Vietnamese communists to join them in 
denouncing the Soviet Union for deviating from Marxism.38 North Vietnam 
tried its utmost not to get involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute.39 In 
January 1962, the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party sent letters to 
a number of fraternal parties expressing its concern over the Sino-Soviet 
differences. The Vietnamese communists proposed that a meeting be convened 
among the representatives of communist and workers' parties to settle their 
differences and that pending such a meeting, the parties should cease 
criticising one another in the mass media.40
French Soviet specialists in the Direction d'Europe at the Quai 
d'Orsay were of the view that since the 22nd CPSU Congress (17-31 October 
1961) the North Vietnamese had moved completely into the Chinese fold. The 
Direction d'Asie of the Quai d'Orsay also noticed a considerable swing
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towards China in late 1961 but it thought that the North Vietnamese would 
be very reluctant to provoke the Russians to the point where the latter cut 
off economic a i d / 1 Indeed, on 30 December, an agreement on Soviet loans 
to North Vietnam, involving 3.5 billion roubles for the purchase of Soviet 
goods was signed in Hanoi between Nguyen Duy Trinh and the Soviet 
ambassador. It was further reported that the Vietnamese-Soviet Commission 
for Scientific and Technical Cooperation had recently worked out a joint- 
plan for the first half of 1962, under which the Russians would supply 
North Vietnam with technical documents on construction, foundries, 
electrical appliances, forestry and other areas. In return, the North 
Vietnamese would assist the Soviet Union in its study of the use of 
equipment under tropical conditions/2
A protocol for commodity exchange and payments for 1962 between China 
and North Vietnam was signed on 20 January 1962 whereby both countries 
would do their utmost to provide each other with the commodities needed by 
their national economies. China would provide the Vietnamese with rolled 
steel, lead, zinc, coke, soft coal, machinery, machine parts, medicine, 
cotton and other raw materials. The Vietnamese would supply China with hard 
coal, cement, timber, chromate, jute, peanuts, marine and agricultural 
products. The signing of the protocol was well publicised in both the 
Vietnamese and Chinese newspapers/3 However, as a consequence of the 
Chinese economic difficulties, China's aid to North Vietnam in 1962 
inevitably fell short of its promises and Soviet aid surpassed that of the 
former/4
British officials in Beijing reported that the Chinese internal 
situation at the end of 1961 was very bad. For the third consecutive year, 
China had been afflicted with drought and floods. A series of bad 
agricultural years had not only raised the question of how to feed the 
population but also crippled a great part of China's light industry, hit
FO 371/160125, DV 1022/4, 21 December 1961, from Paris to Foreign 
Office (Secret).
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Office.
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nearly three-quarters of its export potential and seriously affected its 
foreign exchange earnings/5 The first six months of 1962 saw little 
change in the economic situation. Fears for the 1962 harvest were uppermost 
in all minds/6 From 11 January to 7 February 1962, the CCP Central 
Committee held an enlarged working conference in Beijing to discuss the 
economy which over 7,000 people attended. According to Liu Shaoqi in his 
report, 1962 was to be "the most crucial year for readjustment of the 
national economy" and everyone was exhorted to make the best use of the 
year/7 Right through 1962, there were meetings practically every month 
dealing with the economy.
Ill
Meanwhile, in South Vietnam, British officials reported that by the 
end of 1961 it was no longer safe to travel even by day anywhere outside 
the immediate vicinity of the large towns. By night the dangers were 
greatly increased. This was especially so in the areas in the Central 
Highlands where there was a marked increase in communist strength. Although 
the communists were still not strong enough to hold any towns in the area 
or to make raids to the coast, they had tightened their hold in a number 
of areas to the north and northeast of Saigon. In these areas, they had 
established base areas for supplies, training and even light arms 
production. The security situation also worsened perceptibly in the Mekong 
Delta/8
On 8 February 1962 the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) 
was set up in Saigon under General Paul D. Harkins. But it was only ten
FO 377/158386, FC 1011/1, 3 January 1962, from Beijing to Foreign 
Office.
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days later on 18 February that the North Vietnamese government issued a 
statement which described the setting up of MACV as a most serious act of 
military aggression in South Vietnam by the United States which created a 
direct threat to the security of the North, to peace in South East Asia and 
the Pacific. The co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference were requested 
to urgently study effective measures to end United States aggression in 
South Vietnam/9 A few days later, on 24 February, the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry issued a statement expressing full support. To the Chinese, the 
armed US imperialist intervention and aggression in South Vietnam 
constituted a direct threat to the security of not only the DRV but China 
and the peace of Asia as well.50 In the later half of February 1962, there 
was a profusion of articles and commentaries in both the Vietnamese and 
Chinese mass media condemning US military aggression in South Vietnam. The 
Russians, however, did not follow suit.
Also in February 1962, the Politburo spelt out the tasks of the armed 
forces in South Vietnam. These were: One, to take the initiative to destroy 
the enemy. The way to do this was to strike in small groups at the main 
force of the enemy, at ranger-teams, and at military installations and 
aircraft. Two, to destroy the "strategic hamlet" programme devised by the 
Diem regime.51 The "strategic hamlet" programme initiated during the 
latter part of 1961 started as scattered efforts. In February 1962, a high 
level governmental inter-agency committee was established in South Vietnam 
to direct and coordinate the programme on a national scale. In mid-March, 
it was formally adopted by Diem and on 22 March, "Operation Sunrise" was 
launched in the heavily infiltrated Bing Duong Province, thirty five miles 
north of Saigon. Central to the operation was the forced relocation of 
peasants into strategic hamlets.
From 16 February to 3 March the National Liberation Front of South 
Vietnam held its first congress. The congress agreed that the 
responsibility of the Front was to unite everyone to resolutely struggle 
against American imperialism and the Diem regime so as to establish a
VNA, 18 February 1962, SWB/FE/875/A3/3-4.
NCNAy 24 February 1962, S W / F E / 8 80/A3/1-2.
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democratic, free, neutral and independent South Vietnam.52 However, the 
first communist broadcast of the Congress and its resolutions was only 
monitored on 13 April 1962.53 The time-lag deserves attention.
IV
In Laos the unsettled situation continued to be a source of 
uncertainty for both Beijing and Hanoi. We should recall that the 27 
December 1961 meeting of the three Laotian princes at Vientiane did not 
take place because of the intransigence of Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan. 
According to the British Foreign Office on 22 January 1962 there was no 
more work to be done at Geneva except to wait for a united Laotian 
delegation.5*
There is indication that the Chinese hoped to have a better control 
of the situation in Laos themselves, rather than leaving everything in the 
hands of the North Vietnamese. On 13 January 1962, an air and road-building 
agreement between China and Laos was signed in Khang Khay between He Wei 
and Tiao Sisoumang Sisaleumsak, the Laotian Interior and National Economy 
Minister. Under the agreement, a highway would be constructed to link 
Mengla (Yunnan Province) and Phong Saly Province. The Chinese government 
would undertake the work of building this highway, as well as bear all the 
cost involved. This highway when completed would be the first to directly 
link Laos and China, and it would replace the comparatively longer supply 
line from China to Laos which at present had to pass through North Vietnam. 
The two countries also signed an air transportation agreement. With this 
agreement, the Chinese could now airdrop supplies into Laos, which had so
Tran Van Tra, Nhung Chang Duong Lich Su Cua B2 Thanh Dong (Tap 
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far been the responsibility of the North Vietnamese.55
A month after the aborted 27 December Vientiane meeting and the visit 
of the Chinese military delegation to North Vietnam, fighting broke out 
towards the end of January 1962 around the village of Nam Tha which was 
held by Phoumi's forces but surrounded by the Pathet Lao. Nam Tha, the 
capital of Houa Khong Province in northwest Laos, was situated six miles 
from the Chinese border and eight miles from Thailand. In the last week of 
January 1962, the troops of Bourn Oum-Phoumi Nosavan carried out small scale 
offensive operations in the vicinity in an effort to cut the Pathet Lao 
supply lines between Northern and Southern Laos.56 On 1 February 1962, for 
the first time the airfield at Nam Tha was subjected to mortar fire by the 
communist forces. Seven infantry battalions and a number of other units 
from the North Vietnamese 316th, 335th and 330th Brigades crossed into Laos 
to fight alongside the Pathet Lao-Neutralists at Nam Tha. This was the 
first time since 1954, that the North Vietnamese initiated a military 
campaign to attack the enemy in its rear area. It was also the first major 
breach of the ceasefire since the battle at Ban Padong in June 1961.
A meeting between King Savang Vathana and the three Laotian Princes 
which had been arranged for 2 February 1962 had to be called off at the 
last minute because Bourn Oum refused to attend in view of the fighting in 
Nam Tha. After some discussions in Moscow between Frank Roberts (the 
British ambassador to the Soviet Union) and Pushkin (leader of the Soviet 
delegation at the Geneva Conference), the British and Soviet ambassadors 
in Laos as well as members of the ISCC flew to Khang Khay on 6 February 
with the objective of persuading Souphanouvong to agree to a ceasefire.
The main objective of the North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao-Neutralists 
military campaign was to force the enemy to return to the negotiating table 
on conditions favourable to the NLHX. Souphanouvong told the British 
ambassador that the objective of the military pressure at Nam Tha was 
political and that there was no intention to capture Nam Tha.5" According 
to the British Ambassador to Laos, J.M. Addis, during his meetings with 
Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong in February 1962 he had the impression
NCNA, 13 January 1961, SHB/FE/B4S/C/1-3.
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that there was a great deal of strain and difference between them. The 
atmosphere was unlike his first visits to the Plaine of Jarres in September 
1961 and also during the visit of the two princes to Vientiane at the end 
of December 1961.58
Both the Russians and Souvanna Phouma opposed the Nam Tha offensive. 
Souvanna Phouma's troops were not involved in Nam Tha.59 Marek Thee 
revealed that the Soviet Union did not interfere in the Nam Tha campaign. 
It neither supported nor condemned the military operation. The British 
ambassador, however, reported that Abramov, the Soviet ambassador to Laos, 
made great efforts to persuade Souphanouvong to turn off the military 
pressure at Nam Tha - without success.60 However a statement by a junior 
member of the Soviet Embassy in Vientiane revealed that the Chinese and 
North Vietnamese were encouraging Souphanouvong to continue the military 
pressure at Nam Tha.61 The Chinese openly supported this joint North 
Vietnamese-Pathet Lao offensive. An article in the Renmin Ribao of 9 
February 1962 explained that to create a favourable political atmosphere 
for the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question, the Royal Laotian 
Government and the Pathet Lao fighting units had since 3 May 1961 observed 
the ceasefire order. But, events in the last nine months showed that the 
United States had made use of the ceasefire to strengthen the Phoumi-Boun 
Oum forces. It was therefore inevitable and justified that the RLG and the 
Pathet Lao retaliate. The article further insisted that it was absolutely 
impermissible that a ceasefire at Nam Tha be a precondition for the 
resumption of talks amongst the three princes.62
The communists were convinced that Phoumi Nosavan and Bourn Oum were 
doing everything they could to prevent an agreement on Laos; and were
FO 371/166430, DF 1015/117, 16 February 1962, from Vientiane to 
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unable to understand why the US could not impose on Phoumi Nosavan to 
cooperate. They therefore decided to put military pressure on Phoumi. The 
Foreign Office also thought that the Russians might no longer be able to 
hold Souphanouvong and the North Vietnamese if a settlement was not reached 
soon.63
V
Although there was no official commitment to a ceasefire at Nam Tha, 
the fighting did stop and there was an uneasy lull in Laos64 which 
coincided with the visit of the Soviet Communist Party delegation led by 
B.N. Ponomarev, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to Hanoi from 21 
February to 2 March 1962. It was announced that the Soviet delegation was 
making a return visit for one which a North Vietnamese party delegation 
(led by Le Due Tho) made to the Soviet Union in duly 1961. However it 
should be noted that this visit came in the wake of a series of visits to 
Hanoi by the Russians, for example, the cosmonaut, Herman Titov, the Health 
and Trade Union delegations and a Soviet Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, 
not long after that of the Chinese military delegation to North Vietnam, 
It also took place soon after the formation of MACV, the breakdown of the 
ceasefire in Laos, as well as during the period of the 1st Congress of the 
NLFSV.
The Russian delegation was reported to have met the Lao Dong Party 
Central Committee on 22 February although only Ho, Truong Chinh, Pham Van 
Dong and Le Due Tho were mentioned.65 We do not know what was discussed 
between the Soviet Party delegation and the North Vietnamese, but in his 
public speeches Ponomarev dwelt much on the programme of the CPSU spelt out 
at the 22nd CPSU Congress. He stressed that the programme would enrich not 
just the Soviet Union; a strong and prosperous Soviet Union would benefit 
Vietnam and the communist bloc as well. He also promised Soviet support to
FO 371/166497, DF 2231/31, 15 February 1962, from Foreign Office 
to Washington (Secret).
FO 371/166432, DF 1015/143, 26 February 1962, Foreign Office 
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North Vietnam. According to British officials based in Hanoi, the North 
Vietnamese treated the Soviet delegation with great respect, and seemed 
anxious to demonstrate their support of Soviet leadership and to show that 
relations were close. Ponomarev was the leading party ideologist with long­
standing contacts with the international communist movement and since 1953, 
had been Head of the Department of the Central Committee concerned with 
foreign communist parties outside the Soviet bloc. It is likely that the 
Sino-Soviet differences, Albania, the problem of North and South Vietnam 
were also discussed. On 23 February, the Soviet delegation met a North 
Vietnamese delegation led by Le Due Tho to "exchange experiences on Party 
work".66
On 27 February when Ponomarev was still in North Vietnam, a Soviet 
Foreign Ministry official in Hanoi suddenly told the British Consul- 
General, J.F. Ford, that it was urgent for the co-chairmen to convene a 
conference on South Vietnam.67 The following day, the North Vietnamese 
government issued a memorandum which put forward even more insistently the 
points made on 18 February 1962.6E On 1 March, the Russian delegation met 
Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Pham Hung, Le Due Tho and Van 
Tien Dung,69 According to British sources, Ho met the delegation no less 
than four times. Truong Chinh also met the Russians several times in closed 
meetings. However, Le Duan was not reported to have been present throughout 
this period.70 The Russian delegation left for home on 2 March.
After Ponomarev's visit, Sino-Vietnamese relations continued to be 
good. On 18 March 1962 the inauguration of a new industrial centre at Viet 
Tri built with Chinese aid, some seventy kilometres north west of Hanoi, 
was described by the North Vietnamese media as a symbol of the close 
friendship between the two countries.71 The Vietnamese communists
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continued to strike a balance between the Chinese and the Russians. In the 
same month, the Lao Dong Party and the communist parties of Indonesia, New 
Zealand, Sweden and Great Britain formed a "neutral" group which called for 
an international communist meeting to resolve the differences within the 
movement.72
In early-March 1962, a four-party conference took place in Hanoi 
which lasted for a week. It was attended by Ung Van Khiem, He Wei, Kaysone 
and Tovmassyan, the Soviet ambassador to North Vietnam. The meeting decided 
that the situation in Laos was not yet ready for a coalition government. 
The most important task of the NLHX was to strengthen its alliance with the 
Neutralists, and at the same time expand its military and political forces. 
The Chinese particularly emphasised the need for the NLHX to develop its 
military strength and to consolidate its position in the countryside. It 
was also decided at the conference to increase unofficial supplies to the 
NLHX.73
Meanwhile, American involvement and commitment in the region inched 
forward with the announcement on 6 March 1962 of the Rusk-Thanat statement 
which guaranteed American defence of Thailand. In the same month, two more 
battalions and a number of detachments from the North Vietnamese 316th 
Brigade moved into Nam Tha as reinforcement. Transportation lines in the 
Northwest Military Region were organised, transport aircraft from the North 
Vietnamese 919th air force regiment were utilised to ensure that the 
necessary supplies reached the battlefield. Infantry Battalions 2 and 4 of 
the 335th Brigade travelled twelve days and nights continuously carrying 
weapons to the battleground.
Abramov, the Soviet ambassador to Laos, returned to Hanoi from Moscow 
in mid-March. Both Tovmassyan and he were received by Ho Chi Minh and Pham 
Van Dong on 21 March. Abramov carried a letter from the CPSU to its 
Chinese, Vietnamese and Laotian counterparts. The thrust of the letter was 
that the Russians accepted the conclusions reached at the March conference 
in Hanoi, and treated them with due understanding since Hanoi and Beijing 
were nearer to Laos and knew the local conditions better. Thus the Russians
Alexander Dallin, et al. (ed.), Diversity in International 
Communism: A Documentary Record, 1961-1963, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1963), pp.650-651.
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conceded that the latter could better judge what practical steps could be 
taken in Laos in the near future. According to Marek Thee, "this was a 
clear statement of disengagement as far as internal Laotian developments 
was concerned. The Asian allies were given a free hand to plan and shape 
events; this part of the message was received with satisfaction. But 
resentment grew in Beijing, Hanoi and Khang Khay against the unwillingness 
of the Soviet Union to join with its allies in an active IndoChinese policy 
to defend their most basic national interests."74
At the end of March, when Liu Chun, the Charge d'Affaires of the 
Chinese mission in Khang Khay, told Abramov that China was in economic 
difficulties and asked about further Soviet aid to Laos, the Russian was 
not forthcoming. As Marek Thee observed, the Soviet Union - though it 
distrusted US motives - was unwilling to adopt a militant line against the 
United States and therefore chose progressive disengagement. Dean Rusk, 
Harriman and the British Foreign Office were convinced that the Russians 
wanted a settlement in Laos.75 In a private conversation on 29 March 1962? 
Dean Rusk remarked that he feared that there was little Washington or 
Moscow could do about Laotian situation. He had the impression that the 
Russians wanted a settlement but the Chinese were messing things up.76
For reasons still unclear, the Chinese government chose this time to 
recall its ambassador to North Vietnam. On 15 March it was reported that 
He Wei would be leaving for home to take up a new post.7" He left Hanoi 
for home on 24 March 1962, having served four-and-a-half years as 
ambassador. Whereas his predecessor, Luo Guibo was seen off by Truong Chinh 
when he left his post in December 1957, He Wei was seen off by Nguyen Viet 
Dung, Head of the Protocol Department.78 In April, He Wei assumed the post 
of Second-Secretary of the Party Central Committee of his native province, 
Honan. It was almost five months later before a new ambassador arrived in
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Hanoi to replace him. When Luo Guibo left on 2 December 1957, he was 
replaced in less than a month.
It is possible that the recall of He Wei was related to developments
taking place in Beijing at this time. From 27 March to 16 April the Second
National People's Congress held its third session in Beijing. This Congress
was exceptional in that even foreign communist correspondents were barred
from attending the meetings. Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi reportedly
told the Hungarian ambassador that a major discussion of Chinese internal
policy was in progress and that when the new line had been worked out,
foreign communist colleagues would be told about them.79 According to
British officials who were informed by their "best Chinese contacts", the
Congress spent two days discussing the need to rehabilate rightest
A-
opportunists, including Peng Dehuai and that this was connected with the 
Chinese desire for rapproachment with the Soviet Union.80 On 7 April 1962, 
the Chinese addressed a letter to the CPSU Central Committee proposing a 
conference to resolve their differences. The Russians, in their reply on 
31 May 1962, agreed in principle to the holding of a new conference. Both 
sides also agreed to stop their verbal attacks over the mass media. The 
situation did improve for a period of time.81 British officials also noted 
an uneasy period of comparative restraint in Sino-Soviet relations until 
late-summer 1962.82
Meanwhile the Chinese position regarding the situation at Nam Tha was
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explained to Marek Thee on 26 March, at a lunch with Liu Chun who said that 
there was a need to strike a tactical blow at the enemy. It would be a 
period of neither war nor peace. The Chinese were of the view that the 
Americans would not engage in large operations in Laos as long as the NLHX 
avoided actions that would aggravate the conflict. The strategy was to hold 
the initiative in local military operations and at the same time, to 
continue the negotiations for a coalition government. One example was 
Chinese refusal of Souvanna Phouma's request for Chinese jet pilots to 
defend Laotian airspace. As Liu Chun explained, China did not want to be 
accused of intervention and also did not want to create a pretext for an 
escalation of the conflict. This was also the North Vietnamese position, 
as explained to Marek Thee on 5 April 1962 by Generals Le Chuong and Tong 
Dy. According to Le Chuong, they did not want to capture Nam Tha by 
launching a large frontal attack in order not to provoke a US retaliation.
Also on 5 April during a farewell call on the Chinese Foreign 
Minister, Chen Yi by the British Charge d'Affaires in Beijing, Michael 
Stewart, Chen Yi said that the Chinese still hoped for the formation of a 
united neutral Laotian government under Souvanna Phouma. They accepted that 
a place would have to be found for Phoumi Nosavan in a united government. 
China was anxious that the Laotian situation should not become more 
critical. He also made it clear that China would not expand into South East 
Asia. Expansion southward, even if it were not ruled out on other grounds, 
would not help to solve China's food and economic problems. Chen Yi, 
however discreetly and inoffensively added a warning about South Vietnam. 
The Chinese would not intervene unless they judged that there was a serious 
threat to the North Vietnamese regime. The British ambassador noted that 
the tone of Chen Yi's remarks was in strong contrast with the bellicose 
Chinese published statements on Laos.83
It was around this time that the idea of an international conference 
to settle the question of South Vietnam was taken up by Sihanouk in an 
editorial in the Cambodian newspaper Nationaliste on 25 March 1962 and in 
a speech on 5 April at the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Phnom Penh.84 
In private conversation with a "delicate source", Sihanouk indicated that
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he had been encouraged by the Chinese to take up the initiative and that 
the Russians had indicated-that they would support him.85
In a discussion with Marek Thee at the beginning of April, Ambassador 
Abramov also expressed the view that it might be useful to force the United 
States to accept negotiations on South Vietnam within the framework of the 
1954 Geneva Conference, According to Liu Chun, the Charge d'Affaires of the 
Chinese mission in Khang Khay, Beijing more or less shared the same 
thinking. Chen Yi in a conversation with Andrei Gromyko suggested that the 
Soviet Foreign Minister could remain as a permanent co-chairman. The 
Chinese hope was to neutralise the whole of South East Asia.86 On 13 April 
and 14 April respectively, the Hanoi and Beijing finally reported the 1st 
Congress of the NLFSV (16 February-3 March 1962) and its resolutions.87
On the non-communist side, on 15 April 1962, the first United States 
Marine air units arrived in South Vietnam. Based near Soc Trang, 100 miles 
southwest of Saigon, the 450 Marines and 15 Sikorsky UH-34D combat 
helicopters were to reinforce the two US Army helicopter companies which 
were already in South Vietnam. In April, the Nam Bo Regional Committee held 
a conference which assessed that an all-out military offensive in South 
Vietnam which had been anticipated in October 1961 was not yet possible and 
that the combination of political and military struggle would have to 
continue for some time longer.88
VI
During March and the first half of April 1962, against the advice of 
the United States, Phoumi Nosavan reinforced his garrison at Nam Tha to a
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strength of 5000 and used Nam Tha as a base for attacks into Pathet Lao- 
held territories. As a consequence, fighting broke out southeast of Nam Tha 
on 22 April, each side blaming the other for provoking the fighting. At the 
end of April 1962, an additional North Vietnamese battalion, Battalion 3 
of the 330th Brigade was sent to join the Pathet Lao-Vietnamese combined 
forces. On 3 May, the village of Muong Sing, 25 miles northwest of Nam Tha 
and 5 miles from the Chinese border, was captured by the Pathet Lao- 
Vietnamese forces. On 6 May 1962, they captured Nam Tha.09 There was no 
evidence of Chinese participation.90 However it was believed that Beijing 
permitted the transit of the Pathet Lao-Viet forces through a salient of 
Chinese territory in the attack on Muong Sing while the logistic supplies 
were furnished by the Soviet-North Vietnam airlifts.91 The British were 
of the view that the Nam Tha episode was not provoked by the communists but 
engineered by Phoumi Nosavan; and that his retreat to the Mekong, one of 
the swiftest in military history, was calculated to precipitate a panic in 
Thailand and force the Americans to back him.92 However, the Pathet Lao- 
North Vietnamese forces did not harass or interfere with the withdrawal of 
Nosavan's troops during the whole of their 120 kilometre retreat to the 
Mekong at Ban Houei Sai.93 According to a US intelligence estimate, the 
fall of Nam Tha - which was also an area of direct security interest to the 
Chinese - eliminated RLG control of the whole of North Laos and opened the 
provinces of western Luang Prabang and Nam Tha (which borders on Burma and 
Thailand) to communist domination.94
See S m / F E /939/C/l and S m /F E /940/C/1-2.
F0 37.7/166439, DF 1015/282, 10 May 1962, from Commonwealth
Relations Office to Foreign Office.
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 58-3-62) dated 9 May 
1962 in Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XXIV, 
1961-1963: Laos Crisis, (Washington: US Government Printing
House, 1994), pp.726-729.
F0 371/169802, DF 1011/1, 15 January 1963, from Vientiane to
Foreign Office.
FO 371/166441, DF 1015/335, 16 May 1962, from Vientiane to
Foreign Office.
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 58-3-62) dated 9 May 
1962 in Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XXIV,
1961-1963: Laos Crisis, (Washington: US Government Printing
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As a consequence of the fall of Nam Tha, the United States on 11 May 
announced that it was dispatching troops to Thailand and sending elements 
of the US Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Siam. On 17 May, 2800 United States 
marines arrived in Bangkok to be based at Udorn, thirty-five miles from 
Vientiane. A Military Assistance Command for Thailand (MACTHAI) was also 
established.
During this time, the Chinese were apparently concerned about the 
collaboration of the Jiang Jieshi brigands with the Phoumi-Boum Oum group. 
A Renmin Ribao commentary of 16 May 1962 entitled, "The Chinese People 
Cannot Remain Indifferent" highlighted the participation of the remnant 
Guomindang troops in the civil war in Laos. It recalled a 31 January 1961 
UPI report of the movement of the remnant Guomindang troops from northeast 
Burma across the border into northern Laos. The commentary claimed that 
Taiwan had dispatched military personnel and equipment to the Nosavan-Boun 
Oum group, and drew attention to the presence of a task force from the 
United States Seventh Fleet in the region.95 On 24 May 1962, the Chinese 
reported that remnants of Jiang Jieshi's troops on the southwest border of 
Yunnan had been incorporated into the army of Phoumi Nosavan and had taken 
part in the Laotian civil war.96 Unfortunately, we do not have much 
information regarding the activities of these Nationalist Chinese military 
units, except that a large number of them were driven into Thailand and 
Laos by the Burmese Army in January 1961 and again in March 1962 after Ne 
Win seized power in Burma in a bloodless coup. During a conversation 
between the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Douglas Home 
and Chen Yi in Geneva on 12 June 1961, Chen Yi had spoken of the 5000 
Guomindang troops who had been in Laos for eleven years and wanted their 
withdrawal expedited.97
As for the Soviet Union, soon after the fall of Nam Tha, Robert 
Kennedy sent a private message to Khrushchev telling him that the United 
States President had relied on Soviet assurances that there would not be
House, 1994), pp.726-729.
NCNA, 16 May 1961, SHB/FE/946/C1/1-2.
NCRA, 24 May 1962, SNB/FE/954/C/2.
F0 377/159941, DF 2231/276, 14 June 1961, Record of conversation 
between Secretary of State and Marshal Chen Yi on 12 June 1961 at 
the Villa Mont Fleury, Geneva.
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any more fighting and now felt that he had been double-crossed. A few days 
later, Khrushchev replied with the assurance that there would be no more 
armed action in Laos and that the Soviet Union too was anxious to see the 
Laotian question resolved peacefully.98 On 25 May, Khrushchev announced 
that the Soviet Union still supported the establishment of a neutral Laos 
despite the presence of American troops in Thailand. Thus after the fall 
of Nam Tha, it was clear to all parties concerned that a return to 
diplomacy was urgently required to diffuse what was perceived to be a 
potentially volatile situation. On the same day, 25 May, Souvanna Phouma 
who was in Paris when Nam Tha fell announced that he was prepared to return 
to Laos for new negotiations. Four days later on 29 May, it was reported 
that Souvanna Phouma had declared that both Souphanouvong and himself were 
prepared to resume talks with Bourn Oum and had set 15 June 1962 as the 
deadline for the completion of negotiations.99 Soon after that, on 7 June, 
negotiations amongst the three Princes reopened. The three Laotian Princes 
finally reached agreement on the coalition government at a meeting in the 
Plaine des Jarres on 12 June and on 23 June, the Government of National 
Union was formed.
Meanwhile in Cambodia, the British government sent Malcom MacDonald 
to dissuade Sihanouk from pushing for an international conference on 
Vietnam. MacDonald was in Cambodia from 11-15 May 1962. A conversation 
which he had with Sihanouk on 12 May gives us some insight into Sihanouk's 
perception of the regional situation during this period. Regarding Laos, 
Sihanouk did not think that anyone should foolishly believe that the whole 
of Laos could be neutral since about a third of the country was under 
Pathet Lao-Vietnamese communist control. However, he felt that a neutral 
government under Souvanna Phouma was not only the best but also the only 
means to ensure that Laos did not fall completely into communist hands. But 
that would require active support from the countries of the free world. 
Sihanouk did not appear to be very worried about the communist threat to 
his country. He was most concerned about the South Vietnamese and the 
Thais, who were equipped with American weapons, committing territorial 
aggression against Cambodia. In that situation, Sihanouk said that he would
Michael R. Beschloss, Kennedy v . Khrushchev: The Crisis Years 
1960-63, (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1991), p.397.
99 Radio of the Laotian Kingdom, 29 May 1962, SDB/FE/958/C/l
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have no choice but to resort to Chinese assistance, which would then mean 
the end of Cambodia's policy of non-alignment.100
VII
Despite the tense atmosphere in the region in May 1962, on 18 May 
1962 on the eve of Ho Chi Minh's seventy-second birthday, he again visited 
Nanning. In accordance with Ho's wishes, there was no major celebration of 
his birthday, except that on the night of 19 May, a small scale cultural 
performance organised by the comrades in Guangxi was held on the first 
floor of the Xiyuan Rest House where he stayed,101 This was the third year 
in succession that Ho spent his birthday in China. We know very little 
about his three consecutive visits to China other than what the Chinese 
revealed. But it is worth noting that all three visits took place at very 
significant junctures: In 1960, it coincided with the announcement that the 
Paris summit had been called off; and in 1961, it coincided with the 
opening of the Geneva Conference on Laos.
Ho Chi Minh also did not appear in public in Hanoi in June. He did 
not even attend the Children's Day celebration on 2 June 1962, an event 
which he seldom missed. British officials in Hanoi initially assumed that 
he was resting in one of the mountain resorts in North Vietnam. However, 
it was reported in the Indian press on 24 June that he had been seen in a 
Moscow theatre on 22 June. British officials believed that he went to the 
Soviet Union to discuss the Vietnamese situation with the Russians.10' A
FO 371/166667, DU 1022/5, 6 June 1962, Notes on conversation with 
Prince Sihanouk about Cambodia's attitude to present day South 
East Asian problems.
AO/I, 25 August 1979, 5/Vfi/F£/6208/A3/3; Huang Zheng, Ho Zhiming 
Yu Zhongguo, (Beijing: Jiefang Jun Chubanshe, 1987), p.163.
FO 371/166709, DV 1016/18, 2 July 1962, from Hanoi to Foreign 
Office; FO 377/166710, DV 1016/30, 2 August 1962, from Hanoi to 
Foreign Office; the Indonesian Consul-General in Hanoi also 
believed that Ho had visited the Soviet Union in June, see F0 
371/166710, DV 1016/27, 10 July 1962: Report by the Indonesian 
Consul-General in Hanoi On political situation in North Vietnam, 
from Hanoi to Foreign Office; F0 371/170088, DV 1011/1, 2 January 
1962, from Saigon to Foreign Office: Annual Report of North
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Chinese source claimed that in response to the North Vietnamese request for 
military assistance, Khrushchev offered 3000 guns which the Russians 
captured from the Germans during the Second World War. Ho Chi Minh said 
angrily that those guns should be sent to the museum.103
After the formation of a Laotian Government of National Union on 23 
June, the Geneva Conference on Laos reconvened 2 July after a five month 
interval. The Protocol and the Declaration of the Neutrality of Laos was 
finally signed on 23 July, very much later than the "six weeks" the
Russians had expected when the Conference opened in May 1961. In his 
closing speech, Chen Yi described the peaceful settlement of the Laotian 
question as having broken through a link in the chain of tensions in South 
East Asia and expressed hope that it would be a new starting point in the 
relaxation of tensions in the area, a sentiment shared by all the 
representatives. Chen Yi and Ung Van Khiem, however, did not fail to
express their reservations regarding the presence of American troops in 
Thailand and South Vietnam, which still needed to be resolved.104 
Khrushchev was very pleased with the settlement in Laos but was also 
concerned about the continued presence of American troops in Thailand. He 
conveyed to Kennedy that he understood why the troops were sent but hoped 
that it was now possible to withdraw them. Kennedy replied that he would 
withdraw the troops in ten days, to which Khrushchev responded with the 
message that the withdrawal would mean a great deal to him.105 In the
middle of 1962, Laos finally moved out of centre-stage and South Vietnam
returned to the forefront after being overshadowed by the former for almost 
two years.
Vietnam (1962) also confirmed that Ho was in Moscow on 22 June 
1962, although dates of arrival and departure were never 
published.
Wang Xiangen, Yuanyue Kangmei Shilu, (Jinan Chubanshe, 1992),
p.18.
George Modelski, Internati onal Conference on the Sett]ement of 
the Laotian Question 1961-62, (Department of International 
Relations, ANU, Working Paper Number 2, 1962), pp.135-136, 140- 
143.
Michael R. Beschloss, op.cit., p.398.
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VIII
Soon after the Geneva Conference, in late-July 1962 Bernard Fall had 
a conversation with Pham Van Dong and Ho Chi Minh in the Presidential 
Palace in Hanoi.106 Ho appeared briefly in the midst of the interview, 
which surprised Fall since he thought that Ho was vacationing in the Soviet 
Union at the time. According to Pham Van Dong, the DRV would not take any 
military action in the South which could give the Americans any pretext for 
military intervention in North Vietnam. He did not feel that it was 
necessary at that point of time to intervene militarily. He appeared to be 
satisfied with the way the war was going on there and believed that given 
time and patience, American weariness would compel them to withdraw. 
Meanwhile, the DRV would keep up the publicity about American intervention 
and Vietnamese resistance. Ho's assessment was that Ngo Dinh Diem was in 
a very difficult position at that time and had no popular support. Both 
Pham and Ho agreed that it would be a protracted struggle.
The NLFSV on 1 July 1962 had sent the co-chairmen of the Geneva 
Conference a memorandum backing Sihanouk's proposal for an international 
conference on South Vietnam which was endorsed by the North Vietnamese 
press. On 23 July 1962, the emigre Vietnamese politician Tran Van Huu 
issued a statement welcoming‘the newly concluded Geneva Agreements on Laos 
and urged a similar conference to settle the Vietnamese problem. In his 
statement, Huu made no reference to Sihanouk. Apparently Huu had been 
approached by North Vietnamese officials and was being encouraged to play 
the role of a neutralist Souvanna Phouma in a South Vietnamese coalition 
government.107 According to Arthur Lall, many delegates at the Geneva 
Conference expected that a conference on Vietnam would follow a few weeks
For the transcript of the interview, see Bernard B. Fall (ed.), 
Ho Chi Minh: On Revolution (Selected Writings, 1920-66), (London: 
Pall Mall Press, 1967), pp.352-358.
Journal de Geneve, 24 July 1962, cited by Gareth Porter in Jayne 
Werner and David Hunt (ed.), The American War in Vietnam, 
(Southeast Asia Program)(New York: Cornell University, 1993), p. 
11, footnote 13.
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after the successful conclusion of the conference on Laos.108
Pham Van Dong told Fall that Hanoi was prepared to negotiate. 
However, he felt that the situation was not yet ripe for talks because the 
the Diem-regime showed no intention to compromise. On 1 August, Chen Yi 
also said that China supported Sihanouk's proposal for an international 
conference on South Vietnam but since very few countries had responded, the 
time was perhaps not ripe. When the struggle reached a certain stage, a 
conference would become inevitable.109 We should recall that it was 
actually the Chinese who had encouraged Sihanouk to propose such a 
conference. By 20 August, Sihanouk appeared to have completely lost 
interest in a conference on Vietnam. Instead, he now began an appeal for 
an international conference on Cambodia.
From the conversation with Pham Van Dong, Fall gathered the 
impression that in the immediate future, the DRV would not risk its 
internal development by military provocation of a kind that would lead to 
retaliation in the form of undisguised bombing of the northern centres by 
American planes. The DRV's short-term objective was not reunification of 
the country. A neutral government which excluded Diem would be acceptable 
to the North, as long as American military presence was withdrawn as 
well.110
From the above account, it seems that soon after 23 July 1962, Hanoi 
and Beijing changed their minds regarding an early international conference 
on South Vietnam. Unfortunately we do not know the reasons for this. One 
possibility is that the communists felt that they were not in a good 
negotiating position. At the July 1962 Honolulu Conference, US Defence 
Secretary McNamara was informed by COMUSMACV that there had been 
"tremendous progress" in South Vietnam in the last six months and that the
Arthur La 11, How Communist China Negotiates, (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1968), p.180.
NCNAy 1 August 1962, S M / F E / 1012/C1/1.
FO 371/166710, DV 1016/21, 14 July 1962, from Hanoi to Foreign 
Office; FO 371/1666711, DV 1016/45, 30 July 1962, from Canadian 
Delegation, ICSC (Saigon) to Foreign Office; FO 371/ 166711, DV 
1016/45, 6 August 1962, from Canadian Delegation, ICSC (Phnom 
Penh) to Foreign Office.
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South Vietnamese communists could be eliminated in about a year.111
It is likely that the new communist position was taken after 
discussions in Beijing. Chinese sources have since disclosed that in the 
summer of 1962, Ho Chi Minh and Nguyen Chi Thanh made a trip to Beijing to 
request Chinese military assistance. We should recall that in March 1961, 
Nguyen Chi Thanh, the only other four-star general besides Vo Nguyen Giap, 
was transferred from the army to head the Ministry of Agricultural 
Cooperatives. The only other report we have of him in 1961 was on 28 
September when he was in Beijing after attending the 4th National Congress 
of the North Korean Worker's Party in Pyongyang. That it was Thanh who 
accompanied Ho Chi Minh in summer 1962 might indicate that he had been 
given a new assignment, most likely to oversee the military struggle in the 
South.112 We should also recall that in August 1959 at a meeting with Ho 
in Beijing, Zhou had promised to provide Hanoi with material support for 
the struggle in the South by the end of that year; but for reasons still 
unknown, the Chinese promise had not been fulfilled. In early 1962, the 
North Vietnamese and Chinese leaders met again to discuss Chinese military 
assistance for the struggle in the South.113 In summer 1962 the Chinese 
finally supplied 90,000 guns of all types to be used for the guerilla war 
in the South. According to the Chinese, this was the beginning of Chinese 
help in promoting the development, strengthening and expansion of the 
communist military arsenal in the South. From this point onwards, Chinese 
assistance increased as the war gradually expanded. When Zhou Enlai 
recalled Chinese assistance to the Vietnamese struggle in South Vietnam, 
he cited 1962 as the starting point.114 (In December 1964, the Americans
The Pentagon Papers: The Defence Department History of US
Decision making on Vietnam, (The Senator Gravel Edition), Volume 
II, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p.164.
FO 371/1666697, DV 1011/2, 15 February 1962, from Saigon to 
Foreign Office.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo dui Hai Guanxi Gaishu, (Shanghai Waiyu 
Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1989), p.89.
Huang Guoan, et al., Zhongyue Guanxi Jianbian, (Guangxi Renmin 
Chubanshe, 1986), p.209; Guo Ming (ed.), Zhongyue Guanxi Yianbian 
Shishi Nian, (Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1992), p.69; Wang 
Xiangen, Yuanyue Kangmei Shilu, (Jinan Chubanshe, 1992), p. 18; 
Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao, (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue
Chubanshe, 1990), p.159; "On Hanoi's White Book" in Beijing
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captured Chinese communist-manufactured weapons and ammunition in Chuong 
Thien province and subsequently in the four Corpyareas of South Vietnam as 
well. These weapons included the 7.62 semi-automatic carbine, 7.62 light 
machine gun and 7.62 assault rifle, all manufactured in China in 1962.)115
On 27 July 1962, four days after the Geneva Conference ended and 
almost four months after He Wei was recalled to Beijing, the Chinese 
finally appointed Zhu Qiwen as the new ambassador to North Vietnam.116 Zhu 
arrived in Hanoi on 18 August 1962 and assumed his appointment on 21 August 
1962. In August too, Ho Chi Minh found time to take another vacation in 
China. This time he spent it at the Stone Forest in Yunnan Province, where 
he stayed at the Shi 1 in Hotel. He was the guest of Yunnan soprano, Du 
Lihua, whom he got to know in November 1961 when he visited Beijing.117
Meanwhile a letter from Le Duan to the comrades in South Vietnam in 
July 1962 made clear the Vietnamese communist strategy at this point. 
According to Le Duan, although the revolutionary struggle in the South had 
made much significant progress in the last eight years, there were new 
difficulties. The American imperialists were determined to prevent South 
Vietnam from being absorbed into the orbit of socialism and it was their 
intention to make South Vietnam a springboard to attack the North. South 
Vietnam was to serve as a wall to prevent the tide of socialism from
Review, No.47, 23 November 1979; Hoang Van Hoan, "Distortion of 
Facts about Militant Friendship between Vietnam and China is 
Impermissible" in Beijing Review, No.49, 7 December 1979.
United States Government "White Paper": Aggression from the 
North: The Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Conquer South 
Vietnam (US Department of State Publication 7839; Far Eastern 
Series 130)(Washington D.C., February 1965) reproduced in 
Gettleman, Marvin E. (ed.), Vietnam: History, Documents and 
Opinions on a Major World Crisis, (Middlesex: Penguin Books,
1966), pp.300-334.
There was no report of Chinese weapons captured in the 1961 
"White Paper", A Threat to Peace: North Vietnam's Efforts to 
Conquer South Vietnam (US Department of State 7308; Far Eastern 
Series 110)(Washington D.C., December 1961).
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was ambassador to Bulgaria. Zhu's expertise and previous 
experience was mainly in the legal field. See Who's Who in 
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engulfing South East Asia. Therein lay the complexity of the revolution in 
the South. Unlike Laos, South Vietnam did not share a common border with 
China. It was thus highly probable that the Americans would be less 
hesitant about a direct invasion of South Vietnam because unlike Laos, they 
would not run the risk of colliding with China. The Vietnamese communists 
therefore needed to fight cautiously. The two-fold task was to protect the 
peace in order that the North could carry out its socialist construction 
and at the same time to resolutely resist the Americans and their lackeys 
so as to liberate the South, North and South Vietnam were inter-related. 
If they did not struggle against the Americans in the South, the stability 
and peace of the North could not be assured. And if they did not protect 
the peace and allow the North to complete its socialist development, the 
revolution would encounter even more difficulties. Referring to those who 
emphasised military struggle and underestimated the value of political 
struggle, Le Duan urged them to evaluate fully their own capability. He 
warned against underestimating the power of the enemy, who in all aspects, 
for example numerical strength, weaponry, transportation, modern 
communication, were superior to them. Referring to the struggle in Laos 
which had "just temporarily ended", he said that the socialist victory 
there did not come about by coincidence but by following the correct line 
and strategy which was to persistently struggle against the imperialists 
and at the same time to know when to exercise restraint in order to avoid 
a war between the two opposing camps. Nam Tha was a case in point. The 
Laotian struggle was therefore an important lesson for the revolution in 
South Vietnam. Le Duan once again reiterated the importance of combining 
both the political and military struggle, especially in countering the 
"strategic hamlet" programme. It would be a long struggle but there was 
always the possibility that the enemy could be compelled to negotiate or 
give in at some point when the opportunity cost was higher than they were 
prepared to pay, as had been the case in Laos and Algeria.118
Le Duan, Thu Vao Nam, (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Su That, 1985), pp.BO- 
67.
Conclusion
The preceding chapters have attempted to trace the development of 
Vietnamese communists relations with China between January 1956 and summer 
1962 taking into account the interplay of domestic politics, the role of 
individual leaders and political factions particularly in Hanoi and 
Beijing, and the changing international conditions, particularly within the 
communist bloc, which impinged on both countries. Admittedly, there are 
still many gaps that need to be filled and many questions about the 
relationship during this period that still need to be answered. But pending 
the release of more archival material, it is my hope that this study has 
at least contributed a little to furthering our understanding of Sino- 
Vietnamese relations during the beginning stage of the Second IndoChina 
War. It is also hoped that this thesis has clarified some misconceptions 
regarding both Sino-Vietnamese relations and the War.
Even before the end of the 1954 Geneva Conference, neither the Hanoi 
nor the Beijing leadership expected a peaceful reunification of North and 
South Vietnam; and the United States was identified as the new enemy 
replacing the French. Thus while on the surface the Vietnamese communists 
appeared conciliatory and forwarded many proposals for a peaceful 
reunification, secretly they were preparing for an eventual armed struggle. 
This strategy of lying low, mustering strength, keeping in touch with the 
people while waiting for an opportunity to strike had the support of the 
Chinese. The Russians, on the other hand, believed that through peaceful 
coexistence and friendly economic competition, South Vietnam would 
eventually seek to be unified with the North. Up till 1958, the Hanoi 
leadership could to an extent reconcile both the Chinese and the Russian 
approaches with their own since the first stage of the North Vietnamese 
strategy was to rebuild their economy. But by mid-1958, Diem's renewed 
efforts to exterminate the Southern communists began to adversely affect 
the revolutionary struggle in the South. By late-1958, Hanoi realised that 
they could no longer continue to advocate restraint without losing the 
struggle in the South to Diem.
Hanoi's decision in January 1959 to renew the struggle in the South 
(which was only made public four months later in May) coincided with the 
Huong Lap and Phu Loi incidents as well as the downturn in Sino-Soviet
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relations. As far as we can tell, Moscow was not in favour of the 
resumption of armed struggle in South Vietnam but did not object. 
Khrushchev was trying to balance his desire to improve relations with the 
United States against his commitment to the communist fraternity. Beijing 
reluctantly gave its support. In August 1959 (soon after the Lushan meeting 
and the 8th Plenary session of the CCP Central Committee) at a meeting with 
Ho Chi Minh in Beijing, Zhou Enlai promised to provide Hanoi with material 
support for the struggle in the South by the end of that year but for 
reasons still unknown, the Chinese did not fulfil their promise. 
Consequently, in the first three months of 1960, Sino-Vietnamese relations 
were not as warm as before. The announcement in April that Zhou Enlai would 
visit Hanoi in May 1960 signalled an improvement in the relationship 
between the two countries. During Zhou's visit on that occasion, an 
understanding regarding the struggle in the South was apparently reached 
between the North Vietnamese and Chinese leaders. This series of diplomatic 
activities should be seen against the build-up to the Paris summit between 
Khrushchev and Eisenhower, which was aborted at the last moment on 17 May 
1960.
From the very beginning it was an IndoChina rather than just a
Vietnam War. If Cambodia seemed to be rather peripheral in the early years
of the war, it was because of Sihanouk's political acumen, and even more
so the decisions of both Hanoi and Beijing, although not necessarily for
the same reasons. As for Laos, it was definitely of strategic importance
to both North Vietnam and China, but for reasons which again were different
for Hanoi and for Beijing. Unlike the North Vietnamese, the Chinese were
M.much more ready to accomodate a neutral Laos, if the Americans had allowed 
it; whereas Hanoi woufc? only countenance a neutral Laos in which the 
government was prepared to turn a blind eye to its own use of Laotian 
territory to support its Southern cadres. Much of the Ho Chi Minh Trail was 
in Laotian territory. If Laos had been neutral and relatively stable like 
Cambodia, fundamental Sino-Vietnamese differences over Laos might have 
surfaced. In the event, because an American presence in Laos was always a 
possibility, they both campaigned for a neutralisation of Laos. An American 
presence in Laos was the last thing that both the North Vietnamese and the 
Chinese wanted.
In 1960 and particularly from the Kong Lae coup on 9 August 1960 till 
the summer of 1962, developments in Laos overshadowed the armed struggle
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in South Vietnam (which was underway by the end of 1959). Also, it was 
initially in Laos and not in South Vietnam that the Russians, who had been 
staunchly opposed to a military solution to the Vietnam problem, found
themselves deeply involved after the Kong Lae coup.
Up till the Taylor-mission to South Vietnam in October 1961, China
was also more concerned about the situation in Laos than in South Vietnam.
But after the Taylor-mission, Beijing gradually shifted its attention to 
South Vietnam. Not long after the Taylor-mission, a very high-powered 
Chinese military delegation led by Yeh Jianying visited North Vietnam in 
December 1961 ostensibly to celebrate the 17th anniversary of the VPA. The 
establishment of MACV on 8 February 1962 added to North Vietnamese and 
Chinese concerns while the problem of Laos remained unsettled. Chinese 
policy regarding South Vietnam only crystallised in July at about the time 
when the Laotian problem was resolved. In the summer of 1962, Ho Chi Minh 
and Nguyen Chi Thanh made a secret trip to Beijing and that was when the 
Chinese agreed to provide concrete military aid for the struggle in the 
South.
It is untrue that Hanoi was simply following the instructions of the 
Chinese or the Russians, or both. In fact, the Vietnamese communists were 
remarkably in control of their own decision-making, despite being very 
dependent on China and the Soviet Union for both economic and military 
resources. One should not assume that Beijing was always kept well-informed 
or knew every move of the North Vietnamese in advance. Certainly the 
Vietnamese communists consulted the Chinese but the decision of the 15th 
Plenary session of the Lao Dong Party to resume armed struggle was made
without the prior consent of the Chinese (or the Russians). Also, on many
occasions, Hanoi, Beijing and Moscow were simply reacting to developments 
in Laos which to a large extent were beyond the control of any of the three 
governments.
To say this is not in any way to discount the role of China in the 
IndoChina conflict and war. As we have seen in this study, the Vietnamese 
communists always made it a point to seek the views of Beijing (and Moscow) 
and as far as possible their concurrence as well. But just as the
Vietnamese communists needed China's support in their war of national 
liberation, China too needed the Vietnamese. This is an aspect of the 
relationship that is sometimes overlooked. China's fear of being encircled 
by the United States and its allies and - as the Sino-Soviet dispute
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developed, the fear of the Soviet Union - raised the strategic importance 
of Vietnam in Chinese eyes. Thus by virtue of the geographical proximity 
of Vietnam and China, the Lao Dong Party, a relatively small party within 
the communist camp, became a crucial player, especially to the Chinese, in 
the growing Sino-Soviet dispute. The relationship was thus mutually 
beneficial, but they had differences too. However Hanoi and Beijing 
believed that by not discussing controversial and divisive issues openly, 
it would better serve their respective national interests. As to whether 
the Sino-Soviet rift provided a "window of opportunity" which the 
Vietnamese communists exploited for their own ends, my study shows that at 
least up till 1962, the Hanoi leadership preferred a united communist camp 
and viewed the growing rift between Beijing and Moscow detrimental to their 
cause. It should be mentioned that despite the differences between Beijing 
and Moscow from 1956 to 1962, Beijing did not envisage a split with the 
Soviet Union.
Many scholars, and this is true up to the early 90s, are very much 
influenced by the views of P.J.Honey, for many years the leading Vietnam 
specialist in the West, regarding North Vietnam's relations with both China 
and the Soviet Union. For example, 1954-1957 was described as the "Chinese 
phase" in Vietnam's relations with China and Russia and the years 1957-1961 
were described as the "Soviet phase". It was said that in 1957, there was 
a power struggle between the "pro-Chinese" and "pro-Soviet" factions in the 
Lao Dong Party; that there was a swing away from Beijing towards closer 
relations with Moscow; and that, during the Third Lao Dong Party Congress 
in September 1960, North Vietnam took the side of the Soviet Union against 
China. My study has shown that that was not how it was. As we have noted, 
the Chinese have since admitted that although both they and the North 
Vietnamese did not fully agree on the gravity of the agrarian reform 
debacle and about Soviet revisionism, Sino-Vietnamese relations in the 50s 
and 60s were good. My own study therefore supports Carlyle Thayer's view 
that Vietnamese communists' relations with China and the Soviet Union were 
not necessarily a "zero-sum game"1.
Regarding the issue of factionalism within the North Vietnamese 
leadership and internal party disputes - between Truong Chinh and Pham Van
See Carlyle Thayer, The Origins of the National Front for the 
Liberation of South Vietnam, (PhD dissertation, ANU, 1977),
pp.608-628.
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Dong; Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap; Truong Chinh and Le Duan; Le Duan 
and Ho Chi Minh; Le Duan and Vo Nguyen Giap; and Vo Nguyen Giap and Nguyen 
Chi Thanh - it still cannot be fully established. There were disagreements 
within the leadership on issues such as agricultural and industrialisation 
strategies, military modernisation and the pace of the struggle for 
reunification. Different personalities might hold views which coincided 
with those of either Beijing or Moscow but no one within the leadership 
(apart from Hoang Van Hoan, who we now know for certain was a Sinophile), 
can or need be categorised either as pro-Chinese or pro-Russian. Whatever 
the differences amongst the leaders, their disagreements did not originate 
from Beijing or Moscow. This is true of Ho Chi Minh, who of all the 
Vietnamese leaders had the closest ties with the Chinese. Even Truong 
Chinh, despite the fact that he adopted an alias which meant "Long March", 
was not pro-Chinese in the same way as Hoang Van Hoan, Indeed, Truong Chinh 
was one of those who at one stage shared Khrushchev's view of peaceful 
competition between the two Blocs. As for Le Duan, it is wrong to see him 
simply as the outspoken champion of armed struggle. On the contrary, Le 
Duan was too much aware of the military power of the United States to 
advocate callous and unrestrained armed struggle. Indeed while the 15th 
Plenary session officially sanctioned the resumption of armed struggle, it 
was meant to support and not replace the political struggle. Le Duan who 
is often considered to be "pro-Soviet" was in the late 50s and early 60s 
more attuned to the Chinese viewpoint which suppported the use of armed 
struggle to achieve national liberation in colonial countries. During the 
years 1956-1962, the Vietnamese communist leadership was on the whole 
cohesive in spite of their differences.
The summer of 1962 is an appropriate point to end this study. In the 
case of Laos, the conclusion of the one-year long Geneva Conference in July 
1962 marked the end of one phase of its post-colonial political experience. 
The next stage was how to make the 1962 Geneva settlement work. Regarding 
the issue of the reunification of Vietnam, for a brief period after the 
successful conclusion of the Geneva Conference on Laos, there were 
indications that both Hanoi and Beijing (and Moscow as well) were in 
agreement that through a "low-intensity" type of warfare the communists 
could perhaps pressure the United States and South Vietnam to agree to 
convene another international conference for Vietnam similar to the one for 
Laos. There were also signs of an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations
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during this time. In Cambodia, Sihanouk's control of the country remained 
firm, but within the Khmer communist underground there was a significant 
development which would affect Sino-Vietnamese relations in years to come. 
On 20 July 1962 or thereabouts, Tou Samouth was assassinated. Pol Pot 
became the Acting Secretary-General of the party and was subsequently 
confirmed as Secretary-General during the 3rd Congress of the Khmer 
People's Revolutionary Party on 20-21 February 1963.2
The summer of 1962 was therefore a significant point in the 
communist struggle. With hindsight, we know that the Laos settlement broke 
down, the Sino-Soviet rift became public and an international conference 
to resolve the Vietnam problem never materialised. But all these must 
remain the subject of further study.
The circumstances surrounding Tou Samouth's death remain 
controversial. See Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power, 
(London: Verso, 1985), pp.197-198, 241; David P. Chandler,
Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1992), pp.63-64, 206; Serge Thion, Hatching 
Cambodia: Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodian Tangle, (Bangkok: 
White Lotus Co. Ltd., 1993), Appendix 3: “About Tou Samouth", 
pp.222-224.
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